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(56) Documents Cited:
None

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
(58) Field of Search:
Other: No search performed: Section 17(5)(b)

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(54) Abstract Title: Secure, decentralised and anonymous peer-to-peer network

(57) This invention is a network that is defined by its novel approach to privacy, security and freedom for its users. Privacy by allowing access anonymously, security by encrypting and obfuscating resources and freedom by allowing users to anonymously and irrefutably be seen as genuine individuals on the network and to communicate with other users with total security and to securely access resources that are both their own and those that are shared by others with them. Further, this invention comprises a system of self healing data, secure messaging and a voting system to allow users to dictate the direction of development of the network, whereby adoption or denial of proposed add-ons to the network will be decided. System incompatibilities and security breaches on networks and the Internet are addressed by this invention where disparity and tangents of development have had an undue influence. The functional mechanisms that this invention provides will restore open communications and worry-free access in a manner that is very difficult to infect with viruses or cripple through denial of service attacks and spam messaging, plus, it will provide a foundation where vendor lock-in need not be an issue. Possible features include a distributed or peer-to-peer system which provides: secure communications; data storage and shared resources; anonymous backing-up and restoration of data; sharing of private files and secure data in a decentralized manner; anonymous authentication of users; transaction approval based on digital currency; and CPU sharing via anonymous voting.

Figure 5 - Data Assurance Event Sequence






Figure 1a - maidsafe.net associations

Figure 1b - maidsafe.net associations





Figure 1c – maidsafe.net associations





Figure 1d – maidsafe.net associations





Figure 1e – maidsafe.net associations







Figure 1f – maidsafe.net associations



11 08 08




Figure 1g – malsafe.net associations





Figure 1h – malsafe.net associations

Figure 1i - maidsafe.net associations





Figure 2 – Self Authentication Detail




Figure 3 – Peer to Peer Schematic





Figure 4 – Authentication Flowchart




Figure 5 – Data Assurance Event Sequence





Figure 6 – Chunking Event Sequence





Figure 6 – Chunking Event Sequence







Figure 7 – Chunking Example

Figure 8 – Self Healing Event Sequence





Figure 9 – Peer Ranking Event Sequence




Figure 10 – Duplicate Removal Event Sequence






Figure 11 – Perpetual Data







Figure 12 – Chunk Checks





Figure 13 – Storage of Additional Chunks

Figure 14 – Self Healing Event Sequence







Figure 15 – Aput







Figure 16 - Aforget





Figure 17 – Self Encrypting Files





Figure 18 – Shared Access to Private Files






Figure 19 - ms Messenger

Figure 20 – Worldwide Voting



STATEMENT OF INVENTION:

19 An issue with today's networks is a combination of vendor lock in,
20 imposed vendor based controls and lack of standards. The present
21 invention allows users to take charge of a new global network in a
22 manner that will maintain effectiveness and promote the setting and
23 attaining of common goals.

24 Another issue with today's networks is the security and privacy of data,
25 this invention allows a secure private and free network where users can
26 enjoy an efficiently managed working environment that presents a
27 guaranteed level of private and securely protected activity.

28 Also today, many computer resources are underutilised to a great
29 degree, including disk space, memory, processing power and any other
30 attached resources, this is inefficient and environmentally detrimental.
31 The present invention seeks to maximise these resources and share
32 them globally to people who purchase them or to people or
33 organisations who are deemed appropriate to benefit from them, such
34 as children in poorer countries, science labs etc. Allocation from these
35 resource pools, together with other resources, will be decided by the
36 users of the system.

BACKGROUND:

37 Digital data is often stored on the hard disks of individual PCs which
38 invariably have memory and operational overhead restrictions. Storage
39 on distributed systems such as the internet is also possible but requires
40 specific storage servers to be available. In addition to these physical
41 systems, data management elements such as security, repair,
42 encryption, authentication, anonymity and mapping etc. are required to
43 ensure successful data transactions and management via the Internet.

44 Systems of messaging and voting exist today but do not allow either
45 authentication on what was voted for or on line anonymity. There have
46 been some attempts as listed below, but none of these systems operate
47 as maidsafe.net does.

48 Listed below is some prior art for these individual elements, of which we
49 have analysed and rejected as true prior art, where necessary we
50 indicate why it is not prior art for our invention:

51 ***PERPETUAL DATA***

52 Most perpetual data generation is allocated with time & calendar etc.
53 (US62669563, JP2001100633). This is not related to this current
54 invention as we have no relation to calendaring, which demonstrates
55 perpetual generation time related data. However, External devices as
56 communication terminal (JP2005057392) (this is a hardware device not
57 related to this present invention) have been used for plurality of packet
58 switching to allow perpetual hand-off of roaming data between networks
59 and battery pack (EP0944232) has been used to around-the-clock
60 accessibility of customer premises equipment interconnected to a
61 broadband network is enhanced by perpetual mode operation of a
62 broadband network interface. In addition, perpetual data storage and
63 retrieval in reliable manner in peer to peer or distributed network The
64 only link here is these devices are connected to Internet connections
65 but otherwise presents no prior art.

66 ***DATABASES & DATA STORAGE METHODS***

67 Patents W09637837, TW223167B, US6760756 and US7099898
68 describe methods of data replication and retention of data during failure.
69 Patent WO200505060625 discloses method of secure interconnection
70 when failure occurs.

71 ***AUTHENTICATION***

72 Authentication servers are for user and data transaction authentication
73 e.g. JP2005311545 which describe a system wherein the application of
74 'a digital seal' to electronic documents conforms to the Electronic
75 Signature Act. This is similar to the case of signing paper documents
76 but uses the application of an electronic signature through an electronic
77 seal authentication system. The system includes: client computers, to
78 each of which a graphics tablet is connected; an electronic seal
79 authentication server and a PKI authentication server, plus the
80 electronic seal authentication server. US2004254894 discloses an
81 automated system for the confirmed efficient authentication of an
82 anonymous subscriber's profile data in this case.

83 JP2005339247 describes a server based one time ID system and uses
84 a portable terminal. US2006136317 discloses bank drop down boxes
85 and suggests stronger protection by not transmitting any passwords or
86 IDs. Patent US2006126848 discloses a server centric and deals with a
87 one time password or authentication phrase and is not for use on a
88 distributed network. Patent US2002194484 discloses a distributed
89 networks where all chunks are not individually verified and where the
90 manifest is only re-computed after updates to files and hashes are
91 applied and are for validation only.

92 ***SELF-AUTHENTICATION***

93 This is mostly used in biometric (WO2006069158). System for
94 generating a patch file from an old version of data which consists of a
95 series of elements and a new version of data which also consists of a
96 series of elements US2006136514). Authentication servers (therefore
97 not a distributed networking principle as per this invention) are
98 commonly used (JP2006107316, US2005273603, EP1548979).
99 However, server and client exchange valid certificates can be used
100 (US2004255037). Instead of server, uses of information exchange
101 system (semantic information) by participant for authentication can be

102 used (JP2004355358), again this semantic information is stored and
103 referenced unlike this present invention.

104 Concepts of identity-based cryptography and threshold secret sharing
105 provides for a distributed key management and authentication. Without
106 any assumption of pre-fixed trust relationship between nodes, the ad
107 hoc network works in a self-organizing way to provide the key
108 generation and key management service, which effectively solves the
109 problem of single point of failure in the traditional public key
110 infrastructure (PKI)-supported system (US2006023887). Authenticating
111 involves encryption keys for validation (WO2005055162) These are
112 validated against known users unlike the present invention. Also, for
113 authentication external housing are used (WO2005034009). All of
114 these systems require a lost or (whether distributed or not) record of
115 authorised users and pass phrases or certificates and therefore do not
116 represent prior art.

117 Ranking, hashing for authentication can be implemented step-by-step
118 and empirical authentication of devices upon digital authentication
119 among a plurality of devices. Each of a plurality of authentication
120 devices can unidirectionally generate a hash value of a low experience
121 rank from a hash value of a high experience rank, and receive a set of
122 high experience rank and hash value in accordance with an experience.
123 In this way, the authentication devices authenticate each other's
124 experience ranks (US2004019788). This is a system of hashing access
125 against known identities and providing a mechanism of effort based
126 access. This present invention does not rely or use such mechanisms.

127 ***QUICK ENCIPHERING***

128 This is another method for authentication (JP2001308845). Self-
129 verifying certificate for computer system, uses private and public keys –
130 no chunking but for trusted hardware subsystems (US2002080973) this
131 is a mechanism of self signing certificates for authentication, again

132 useful for effort based computing but not used in this present invention.
133 Other authentication modes are, device for exchanging packets of
134 information (JP2001186186), open key certificate management data
135 (JP10285156), and certification for authentication (WO96139210).
136 Authentication for Peer to Peer system is demonstrated by digital rights
137 management (US2003120928). Digital rights management and CSC
138 (part of that patent s a DRM container) issues which are based on
139 ability to use rather than gaining access to network or resources and
140 therefore not prior art.

141 Known self-healing techniques are divided broadly into two classes.
142 One is a centralized control system that provides overall rerouting
143 control from the central location of a network. In this approach, the
144 rerouting algorithm and the establishing of alarm collection times
145 become increasingly complex as the number of failed channels
146 increases, and a substantial amount of time will be taken to collect
147 alarm signals and to transfer rerouting information should a large
148 number of channels of a multiplexed transmission system fail. The other
149 is a distributed approach in which the rerouting functions are provided
150 by distributed points of the network. The following papers on distributed
151 rerouting approach have been published: (these are all related to self
152 healing but from a network pathway perspective and therefore are not
153 prior art for this invention which deals with data or data chunks self
154 healing mechanisms.

155 Document 1: W. D. Grover, "The Selfhealing Network", Proceedings of
156 Globecom '87, November 1987.

157 Document 2: H. C. Yang and S. Hasegawa, "Fitness: Failure
158 Immunization Technology For Network Service Survivability",
159 Proceedings of Globecom '88, December 1988.

160 Document 3: H. R. Amirazizi, "Controlling Synchronous Networks With
161 Digital Cross-Connect Systems", Proceedings of Globecom '88,
162 December 1988.

163 Document 1 is concerned with a restoration technique for failures in a
164 single transmission system, and Document 2 relates to a "multiple-
165 wave" approach in which route-finding packets are broadcast in multiple
166 wave fashion in search of a maximum bandwidth until alternate routes
167 having the necessary bandwidth are established. One shortcoming of
168 this multiple wave approach is that it takes a long recovery time.
169 Document 3 also relates to fault recovery for single transmission
170 systems and has a disadvantage in that route-finding packets tend to
171 form a loop and hence a delay is likely to be encountered.

172 ***SELF-HEALING***

173 This is demonstrated by a system and method of secure and
174 tamperproof remote files over distributed system, redirects integrity
175 check fail data to install module for repairing (WO20566133) This
176 discloser relies on testing data from a central location and not
177 distributed chunking as with the present invention. It also does not allow
178 for multiple access and sharing of the testing and ownership of chunks.
179 Server are used for self-healing (US2004177156), effectively removing
180 these from a prior art claim. Self-repairing is conducted by data overlay
181 is built as a data structure on top of a logical space defined by a
182 distributed hash table (DHT) in a peer-to-peer (P2P) network
183 environment (US2005187946) This Microsoft patent is a patent to DT
184 networks which is peculiar as these exist in some quantity and have
185 done for many years, however there is no claim made to self repair data
186 as is in this present invention but to self repair data storage locations
187 (i.e. in p2p terms find nearest node). This is not self healing data but
188 merely a description of a typical DHT and the availability of routes to
189 data and providing multiple routes. This is not prior art for this present

190 inventions but very likely not enforceable as there are many cases of
191 prior art against this Microsoft patent.

192 Identical communicating node elements are used for power delivery
193 network for self-repairing (US2005043858). Self-healing also relates to
194 distributed data systems and, in particular, to providing high availability
195 during performance of a cluster topology self-healing process within a
196 distributed data system cluster. A cluster topology self-healing process
197 may be performed in response to a node failure in order to replicate a
198 data set stored on a failed node from a first node storing another copy
199 of the data set to a second non-failed node (US2004066741). An
200 apparatus and method for self-healing of software may rely on a
201 distribution object in a directory services of a network to provide data for
202 controlling distribution of software and installation of files associated
203 therewith (US6023586). A technique for the substantially instantaneous
204 self-healing of digital communications networks. Digital data streams
205 from each of N nearby sources are combined and encoded to produce
206 N+M coded data streams using a coding algorithm. The N+M coded
207 data streams are then each transmitted over a separate long haul
208 communications link to a decoder where any N of the N+M coded data
209 streams can be decoded uniquely to produce the original N data streams
210 (EP0420648. To provide a self-healing communications network which
211 can be recovered from a failure in a short period of time even if the
212 failure has occurred in a multiplexed transmission line (US5235599)
213 The above patents and inventions are based on clustering technology
214 and not distributed computing or Internet based computing. The cluster
215 is simply many machines connected to create a larger machine. It is
216 treated as a single machine with known user access etc. and not prior
217 art to this present invention. The N + M coding schemes discussed are
218 patents based on digital communications and reception links and are
219 not related to this present invention although at first glance they appear
220 to have the same language in areas.

221 Attempts to moving towards attaining some limited aspects of self-
222 encryption are demonstrated by

223 (a) US2003053053625 discloser shows limitation of asymmetrical and
224 symmetrical encryption algorithms, and particularly not requiring
225 generating a key stream from symmetric keys, nor requiring any time
226 synchronising, with minimal computational complexity and capable of
227 operated at high speed. A serial data stream to be securely transmitted
228 is first demultiplexed into a plurality N of encryptor input data stream.
229 The input data slices are created which have cascade of stages, include
230 mapping & delay function to generate output slices. These are
231 transmitted though a transmission channel. Decryptor applies inverse
232 step of cascade of stages, equalizing delay function and mapping to
233 generate output data slices. The output data streams are multiplexed.
234 The encryptor and decryptor require no synchronizing or timing and
235 operate in simple stream fashion. N:N mapping does not require
236 expensive arithmetic and implemented in table lookup. This provides
237 robust security and efficiency. A significant difference between this
238 approach and prior cipher method is that the session key is used to
239 derive processing parameters (tables and delays) of the encryptor and
240 decryptor in advance of data transmission. Instead of being used to
241 generate a key stream at real-time rates. Algorithm for generating
242 parameters from a session key is disclosed This patent is based on
243 data communications and encrypting data in transit automatically and
244 decrypting automatically at the remote end, this is not related to this
245 present invention.

246 (b) US2002184485 discloser addresses secure communication, by
247 encryption of message (SSDO-self signing document objects), such
248 that only known recipient in possession of a secret key can read the
249 message and verification of message, such that text and origin of
250 message can be verified. Both capabilities and built into message that
251 can be transmitted over internet and decrypted or verified by computer

252 implementing a document representation language that supports
253 dynamic content e.g. any standard web browser, such that elaborate
254 procedures to ensure transmitting and receiving computers have same
255 software are no longer necessary. Encrypted message or one encoded
256 for verification can carry within itself all information needed to specify
257 the algorithm needed for decryption. This is a patent describing a key
258 pair encryption and validation of same software. This is not used by the
259 present invention where key pairs are used for asymmetric encryption
260 of some data but this is used with the RSA (now out of patent)
261 encryption ciphers and not in the manner described above which is
262 more for validation.

263 A range of limited methods for self-encryption have been developed
264 e.g. system for randomisation-encryption of digital data sequence with
265 freely selectable (EP1182777) (this is a key generating patent and not
266 self encryption as this current invention shows), use of code key
267 calculation encryption mode but using server (CN1658553), uses self-
268 test mode (US6028527), encryption system for randomising data signal
269 for transmission (not storing) and reproducing information at a receiver
270 (US4760598), uses private encryption keys into components and
271 sending them to trusted agents (rather than self encryption as per this
272 present invention) (JP2005328574), cryptographic system with key
273 escrow feature, rather than self encryption as described in this present
274 invention (US6009177), steps of first encoding one set of message
275 signal with first keyed transformation (US6385316), self-modifying fail-
276 safe password system (US6370649), time-based encrypting method
277 involves splitting voice signal into time intervals, random permutations
278 etc. (RU2120700), uses hardware decryption module (HDM)
279 (US2003046568), realizing data security storage and algorithm storage
280 by means of semiconductor memory device (US2006149972), use
281 certificate from certificate server (US20020428080), use certificates for
282 encryption of communications (EP1422865), use self-service terminal
283 for encryption and transmission of data (US2006020788), method for

284 implementing security communication by encryption algorithm
285 (US2005047597), method of data encryption – block encryption variable
286 length (BEVL) encoding, overcomes weakness of CMEA algorithm)
287 (US2004190712), encrypted cipher code for secure data transmission
288 (CN1627681) method and system for encrypting streamed data
289 employing fast set-up single use key and self-synchronising
290 (US2005232424) and for security, generate MAC for data integrity,
291 placing electronic signature, use TREM software module
292 (US2004199768)

293 None of the above systems utilise self encryption as per the present
294 invention and are related to voice and data transmissions, or include
295 hardware controllers or servers.

296 ***PRIVATE SHARED FILES***

297 US6859812 discloses a system and method for differentiating private
298 and shared files, where clustered computers share a common storage
299 resource, Network-Attached Storage (NAS) and Storage Area Network
300 (SAN), therefore not distributed as in this present invention. US5313646
301 has a system which provides a copy-on-write feature which protects the
302 integrity of the shared files by automatically copying a shared file into
303 user's private layer when the user attempts to modify a shared file in a
304 back layer, this is a different technology again and relies on user
305 knowledge – not anonymous. WO02095545 discloses a system using a
306 server for private file sharing which is not anonymous.

307 ***DISTRIBUTED NETWORK SHARED MAPS***

308 A computer system having plural nodes interconnected by a common
309 broadcast bus is disclosed by US5117350. US5423034 shows how
310 each file and level in the directory structure has network access
311 privileges. The file directory structure generator and retrieval tool have a
312 document locator module that maps the directory structure of the files
313 stored in the memory to a real world hierarchical file structure of files.

314 Therefore not distributed across public networks or anonymous or self
315 encrypting, the present inventions does not use broadcasting in this
316 manner.

317 **SECURITY**

318 Today systems secure transactions through encryption technologies
319 such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Digital Certificates, and Public
320 Key Encryption technologies. The systems today address the hackers
321 through technologies such as Firewalls and Intrusion Detection
322 systems. The merchant certification programs are designed to ensure
323 the merchant has adequate inbuilt security to reasonably assure the
324 consumer their transaction will be secure. These systems also ensure
325 that the vendor will not incur a charge back by attempting to verify the
326 consumer through secondary validation systems such as password
327 protection and eventually, Smart Card technology.

328 Network firewalls are typically based on packet filtering which is limited
329 in principle, since the rules that judge which packets to accept or reject
330 are based on subjective decisions. Even VPNs (Virtual Private
331 Networks) and other forms of data encryption, including digital
332 signatures, are not really safe because the information can be stolen
333 before the encryption process, as default programs are allowed to do
334 whatever they like to other programs or to their data files or to critical
335 files of the operating system. This is done by (CA247150) automatically
336 creating an unlimited number of Virtual Environments (VEs) with virtual
337 sharing of resources, so that the programs in each VE think that they
338 are alone on the computer. The present invention takes a totally
339 different approach to security and obviates the requirement of much of
340 the above particularly CA2471505.

341 US6185316 discloses security via fingerprint imaging testing bit of code
342 using close false images to deter fraudulent copying, this is different

343 from the present invention in that we store no images at all and certainly
344 not in a database.

345 ***SECURITY & STORAGE SYSTEMS***

346 There are currently several types of centralised file storage systems
347 that are used in business environments. One such system is a server-
348 tethered storage system that communicates with the end users over a
349 local area network, or LAN. The end users send requests for the
350 storage and retrieval of files over the LAN to a file server, which
351 responds by controlling the storage and/or retrieval operations to
352 provide or store the requested files. While such a system works well for
353 smaller networks, there is a potential bottleneck at the interface
354 between the LAN and the file storage system.

355 Another type of centralised storage system is a storage area network,
356 which is a shared, dedicated high-speed network for connecting storage
357 resources to the servers. While the storage area networks are generally
358 more flexible and scalable in terms of providing end user connectivity to
359 different server-storage environments, the systems are also more
360 complex. The systems require hardware, such as gateways, routers,
361 switches, and are thus costly in terms of hardware and associated
362 software acquisition.

363 Yet another type of storage system is a network attached storage
364 system in which one or more special-purpose servers handle file
365 storage over the LAN.

366 Another file storage system utilizes distributed storage resources
367 resident on various nodes, or computers, operating on the system,
368 rather than a dedicated centralised storage system. These are
369 distributed systems, with the clients communicating peer-to-peer to
370 determine which storage resources to allocate to particular files,
371 directories and so forth. These systems are organized as global file

372 stores that are physically distributed over the computers on the system.
373 A global file store is a monolithic file system that is indexed over the
374 system as, for example, a hierarchical directory. The nodes in the
375 systems use Byzantine agreements to manage file replications, which
376 are used to promote file availability and/or reliability. The Byzantine
377 agreements require rather lengthy exchanges of messages and thus
378 are inefficient and even impractical for use in a system in which many
379 modifications to files are anticipated. US200211434 shows a peer-to-
380 peer storage system which describes a storage coordinator that
381 centrally manages distributed storage resources. The difference here is
382 the requirement of a storage broker, making this not fully distributed.
383 The present invention also differs in that the present invention has no
384 central resources for any of the system and we also encrypt data for
385 security as well as the self healing aspect of our system which is again
386 distributed.

387 US7010532 discloses improved access to information stored on a
388 storage device. A plurality of first nodes and a second node are coupled
389 to one another over a communications pathway, the second node being
390 coupled to the storage device for determining meta data including block
391 address maps to file data in the storage device.

392 JP2003273860 discloses a method of enhancing the security level
393 during access of an encrypted document including encrypted content. A
394 document access key for decrypting an encrypted content within an
395 encrypted document is stored in a management device, and a user
396 device wishing to access the encrypted document transmits its user ID
397 and a document identification key for the encrypted document, which
398 are encrypted by a private key, together with a public key to the
399 management device to request transmission of the document access
400 key. Differing from this invention in that it never transmit user id or login
401 in the network at all. Also it does not require management devices of
402 any form.

403 JP2002185444 discloses improves security in networks and the
404 certainty for satisfying processing requests. In the case of user
405 registration, a print server forms a secret key and a public key, and
406 delivers the public key to a user terminal, which forms a user ID, a
407 secret key and a public key, encrypts the user ID and the public key by
408 using the public key, and delivers them to the print server. This is not
409 linked at all to this invention and is a system for a PKI infrastructure for
410 certificate access to network nodes.

411 The private and public keys of users are used in US6925182, and are
412 encrypted with a symmetric algorithm by using individual user
413 identifying keys and are stored on a network server making it a different
414 proposition from a distributed network

415 US2005091234 describes data chunking system which divides data into
416 predominantly fixed-sized chunks such that duplicate data may be
417 identified. This is associated with storing and transmitting data for
418 distributed network. US2006206547 discloses a centralised storage
419 system, whilst US2005004947 discloses a new PC based file system.
420 US2005256881 discloses data storage in a place defined by a path
421 algorithm. This is a server based duplicate removal and not necessarily
422 encrypting data, unlike the present invention which does both and
423 requires no servers.

424 ***SECURITY & ENCRYPTION***

425 Common email communications of sensitive information is in plain text
426 and is subject to being read by unauthorized code on the senders
427 system, during transit and by unauthorized code on the receiver's
428 system. Where there is a high degree of confidentiality required, a
429 combination of hardware and software secures data.

430 A high degree of security to a computer or several computers
431 connected to the Internet or a LAN as disclosed in US2002099666.
432 Hardware system is used which consists of a processor module, a
433 redundant non-volatile memory system, such as dual disk drives, and
434 multiple communications interfaces. This type of security system must
435 be unlocked by a pass phrase to access data, and all data is
436 transparently encrypted, stored, archived and available for encrypted
437 backup. A system for maintaining secure communications, file transfer
438 and document signing with PKI, and a system for intrusion monitoring
439 and system integrity checks are provided, logged and selectively
440 alarmed in a tamper-proof, time-certain manner.

441 ***ENCRYPTION***

442 WO2005093582 discloses method of encryption where data is secured
443 in the receiving node via private tag for anonymous network browsing.
444 However, other numerous encryption methods are also available such
445 as (i) implantation of Reed Solomon algorithm (WO02052787), which
446 ensures data is coded in parabolic fashion for self-repairing and
447 storage, (ii) storage involves incremental backup (WO02052787), (ii)
448 uses stenographic (US2006177094), (iv) use cipher keys (CN1620005),
449 encryption for non text (US2006107048) and US2005108240 discloses
450 user keys and randomly generated leaf node keys. The present
451 invention uses none of these methods of encryption and in particular
452 ensures all chunks are unique and do not point to another for security
453 (an issue with Reed Solomon and $N + K$ implementations of parabolic
454 coding)

455 ***ENCRYPTED DOCUMENT SIGNING***

456 WO2005060152 discloses a digital watermark representing the one-
457 way hash is embedded in a signature document is used for electronic
458 signing. Mostly encrypted document signing is associated with legal
459 documents, e.g. on-line notary etc. e.g. US2006161781, signature
460 verification (US6381344). WO0182036 discloses a system and method

461 for signing, storing, and authenticating electronic documents using
462 public key cryptography. The system comprises a document service
463 computer cluster connected to user computers, document owner server
464 computers, and registration computers via a network such as for
465 example, the internet or the world wide web. WO0013368 discloses
466 both the data object and the signature data are encrypted. None of
467 these systems are designed or allow for distributed signing networks
468 unlike the present invention.

469 US6912660 discloses a method for parallel approval of an electronic
470 document. A document authentication code (DAC 0) is generated,
471 linked to the original document. Subsequent approvals of the document
472 generate a DAC x related to that specific approval. This is not linked to
473 the present invention as it's a document approval system – i.e. one
474 which allows a document to have multiple signatories to authenticate
475 approval, the present invention does not do this at all.

476 US6098056 discloses a system and method for controlling access
477 rights to and security of digital content in a distributed information
478 system, e.g., Internet. The network includes at least one server coupled
479 to a storage device for storing the limited access digital content
480 encrypted using a random-generated key, known as a Document
481 Encryption Key (DEK). The DEK is further encrypted with the server's
482 public key, using a public/private key pair algorithm and placed in a
483 digital container stored in a storage device and including as a part of the
484 meta-information which is in the container. The client's workstation is
485 coupled to the server (one of the many difference's from the present
486 invention) for acquiring the limited access digital content under the
487 authorized condition. A Trusted Information Handler (TIH) is validated
488 by the server after the handler provides a data signature and type of
489 signing algorithm to transaction data descriptive of the purchase
490 agreement between the client and the owner. After the handler has
491 authenticated, the server decrypts the encrypted DEK with its private

17

492 key and re-encrypts the DEK with the handler's public key ensuring that
493 only the information handler can process the information. The encrypted
494 DEK is further encrypted with the client's public key personalizing the
495 digital content to the client. The client's program decrypts the DEK with
496 his private key and passes it along with the encrypted content to the
497 handler which decrypts the DEK with his private key and proceeds to
498 decrypt the content for displaying to the client.

499 US5436972 discloses a method for preventing inadvertent betrayal by a
500 trustee of escrowed digital secrets. After unique identification data
501 describing a user has been entered into a computer system, the user is
502 asked to select a password to protect the system. US5557518 discloses
503 a system to open electronic commerce using trusted agents.

504 US5557765 discloses a system and method for data recovery. An
505 encrypting user encrypts a method using a secret storage key (KS) and
506 attaches a Data Recovery Field (DRF), including an Access Rule Index
507 (ARI) and the KS to the encrypted message.

508 US5590199, discloses a system for authenticating and authorizing a
509 user to access services on a heterogeneous computer network. The
510 system includes at least one workstation and one authorization server
511 connected to each other through a network.

512 US2006123227 and WO0221409 describe trust based effort measuring
513 techniques to validate signatures without the requirement for a central
514 body or central messaging entity. This is an interesting new concept but
515 not used in the current invention.

516 ***SELF-ENCRYPTION***

517 Attempts to moving towards attaining some limited aspects of self-
518 encryption are demonstrated by:

519 (a) US2003053053625 discloses limitation of asymmetrical and
520 symmetrical encryption algorithms, and particularly not requiring
521 generation of a key stream from symmetric keys, nor requiring any time
522 synchronizing, with minimal computational complexity and capable of
523 operating at high speed. A serial data stream to be securely transmitted
524 is first demultiplexed into a plurality N of encryptor input data stream.
525 The input data slices are created which have a cascade of stages,
526 include mapping & delay functions to generate output slices. These are
527 transmitted though a transmission channel. Decryptor applies inverse
528 step of cascade of stages, equalizing delay function and mapping to
529 generate output data slices. The output data streams are multiplexed.
530 The encryptor and decryptor require no synchronizing or timing and
531 operate in simple stream fashion. N:N mapping does not require
532 expensive arithmetic and implemented in table lookup. This provides
533 robust security and efficiency. A significant difference between this
534 approach and prior cipher method is that the session key is used to
535 derive processing parameters (tables and delays) of the encryptor and
536 decryptor in advance of data transmission. Instead of being used to
537 generate a key stream at real-time rates. Algorithm for generating
538 parameters from a session key is disclosed. This is a data
539 communications network and not related to current invention.

540 (b) US2002184485 addresses secure communication, by encryption of
541 message (SSDO-self signing document objects), such that only known
542 recipient in possession of a secret key can read the message and
543 verification of message, such that text and origin of message can be
544 verified. Both capabilities are built into message that can be transmitted
545 over internet and decrypted or verified by computer implementing a
546 document representation language that supports dynamic content e.g.
547 any standard web browser, such that elaborate procedures to ensure
548 transmitting and receiving computers have same software are no longer
549 necessary. Encrypted message or one encoded for verification can

550 carry within itself all information needed to specify the algorithm needed
551 for decryption.

552 ***ANONYMOUS TRANSACTIONS & INTERFACES***

553 US2004117303 discloses an anonymous payment system and is
554 designed to enable users of the Internet and other networks to
555 exchange cash for electronic currency that may be used to conduct
556 commercial transactions world-wide through public networks.

557 US2005289086 discloses an anonymity for web registration which
558 allows payment system. US2002073318 describe use of servers where
559 the system is effort based trust on combination of anonymous keys to
560 transact and public key to buy non anonymous credits. Each of these is
561 a centrally controlled system and do not provide a mechanism to
562 transfer credits or cash to anonymous accounts. Many of these actually
563 require user registration on a web site.

564 US2003163413 discloses a method of conducting anonymous
565 transactions over the Internet to protect consumers from identity fraud.
566 The process involves the formation of a Secure Anonymous
567 Transaction Engine to enable any consumer operating over an open
568 network, such as the Internet to browse, collect information, research,
569 shop, and purchase anonymously. The Secure Anonymous Transaction
570 Engine components provide a highly secure connection between the
571 consumer and the provider of goods or services over the Internet by
572 emulating an in store anonymous cash transaction although conducted
573 over the Internet. This again is server based and requires user
574 registration.

575 With regard to cash transfers, a truly anonymous purchase is one in
576 which the purchaser and seller are unknown to each other, the
577 purchase process is not witnessed by any other person, and the
578 exchange medium is cash. Such transactions are not the norm. Even
579 cash transactions in a place of business are typically witnessed by

580 salespersons and other customers or bystanders, if not recorded on
581 videotape as a routine security measure. On the other hand, common
582 transaction media such as payment by personal check or credit card
583 represent a clear loss of anonymity, since the purchaser's identity as
584 well as other personal information is attached to the transaction (e. g.,
585 driver's license number, address, telephone number, and any
586 information attached to the name, credit card, or driver's license
587 number). Thus, although a cash transaction is not a truly anonymous
588 purchase, it provides a considerably higher degree of purchase
589 anonymity than a transaction involving a personal check or credit card,
590 and affords perhaps the highest degree of purchase anonymity
591 achievable in the present. The use of cash, however, has limitations,
592 especially in the context of electronic commerce.

593 WO0203293 discloses methods, systems, and devices for performing
594 transactions via a communications network such as the Internet while
595 preserving the anonymity of at least one of the parties. A transaction
596 device is linked to an anonymous account to allow a party to preserve
597 an equivalent level of anonymity as the use of cash when making a
598 transaction at a traditional brick-and-mortar business as well as in the
599 virtual world of electronic commerce. As such, the transaction device
600 may be considered equivalent to a flexible and versatile cash wallet. In
601 this way, combines the desirable features of cash (anonymity, security,
602 and acceptance) and of electronic commerce (speed, ease, and
603 convenience). This like the next invention requires a hardware based
604 device unlike the present invention.

605 EP0924667 is based on a distributed payment system for cash-free
606 payment with purse chip cards using the Net. The system consists of a
607 client system which is, for example, installed at the customer site and a
608 server system which is, for example, installed at the dealer.

609 US6299062 discloses an electronic cash system for performing an
610 electronic transaction using an electronic cash, comprises at least one
611 user apparatus each capable of using the electronic cash; an
612 authentication centre apparatus, for receiving a user identity
613 information, a corresponding public key along with a certificate issue
614 request from one of the user apparatus and for issuing a certificate for
615 the user apparatus's public key after confirming the identity of the
616 corresponding user. This again requires hardware and user registration
617 to the system

618 US2004172539 discloses method for generating an electronic receipt in
619 a communication system providing a public key infrastructure,
620 comprising the steps of receiving by a second party a request message
621 from a first party, the request message comprising a transaction request
622 and a first public key based on a secret owned by the first party and
623 wherein the secret is associated with at least the secret of a further
624 public key of the first party. (server based)

625 WO0219075 discloses publicly-accessible, independent, and secure
626 host internet site that provides a downloadable agent program to any
627 anonymous client PC, with the agent program generating within the
628 client PC a registration checksum based upon the document to be
629 registered.

630 ***ANONYMOUS VOTING***

631 US2003159032 discloses automatically generating unique, one-way
632 compact and mnemonic voter credentials that support privacy and
633 security services. Discloses any voting system, voting organization, or
634 voting game wherein participants need to be anonymous and/or must
635 exchange secrets and/or make collective decisions. US2002077887
636 (requires registration and initial knowledge of the person who receives
637 the ballot, and requires a server) discloses an architecture that enables
638 anonymous electronic voting over the Internet using public key



639 technologies. Using a separate public key/private key pair, the voting
640 mediator validates the voting ballot request. (Hardware device)
641 DE10325491 discloses that the voting method has an electronic ballot
642 box for collecting encoded electronic voting slips and an electronic box
643 for collecting the decoded voting slips. The voter fills out his voting slip
644 at a computer and authenticates his vote with an anonymous signature
645 setting unit.

646 US2004024635 (hardware based, requiring servers) discloses a
647 distributed network voting system; a server for processing votes cast
648 over a distributed computing network. The server includes memory
649 storage, data identification, an interested party and a processor in
650 communication with the memory. The processor operates to present an
651 issue to a user of a client computer, receive a vote on the issue from
652 the user, and transmit data relating to the vote to the interested party
653 based upon the data identifying the interested party stored in the
654 memory. The processor further operates to generate a vote status
655 cookie when the user submits the vote, transmit the vote status cookie
656 to the client for storage, and transmit data to the user that prompts the
657 user to provide authentication data relating to the user, who then
658 receives authentication data relating to the user and authenticate the
659 user based on the authentication data.

660 WO03098172 discloses modular monitoring and protection system with
661 distributed voting logic.

662 ***MAPPING***

663 US2006112243 discloses a hard disk mapping where the data is copied
664 locally and then the machine decides it can use either copy and
665 whether or not update the other one. EP1049291 discloses a remote
666 device monitoring using pre-calculated maps of equipment locations.
667 These are hardware based data mapping systems and not related.

668 As above prior art highlights separate existence of elements such as
669 storage, security, repairing, encryption, authentication, anonymity,
670 voting and mapping etc. for data transaction and storage via internet.
671 There is some limited linkage between a few of the individual elements,
672 but none are inter-linked to provide comprehensive solution for secure
673 data storage and transmittance via internet utilisation. The inventions
674 below list solutions to address the vacuum and provide an inexpensive
675 solution for secure internet data storage and transmittance with other
676 added benefits.

Summary of Invention

677 The main embodiments of this invention are as follows:

678 A system of sharing access to private files which has the functional
679 elements of:

- 680 1. Perpetual Data
- 681 2. Self encryption
- 682 3. Data Maps
- 683 4. Anonymous Authentication
- 684 5. Shared access to Private files
- 685 6. ms Messenger
- 686 7. Cyber Cash
- 687 8. Worldwide Voting System

688 ... with the additionally linked functional elements of:

- 689 1. Peer Ranking
- 690 2. Self Healing
- 691 3. Security Availability
- 692 4. Storage and Retrieval
- 693 5. Duplicate Removal
- 694 6. Storing Files
- 695 7. Chunking
- 696 8. Encryption / Decryption
- 697 9. Identify Chunks
- 698 10. Revision Control
- 699 11. Identify Data with Very Small File
- 700 12. Logon
- 701 13. Provide Key Pairs
- 702 14. Validation
- 703 15. Create Map of Maps

- 704 16. Share Map
- 705 17. Provide Public ID
- 706 18. Encrypted Communications
- 707 19. Document Signing
- 708 20. Contract Conversations
- 709 21. Counterfeit Protection
- 710 22. Allow Selling of Machine Resources
- 711 23. Interface with Non-Anonymous Systems
- 712 24. Anonymous Transactions
- 713 25. Anonymity
- 714 26. Proven Individual
- 715 27. Validation of Vote Being Used
- 716 28. Distributed Controlled Voting

717 A distributed network system and product which provides:

- 718 a. secure communications
- 719 b. store data & share resources
- 720 c. anonymous backing and restoring data
- 721 d. share private files & secure data without using server
- 722 e. anonymous authentication of users
- 723 f. approve transaction based on digital currency
- 724 g. CPU sharing via anonymous voting system

725 A method of allowing users to securely store data and share resources
726 across a distributed network by utilising anonymously shared computer
727 resources.

728 A method to allow secure communications between users by utilising
729 public ID's linked to anonymous ID's to authenticate users as well as
730 allowing contract signed conversations.

731 A method to allow sharing and allocation of resources globally by
732 utilising effort based testing and anonymously authenticated users in a
733 global distributed network.

734 A method specifically to backup and restore data anonymously in a
735 distributed network with guarantees on integrity and recovery times..

736 A method to share private and secured data without the use of file
737 servers or any controlling body or centralised resource.

738 A method to approve the exchange of resources and other transactions
739 based on a digital currency which utilises links with non anonymous
740 payment systems.

741 A method to allow data to be described decoded and identified using
742 very small data map files.

743 A method to allow anonymous authentication of users on a network.

744 A method of above to allow sharing of CPU power globally and to
745 contribute to systems based on users input from a worldwide secure
746 and anonymous voting system.

747 A method where a person's computer operating system and related
748 computer program may be held on a removable disk (such as a USB
749 stick optionally with biometric recognition to evade keyloggers) and
750 used to boot any compatible computer with a known virus / trojan horse
751 free system to access their data remotely and securely without worrying
752 about the integrity of host machine they are using.

753 At least one computer program comprising instructions for causing at
754 least one computer to perform the method, system and product
755 according to any of above.

756

That at least one computer program of above embodied on a recording medium or read-only memory, store.

757

DESCRIPTION*Detailed Description:*

758 (References to IDs used in descriptions of the system's functionality)

759 **MID** – this is the base ID and is mainly used to store and forget files.
760 Each of these operations will require a signed request. Restoring may
761 simply require a request with an ID attached.

762 **PMID** – This is the proxy mid which is used to manage the receiving of
763 instructions to the node from any network node such as get/ put / forget
764 etc. This is a key pair which is stored on the node – if stolen the key pair
765 can be regenerated simply disabling the thief's stolen PMID – although
766 there's not much can be done with a PMID key pair.

767 **CID** – Chunk Identifier, this is simply the chunkid.KID message on the
768 net.

769 **TMID** – This is today's ID a one time ID as opposed to a one time
770 password. This is to further disguise users and also ensure that their MID
771 stays as secret as possible.

772 **MPID** – The maidsafe.net public ID. This is the ID to which users can add
773 their own name and actual data if required. This is the ID for messenger,
774 sharing, non anonymous voting and any other method that requires we
775 know the user.

776 **MAID** – this is basically the hash of and actual public key of the MID. this
777 ID is used to identify the user actions such as put / forget / get on the
778 maidsafe.net network. This allows a distributed PKI infrastructure to exist
779 and be automatically checked.

780 **KID** – Kademlia ID this can be randomly generated or derived from
781 known and preferably anonymous information such as an anonymous
782 public key hash as with the MAID.. In this case we use kademlia as the
783 example overlay network although this can be almost any network
784 environment at all.

785 **MSID** – maidsafe.net Share ID, an ID and key pair specifically created for
786 each share to allow users to interact with shares using a unique key not
787 related to their MID which should always be anonymous and separate.

Anonymous Authentication Description

788 Anonymous authentication relates to system authentication and, in
789 particular, authentication of users for accessing resources stored on a
790 distributed or peer-to-peer file system. Its aim is to preserve the
791 anonymity of the users and to provide secure and private storage of data
792 and shared resources for users on a distributed system. It is a method of
793 authenticating access to a distributed system comprising the steps of;

- 794 • Receiving a user identifier;
- 795 • Retrieving an encrypted validation record identified by the user
796 identifier;
- 797 • Decrypting the encrypted validation record so as to provide
798 decrypted information; and ...
- 799 • Authenticating access to data in the distributed system using the
800 decrypted information.

801 Receiving, retrieving and authenticating may be performed on a node in
802 the distributed system preferably separate from a node performing the
803 step of decrypting. The method further comprises the step of generating
804 the user identifier using a hash. Therefore, the user identifier may be
805 considered unique (and altered if a collision occurs) and suitable for

806 identifying unique validation records. The step of authenticating access
807 may preferably further comprise the step of digitally signing the user
808 identifier. This provides authentication that can be validated against
809 trusted authorities. The method further comprises the step of using the
810 signed user identifier as a session passport to authenticate a plurality of
811 accesses to the distributed system. This allows persistence of the
812 authentication for an extended session.

813 The step of decrypting preferably comprises decrypting an address in the
814 distributed system of a first chunk of data and the step of authenticating
815 access further comprises the step of determining the existence of the first
816 chunk at the address, or providing the location and names of specific
817 data elements in the network in the form of a data map as previously
818 describe. This efficiently combines the tasks of authentication and
819 starting to retrieve the data from the system. The method preferably
820 further comprises the step of using the content of the first chunk to obtain
821 further chunks from the distributed system. Additionally the decrypted
822 data from the additional chunks may contain a key pair allowing the user
823 at that stage to sign a packet sent to the network to validate them or
824 additionally may preferable self sign their own id.

825 Therefore, there is no need to have a potentially vulnerable record of the
826 file structure persisting in one place on the distributed system, as the
827 user's node constructs its database of file locations after logging onto the
828 system.

829 There is provided a distributed system comprising;

- 830 • a storage module adapted to store an encrypted validation record;
- 831 • a client node comprising a decryption module adapted to decrypt an
832 encrypted validation record so as to provide decrypted information;
- 833 and
- 834 • a verifying node comprising:

- 835 • a receiving module adapted to receive a user identifier;
- 836 • a retrieving module adapted to retrieve from the storage module an
- 837 encrypted validation record identified by the user identifier;
- 838 • a transmitting module adapted to transmit the encrypted validation
- 839 record to the client node; and
- 840 • an authentication module adapted to authenticate access to data in
- 841 the distributed file system using the decrypted information from the
- 842 client node.

843 The client node is further adapted to generate the user identifier using a
844 hash. The authentication module is further adapted to authenticate
845 access by digitally sign the user identifier. The signed user identifier is
846 used as a session passport to authenticate a plurality of accesses by the
847 client node to the distributed system. The decryption module is further
848 adapted to decrypt an address in the distributed system of a first chunk of
849 data from the validation record and the authentication module is further
850 adapted to authenticate access by determining the existence of the first
851 chunk at the address. The client node is further adapted to use the
852 content of the first chunk to obtain further authentication chunks from the
853 distributed system.

854 There is provided at least one computer program comprising program
855 instructions for causing at least one computer to perform. One computer
856 program is embodied on a recording medium or read-only memory,
857 stored in at least one computer memory, or carried on an electrical
858 carrier signal.

859 Additionally there is a check on the system to ensure the user is login
860 into a valid node (software package). This will preferably include the
861 ability of the system to check validity of the running maidsafe.net
862 software by running content hashing or preferably certificate checking of
863 the node and also the code itself.

Linked elements for maidsafe.net (Figure 1)

864 The maidsafe.net product invention consists of 8 individual inventions,
865 which collectively have 28 inter-linked functional elements, these are:.

866 The individual inventions are:

867 PT1 – Perpetual Data

868 PT2 – Self encryption

869 PT3 – Data Maps

870 PT4 – Anonymous Authentication

871 PT5 – Shared access to Private files

872 PT6 – ms Messenger

873 PT7 – Cyber Cash

874 PT8 – Worldwide Voting System

875 The inter-linked functional elements are:

876 P1 – Peer Ranking

877 P2 – Self Healing

878 P3 – Security Availability

879 P4 – Storage and Retrieval

880 P5 – Duplicate Removal

881 P6 – Storing Files

882 P7 – Chunking

883 P8 – Encryption / Decryption

884 P9 – Identify Chunks

885 P10 – Revision Control

886 P11 – Identify Data with Very Small File

887 P12 – Logon

888 P13 – Provide Key Pairs

889 P14 – Validation

890 P15 – Create Map of Maps

891	P16 – Share Map
892	P17 – Provide Public ID
893	P18 – Encrypted Communications
894	P19 – Document Signing
895	P20 – Contract Conversations
896	P21 – Counterfeit Prevention
897	P22 – Allow Selling of Machine Resources
898	P23 – Interface with Non-Anonymous Systems
899	P24 – Anonymous Transactions
900	P25 - Anonymity
901	P26 – Proven Individual
902	P27 – Validation of Vote Being Used
903	P28 – Distributed Controlled Voting
904	
905	(description of figure 1 here ****)
906	

Self Authentication Detail (Figure 2)

- 907 1. A computer program consisting of a user interface and a chunk server (a
908 system to process anonymous chunks of data) should be running, if not
909 they are started when user selects an icon or other means of starting the
910 program.
- 911 2. A user will input some data known to them such as a userid (random ID)
912 and PIN number in this case. These pieces of information may be
913 concatenated together and hashed to create a unique (which may be
914 confirmed via a search) identifier. In this case this is called the **MID**
915 (maidsafe.net ID)
- 916 3. A TMID (Today's MID) is retrieved from the network, the TMID is then
917 calculated as follows:

918 The TMID is a single use or single day ID that is constantly changed.
 919 This allows maidsafe.net to calculate the hash based on the user ID pin
 920 and another known variable which is calculable. For this variable we use
 921 a day variable for now and this is the number of days since epoch
 922 (01/01/1970). This allows for a new ID daily, which assists in maintaining
 923 the anonymity of the user. This TMID will create a temporary key pair to
 924 sign the database chunks and accept a challenge response from the
 925 holder of these db chunks. After retrieval and generation of a new key
 926 pair the db is put again in new locations – rendering everything that was
 927 contained in the TMID chunk useless. The TMID CANNOT be signed by
 928 anyone (therefore hackers can't BAN an unsigned user from retrieving
 929 this – in a DOS attack)– it is a special chunk where the data hash does
 930 NOT match the name of the chunk (as the name is a random number
 931 calculated by hashing other information (i.e. its a hash of the TMID as
 932 described below)

- 933 • take dave as user ID and 1267 as pin.
- 934 • dave + (pin) 1267 = dave1267 Hash of this becomes MID
- 935 • day variable (say today is 13416 since epoch) = 13416
- 936 • so take pin, and for example add the number in where the pin states
 937 i.e.
- 938 • 613dav41e1267
- 939 • (6 at beginning is going round pin again)
- 940 • so this is done by taking 1st pin 1 - so put first day value at position 1
- 941 • then next pin number 2 - so day value 2 at position 2
- 942 • then next pin number 6 so day value 3 at position 6
- 943 • then next pin number 7 so day value 4 at position 7
- 944 • then next pin number is 1 so day value 5 at position 1 (again)
- 945 • so TMID is hash of 613dav41e1267 and the MID is simply a hash of
 946 dave1267

- 947 (This is an example algorithm and many more can be used to enforce
948 further security.)
- 949 4. From the TMID chunk the map of the user's database (or list of files
950 maps) is identified. The database is recovered from the net which
951 includes the data maps for the user and any keys passwords etc.. The
952 database chunks are stored in another location immediately and the old
953 chunks forgotten. This can be done now as the MID key pair is also in
954 the database and can now be used to manipulate user's data.
- 955 5. The maidsafe.net application can now authenticate itself as acting for
956 this MID and put get or forget data chunks belonging to the user.
- 957 6. The watcher process and Chunk server always have access to the PMID
958 key pair as they are stored on the machine itself, so can start and
959 receive and authenticate anonymous put / get / forget commands.
- 960 7. A DHT ID is required for a node in a DHT network this may be randomly
961 generated or in fact we can use the hash of the PMID public key to
962 identify the node.
- 963 8. When the users successfully logged in he can check his authentication
964 validation records exist on the network. These may be as follows:

MAID (maidsafe.net anonymous ID)

- 965 1. This is a data element stored on net and preferably named with the hash
966 of the MID public Key.
- 967 2. It contains the MID public key + any PMID public keys associated with
968 this user.

- 969 3. This is digitally signed with the MID private key to prevent forgery.
- 970 4. Using this mechanism this allows validation of MID signatures by
971 allowing any users access to this data element and checking the
972 signature of it against any challenge response from any node pertaining
973 to be this MID (as only the MID owner has the private key that signs this
974 MID) Any crook could not create the private key to match to the public
975 key to digitally sign so forgery is made impossible given today's
976 computer resources.
- 977 5. This mechanism also allows a user to add or remove PMIDS (or chunk
978 servers acting on their behalf like a proxy) at will and replace PMID's at
979 any time in case of the PMID machine becoming compromised.
980 Therefore this can be seen as the PMID authentication element.

PMID (Proxy MID)

- 981 1. This is a data element stored on the network and preferably named with
982 the hash of the PMID public key.
- 983 2. It contains the PMID public key and the MID ID (i.e. the hash of the MID
984 public key) and is signed by the MID private key (authenticated).
- 985 3. This allows a machine to act as a repository for anonymous chunks and
986 supply resources to the net for a MID.
- 987 4. When answering challenge responses any other machine will confirm the
988 PMID by seeking and checking the MIAD for the PMID and making sure
989 the PMID is mentioned in the MAID bit – otherwise the PMID is
990 considered rouge.

- 991 5. The key pair is stored on the machine itself and may be encoded or
992 encrypted against a password that has to be entered upon start-up
993 (optionally) in the case of a proxy provider who wishes to further
994 enhance PMID security.
- 995 6. The design allows for recovery from attack and theft of the PMID key pair
996 as the MAID data element can simply remove the PMID ID from the
997 MAID rendering it unauthenticated.

998 Figure 3 illustrates, in schematic form, a peer-to-peer network in
999 accordance with an embodiment of the invention; and

1000 Figure 4 illustrates a flow chart of the authentication, in accordance with
1001 a preferred embodiment of the present invention.

1002 With reference to Figure 3, a peer-to-peer network 2 is shown with nodes
1003 4 to 12 connected by a communication network 14. The nodes may be
1004 Personal Computers (PCs) or any other device that can perform the
1005 processing, communication and/or storage operations required to
1006 operate the invention. The file system will typically have many more
1007 nodes of all types than shown in Figure 3 and a PC may act as one or
1008 many types of node described herein. Data nodes 4 and 6 store chunks
1009 16 of files in the distributed system. The validation record node 8 has a
1010 storage module 18 for storing encrypted validation records identified by a
1011 user identifier.

1012 The client node 10 has a module 20 for input and generation of user
1013 identifiers. It also has a decryption module 22 for decrypting an encrypted
1014 validation record so as to provide decrypted information, a database or
1015 data map of chunk locations 24 and storage 26 for retrieved chunks and
1016 files assembled from the retrieved chunks.

1017 The verifying node 12 has a receiving module 28 for receiving a user
1018 identifier from the client node. The retrieving module 30 is configured to
1019 retrieve from the data node an encrypted validation record identified by
1020 the user identifier. Alternatively, in the preferred embodiment, the
1021 validation record node 8 is the same node as the verifying node 12, i.e.
1022 the storage module 18 is part of the verifying node 12 (not as shown in
1023 Figure 3). The transmitting module 32 sends the encrypted validation
1024 record to the client node. The authentication module 34 authenticates
1025 access to chunks of data distributed across the data nodes using the
1026 decrypted information.

1027 With reference to Figure 4, a more detailed flow of the operation of the
1028 present invention is shown laid out on the diagram with the steps being
1029 performed at the User's PC (client node) on the left 40, those of the
1030 verifying PC (node) in the centre 42 and those of the data PC (node) on
1031 the right 44.

1032 A login box is presented 46 that requires the user's name or other detail
1033 Preferably email address (the same one used in the client node software
1034 installation and registration process) or simply name (i.e. nickname) and
1035 the user's unique number, preferably PIN number. If the user is a 'main
1036 user' then some details may already be stored on the PC. If the user is a
1037 visitor, then the login box appears.

1038 A content hashed number such as SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm),
1039 Preferably 160 bits in length, is created 48 from these two items of data.
1040 This 'hash' is now known as the 'User ID Key' (MID), which at this point is
1041 classed as 'unverified' within the system. This is stored on the network as
1042 the MAID and is simply the hash of the public key containing an
1043 unencrypted version of the public key for later validation by any other
1044 node. This obviates the requirement for a validation authority

1045 The software on the user's PC then combines this MID with a standard
1046 'hello' code element 50, to create 52 a 'hello.packet'. This hello.packet is
1047 then transmitted with a timed validity on the Internet.

1048 The hello.packet will be picked up by the first node (for this description,
1049 now called the 'verifying node') that recognises 54 the User ID Key
1050 element of the hello.packet as matching a stored, encrypted validation
1051 record file 56 that it has in its storage area. A login attempt monitoring
1052 system ensures a maximum of three responses. Upon to many attempts,
1053 the verifying PC creates a 'black list' for transmission to peers.
1054 Optionally, an alert is returned to the user if a 'black list' entry is found
1055 and the user may be asked to proceed or perform a virus check.

1056 The verifying node then returns this encrypted validation record file to the
1057 user via the internet. The user's pass phrase 58 is requested by a dialog
1058 box 60, which then will allow decryption of this validation record file.

1059 When the validation record file is decrypted 62, the first data chunk
1060 details, including a 'decrypted address', are extracted 64 and the user PC
1061 sends back a request 66 to the verifying node for it to initiate a query for
1062 the first 'file-chunk ID' at the 'decrypted address' that it has extracted
1063 from the decrypted validation record file, or preferably the data map of
1064 the database chunks to recreate the database and provide access to the
1065 key pair associated with this MID.

1066 The verifying node then acts as a 'relay node' and initiates a 'notify only'
1067 query for this 'file-chunk ID' at the 'decrypted address'.

1068 Given that some other node (for this embodiment, called the 'data node')
1069 has recognised 68 this request and has sent back a valid 'notification
1070 only' message 70 that a 'file-chunk ID' corresponding to the request sent
1071 by the verifying node does indeed exist, the verifying node then digitally
1072 signs 72 the initial User ID Key, which is then sent back to the user.

1073 On reception by the user 74, this verified User ID Key is used as the
1074 user's session passport. The user's PC proceeds to construct 76 the
1075 database of the file system as backed up by the user onto the network.
1076 This database describes the location of all chunks that make up the
1077 user's file system. Preferably the ID Key will contain irrefutable evidence
1078 such as a public/private key pair to allow signing onto the network as
1079 authorised users, preferably this is a case of self signing his or her own
1080 ID – in which case the ID Key is decrypted and user is valid – self
1081 validating.

1082 Further details of the embodiment will now be described. A 'proxy-
1083 controlled' handshake routine is employed through an encrypted point-to-
1084 point channel, to ensure only authorised access by the legal owner to the
1085 system, then to the user's file storage database, then to the files therein.
1086 The handshaking check is initiated from the PC that a user logs on to
1087 (the 'User PC'), by generating the 'unverified encrypted hash' known as
1088 the 'User ID Key', this preferably being created from the user's
1089 information preferably email address and their PIN number. This 'hash'
1090 is transmitted as a 'hello.packet' on the Internet, to be picked up by any
1091 system that recognises the User ID as being associated with specific
1092 data that it holds. This PC then becomes the 'verifying PC' and will
1093 initially act as the User PC's 'gateway' into the system during the
1094 authentication process. The encrypted item of data held by the verifying
1095 PC will temporarily be used as a 'validation record', it being directly
1096 associated with the user's identity and holding the specific address of a
1097 number of data chunks belonging to the user and which are located
1098 elsewhere in the peer-to-peer distributed file system. This 'validation
1099 record' is returned to the User PC for decryption, with the expectation
1100 that only the legal user can supply the specific information that will allow
1101 its accurate decryption.

1102 Preferably this data may be a signed response being given back to the
1103 validating node which is possible as the id chunk when decrypted
1104 (preferably symmetrically) contains the users public and private keys
1105 allowing non refutable signing of data packets.

1106 Preferably after successful decryption of the TMID packet (as described
1107 above) the machine will now have access to the data map of the
1108 database and public/private key pair allowing unfettered access to the
1109 system.

1110 It should be noted that in this embodiment, preferably no communication
1111 is carried out via any nodes without an encrypted channel such as TLS
1112 (Transport Layer Security) or SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) being set up
1113 first. A peer talks to another peer via an encrypted channel and the other
1114 peer (proxy) requests the information (e.g. for some space to save
1115 information on or for the retrieval of a file). An encrypted link is formed
1116 between all peers at each end of communications and also through the
1117 proxy during the authentication process. This effectively bans snoopers
1118 from detecting who is talking to whom and also what is being sent or
1119 retrieved. The initial handshake for self authentication is also over an
1120 encrypted link.

1121 Secure connection is provided via certificate passing nodes, in a manner
1122 that does not require intervention, with each node being validated by
1123 another, where any invalid event or data, for whatever reason (fraud
1124 detection, snooping from node or any invalid algorithms that catch the
1125 node) will invalidate the chain created by the node. This is all transparent
1126 to the user.

1127 Further modifications and improvements may be added without departing
1128 from the scope of the invention herein described.

1129 Figure 5 illustrates a flow chart of data assurance event sequence in
1130 accordance with first embodiment of this invention

1131 Figure 6 illustrates a flow chart of file chunking event sequence in
1132 accordance with second embodiment of this invention

1133 Figure 7 illustrates a schematic diagram of file chunking example

1134 Figure 8 illustrates a flow chart of self healing event sequence

1135 Figure 9 illustrates a flow chart of peer ranking event sequence

1136 Figure 10 illustrates a flow chart of duplicate removal event sequence

1137 With reference to Figure 5, guaranteed accessibility to user data by data
1138 assurance is demonstrated by flow chart. The data is copied to at least
1139 three disparate locations at step (10). The disparate locations store data
1140 with an appendix pointing to the other two locations by step (20) and is
1141 renamed with hash of contents. Preferably this action is managed by
1142 another node i.e. super node acting as an intermediary by step (30).

1143 Each local copy at user's PC is checked for validity by integrity test by
1144 step (40) and in addition validity checks by integrity test are made that
1145 the other 2 copies are also still ok by step (50).

1146 Any single node failure initiates a replacement copy of equivalent leaf
1147 node being made in another disparate location by step (60) and the other
1148 remaining copies are updated to reflect this change to reflect the newly
1149 added replacement leaf node by step (70).

1150 The steps of storing and retrieving are carried out via other network
1151 nodes to mask the initiator (30).

1152 The method further comprises the step of renaming all files with a hash
1153 of their contents.

1154 Therefore, each file can be checked for validity or tampering by running a
1155 content hashing algorithm such as (for example) MD5 or an SHA variant,
1156 the result of this being compared with the name of the file.

1157 With reference to Figure 6, provides a methodology to manageable sized
1158 data elements and to enable a complimentary data structure for and
1159 compression and encryption and the step is to file chunking. By user's
1160 pre-selection the nominated data elements (files are passed to chunking
1161 process. Each data element (file) is split into small chunks by step (80)
1162 and the data chunks are encrypted by step (90) to provide security for the
1163 data. The data chunks are stored locally at step (100) ready for network
1164 transfer of copies. Only the person or the group, to whom the overall data
1165 belongs, will know the location of these (100) or the other related but
1166 dissimilar chunks of data. All operations are conducted within the user's
1167 local system. No data is presented externally.

1168 Each of the above chunks does not contain location information for any
1169 other dissimilar chunks. This provides for, security of data content, a
1170 basis for integrity checking and redundancy.

1171 The method further comprises the step of only allowing the person (or
1172 group) to whom the data belongs, to have access to it, preferably via a
1173 shared encryption technique. This allows persistence of data.

1174 The checking of data or chunks of data between machines is carried out
1175 via any presence type protocol such as a distributed hash table network.

1176 On the occasion when all data chunks have been relocated (i.e. the user
1177 has not logged on for a while,) a redirection record is created and stored
1178 in the super node network, (a three copy process – similar to data)

1179 therefore when a user requests a check, the redirection record is given to
 1180 the user to update their database.

1181 This efficiently allows data resilience in cases where network churn is a
 1182 problem as in peer to peer or distributed networks.

1183 With reference to Figure 7 which illustrates flow chart example of file
 1184 chunking. User's normal file has 5Mb document, which is chunked into
 1185 smaller variable sizes e.g. 135kb, 512kb, 768kb in any order. All chunks
 1186 may be compressed and encrypted by using Pass phrase. Next step is to
 1187 individually hash chunks and given hashes as names. Then database
 1188 record as a file is made from names of hashed chunks brought together
 1189 e.g. in empty version of original file (C1#####,t1,t2,t3:
 1190 C2#####,t1,t2,t3 etc), this file is then sent to transmission queue in
 1191 storage space allocated to client application.

1192 With reference to Figure 8 provides a self healing event sequence
 1193 methodology. Self healing is required to guarantee availability of accurate
 1194 data. As data or chunks become invalid by failing integrity test by step
 1195 (110). The location of failing data chunks is assessed as unreliable and
 1196 further data from the leaf node is ignored from that location by step (120).
 1197 A 'Good Copy' from the 'known good' data chunk is recreated in a new
 1198 and equivalent leaf node. Data or chunks are recreated in a new and
 1199 safer location by step (130). The leaf node with failing data chunks is
 1200 marked as unreliable and the data therein as 'dirty' by step (140). Peer
 1201 leaf nodes become aware of this unreliable leaf node and add its location
 1202 to watch list by step (150). All operations conducted within the user's
 1203 local system. No data is presented externally.

1204 Therefore, the introduction of viruses, worms etc. will be prevented and
 1205 faulty machines/ equipment identified automatically.

1206 The network will use SSL or TLS type encryption to prevent unauthorised
1207 access or snooping.

1208 With reference to Figure 9, Peer Ranking id required to ensure consistent
1209 response and performance for the level of guaranteed interaction
1210 recorded for the user. For Peer Ranking each node (leaf node) monitors
1211 its own peer node's resources and availability in a scaleable manner,
1212 each leaf node is constantly monitored.

1213 Each data store (whether a network service, physical drive etc.) is
1214 monitored for availability. A qualified availability ranking is appended to
1215 the (leaf) storage node address by consensus of a monitoring super node
1216 group by step (160). A ranking figure will be appended by step (160) and
1217 signed by the supply of a key from the monitoring super node; this would
1218 preferably be agreed by more super nodes to establish a consensus for
1219 altering the ranking of the node. The new rank will preferably be
1220 appended to the node address or by a similar mechanism to allow the
1221 node to be managed preferably in terms of what is stored there and how
1222 many copies there has to be of the data for it to be seen as perpetual.

1223 Each piece of data is checked via a content hashing mechanism for data
1224 integrity, which is carried out by the storage node itself by step (170) or
1225 by its partner nodes via super nodes by step (180) or by instigating node
1226 via super nodes by step (190) by retrieval and running the hashing
1227 algorithm against that piece of data. The data checking cycle repeats
1228 itself.

1229 As a peer (whether an instigating node or a partner peer (i.e. one that
1230 has same chunk)) checks the data, the super node querying the storage
1231 peer will respond with the result of the integrity check and update this
1232 status on the storage peer. The instigating node or partner peer will
1233 decide to forget this data and will replicate it in a more suitable location.

1234 If data fails the integrity check the node itself will be marked as 'dirty' by
 1235 step (200) and 'dirty' status appended to leaf node address to mark it as
 1236 requiring further checks on the integrity of the data it holds by step (210).
 1237 Additional checks are carried out on data stored on the leaf node marked
 1238 as 'dirty' by step (220). If pre-determined percentage of data found to be
 1239 'dirty' node is removed from the network except for message traffic by
 1240 step (230). A certain percentage of dirty data being established may
 1241 conclude that this node is compromised or otherwise damaged and the
 1242 network would be informed of this. At that point the node will be removed
 1243 from the network except for the purpose of sending it warning messages
 1244 by step (230).

1245 This allows either having data stored on nodes of equivalent availability
 1246 and efficiency or dictating the number of copies of data required to
 1247 maintain reliability.

1248 Further modifications and improvements may be added without departing
 1249 from the scope of the invention herein described.

1250 With reference to Figure 10, duplicate data is removed to maximise the
 1251 efficient use of the disk space. Prior to the initiation of the data backup
 1252 process by step (240), internally generated content hash may be
 1253 checked for a match against hashes stored on the internet by step (250)
 1254 or a list of previously backed up data (250). This will allow only one
 1255 backed up copy of data to be kept. This reduces the network wide
 1256 requirement to backup data which has the exact same contents.
 1257 Notification of shared key existence is passed back to instigating node by
 1258 step (260) to access authority check requested, which has to pass for
 1259 signed result is to be passed back to storage node. The storage node
 1260 passes shared key and database back to instigating node by step (270)

1261 Such data is backed up via a shared key which after proof of the file
 1262 existing (260) on the instigating node, the shared key (270) is shared with

1263 this instigating node. The location of the data is then passed to the node
1264 for later retrieval if required.

1265 This maintains copyright as people can only backup what they prove to
1266 have on their systems and not publicly share copyright infringed data
1267 openly on the network.

1268 This data may be marked as protected or not protected by step (280)
1269 which has check carried out for protected or non-protected data content.
1270 The protected data ignores sharing process.

Perpetual Data (Figure 1 – PT1 and Figure 11)

1271 ***According to a related aspect of this invention***, a file is chunked or
1272 split into constituent parts (1) this process involves calculating the chunk
1273 size, preferably from known data such as the first few bytes of the hash
1274 of the file itself and preferably using a modulo division technique to
1275 resolve a figure between the optimum minimum and optimum maximum
1276 chunk sizes for network transmission and storage.

1277 Preferably each chunk is then encrypted and obfuscated in some manner
1278 to protect the data. Preferably a search of the network is carried out
1279 looking for values relating to the content hash of each of the chunks (2).

1280 If this is found (4) then the other chunks are identified too, failure to
1281 identify all chunks may mean there is a collision on the network of file
1282 names or some other machine is in the process of backing up the same
1283 file. A back-off time is calculated to check again for the other chunks. If
1284 all chunks are on the network the file is considered backed up and the
1285 user will add their MID signature to the file after preferably a challenge
1286 response to ensure there a valid user and have enough resources to do
1287 this.

1288 If no chunks are on the net the user preferably via another node (3) will
1289 request the saving of the first copy (preferably in distinct time zones or
1290 other geographically dispersing method).

1291 The chunk will be stored (5) on a storage node allowing us to see the
1292 PMID of the storing node and store this.

1293 Then preferably a Key.value pair of chunkid.public key of initiator is
1294 written to net creating a Chunk ID (CID) (6)

Storage and Retrieval (Figure 1- P4)

1295 ***According to a related aspect of this invention***, the data is stored in
1296 multiple locations. Each location stores the locations of its peers that hold
1297 identical chunks (at least identical in content) and they all communicate
1298 regularly to ascertain the health of the data. The preferable method is as
1299 follows:

1300 Preferably the data is copied to at least three disparate locations.

1301 Preferably each copy is performed via many nodes to mask the initiator.

1302 Preferably each local copy is checked for validity and checks are made
1303 that the preferably other 2 copies are also still valid.

1304 Preferably any single node failure initiates a replacement copy being
1305 made in another disparate location and the other associated copies are
1306 updated to reflect this change.

1307 Preferably the steps of storing and retrieving are carried out via other
1308 network nodes to mask the initiator.

1309 Preferably, the method further comprises the step of renaming all files
1310 with a hash of their contents.

1311 Preferably each chunk may alter its name by a known process such as a
1312 binary shift left of a section of the data. This allows the same content to
1313 exist but also allows the chunks to appear as three different bits of data
1314 for the sake of not colliding on the network.

1315 Preferably each chunk has a counter attached to it that allows the
1316 network to understand easily just how many users are attached to the
1317 chunk – either by sharing or otherwise. A user requesting a 'chunk forget'
1318 will initiate a system question if they are the only user using the chunk
1319 and if so the chunk will be deleted and the user's required disk space
1320 reduced accordingly. This allows users to remove files no longer required
1321 and free up local disk space. Any file also being shared is preferably
1322 removed from the user's quota and the user's database record or data
1323 map (see later) is deleted.

1324 Preferably this counter is digitally signed by each node sharing the data
1325 and therefore will require a signed 'forget' or 'delete' command.
1326 Preferably even 'store', 'put', 'retrieve' and 'get' commands should also
1327 be either digitally signed or preferably go through a PKI challenge
1328 response mechanism.

1329 To ensure fairness preferably this method will be monitored by a
1330 supernode or similar to ensure the user has not simply copied the data
1331 map for later use without giving up the disk space for it. Therefore the
1332 user's private ID public key will be used to request the forget chunk
1333 statement. This will be used to indicate the user's acceptance of the
1334 'chunk forget' command and allow the user to recover the disk space.
1335 Any requests against the chunk will preferably be signed with this key

1336 and consequently rejected unless the user's system gives up the space
1337 required to access this file.

1338 Preferably each user storing a chunk will append their signed request to
1339 the end of the chunk in an identifiable manner i.e. prefixed with 80 – or
1340 similar.

1341 Forgetting the chunk means the signature is removed from the file. This
1342 again is done via a signed request from the storage node as with the
1343 original backup request.

1344 Preferably this signed request is another small chunk stored at the same
1345 location as the data chunk with an appended postfix to the chunk
1346 identifier to show a private ID is storing this chunk. Any attempt by
1347 somebody else to download the file is rejected unless they first subscribe
1348 to it, i.e. a chunk is called 12345 so a file is saved called 12345 <signed
1349 store request>. This will allow files to be forgotten when all signatories to
1350 the chunk are gone. A user will send a signed 'no store' or 'forget' and
1351 their ID chunk will be removed, and in addition if they are the last user
1352 storing that chunk, the chunk is removed. Preferably this will allow a
1353 private anonymous message to be sent upon chunk failure or damage
1354 allowing a proactive approach to maintaining clean data.

1355 Preferably as a node fails the other nodes can preferably send a
1356 message to all sharers of the chunk to identify the new location of the
1357 replacement chunk.

1358 Preferably any node attaching to a file then downloading immediately
1359 should be considered an alert and the system may take steps to slow
1360 down this node's activity or even halt it to protect data theft.

Chunk Checks: (Figure 1 – P9 and Figure 12)

- 1361 1. Storage node containing chunk 1 checks its peers. As each peer is
1362 checked it reciprocates the check. These checks are split into preferably
1363 2 types:
- 1364 a. Availability check (i.e. simple network ping)
1365 b. Data integrity check – in this instance the checking node takes a chunk
1366 and appends random data to it and takes a hash of the result. It then
1367 sends the random data to the node being checked and requests the
1368 hash of the chunk with the random data appended. The result is
1369 compared with a known result and the chunk will be assessed as
1370 either healthy or not. If not, further checks with other nodes occur to
1371 find the bad node.
- 1372 2. There may be multiple storage nodes depending on the rating of
1373 machines and other factors. The above checking is carried out by all
1374 nodes from 1 to n (where n is total number of storage nodes selected for
1375 the chunk). Obviously a poorly rated node will require to give up disk
1376 space in relation to the number of chunks being stored to allow perpetual
1377 data to exist. This is a penalty paid by nodes that are switched off.
- 1378 3. The user who stored the chunk will check on a chunk from 1 storage
1379 node randomly selected. This check will ensure the integrity of the chunk
1380 and also ensure there are at least 10 other signatures existing already for
1381 the chunk. If there are not and the user's ID is not listed, the user signs
1382 the chunk.
- 1383 4. This shows another example of another user checking the chunk. Note
1384 that the user checks X (40 days in this diagram) are always at least 75%
1385 of the forget time retention (Y) (i.e. when a chunk is forgotten by all
1386 signatories it is retained for a period of time Y). This is another algorithm
1387 that will continually develop.

Storage of Additional Chunks: (Figure 12)

1388 1. maidsafe.net program with user logged in (so MID exists) has chunked a
 1389 file. It has already stored a chunk and is now looking to store additional
 1390 chunks. Therefore a Chunk ID (CID) should exist on the net. This process
 1391 retrieves this CID.

1392 2. The CID as shown in storing initial chunk contains the chunk name and
 1393 any public keys that are sharing the chunk. In this instance it should only
 1394 be our key as we are first ones storing the chunks (others would be in a
 1395 back-off period to see if we back other chunks up). We shift the last bit
 1396 (could be any function on any bit as long as we can replicate it)

1397 3. We then check we won't collide with any other stored chunk on the net –
 1398 i.e. it does a CID search again.

1399 4. We then issue our broadcast to our supernodes (i.e. the supernodes we
 1400 are connected to) stating we need to store X bytes and any other
 1401 information about where we require to store it (geographically in our case
 1402 – time zone (TZ))

1403 5. The supernode network finds a storage location for us with the correct
 1404 rank etc.

1405 6. The chunk is stored after a successful challenge response i.e. In the
 1406 maidsafe.net network. MIDs will require to ensure they are talking or
 1407 dealing with validated nodes, so to accomplish this a challenge process
 1408 is carried out as follows: sender **[S]** receiver **[R]**

1409 • **[S]** I wish to communicate (store retrieve forget data etc.) and I am MAID

- 1410 • [R] retrieves MAID public key from DHT and encrypts a challenge
1411 (possibly a very large number encrypted with the public key retrieved)
1412 • [S] gets key and decrypts and encrypts [R] answer with his challenge
1413 number also encrypted with [R]'s public key
1414 • [R] receives response and decrypts his challenge and passes back
1415 answer encrypted again with [S] public key
1416 (Communication is now authenticated between these two nodes.)
- 1417 7. The CID is then updated with the second chunk name and the location it
1418 is stored at. This process is repeated for as many copies of a chunk that
1419 are required.
- 1420 8. Copies of chunks will be dependent on many factors including file
1421 popularity (popular files may require to be more dispersed closer to
1422 nodes and have more copies. Very poorly ranked machines may require
1423 an increased amount of chunks to ensure they can be retrieved at any
1424 time (poorly ranked machines will therefore have to give up more space.)

Security Availability (Figure 1 – P3)

1425 ***According to a related aspect of this invention***, each file is split into
1426 small chunks and encrypted to provide security for the data. Only the
1427 person or the group, to whom the overall data belongs, will know the
1428 location of the other related but dissimilar chunks of data.

1429 Preferably, each of the above chunks does not contain location
1430 information for any other dissimilar chunks; which provides for security of
1431 data content, a basis for integrity checking and redundancy.

1432 Preferably, the method further comprises the step of only allowing the
1433 person (or group) to whom the data belongs to have access to it,

1434 preferably via a shared encryption technique which allows persistence of
1435 data.

1436 Preferably, the checking of data or chunks of data between machines is
1437 carried out via any presence type protocol such as a distributed hash
1438 table network.

1439 Preferably, on the occasion when all data chunks have been relocated,
1440 i.e. the user has not logged on for a while, a redirection record is created
1441 and stored in the super node network, (a three copy process – similar to
1442 data) therefore when a user requests a check, the redirection record is
1443 given to the user to update their database, which provides efficiency that
1444 in turn allows data resilience in cases where network churn is a problem
1445 as in peer to peer or distributed networks. This system message can be
1446 preferably passed via the messenger system described herein.

1447 Preferably the system may simply allow a user to search for his chunks
1448 and through a challenge response mechanism, locate and authenticate
1449 himself to have authority to get/forget this chunk.

1450 Further users can decide on various modes of operation preferably such
1451 as maintain a local copy of all files on their local machine, unencrypted or
1452 chunked or chunk and encrypt even local files to secure machine
1453 (preferably referred to as off line mode operation) or indeed users may
1454 decide to remove all local data and rely completely on preferably
1455 maidsafe.net or similar system to secure their data.

Self Healing (Figure 1 – P2)

1456 **According to a related aspect of this invention,** a self healing network
1457 method is provided via the following process;

- 1458 • As data or chunks become invalid – data is ignored from that location
- 1459 • Data or chunks are recreated in a new and safer location.
- 1460 • The original location is marked as bad.
- 1461 • Peers note this condition and add the bad location to a watch list.

1462 This will prevent the introduction of viruses; worms etc. will allow faulty
1463 machines/ equipment to be identified automatically.

1464 Preferably, the network layer will use SSL or TLS channel encryption to
1465 prevent unauthorised access or snooping.

Self Healing (Figure 13)

- 1466 1. A data element called a Chunk ID (CID) is created for each chunk. Added
1467 to this is the 'also stored at' MID for the other identical chunks. The other
1468 chunk names are also here as they may be renamed slightly (i.e. by bit
1469 shifting a part of the name in a manner that calculable).
- 1470 2. All storing nodes (related to this chunk) have a copy of this CID file or
1471 can access it at any stage from the DHT network, giving each node
1472 knowledge of all others.
- 1473 3. Each of the storage nodes have their copy of the chunk.
- 1474 4. Each node queries its partner's availability at frequent intervals. On less
1475 frequent intervals a chunk health check is requested. This involves a
1476 node creating some random data and appending this to it's chunk and
1477 taking the hash. The partner node will be requested to take the random
1478 data and do likewise and return the hash result. This result is checked
1479 against the result the initiator had and chunk is then deemed healthy or
1480 not. Further tests can be done as each node knows the hash their chunk

- 1481 should create and can self check n that manner on error and report a
1482 dirty node.
- 1483 5. Now we have a node fail (creating a dirty chunk)
- 1484 6. The first node to note this carries out a broadcast to other nodes to say it
1485 is requesting a move of the data.
- 1486 7. The other nodes agree to have CID updated (they may carry out their
1487 own check to confirm this).
- 1488 8. A broadcast is sent to the supernode network closest to the storage node
1489 that failed, to state a re-storage requirement.
- 1490 9. The supernode network picks up the request.
- 1491 10. The request is to the supernode network to store x amount of data at a
1492 rank of y.
- 1493 11. A supernode will reply with a location
- 1494 12. The storage node and new location carry out a challenge response
1495 request to validate each other.
- 1496 13. The chunk is stored and the CID is updated and signed by the three or
1497 more nodes storing the chunk.

Peer Ranking (Figure 1 – P1)

- 1498 **According to a related aspect of this invention,** there is the addition of
1499 a peer ranking mechanism, where each node (leaf node) monitors its

1500 own peer node's resources and availability in a scalable manner. Nodes
1501 constantly perform this monitoring function.

1502 Each data store (whether a network service, physical drive etc.) is
1503 monitored for availability. A ranking figure is appended and signed by the
1504 supply of a key from the monitoring super node, this being preferably
1505 agreed by more super nodes to establish a consensus before altering the
1506 ranking of the node. Preferably, the new rank will be appended to the
1507 node address or by a similar mechanism to allow the node to be
1508 managed in terms of what is stored there and how many copies there
1509 has to be of the data for it to be seen as perpetual.

1510 Each piece of data is checked via a content hashing mechanism. This is
1511 preferably carried out by the storage node itself or by its partner nodes
1512 via super nodes or by an instigating node via super nodes by retrieving
1513 and running the hashing algorithm against that piece of data.

1514 Preferably, as a peer (whether an instigating node or a partner peer (i.e.
1515 one that has same chunk)) checks the data, the super node querying the
1516 storage peer will respond with the result of the integrity check and update
1517 this status on the storage peer. The instigating node or partner peer will
1518 decide to forget this data and will replicate it in a more suitable location.

1519 If data fails the integrity check, the node itself will be marked as 'dirty' and
1520 this status will preferably be appended to the node's address for further
1521 checks on other data to take this into account. Preferably a certain
1522 percentage of dirty data being established may conclude that this node is
1523 compromised or otherwise damaged and the network would be informed
1524 of this. At that point the node will be removed from the network except for
1525 the purpose of sending it warning messages.

1526 In general, the node ranking figure will take into account at least;
1527 availability of the network connection, availability of resources, time on

1528 the network with a rank (later useful for effort based trust model), amount
 1529 of resource (including network resources) and also the connectivity
 1530 capabilities of any node (i.e. directly or indirectly contactable)

1531 This then allows data to be stored on nodes of equivalent availability and
 1532 efficiency, and to determine the number of copies of data required to
 1533 maintain reliability.

Aput: (Figure 15)

1534 Here the MID is the MID of the machine saving data to the net and the
 1535 PMID is the ID of the storage node chunk server. The communication is
 1536 therefore between a maidsafe.net application with a logged in user (to
 1537 provide MID) and a chunking system on the net somewhere (storage
 1538 node).

- 1539 1. A message signed with a user's MID (checked by getting the MAID
 1540 packet from the net) is received requesting storage of a data chunk.
- 1541 2. This message is a specific message stating the storage node's ID (PMID)
 1542 and the chunk name to be saved and signed (i.e. this is a unique
 1543 message)
- 1544 3. The chunk server decides if it will store the chunk.
- 1545 4. A signed message is returned stating if PMID will store this chunk
 1546 (chunkID).
- 1547 5. The chunk is stored and checked (SHA check)
- 1548 6. A message is sent back to state that the chunk is saved and is ok. This is
 1549 signed by the PMID of the chunk server.

- 1550 7. The chunk server awaits the locations of the other identical chunks.
- 1551 8. Locations of the identical chunks returned to the chunk server signed with
1552 the MID.
- 1553 9. Each storage node is contacted and public keys exchanged (PMIDs)
- 1554 10. The chunk checking process is initiated.

Aforget (Figure 16)

- 1555 1. A user has requested that a file should be deleted from his backup
1556 (forgotten). The system signs a request using the user MID.
- 1557 2. The request is sent to a chunk server (storage node).
- 1558 3. The storage node picks up the request
- 1559 4. The storage node sends the signed request to the other storage nodes
1560 that have this chunk.
- 1561 5. The MID is checked as being on the list of MIDs that are watching the
1562 chunk (remember only a few – 20 in our case are ever listed)
- 1563 6. The other storage nodes are notified of this.
- 1564 7. If this is the only MID listed then all owners are possibly gone.
- 1565 8. Chunk delete times begins, this timer will always be higher than a user
1566 check interval – i.e. timer of 60 days – user check interval 40 days.

1567 9. This information is also passed to other storage nodes.

Duplicate Removal (Figure 1 - P5)

1568 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, prior to data being
1569 backed up, the content hash may be checked against a list of previously
1570 backed up data. This will allow only one backed up copy of data to be
1571 kept, thereby reducing the network wide requirement to backup data that
1572 has the exact same content. Preferably this will be done via a simple
1573 search for existence on the net of all chunks of a particular file.

1574 Preferably such data is backed up via a shared key or mechanism of
1575 appending keys to chunks of data. After proof of the file existing on the
1576 instigating node, the shared key is shared with the instigating node and
1577 the storing node issues a challenge response to add their ID to the pool if
1578 it is capable of carrying out actions on the file such as get/ forget (delete).
1579 The location of the data is then passed to the node for later retrieval if
1580 required.

1581 This maintains copyright as people can only backup what they prove to
1582 have on their systems and not easily publicly share copyright infringed
1583 data openly on the network.

1584 Preferably, data may be marked as protected or not protected. Preferably
1585 protected data ignores sharing process.

Chunking (Figure 1 - P7)

1586 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, files are split
1587 preferably using an algorithm to work out the chunk size into several
1588 component parts. The size of the parts is preferably worked out from

1589 known information about the file as a whole, preferably the hash of the
1590 complete file. This information is run through an algorithm such as adding
1591 together the first x bits of the known information and using modulo
1592 division to give a chunk size that allows the file to preferably split into at
1593 least three parts.

1594 Preferably known information from each chunk is used as an encryption
1595 key. This is preferably done by taking a hash of each chunk and using
1596 this as the input to an encryption algorithm to encrypt another chunk in
1597 the file. Preferably this is a symmetrical algorithm such as AES256.

1598 Preferably this key is input into a password creating algorithm such as
1599 pbkdf and an initial vector and key calculated from that. Preferably the
1600 iteration count for the pbkdf is calculated from another piece of known
1601 information, preferably the sum of bits of another chunk or similar.

1602 Preferably each initial chunk hash and the final hash after encryption are
1603 stored somewhere for later decryption.

Self Encrypting Files (Figure 1 – PT2 and Figure 17)

- 1604 1. Take a content hash of a file or data element
- 1605 2. Chunk a file with preferably a random calculable size i.e. based on an
1606 algorithm of the content hash (to allow recovery of file). Also obfuscate
1607 the file such as in 3
- 1608 3. Obfuscate the chunks to ensure safety even if encryption is eventually
1609 broken (as with all encryption if given enough processing power and time)
 - 1610 a. chunk 1 byte 1 swapped with byte1 of chunk 2
 - 1611 b. chunk 2 byte 2 swapped with byte 1 chunk 3

- 1612 c. chunk 3 byte 2 swapped with byte 2 of chunk 1
1613 d. This repeats until all bytes swapped and then repeats the same
1614 number of times as there are chunks with each iteration making next
1615 chunk first one
1616 e. - i.e. second time round chunk 2 is starting position
- 1617 4. Take hash of each chunk and rename chunk with its hash.
- 1618 5. Take h2 and first x bytes of h3 (6 in our example case) and either use
1619 modulo division or similar to get a random number between 2 fixed
1620 parameter (in our case 1000) to get a variable number. Use the above
1621 random number and h2 as the encryption key to encrypt h1 or use h2 and
1622 the random number as inputs to another algorithm (pdkbk2 in our case) to
1623 create a key and iv.(initialisation vector)
- 1624 6. This process may be repeated multiple times to dilute any keys
1625 throughout a series of chunks.
- 1626 7. Chunk name i.e. h1 (unencrypted) and h1c (and likewise for each chunk)
1627 written to a location for later recovery of the data. Added to this we can
1628 simply update such a location with new chunks if a file has been altered,
1629 thereby creating a revision control system where each file can be rebuilt
1630 to any previous state.
- 1631 8. The existence of the chunk will be checked on the net to ensure it is not
1632 already backed up. All chunks may be checked at this time.
- 1633 9. If a chunk exists all chunks must be checked for existence.
- 1634 10. The chunk is saved
- 1635 11. The file is marked as backed up.

1636 12. If a collision is detected the process is redone altering the original size
1637 algorithm (2) to create a new chunk set, each system will be aware of this
1638 technique and will do the exact same process till a series of chunks do
1639 not collide. There will be a back off period here to ensure the chunks are
1640 not completed due to the fact another system is backing up the same file.
1641 The original chunk set will be checked frequently in case there are false
1642 chunks or ones that have been forgotten. If the original names become
1643 available the file is reworked using these parameters.

Duplicate Removal (Figure 1 - P5)

1644 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, data chunked and
1645 ready for storing can be stored on a distributed network but a search
1646 should preferably be carried out for the existence of all associated
1647 chunks created. Preferably the locations of the chunks have the same
1648 ranking (From earlier ranking system) as user or better, otherwise the
1649 existing chunks on the net are promoted to a location of equivalent rank
1650 at least. If all chunks exist then the file is considered as already backed
1651 up. If less than all chunks exist then this will preferably be considered as
1652 a collision (after a time period) and the file will be re chunked using the
1653 secondary algorithms (preferably just adjusted file sizes). This allows
1654 duplicate files on any 2 or more machines to be only backed up once,
1655 although through perpetual data several copies will exist of each file, this
1656 is limited to an amount that will maintain perpetual data.

Encrypt – Decrypt (Figure 1 - P8)

1657 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, the actual encrypting
1658 and decrypting is carried out via knowledge of the file's content and this
1659 is somehow maintained (see next). Keys will be generated and preferably
1660 stored for decrypting. Actually encrypting the file will preferably include a

1661 compression process and further obfuscation methods. Preferably the
1662 chunk will be stored with a known hash preferably based on the contents
1663 of that chunk.

1664 Decrypting the file will preferably require the collation of all chunks and
1665 rebuilding of the file itself. The file may preferably have its content mixed
1666 up by an obfuscation technique rendering each chunk useless on its own.

1667 Preferably every file will go through a process of byte (or preferably bit)
1668 swapping between its chunks to ensure the original file is rendered
1669 useless without all chunks.

1670 This process will preferably involve running an algorithm which preferably
1671 takes the chunk size and then distributes the bytes in a pseudo random
1672 manner preferably taking the number of chunks and using this as an
1673 iteration count for the process. This will preferably protect data even in
1674 event of somebody getting hold of the encryption keys – as the chunks
1675 data is rendered useless even if transmitted in the open without
1676 encryption.

1677 This defends against somebody copying all data and storing for many
1678 years until decryption of today's algorithms is possible, although this is
1679 many years away.

1680 This also defends against somebody; instead of attempting to decrypt a
1681 chunk by creating the enormous amount of keys possible, (in the region
1682 of 2^{54}) rather instead creating the keys and presenting chunks to all
1683 keys – if this were possible (which is unlikely) a chunk would decrypt.
1684 The process defined here makes this attempt useless.

1685 All data will now be considered to be diluted throughout the original
1686 chunks and preferably additions to this algorithm will only strengthen the
1687 process.

Identify Chunks (Figure 1 - P9)

1688 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, a chunk's original
1689 hash or other calculable unique identifier will be stored. This will be
1690 stored with preferably the final chunk name. This aspect defines that
1691 each file will have a separate map preferably a file or database entry to
1692 identify the file and the name of its constituent parts. Preferably this will
1693 include local information to users such as original location and rights
1694 (such as a read only system etc.). Preferably some of this information
1695 can be considered shareable with others such as filename, content hash
1696 and chunks names.

ID Data with Small File (Figure 1 - P11)

1697 **According to a related aspect of this invention**; these data maps may
1698 be very small in relation to the original data itself allowing transmission of
1699 files across networks such as the internet with extreme simplicity,
1700 security and bandwidth efficiency. Preferably the transmission of maps
1701 will be carried out in a very secure manner, but failure to do this is akin to
1702 currently emailing a file in its entirety.

1703 This allows a very small file such as the data map or database record to
1704 be shared or maintained by a user in a location not normally large
1705 enough to fit a file system of any great size, such as on a PDA or mobile
1706 phone. The identification of the chunk names, original names and final
1707 names are all that is required to retrieve the chunks and rebuild the file
1708 with certainty.

1709 With data maps in place a user's whole machine, or all its data, can exist
1710 elsewhere. Simply retrieving the data maps of all data, is all that is

1711 required to allow the user to have complete visibility and access to all
1712 their data as well as any shared files they have agreed to.

Revision Control (Figure 1 - P10)

1713 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, as data is updated
1714 and the map contents alter to reflect the new contents, this will preferably
1715 not require the deletion or removal of existing chunks, but instead allow
1716 the existing chunks to remain and the map appended to with an
1717 indication of a new revision existing. Preferably further access to the file
1718 will automatically open the last revision unless requested to open an
1719 earlier revision.

1720 Preferably revisions of any file can be forgotten or deleted (preferably
1721 after checking the file counter or access list of sharers as above). This
1722 will allow users to recover space from no longer required revisions.

Create Map of Maps (Figure 1 - P15)

1723 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, data identifiers,
1724 preferably data maps as mentioned earlier, can be appended to each
1725 other in a way that preferably allows a single file or database record to
1726 identify several files in one map. This is known as a share. Such a share
1727 can be private to the individual, thereby replacing the directory structure
1728 of files that users are normally used to, and replacing this with a new
1729 structure of shares very similar to volumes or filing cabinets as this is
1730 more in line with normal human nature and should make things simpler.

Share Maps (Figure 1 - P16)

1731 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, this map of maps will
1732 preferably identify the users connected to it via some public ID that is
1733 known to each other user, with the map itself will being passed to users
1734 who agree to join the share. This will preferably be via an encrypted
1735 channel such as ms messenger or similar. This map may then be
1736 accessed at whatever rank level users have been assigned. Preferably
1737 there will be access rights such as read / delete / add / edit as is typically
1738 used today. As a map is altered, the user instigating this is checked
1739 against the user list in the map to see if this is allowed. If not, the request
1740 is ignored but preferably the users may then save the data themselves to
1741 their own database or data maps as a private file or even copy the file to
1742 a share they have access rights for. These shares will preferably also
1743 exhibit the revision control mechanism described above.

1744 Preferably joining the share will mean that the users subscribe to a
1745 shared amount of space and reduce the other subscription, i.e. a 10Gb
1746 share is created then the individual gives up 10Gb (or equivalent
1747 dependent on system requirements which may be a multiple or divisor of
1748 10Gb). Another user joining means they both have a 5Gb space to give
1749 up and 5 users would mean they all have a 2Gb or equivalent space to
1750 give up. So with more people sharing, requirements on all users reduce.

Shared Access to Private Files (Figure 1 – PT5 and Figure 18)

- 1751 1. User 1 logs on to network
- 1752 2. Authenticates ID – i.e. gets access to his public and private keys to sign
1753 messages. This should NOT be stored locally but should have been
1754 retrieved from a secure location – anonymously and securely.
- 1755 3. User 1 saves a file as normal (encrypted, obfuscated, chunked, and
1756 stored on the net via a signed and anonymous ID. This ID is a special

1757 maidsafe.net Share ID (MSID) and is basically a new key pair created
1758 purely for interacting with the share users – to mask the user's MID (i.e.
1759 cannot be tied to MPID via a share). So again the MSID is a key pair and
1760 the ID is the hash of the public key – this public key is stored in a chunk
1761 called the hash and signed and put on the net for others to retrieve and
1762 confirm that the public key belongs to the hash.

1763 4. User creates a share – which is a data map with some extra elements to
1764 cover users and privileges.

1765 5. File data added to file map is created in the backup process, with one
1766 difference, this is a map of maps and may contain many files – see 14

1767 6. User 2 logs in

1768 7. User 2 has authentication details (i.e. their private MPID key) and can
1769 sign / decrypt with this MPID public key.

1770 8. User 1 sends a share join request to user 2 (shares are invisible on the
1771 net – i.e. nobody except the sharers to know they are there).

1772 9. User 1 signs the share request to state he will join share. He creates his
1773 MSID key pair at this time. The signed response includes User 2's MSID
1774 public key.

1775 10. Share map is encrypted or sent encrypted (possibly by secure
1776 messenger) to User 1 along with the MSID public keys of any users of the
1777 share that exist. Note the transmission of MSID public key may not be
1778 required as the MSID chunks are saved on the net as described in 3 so
1779 any user can check the public key at any time – this just saves the search
1780 operation on that chunk to speed the process up slightly.

1781 11. Each user has details added to the share these include public name
1782 (MPID) and rights (read / write / delete / admin etc.)

1783 12. A description of the share file

1784 Note that as each user saves new chunks he does so with the MSID
1785 keys. this means that if a shares is deleted or removed the chunks still
1786 exist in the users home database and he can have the option to keep the
1787 data maps and files as individual files or simply forget them all.

1788 Note also that as a user opens a file, a lock is transmitted to all other
1789 shares and they will only be allowed to open a file read only – they can
1790 request unlock (i.e. another user unlocks the file – meaning it becomes
1791 read only). Non-logged in users will have a message buffered for them –
1792 if the file is closed the buffered message is deleted (as there is no point
1793 in sending it to the user now) and logged in users are updated also.

1794 This will take place using the messenger component of the system to
1795 automatically receive messages from share users about shares (but
1796 being limited to that).

Provide Public ID (Figure 1 - P17)

1797 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, a public and Private
1798 key pair is created for a network where preferably the user is
1799 anonymously logged on, and preferably has a changeable pseudo
1800 random private id which is only used for transmission and retrieval of ID
1801 blocks giving access to that network.

1802 Preferably this public private key pair will be associated with a public ID.
1803 This ID will be transmittable in a relatively harmless way using almost
1804 any method including in the open (email, ftp, www etc.) but preferably in

1805 an encrypted form. Preferably this ID should be simple enough to
1806 remember such as a phone number type length. Preferably this ID will be
1807 long enough however, to cope with all the world's population and more,
1808 therefore it would be preferably approx 11 characters long.

1809 This ID can be printed on business cards or stationary like a phone
1810 number or email address and cannot be linked to the users private ID by
1811 external sources. However the user's own private information makes this
1812 link by storing the data in the ID bit the user retrieves when logging in to
1813 the network or via another equally valid method of secure network
1814 authentication.

1815 This ID can then be used in data or resource sharing with others in a
1816 more open manner than with the private id. This keeps the private ID
1817 private and allows much improved inter-node or inter-person
1818 communications.

Secure Communications (Figure 1 - P18)

1819 ***According to a related aspect of this invention***, the communications
1820 between nodes should be both private and validated. This is preferably
1821 irrefutable but there should be options for refutable communications if
1822 required. For irrefutable communications the user logs on to the network
1823 and retrieves their key pair and ID. This is then used to start
1824 communications. Preferably the user's system will seek another node to
1825 transmit and receive from randomly – this adds to the masking of the
1826 user's private ID as the private ID is not used in any handshake with
1827 network resources apart from logging in to the network.

1828 As part of the initial handshake between users, a key may be passed.
1829 Preferably this is a code passed between users over another
1830 communications mechanism in a form such as a pin number known only

1831 to the users involved or it may be as simple as appending the user's
1832 name and other info to a communication request packet such as exists in
1833 some instant messaging clients today - i.e. David wants to communicate
1834 with you allow / deny / block.

1835 Unlike many communications systems today, this is carried out on a
1836 distributed server-less network. This however provides the problem of
1837 what to do when users are off line. Today messages are either, stopped
1838 or stored on a server, and in many cases not encrypted or secured. This
1839 invention allows users to have messages securely buffered whilst off line.
1840 This is preferably achieved by the node creating a unique identifier for
1841 only this session and passing that ID to all known nodes in the user's
1842 address book. Users on-line get this immediately, users off-line have this
1843 buffered to their last known random ID. This ensures that the ability to
1844 snoop on a user's messages is significantly reduced as there is no
1845 identifier to people outside the address book as to the name of the
1846 random ID bit the messages are stored to. The random ID bit is
1847 preferably used as the first part of the identified buffer file name and
1848 when more messages are stored then another file is saved with the
1849 random id and a number appended to it representing the next sequential
1850 available number. Therefore a user will log on and retrieve the messages
1851 sequentially. This allows buffered secured and distributed messaging to
1852 exist.

Document Signing (Figure 1 - P19)

1853 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, a by-product of
1854 securing communications between nodes using asymmetric encryption is
1855 as previously stated, introducing a non-refutable link. This allows for not
1856 only messages between nodes to be non-refutable but also for
1857 documents signed in the same manner as messages to be non refutable.
1858 Today somebody can easily steal a user's password or purposely attack

1859 users as they are not anonymous; this invention provides a great deal of
1860 anonymity and backs this up with access to resources.

1861 Documents may be signed and passed as legally enforceable between
1862 parties as a contract in many countries.

Contract Conversations (Figure 1 – P20)

1863 ***According to a related aspect of this invention,*** a conversation or
1864 topic can be requested under various contracted conditions. The system
1865 may have a non disclosure agreement as an example and both parties
1866 digitally sign this agreement automatically on acceptance of a contract
1867 conversation. In this case a non disclosure conversation. This will
1868 preferably speed up and protect commercial entities entering into
1869 agreements or where merely investigating a relationship. Preferably other
1870 conditions can be applied here such as preferably full disclosure
1871 conversations, Purchase order conversations, contract signing
1872 conversations etc. This is all carried out via a system preferably having
1873 ready made enforceable contracts for automatic signing. These contracts
1874 may preferably be country or legal domain specific and will require to be
1875 enforceable under the law of the countries where the conversation is
1876 happening. This will require the users to preferably automatically use a
1877 combination of geographic IP status and by selecting which is their home
1878 country and where are they are at that time located and having that
1879 conversation.

1880 Preferably only the discussion thread is under this contract, allowing any
1881 party to halt the contract but not the contents of the thread which is under
1882 contract.

1883 Preferably there can also be a very clear intent statement for a
1884 conversation that both parties agree to. This statement will form the basis

1885 of a contract in the event of any debate. The clearer the intent statement
1886 is; the better for enforceability. These conversations are potentially not
1887 enforceable but should lead to simplifying any resolution required at a
1888 later date. Preferably this can be added together with an actual contract
1889 conversation such as a non disclosure agreement to form a pack of
1890 contracts per conversation. Contract conversations will be clearly
1891 identified as such with copies of the contracts easily viewable by both
1892 parties at any time, these contracts will preferably be data maps and be
1893 very small in terms of storage space required.

ms_messenger (Figure 1 – PT6 and Figure 19)

- 1894 1. A non public ID preferably one which is used in some other autonomous
1895 system is used as a sign in mechanism and creates a Public ID key pair.
- 1896 2. The user selects or creates their public ID by entering a name that can
1897 easily be remembered (such as a nickname) the network is checked for a
1898 data element existing with a hash of this and if not there, this name is
1899 allowed. Otherwise the user is asked to choose again.
- 1900 3. This ID called the MPID (maidsafe.net public ID) can be passed freely
1901 between friends or printed on business cards etc. as an email address is
1902 today.
- 1903 4. To initiate communications a user enters the nickname of the person he
1904 is trying to communicate with along with perhaps a short statement (like a
1905 prearranged pin or other challenge). The receiver agrees or otherwise to
1906 this request, disagreeing means a negative score starts to build with
1907 initiator. This score may last for hours, days or even months depending
1908 on regularity of refusals. A high score will accompany any communication
1909 request messages. Users may set a limit on how many refusals a user
1910 has prior to being automatically ignored.

- 1911 5. All messages now transmitted are done so encrypted with the receiving
1912 party's public key, making messages less refutable.
- 1913 6. These messages may go through a proxy system or additional nodes to
1914 mask the location of each user.
- 1915 7. This system also allows document signing (digital signatures) and
1916 interestingly, contract conversations. This is where a contract is signed
1917 and shared between the users. Preferably this signed contract is equally
1918 available to all in a signed (non changeable manner) and retrievable by
1919 all. Therefore a distributed environment suits this method. These
1920 contracts may be NDAs Tenders, Purchase Orders etc.
- 1921 8. This may in some cases require individuals to prove their identity and this
1922 can take many forms from dealing with drivers licenses to utility bills
1923 being signed off in person or by other electronic methods such as
1924 inputting passport numbers, driving license numbers etc.
- 1925 9. If the recipient is on line then messages are sent straight to them for
1926 decoding.
- 1927 10. If the recipient is not on line, messages are require to be buffered as
1928 required with email today.
- 1929 11. Unlike today's email though, this is a distributed system with no servers to
1930 buffer to. In maidsafe.net messages are stored on the net encrypted with
1931 the receiver's public key. Buffer nodes may be known trusted nodes or
1932 not.
- 1933 12. Messages will look like receivers id.message 1.message 2 or simply
1934 be appended to the users MPID chunk, in both cases messages are
1935 signed by the sender. This allows messages to be buffered in cases

1936 where the user is offline. When the user comes on line he will check his
1937 ID chunk and look for appended messages as above ID.message1 etc.
1938 which is MPID.<message 1 data>.<message 2 data> etc.

1939 This system allows the ability for automatic system messages to be sent,
1940 i.e... in the case of sharing the share, data maps can exist on everyone's
1941 database and never be transmitted or stored in the open. File locks and
1942 changes to the maps can automatically be routed between users using
1943 the messenger system as described above. This is due to the distributed
1944 nature of maidsafe.net and is a great, positive differentiator from other
1945 messenger systems. These system commands will be strictly limited for
1946 security reasons and will initially be used to send alerts from trusted
1947 nodes and updates to share information by other shares of a private file
1948 share (whether they are speaking with them or not).

1949 The best way within our current power to get rid of email spam is to get
1950 rid of email servers.

Anonymous Transactions (Figure 1 - P24)

1951 ***According to a related aspect of this invention***, the ability to transact
1952 in a global digital medium is made available with this invention. This is
1953 achieved by passing signed credits to sellers in return for goods. The
1954 credits are data chunks with a given worth preferably 1, 5, 10, 20, 50,
1955 100 etc. units (called *cybers* in this case). These cybers are a digital
1956 representation of a monetary value and can be purchased as described
1957 below or earned for giving up machine resources such as disk space of
1958 cpu time etc. There should be preferably many ways to earn cybers.

1959 A cyber is actually a digitally signed piece of data containing the value
1960 statement i.e. 10 cybers and preferably a serial number. During a
1961 transaction the seller's serial number database is checked for validity of

1962 the cyber alone. The record of the ID used to transact is preferably not
 1963 transmitted or recorded. This cyber will have been signed by the issuing
 1964 authority as having a value. This value will have been proven and
 1965 preferably initially will actually equate to a single currency for instance
 1966 linked to a Euro. This will preferably alter through time as the system
 1967 increases in capability.

1968 Some sellers may request non anonymous transactions and if the user
 1969 agrees he will then use the public ID creation process to authenticate the
 1970 transaction and may have to supply more data. However there may be
 1971 other sellers who will sell anonymously. This has a dramatic effect on
 1972 marketing and demographic analysis etc. as some goods will sell
 1973 anywhere and some will not. It is assumed this system allows privacy
 1974 and freedom to purchase goods without being analysed.

1975 The process of transacting the cybers will preferably involve a signing
 1976 system such that two people in a transaction will actually pass the cyber
 1977 from the buyer to the seller. This process will preferably alter the
 1978 signature on the cyber to the seller's signature. This new signature is
 1979 reported back to the issuing authority.

Interface with Non-Anonymous Systems (Figure 1 - P23)

1980 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, people may purchase
 1981 digital cash or credits from any seller of the cash. The seller will
 1982 preferably create actual cash data chunks which are signed and
 1983 serialised to prevent forgery. This is preferably accountable as with
 1984 today's actual cash to prevent fraud and counterfeiting. Sellers will
 1985 preferably be registered centrally in some cases. The users can then
 1986 purchase cybers for cash and store these in their database of files in a
 1987 system preferably such as maidsafe.net.

1988 As a cyber is purchased it is preferably unusable and in fact simply a
 1989 reference number used to claim the cyber's monetary value by the
 1990 purchaser's system. This reference number will preferably be valid for a
 1991 period of time. The purchaser then logs in to their system such as
 1992 maidsafe.net and inputs the reference number in a secure
 1993 communications medium as a cyber request. This request is analysed by
 1994 the issuing authority and the transaction process begins. Preferably the
 1995 cyber is signed by the issuing authority that then preferably encrypts it
 1996 with the purchaser's public key and issues a signing request. The cyber
 1997 is not valid at this point. Only when a signed copy of the cyber is received
 1998 by the issuing authority is the serial number made valid and the cyber is
 1999 live.

2000 This cyber now belongs to the purchaser and validated by the issuer. To
 2001 carry out a transaction this process is preferably carried out again i.e. the
 2002 seller asks for payment and a cyber signed by the buyer is presented –
 2003 this is validated by checking with the issuer that the serial code is valid
 2004 and that the buyer is the actual owner of the cyber. Preferably the buyer
 2005 issues a digitally signed transaction record to the issuing authority to
 2006 state he is about to alter that cyber's owner. This is then passed to the
 2007 seller who is requested to sign it. The seller then signs the cyber and
 2008 requests the issuing authority to accept him as new owner via a signed
 2009 request. The authority then simply updates the current owner of the cyber
 2010 in their records.

2011 These transactions are preferably anonymous, as users should be using
 2012 a private id to accomplish this process. This private ID can be altered at
 2013 any time but the old id should be saved to allow cyber transactions to
 2014 take place with the old id.

Anonymity (Figure 1 - P25)

2015 ***According to a related aspect of this invention***, a system of voting
 2016 which is non refutable and also anonymous is to be considered. This is a
 2017 requirement to allow free speech and thinking to take place on a global
 2018 scale without recrimination and negative feedback as is often the case.

2019 To partake in a vote the user will have to be authenticated as above then
 2020 preferably be presented with the issue to be voted on. The user will then
 2021 use a private ID key to sign their vote anonymously. Preferably non
 2022 anonymous irrefutable voting may also take place in the system by
 2023 simply switching from a private ID to a public one. This will preferably
 2024 form the basis of a petition based system as an add-on to the voting
 2025 system.

2026 The system will require that a block of data can be published (preferably
 2027 broadcast to each user via messenger) and picked up by each user of
 2028 the system and presented as a poll. This poll will then be signed by the
 2029 user and sent back to the poll issuer whose system will count the votes
 2030 and preferably show a constant indication of the votes to date.

2031 As there are public and private IDs available, then each vote will require
 2032 preferably only ONE ID to be used to prevent double voting. Preferably
 2033 geographic IP may be used to establish geographic analysis of the voting
 2034 community, particularly on local issues.

Voting System (Figure 1 – PT8 and Figure 20)

2035 1. A vote is created in a normal fashion; it could be a list of candidates or a
 2036 list of choices that users have to select. Preferably this list will always
 2037 have an “I do not have enough information” option appended to the
 2038 bottom of the list – to ensure voters have sufficient knowledge to make a

- 2039 decision. A limit on the last option should be stipulated as a limit to void
2040 the vote and redo with more information.
- 2041 2. This vote is stored on the system with the ID of the voting authority. This
2042 may be a chunk of data called with a specific name and digitally signed
2043 for authenticity. All storage nodes may be allowed to ensure certain
2044 authorities are allowed to store votes, and only store votes digitally
2045 signed with the correct ID.
- 2046 3. A system broadcast may be used to let everyone interested know that
2047 there is a new vote to be retrieved. This is an optional step to reduce
2048 network congestion with constant checking for votes; other similar
2049 systems may be used for the same ends.
- 2050 4. A non anonymous user logged into the net will pick up the vote. This is a
2051 user with a public ID known at least to the authority. The vote may in fact
2052 be a shared chunk that only certain IDs have access to or know of its
2053 location (i.e. split onto several component parts and a messaging system
2054 used to alert when votes are ready.)
- 2055 5. An anonymous user may be logged onto the net and may in fact use a
2056 random ID to pick up the vote.
- 2057 6. The vote is retrieved.
- 2058 7. The system will send back a signed (with the ID used to pick up the vote)
2059 "I accept the vote".
- 2060 8. The voting authority will transmit a ballot paper – i.e. a digitally signed
2061 (and perhaps encrypted / chunked) ballot paper. This may be a digitally
2062 signed "authorisation to vote" slip which may or may not be sequentially
2063 numbered or perhaps a batch of x number of the same serial numbers (to

- 2064 prevent fraud by multiple voting from one source - i.e. issue 5 same
2065 numbers randomly and only accept 5 votes with that number).
- 2066 9. User machine decrypts this ballot paper.
- 2067 10. The users system creates a one time ID + key pair to vote. This public
2068 key can be hashed and stored on the net as with a MAID or PMID so as
2069 to allow checking of any signed or encrypted votes sent back.
- 2070 11. The vote is sent back to the authority signed and preferably encrypted
2071 with the authority's public key.
- 2072 12. In the case of anonymous or non anonymous voting this may be further
2073 masqueraded by passing the vote through proxy machines en route.
- 2074 13. The vote is received and a receipt chunk put on the net. This is a chunk
2075 called with the user's temp (or voting) ID hash with the last bit shifted or
2076 otherwise knowingly mangled – so as not to collide with the voting ID bit
2077 the user stores for authentication of their public key.
- 2078 14. The authority can then publish a list of who voted for what (i.e. a list of
2079 votes and the voting ID's)
- 2080 15. The user's system checks the list for the ID that was used being present
2081 in the list and validates that the vote was cast properly.
- 2082 If this is not the case.
- 2083 16. The users system issues an alert. This alert may take many forms and
2084 may include signing a vote alert packet; this can be a packed similarly (as
2085 in 13,) altered to be a known form of the vote chunk itself. There are
2086 many forms of raising alerts including simply transmitting an electronic

2087 message through messenger or similar and possibly to a vote
2088 authentication party and not necessarily the voting authority themselves.

2089 17. The user has all the information to show the party investigating voting
2090 authenticity, accuracy, legality or some other aspect, thereby allowing
2091 faults and deliberately introduced issues to be tracked down.

2092 18. The user has the option to remove all traces of the vote from his system
2093 at this time.

Proven Individual (Figure 1 - P26)

2094 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, using a system of
2095 anonymous authentication preferably as in maidsafe.net, the first stage is
2096 partially complete and individual accounts are authentic but this does not
2097 answer the question of anonymous individuals, this is described here.

2098 Access to a system can be made with information that we possess
2099 (passwords etc.) or something that we physically have (iris/ fingerprint or
2100 other biometric test). To prove an individual's identity the system will
2101 preferably use a biometric test. This is a key to the voting system as it
2102 becomes more broadly adopted. It is inherent in this system that any
2103 personally identifying data must be kept secret, and also that any
2104 passwords or access control information is never transmitted.

2105 When a user authenticates, the system can recognise if they have done
2106 so biometrically. In this case, the account is regarded as a unique
2107 individual rather than an individual account. This is possible as
2108 maidsafe.net can authenticate without accessing servers or database
2109 records of a biometric nature for example.

2110 As a user logs into maidsafe.net through a biometric mechanism then the
2111 state of login is known so no login box is presented for typing information
2112 in to access the system. This allows the system to guarantee that the
2113 user has logged in biometrically. The system on each machine is always
2114 validated by maidsafe.net on login to ensure this process cannot be
2115 compromised.

2116 Preferably some votes will exist only for biometrically authenticated
2117 users.

Distributed Controlled Voting (Figure 1 - P29)

2118 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, to further manage the
2119 system there has to be a level of control as well as distribution to enable
2120 all users to access it at any time. The distribution of the votes is
2121 controlled as system messages and stored for users using the
2122 messenger system described earlier.

2123 The main issue with a system such as this would be 'what' is voted on
2124 and 'who' poses the votes and words polls. This is key to the fairness
2125 and clarity of the system and process. This voting system will preferably
2126 always have a 'not enough information' selection to provide a route by
2127 which users are able to access information so that they are well informed
2128 before making any decision.

2129 The system will require a group of individuals, who are preferably voted
2130 into office by the public as the policyholders/ trustees of the voting
2131 system. This group will be known by their public ID and use their public
2132 ID to authenticate and publish a poll. This group will preferably be voted
2133 into office for a term and may be removed at any time via a consensus of
2134 the voting public. For this reason there will be continual polls on line

2135 which reflect how well the policyholders are doing as a group and
2136 preferably individually as well.

2137 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, users of the system
2138 will input to the larger issues on the system. Macro management should
2139 be carried out via the policyholders of the system, whom as mentioned
2140 previously may be voted in or out at any time, however larger issues
2141 should be left to the users. These issues can preferably be what licenses
2142 are used, costs of systems, dissemination of charitable contributions,
2143 provision to humanitarian and scientific projects of virtual computing
2144 resources on large scales etc.

2145 To achieve this, preferably a system message will be sent out, where it is
2146 not presented as a message but as a vote. This should show up in the
2147 users voting section of the system. User private IDs will be required to
2148 act on this vote and they can make their decision.

2149 There will be appeals on these votes when it would be apparent that
2150 conclusion of the vote is dangerous to either a small community or the
2151 system as a whole. Users will have an option of continuing with the vote
2152 and potential damage but essentially the user will decide and that will be
2153 final. Preferably this system does not have a block vote or any other
2154 system which rates one individual over another at any time or provides
2155 an advantage in any other way. This requires no ability to allow veto on
2156 any decision or casting of votes by proxy so that the authenticated user's
2157 decision is seen as properly recorded and final.

2158 **According to a related aspect of this invention**, a system of perpetual
2159 data, self encrypting files and data mapping will allow a global
2160 anonymous backup and restore system for data to exist. This system can
2161 be constructed from the previous discussions where data may be made
2162 perpetual on a network and anonymously shared to prevent duplication.
2163 This together with the ability to check, manipulate and maintain revision

2164 control over files adds the capability of a 'time machine' type environment
2165 where data may be time stamped on backup.

2166 This allows a system to rebuild a user's data set as it was at any time in
2167 history since using maidsafe.net or similar technologies. This may form a
2168 defence at times where in cases like prior art enquiries, insider dealing
2169 etc. is being considered, as the system is secure and validated by many
2170 other nodes etc. It can therefore be shown what knowledge (at least from
2171 the point of view of owning the data pertaining to a subject,) anyone had
2172 of certain circumstances.

2173 ***According to a related aspect of this invention,*** preferably using
2174 aspect(s) previously defined or any that may improve this situation.
2175 Taking distributed authentication, backup and restore along with data
2176 map sharing; the system can add to this the ability for granular access
2177 controls. In this case a node entering the network will request an
2178 authenticator to authorise its access. In this case the authenticator will be
2179 a manager or equivalent in an organisation (whether matrix managed or
2180 traditional pyramid). This authorisation will tie the public ID of the
2181 authoriser to the system as having access to this node's data and any
2182 other authorisations they make (in an authorisation chain).

2183 This allows an environment of distributed secure backup, restore and
2184 sharing in a corporate or otherwise private environment.

2185 ***According to a related aspect of this invention,*** all of the capabilities
2186 described here with the exception of the above will ensure that a network
2187 of nodes can be created, in which users have security privacy and
2188 freedom to operate.

2189 These nodes will have refutable IDs (MAID, PMID etc.) as well as non
2190 refutable IDs (MPID) for different purposes, just as in human life in

2191 general there is time to be identified and times when it is just best not to
2192 be.

2193 **According to a related aspect of this invention,** adding the ability of
2194 non refutable messaging allows users to not only communicate genuinely
2195 and securely but also the ability to communicate under contracted terms.
2196 This allows for the implementation of legally kept trade secrets (as
2197 implied with NDA agreements etc.) plus many more contracted
2198 communications. This will hopefully lessen the burden on legal issues
2199 such as litigation etc.

2200 **According to a related aspect of this invention,** adding the ability to
2201 create two voting systems, anonymous and non-anonymous, allows the
2202 system to provide a mechanism for instant democracy. This is achieved
2203 by allowing a voting panel in a user's account that is constantly updated
2204 with issues regarding the system and it's improvements initially. These
2205 votes will be anonymous.

2206 In another anonymous voting scenario users may continually vote on
2207 certain subjects (as in a running poll) these subjects could be the leaders
2208 of boards etc.

2209 In a non anonymous voting scenario it may be there's groups of identified
2210 people (via their MPID) who have a common grouping such as a charity
2211 or similar and they may require certain people to vote on certain matters
2212 and be recognised. This is where the MPID is used for voting.

2213 **According to a related aspect of this invention,** adding to this the
2214 ability to collect and trade credits anonymously allows users to sell
2215 machine resources they are not using, trade on a network with a cash
2216 equivalent and go about there business on a network as they do in real
2217 life.

CLAIMS

- 2218 1. A distributed network system which provides;
- 2219 a. secure communications
- 2220 b. store data & share resources
- 2221 c. anonymous backing and restoring data
- 2222 d. share private files & secure data without using server
- 2223 e. anonymous authentication of users
- 2224 f. approve transaction based on digital currency
- 2225 g. CPU sharing via anonymous voting system
- 2226 2. A distributed network product which provides;
- 2227 a. secure communications
- 2228 b. store data & share resources
- 2229 c. anonymous backing and restoring data
- 2230 d. share private files & secure data without using server
- 2231 e. anonymous authentication of users
- 2232 f. approve transaction based on digital currency
- 2233 g. CPU sharing via anonymous voting system
- 2234 3. A method of allowing users to securely store data and share resources
- 2235 across a distributed network by utilising anonymously shared computer
- 2236 resources;
- 2237 4. A method to allow secure communications between users by utilising
- 2238 public ID's linked to anonymous ID's to authenticate users as well as
- 2239 allowing contract signed conversations;
- 2240 5. A method to allow sharing and allocation of resources globally by utilising
- 2241 effort based testing and anonymously authenticated users in a global
- 2242 distributed network;

- 2243 6. A method specifically to backup and restore data anonymously in a
2244 distributed network with guarantees on integrity and recovery times;
- 2245 7. A method to share private and secured data without the use of file
2246 servers or any controlling body or centralised resource;
- 2247 8. A method to approve the exchange of resources and other transactions
2248 based on a digital currency which utilises links with non anonymous
2249 payment systems;
- 2250 9. A method to allow data to be described decoded and identified using
2251 very small data map files;
- 2252 10. A method to allow anonymous authentication of users on a network;
- 2253 11. A method of claim 4 to allow sharing of CPU power globally and to
2254 contribute to systems based on users input from a worldwide secure and
2255 anonymous voting system
- 2256 12. A method where a person's computer operating system and related
2257 computer program may be held on a removable disk (such as a USB
2258 stick optionally with biometric recognition to evade keyloggers) and used
2259 to boot any compatible computer with a known virus / trojan free system
2260 to access their data remotely and securely without worrying about the
2261 integrity of host machine they are using;
- 2262 13. At least one computer program comprising instructions for causing at
2263 least one computer to perform the method, system and product
2264 according to any of claims 1 to 12;
- 2265 14. That at least one computer program of claim 13 embodied on a recording
2266 medium or read-only memory, store.