Lani Watson
My research in the philosophy of questions focuses on the role that questions and questioning play in everyday life, both in our professional roles and in our personal relationships and interactions with others. I am especially interested in the vital but often underappreciated role that questions plays in education, political discourse, and organisational culture.
I work primarily from the perspectives of applied virtue and social epistemology. My recent and forthcoming publications explore the value of questioning as a learning tool, as a form of democratic engagement, as a response to corrupt media and political discourse, and as a vital skill for navigating the so-called Information Age. I also examine the intellectual virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness, presenting a case for cultivating these question-oriented virtues as an indispensable characterological resource, everywhere from the classroom to the boardroom to the online world.
I am co-founder of The QSM Ltd. where I have co-developed a unique, empirically validated assessment and training package, providing a research-backed method to help individuals and organisations harness the practical and powerful benefits of better questioning.
I am currently a Research Fellow at the University of Oxford, working on a £2.3 million project looking at values and virtues in tech, finance, and law. I was previously a Leverhulme Early Career Research Fellow at the University of Edinburgh and a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing, at the University of Oklahoma. I held a Teaching Fellowship at the University of Edinburgh in 2016 and I received my doctorate from the University of Edinburgh in 2015 with a thesis entitled 'Why Ask: The Epistemology of Questioning.'
AOS: Epistemology, Practical Ethics, Philosophy of Technology, Philosophy of Education
Professional website:
philosophyofquestions.com
Supervisors: Prof. Holly Branigan, Prof. Duncan Pritchard FRSE, Dr Allan Hazlett, and Prof. Theodore Scaltsas
I work primarily from the perspectives of applied virtue and social epistemology. My recent and forthcoming publications explore the value of questioning as a learning tool, as a form of democratic engagement, as a response to corrupt media and political discourse, and as a vital skill for navigating the so-called Information Age. I also examine the intellectual virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness, presenting a case for cultivating these question-oriented virtues as an indispensable characterological resource, everywhere from the classroom to the boardroom to the online world.
I am co-founder of The QSM Ltd. where I have co-developed a unique, empirically validated assessment and training package, providing a research-backed method to help individuals and organisations harness the practical and powerful benefits of better questioning.
I am currently a Research Fellow at the University of Oxford, working on a £2.3 million project looking at values and virtues in tech, finance, and law. I was previously a Leverhulme Early Career Research Fellow at the University of Edinburgh and a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing, at the University of Oklahoma. I held a Teaching Fellowship at the University of Edinburgh in 2016 and I received my doctorate from the University of Edinburgh in 2015 with a thesis entitled 'Why Ask: The Epistemology of Questioning.'
AOS: Epistemology, Practical Ethics, Philosophy of Technology, Philosophy of Education
Professional website:
philosophyofquestions.com
Supervisors: Prof. Holly Branigan, Prof. Duncan Pritchard FRSE, Dr Allan Hazlett, and Prof. Theodore Scaltsas
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In this paper I investigate what makes questioning bad (Section I) then offer a taxonomy of bad questioning practices (Section II). Drawing on examples of questioning in contemporary politics, I go on to discuss the nature and impact of bad questioning in the public sphere (Section III). I argue that bad questioning is an intellectual failing often expressed in intellectual vices such as negligence, closed-mindedness and arrogance (Section IV). As such, bad questioning in the public sphere degrades the professional character of, for example, journalists and politicians and undermines the wider role that they play in our epistemic communities. I conclude that greater attention should be paid to questioning practices in public and political forums in order to check and maintain the epistemic and characterological integrity of key social institutions (Section V).
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This book provides the first comprehensive examination of the right to know and other epistemic rights: rights to goods such as information, knowledge and truth. These rights play a prominent role in our information-centric society and yet they often go unnoticed, disregarded and unprotected. As such, those who control what we know, or think we know, exert an influence on our lives that is often as dangerous as it is imperceptible.
Beginning with a rigorous but accessible philosophical account of epistemic rights, Lani Watson examines the harms caused by epistemic rights violations, drawing on case studies across medical, political and legal contexts. She investigates who has the right to what information, who is responsible for the quality and circulation of information and what epistemic duties we have towards each other. This book is essential reading for philosophers, legal theorists and anyone concerned with the protection and promotion of information, knowledge and truth.
In this paper I investigate what makes questioning bad (Section I) then offer a taxonomy of bad questioning practices (Section II). Drawing on examples of questioning in contemporary politics, I go on to discuss the nature and impact of bad questioning in the public sphere (Section III). I argue that bad questioning is an intellectual failing often expressed in intellectual vices such as negligence, closed-mindedness and arrogance (Section IV). As such, bad questioning in the public sphere degrades the professional character of, for example, journalists and politicians and undermines the wider role that they play in our epistemic communities. I conclude that greater attention should be paid to questioning practices in public and political forums in order to check and maintain the epistemic and characterological integrity of key social institutions (Section V).
This book provides the first comprehensive examination of the right to know and other epistemic rights: rights to goods such as information, knowledge and truth. These rights play a prominent role in our information-centric society and yet they often go unnoticed, disregarded and unprotected. As such, those who control what we know, or think we know, exert an influence on our lives that is often as dangerous as it is imperceptible.
Beginning with a rigorous but accessible philosophical account of epistemic rights, Lani Watson examines the harms caused by epistemic rights violations, drawing on case studies across medical, political and legal contexts. She investigates who has the right to what information, who is responsible for the quality and circulation of information and what epistemic duties we have towards each other. This book is essential reading for philosophers, legal theorists and anyone concerned with the protection and promotion of information, knowledge and truth.