Keith Frankish
I am a Senior Visiting Research Fellow with The Open University, UK (where I was until recently a Senior Lecturer) and an Adjunct Professor with the Brain and Mind Programme at the University of Crete, Greece.
My main research interests lie in philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mind. My early work was on folk psychology, which, I argued, has two different strands, corresponding to two distinct levels of mentality (*Mind and Supermind*, CUP 2004). Since then, I have explored various issues emerging from this work, including the belief/acceptance distinction, doxastic voluntarism, the distinction between partial and flat-out belief, and, in particular, the philosophical implications of dual-process theories of reasoning developed by cognitive and social psychologists. In 2006 I devised and organized the first international interdisciplinary conference on dual-process theories, working in collaboration with Professor Jonathan Evans, and later Jonathan and I edited a major collection of papers on the topic (*In Two Minds, Dual Processes and Beyond*, OUP 2009). I am currently exploring the implications of a dual-process framework for understanding psychotic delusions.
A second research focus is on phenomenal consciousness, where I defend an increasingly radical physicalist approach. I have published a response to the zombie argument, showing that parallel considerations can be used to argue for physicalism ('The anti-zombie argument', 2007) and I have attacked the coherence of the weak notion of qualia commonly used to identify the explanandum for theories of consciousness ('Quining diet qualia', 2011).
In addition, I am completing work on two volumes in the 'Cambridge Handbooks' series, in collaboration with William Ramsey of the University of Nevada (The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence and The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science, both CUP, 2012).
I also have research interests in the areas of philosophy of action, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic.
In the teaching field, as well designing and teaching courses at traditional universities, I have written textbooks for several Open University courses. I enjoy the challenge of presenting philosophical arguments in an accessible and engaging way.
My personal website http://www.keithfrankish.com contains the latest information about me, my research, my publications, selected talks and lectures I have given, and more. It also makes available eprints of my work, podcasts, and lecture presentations.
Address: Please email for address details.
My main research interests lie in philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mind. My early work was on folk psychology, which, I argued, has two different strands, corresponding to two distinct levels of mentality (*Mind and Supermind*, CUP 2004). Since then, I have explored various issues emerging from this work, including the belief/acceptance distinction, doxastic voluntarism, the distinction between partial and flat-out belief, and, in particular, the philosophical implications of dual-process theories of reasoning developed by cognitive and social psychologists. In 2006 I devised and organized the first international interdisciplinary conference on dual-process theories, working in collaboration with Professor Jonathan Evans, and later Jonathan and I edited a major collection of papers on the topic (*In Two Minds, Dual Processes and Beyond*, OUP 2009). I am currently exploring the implications of a dual-process framework for understanding psychotic delusions.
A second research focus is on phenomenal consciousness, where I defend an increasingly radical physicalist approach. I have published a response to the zombie argument, showing that parallel considerations can be used to argue for physicalism ('The anti-zombie argument', 2007) and I have attacked the coherence of the weak notion of qualia commonly used to identify the explanandum for theories of consciousness ('Quining diet qualia', 2011).
In addition, I am completing work on two volumes in the 'Cambridge Handbooks' series, in collaboration with William Ramsey of the University of Nevada (The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence and The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science, both CUP, 2012).
I also have research interests in the areas of philosophy of action, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic.
In the teaching field, as well designing and teaching courses at traditional universities, I have written textbooks for several Open University courses. I enjoy the challenge of presenting philosophical arguments in an accessible and engaging way.
My personal website http://www.keithfrankish.com contains the latest information about me, my research, my publications, selected talks and lectures I have given, and more. It also makes available eprints of my work, podcasts, and lecture presentations.
Address: Please email for address details.
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Books by Keith Frankish
The volume will be suitable for upper-level undergraduates, graduate students, and scholars, with a particular emphasis on the second group. No extensive background knowledge is assumed, either in philosophy or the primary subject areas themselves.
A companion Handbook of Artificial Intelligence is being prepared by the same editors, and the two volumes have been conceived as a pair.
This book aims to make recent philosophical work on consciousness accessible to newcomers to the area, using techniques the OU has successfully developed over the last 30 years—guiding students through the key positions and arguments, and using carefully edited readings and extensive questions, activities, and discussions of answers. It provides a sound grounding in the current debate about consciousness and will enable the reader to adopt an informed position on the issue.
Although written for an Open University course, the book is completely self-contained and assumes no prior knowledge of the subject area. It is an ideal introduction to the philosophy of consciousness, both for the general reader and for students.
Despite the attention these theories are attracting, there is still poor communication between dual-process theorists themselves, and the substantial bodies of work on dual processes in cognitive psychology and social psychology remain isolated from each other. This book brings together leading researchers on dual processes to summarize the state-of-the-art, highlight key issues, present different perspectives, explore implications, and provide a stimulus to further work.
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The volume includes new ideas about the human mind both by contemporary philosophers interested in broad theoretical questions about mental architecture and by psychologists specialising in traditionally distinct and isolated fields. For all those in the cognitive sciences, this is a book that will advance dual-process theorizing, promote interdisciplinary communication, and encourage further applications of dual-process approaches.
Papers by Keith Frankish
The volume will be suitable for upper-level undergraduates, graduate students, and scholars, with a particular emphasis on the second group. No extensive background knowledge is assumed, either in philosophy or the primary subject areas themselves.
A companion Handbook of Artificial Intelligence is being prepared by the same editors, and the two volumes have been conceived as a pair.
This book aims to make recent philosophical work on consciousness accessible to newcomers to the area, using techniques the OU has successfully developed over the last 30 years—guiding students through the key positions and arguments, and using carefully edited readings and extensive questions, activities, and discussions of answers. It provides a sound grounding in the current debate about consciousness and will enable the reader to adopt an informed position on the issue.
Although written for an Open University course, the book is completely self-contained and assumes no prior knowledge of the subject area. It is an ideal introduction to the philosophy of consciousness, both for the general reader and for students.
Despite the attention these theories are attracting, there is still poor communication between dual-process theorists themselves, and the substantial bodies of work on dual processes in cognitive psychology and social psychology remain isolated from each other. This book brings together leading researchers on dual processes to summarize the state-of-the-art, highlight key issues, present different perspectives, explore implications, and provide a stimulus to further work.
.
The volume includes new ideas about the human mind both by contemporary philosophers interested in broad theoretical questions about mental architecture and by psychologists specialising in traditionally distinct and isolated fields. For all those in the cognitive sciences, this is a book that will advance dual-process theorizing, promote interdisciplinary communication, and encourage further applications of dual-process approaches.
that on the action-based view there are no S2 attitudes. This paper replies to Carruthers, proposing a view of S2 attitudes as virtual ones, which are partially realized in S1 attitudes. This view is compatible with, and a natural extension of, the action-based
view.