

Practical Malware Analysis

The Hands-On Guide to Dissecting Malicious Software

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errata updated to print 18




| Page | Error | Correction | Print corrected |
|------|---------------------------------|--|-----------------|
| 10 | 373e7a863a1a345c60edb9e20ec3231 | 373e7a863a1a345c60edb9e20ec3231 1 | Print 2 |
| 54 | Figure replacement |  <p>The screenshot displays a Wireshark capture of network traffic. The packet list pane shows several packets, including a DNS standard query and an HTTP GET request. The packet details pane for the selected HTTP GET request shows the following structure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nAccept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, */*\r\nAccept-Language: en-us\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0)\r\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n <p>The packet bytes pane shows the raw data of the request, including the hex and ASCII representation of the GET request.</p> | Print 6 |

Figure 3-10: Wireshark DNS and HTTP example

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| 66 | Figure replacement |  <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Figure 4-1: Code level examples</i></p> | Print 2 |
| 74 | ... instruction such as <code>lea ebx, [eax*5+5]</code> , where <code>eax</code> is a number, rather than a memory address. This instruction is the functional equivalent of <code>ebx = (eax+1)*5</code> , but the former is shorter or more efficient for the compiler to use instead of a total of four instructions (for example <code>inc eax; mov ecx, 5; mul ecx; mov ebx, eax</code>). | ... instruction such as <code>lea ebx, [eax*4+4]</code> , where <code>eax</code> is a number, rather than a memory address. This instruction is the functional equivalent of <code>ebx = (eax+1)*4</code> , but the former is shorter or more efficient for the compiler to use instead of a total of four instructions (for example <code>inc eax; mov ecx, 4; mul ecx; mov ebx, eax</code>). | Print 14 |
| 76 | The instruction <code>nop</code> is actually a pseudonym for <code>xchg eax, eax</code> ... | The instruction <code>nop</code> is actually a pseudonym for <code>xchg eax, eax</code> ... | Print 7 |

| Page | Error | Correction | Print corrected |
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| 79 | Figure replacement |  <p data-bbox="1066 820 1396 852">Figure 4-8: Individual stack frame</p> | Print 8 |
| 82 | This works in the same way as cmpsb, but it compares the byte located at address ESI to AL, rather than to EDI . | This works in the same way as cmpsb, but it compares the byte located at address EDI to AL, rather than to ESI . | Print 8 |
| 84 | Table 4-12 | Listing 4-2 | Print 10 |
| 110, 111 | <pre>printf("total = %d\n", x);</pre> | <pre>printf("Total = %d\n", x);</pre> | Print 4 |
| 111, 112 | <pre>00401006 mov dword ptr [ebp-4], 0 0040100D mov dword ptr [ebp-8], 1</pre> | <pre>00401006 mov dword ptr [ebp-4], 1 0040100D mov dword ptr [ebp-8], 2</pre> | Print 2 |
| 148 | The <code>lpStartupInfo</code> structure for the process stores the standard output ❶ , standard input ❷ , and standard error ❸ that will be used for the new process. | The <code>lpStartupInfo</code> structure for the process stores the standard output ❷ , standard input ❸ , and standard error ❶ that will be used for the new process. | Print 2 |
| 178 | ... and <code>0x411001</code> if the language is Chinese. | ... and <code>0x41100A</code> if the language is Chinese. | Print 7 |
| 258 | <pre>CreateProcess(..., "svchost.exe", ..., CREATE_SUSPEND, ...);</pre> | <pre>CreateProcess(..., "svchost.exe", ..., CREATE_SUSPENDED, ...);</pre> | Print 2 |

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| 263 | Every thread has a queue of APCs attached to it, and these are processed when the thread is in an alertable state, such as when they call functions like WaitForSingleObjectEx, WaitForMultipleObjectsEx, and Sleep. | Every thread has a queue of APCs attached to it, and these are processed when the thread is in an alertable state, such as when they call functions like WaitForSingleObjectEx, WaitForMultipleObjectsEx, and Sleep Ex . | Print 2 |
| 290 | <pre>cbuf = f.read()</pre> | <pre>cbuf = cfile.read()</pre> | Print 5 |
| 338 | Figure replacement | <p>Figure 15-5: Multilevel inward-jumping sequence</p> | Print 2 |
| 338 | <pre>74 F9 jz short near ptr sub_4011C0+1</pre> | <pre>74 FA jz short near ptr sub_4011C0+2</pre> | Print 2 |
| 339 | <pre>F9 db 0F9h</pre> | <pre>FA db 0FAh</pre> | Print 2 |
| 363 | Because INT 0x2D is the way that kernel debuggers set breakpoints, the method shown in Listing 16-10 applies. | Because INT 0x2D is the way that kernel debuggers set breakpoints, the method shown in Listing 16-9 applies. | Print 2 |
| 376 | 0x5668 (vx) | 0x5658 (vx) | Print 14 |
| 440 | 3. At 0x4036F0, there is a function call that takes the string Config error, followed a few instructions later by a call to CxxThrowException. | 3. The function 0x4036F0 is called multiple times and each time it takes the string Config error, followed a few instructions later by a call to CxxThrowException. | Print 6 |
| 447 | \WOW64 | \SysWOW64 | Print 12 |
| 448 | C:\Windows\WOW64 | C:\Windows\SysWOW64 | Print 12 |
| 471 | URL update | You can download PEview from http://wjradburn.com/software/ | Print 2 |
| 499 | View ► Graphs ► Xrefs From | View ► Graphs ► User Xrefs Chart | Print 2 |
| 514 | If the call fails, the program exits. | If the call succeeds, the program exits. | Print 2 |

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| 523 | ... if so, it calls the <code>sleep</code> function to sleep for 60 seconds. | ... if so, it calls the <code>sleep</code> function to sleep for about 394 seconds. | Print 6 |
| 533 | <i>If you perform a full analysis of 0x402520...</i> | <i>If you perform a full analysis of 0x402510...</i> | Print 7 |
| 649 | The two functions (<code>sub_4012F2</code> and <code>sub_401369</code>)... | The two functions (<code>sub_40130F</code> and <code>sub_401386</code>)... | Print 2 |
| 675 | The malware is querying the I/O communication port (0x56 68)... | The malware is querying the I/O communication port (0x56 58)... | Print 14 |
| 680 | ... as described in “Searching for Vulnerable Instructions” on page 670 . | ... as described in “Searching for Vulnerable Instructions” on page 678 . | Print 6 |