Why did the flurry of summitry in the Trump years to denuclearize North Korea fall short? What is... more Why did the flurry of summitry in the Trump years to denuclearize North Korea fall short? What is the crux of the Korean security problem? To understand peninsular security, I argue that a more holistic approach is warranted to unpack and piece together the many crosscutting and overlapping security dynamics in a cogent and coherent manner. In this article, I first argue that the Korean Peninsula should be understood as a security system writ large, comprising the United States, China, and the two Koreas as indispensable players in all major issues pertaining to peninsular security. The second section introduces complex systems theory as an analytical approach that injects more sophistication and dynamic into the otherwise overly structural analysis typical of the field. The third and fourth sections reconstruct the unfolding of major events in terms of a positive feedback loop – namely, how great power realpolitik and North Korea’s provocations converged and ricocheted to cause the crisis in 2017, as well as a negative feedback loop in which triangular interactions both facilitated and obstructed US – North Korea wrangling. The conclusion offers some preliminary assessments of how things might play out in the future.
Why did the flurry of summitry in the Trump years to denuclearize
North Korea fall short? What is... more Why did the flurry of summitry in the Trump years to denuclearize North Korea fall short? What is the crux of the Korean security problem? To understand peninsular security, I argue that a more holistic approach is warranted to unpack and piece together the many crosscutting and overlapping security dynamics in a cogent and coherent manner. In this article, I first argue that the Korean Peninsula should be understood as a security system writ large, comprising the United States, China, and the two Koreas as indispensable players in all major issues pertaining to peninsular security. The second section introduces complex systems theory as an analytical approach that injects more sophistication and dynamic into the otherwise overly structural analysis typical of the field. The third and fourth sections reconstruct the unfolding of major events in terms of a positive feedback loop – namely, how great power realpolitik and North Korea’s provocations converged and ricocheted to cause the crisis in 2017, as well as a negative feedback loop in which triangular interactions both facilitated and obstructed US – North Korea wrangling. The conclusion offers some preliminary assessments of how things might play out in the future.
No amount of sugarcoating can downplay the current depth and scope of stress in Sino-US relations... more No amount of sugarcoating can downplay the current depth and scope of stress in Sino-US relations. Clashes routinely run the gamut between Beijing’s handling of Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan; its...
Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught... more Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught of punishing acts—the trade war being a prime, but far from the only, example. This article, in addition to contextualizing their earlier optimism about the relations with the United States under President Trump, examines why Chinese leaders and analysts were surprised by the turn of events. It argues that three main factors contributed to the lapse of judgment. First, Chinese officials and analysts grossly misunderstood Donald Trump the individual. By overemphasizing his pragmatism while downplaying his unpredictability, they ended up underprepared for the policies he unleashed. Second, some ingrained Chinese beliefs, manifested in the analogies of the pendulum swing and the ‘bickering couple’, as well as the narrative of the ‘ballast’, lulled officials and scholars into undue optimism about the stability of the broader relationship. Third, analytical and methodological problems as wel...
This article aims to provide a first-cut analysis of the causes of the initial COVID-19 outbreak ... more This article aims to provide a first-cut analysis of the causes of the initial COVID-19 outbreak as well as the subsequent political contestations in which the masses ended up rallying behind the party-state. While the Wuhan fiasco had everything to do with entrenched pathologies of the bureaucratic state, after Beijing took central command of the broader campaign its overriding priority was to contain the virus with a goal toward salvaging its legitimacy at home. To that end, Beijing unleashed its warrior diplomats to aggressively defend its handling of the pandemic, even to the detriment of its international image. Nevertheless, the strategy worked because the nationalist and populist backlash against the regime's foreign and domestic critics helped turn the public opinion around in its favor.
Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught of ... more Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught of punishing acts—the trade war being a prime, but far from the only, example. This article, in addition to contextualizing their earlier optimism about the relations with the United States under President Trump, examines why Chinese leaders and analysts were surprised by the turn of events. It argues that three main factors contributed to the lapse of judgment. First, Chinese officials and analysts grossly misunderstood Donald Trump the individual. By overemphasizing his pragmatism while downplaying his unpredictability, they ended up underprepared for the policies he unleashed. Second, some ingrained Chinese beliefs, manifested in the analogies of the pendulum swing and the ‘bickering couple’, as well as the narrative of the ‘ballast’, lulled officials and scholars into undue optimism about the stability of the broader relationship. Third, analytical and methodological problems as well as political considerations prevented them from fully grasping the strategic shift against China in the US.
Since the early 2000s, crises on the Korean Peninsula have prompted Chinese intellectuals and pol... more Since the early 2000s, crises on the Korean Peninsula have prompted Chinese intellectuals and policy elites into fierce debates about Beijing’s North Korea policy. This study first provides an overview of those testy exchanges and then delves into the contestations about the bilateral relationship as well as the underlying assumptions beneath. On the question of identification, the Chinese are torn between characterizing North Korea as an ally or just as a neighbourly friend. On the question of whether its usefulness justifies continued Chinese support, the debates have revolved around North Korea as a geopolitical buffer, even though the strategic underpinnings are questionable. In both cases the mainstream views are fraught with contradictions and inconsistencies, which will certainly continue to hobble China’s North Korea policy.
Why has the Western strategy of engagement towards China been less effective than initially heral... more Why has the Western strategy of engagement towards China been less effective than initially heralded? Juxtaposing theoretical advances in the International Relations (IR) scholarship against the evolution of China's domestic politics and foreign behaviour, this article critically examines the socialization scholarship, not only because of the tremendous amount of theoretical purchase constructivists have invested in it, but also because liberal-minded IR scholars have predictably relied upon this line of inquiry to endorse a strategy of engagement and integration towards an outsider power such as China. I argue that the effects of engagement/socialization are often overstated and oversold, because conventional constructivists, in their attempt to specify the conditions under which certain behavioural adaptation constitutes identity change, tend to obfuscate some issues of theoretical and methodological concern. Two approaches are under the spotlight. First, transnationalism, as it pertains to China, has a poor record of engendering and sustaining domestic political change, because the party-state, firmly in the driver's seat, fiercely rebuffs any foreign attempt that it deems to undermine its iron-clad hold on state power. Secondly, international institutions are not as transformative as claimed by constructivists, who conflate the distinction between agents and principals. Furthermore, the socialization perspective's penchant for positioning the state in question in a reactive mode can be an analytical straitjacket, in turn rendering it outdated and inadequate to capture the critically important dynamics and dimensions of a great power such as China in international politics and global governance. I call for a more compressive and eclectic approach that understands China as a proactive participant in international affairs.
In lieu of taking stock of the many problems presently plaguing Sino‐US relations, this research ... more In lieu of taking stock of the many problems presently plaguing Sino‐US relations, this research zeroes in on just one of them – the evolving situation on the Korean Peninsula that has both alarmed and captivated the world. Korea, prima facie , is a case that has the likely potential to erupt into an open conflict between China and the United States. Situated against the broad context of great power entanglement on the Peninsula, this paper examines the convergence, as well as divergence, of interests and strategic objectives for both China and the United States in terms of areas of cooperation and competition. It argues that their shared aversion to a war, and the complex, multilateral nature of the matter, distinguishes Korea from other disputes, particularly Taiwan and the South China Sea. Korea, therefore, is not at the center of a Sino‐US Thucydides Trap. Nevertheless, Sino‐US competition to shape the future of the strategic landscape of the Peninsula will undoubtedly continue and might even intensify.
In tackling the current nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, President Donald Trump has invest... more In tackling the current nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, President Donald Trump has invested—especially before the dramatic turn of events since early 2018—a great deal of political capital in President Xi Jinping in the hopes that he might rein in North Korea, China's traditional ally. However, expecting Beijing to ‘solve’ the problem is unrealistic. Chinese thinking on North Korea—as reflected in policy positions and domestic debates—has been marred by inconsistencies and overcaution and it is now further complicated by the intensifying geopolitical competition with the United States, which also embroils, to a varying degree, South Korea and Taiwan. Beijing has been strenuously walking a fine line between pressing Pyongyang and averting a war, all the while watching its back, particularly with regard to Taiwan and the South China Sea. Beijing's risk aversion over North Korea and its security competition with the US has led it into a geopolitical conundrum from which there is no clear exit.
Synopsis Instead of seeking the forgiveness of Japan's neighbours, Abe recast his war apology lar... more Synopsis Instead of seeking the forgiveness of Japan's neighbours, Abe recast his war apology largely in the context of current Sino-Japanese relations that shed unfavourable light on China. His no-more-apologies caveat bodes ill for reconciliation as Japanese revisionists unwind past apologies and repentance. Commentary IN THE intense anticipation of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's speech commemorating the 70th anniversary of Japan's World War II surrender, the question was whether he would apologise. It turned out that he raised the Japanese art of apology a notch. In the unusually lengthy statement, he sketched out a broad tapestry of history in which Japan "took the wrong course and advanced along the road to war". He touched on the key words of aggression, repentance, remorse and apology that are deemed indispensable for historical and political correctness. Those looking for something uniquely "Abe-esque," however, are immediately drawn to his caution that "We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologise". To the untrained Western ear, that Japan has a limited supply of apologies makes sense-not only because they have been repeatedly offered but also because Abe pledged to "inherit the past" and "pass it on to the future". So profuse are the regrets that China's refusal to let bygones be bygones would only prove how vengeful the Chinese still are towards the Japanese. Blaming the victims Targeting the Chinese but speaking to the international audience at large was what Abe had done; the speech made direct reference to China or the Chinese four times (but not including the Manchurian Incident), mentioned South Korea only once while North Korea and Japan's annexation of the whole Peninsular were conveniently neglected. Still, Abe did recount the good deeds of the
Japanese foreign policy since the late 1980s has exhibited many signs of liberal internationalism... more Japanese foreign policy since the late 1980s has exhibited many signs of liberal internationalism: a generous development assistance package despite its economic malaise, an expanded presence in international peacekeeping and peace-building missions, and a multi-faceted, people-centered approach to international security. This article, however, draws attention to the (non)liberal character of Japanese activism by shedding light on Japan's entanglement in democracy assistance, a trademark liberal internationalist project. Two features stand out in this juxta-position. First, democracy assistance has been seen as supplementary-rather than parallel-to the peace and development initiatives in Japan's diplomatic repertoire. Second, when democracy was indeed played up, the act nonetheless exposed the myriad innate contradictions between the liberal paradigm and Japan's nationalist impulses that transpired in its diplomatic offensives. Humanistic as it can be at times, Japan's global outreach is non-liberal at best because it is intellectually informed and motivated by a confluence of nationalist resurgence and realist power considerations.
Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught of ... more Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught of punishing acts—the trade war being a prime, but far from the only, example. This article, in addition to contextualizing their earlier optimism about the relations with the United States under President Trump, examines why Chinese leaders and analysts were surprised by the turn of events. It argues that three main factors contributed to the lapse of judgment. First, Chinese officials and analysts grossly misunderstood Donald Trump the individual. By overemphasizing his pragmatism while downplaying his unpredictability, they ended up underprepared for the policies he unleashed. Second, some ingrained Chinese beliefs, manifested in the analogies of the pendulum swing and the ‘bickering couple’, as well as the narrative of the ‘ballast’, lulled officials and scholars into undue optimism about the stability of the broader relationship. Third, analytical and methodological problems as well as political considerations prevented them from fully grasping the strategic shift against China in the US.
Why did the flurry of summitry in the Trump years to denuclearize North Korea fall short? What is... more Why did the flurry of summitry in the Trump years to denuclearize North Korea fall short? What is the crux of the Korean security problem? To understand peninsular security, I argue that a more holistic approach is warranted to unpack and piece together the many crosscutting and overlapping security dynamics in a cogent and coherent manner. In this article, I first argue that the Korean Peninsula should be understood as a security system writ large, comprising the United States, China, and the two Koreas as indispensable players in all major issues pertaining to peninsular security. The second section introduces complex systems theory as an analytical approach that injects more sophistication and dynamic into the otherwise overly structural analysis typical of the field. The third and fourth sections reconstruct the unfolding of major events in terms of a positive feedback loop – namely, how great power realpolitik and North Korea’s provocations converged and ricocheted to cause the crisis in 2017, as well as a negative feedback loop in which triangular interactions both facilitated and obstructed US – North Korea wrangling. The conclusion offers some preliminary assessments of how things might play out in the future.
Why did the flurry of summitry in the Trump years to denuclearize
North Korea fall short? What is... more Why did the flurry of summitry in the Trump years to denuclearize North Korea fall short? What is the crux of the Korean security problem? To understand peninsular security, I argue that a more holistic approach is warranted to unpack and piece together the many crosscutting and overlapping security dynamics in a cogent and coherent manner. In this article, I first argue that the Korean Peninsula should be understood as a security system writ large, comprising the United States, China, and the two Koreas as indispensable players in all major issues pertaining to peninsular security. The second section introduces complex systems theory as an analytical approach that injects more sophistication and dynamic into the otherwise overly structural analysis typical of the field. The third and fourth sections reconstruct the unfolding of major events in terms of a positive feedback loop – namely, how great power realpolitik and North Korea’s provocations converged and ricocheted to cause the crisis in 2017, as well as a negative feedback loop in which triangular interactions both facilitated and obstructed US – North Korea wrangling. The conclusion offers some preliminary assessments of how things might play out in the future.
No amount of sugarcoating can downplay the current depth and scope of stress in Sino-US relations... more No amount of sugarcoating can downplay the current depth and scope of stress in Sino-US relations. Clashes routinely run the gamut between Beijing’s handling of Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan; its...
Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught... more Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught of punishing acts—the trade war being a prime, but far from the only, example. This article, in addition to contextualizing their earlier optimism about the relations with the United States under President Trump, examines why Chinese leaders and analysts were surprised by the turn of events. It argues that three main factors contributed to the lapse of judgment. First, Chinese officials and analysts grossly misunderstood Donald Trump the individual. By overemphasizing his pragmatism while downplaying his unpredictability, they ended up underprepared for the policies he unleashed. Second, some ingrained Chinese beliefs, manifested in the analogies of the pendulum swing and the ‘bickering couple’, as well as the narrative of the ‘ballast’, lulled officials and scholars into undue optimism about the stability of the broader relationship. Third, analytical and methodological problems as wel...
This article aims to provide a first-cut analysis of the causes of the initial COVID-19 outbreak ... more This article aims to provide a first-cut analysis of the causes of the initial COVID-19 outbreak as well as the subsequent political contestations in which the masses ended up rallying behind the party-state. While the Wuhan fiasco had everything to do with entrenched pathologies of the bureaucratic state, after Beijing took central command of the broader campaign its overriding priority was to contain the virus with a goal toward salvaging its legitimacy at home. To that end, Beijing unleashed its warrior diplomats to aggressively defend its handling of the pandemic, even to the detriment of its international image. Nevertheless, the strategy worked because the nationalist and populist backlash against the regime's foreign and domestic critics helped turn the public opinion around in its favor.
Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught of ... more Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught of punishing acts—the trade war being a prime, but far from the only, example. This article, in addition to contextualizing their earlier optimism about the relations with the United States under President Trump, examines why Chinese leaders and analysts were surprised by the turn of events. It argues that three main factors contributed to the lapse of judgment. First, Chinese officials and analysts grossly misunderstood Donald Trump the individual. By overemphasizing his pragmatism while downplaying his unpredictability, they ended up underprepared for the policies he unleashed. Second, some ingrained Chinese beliefs, manifested in the analogies of the pendulum swing and the ‘bickering couple’, as well as the narrative of the ‘ballast’, lulled officials and scholars into undue optimism about the stability of the broader relationship. Third, analytical and methodological problems as well as political considerations prevented them from fully grasping the strategic shift against China in the US.
Since the early 2000s, crises on the Korean Peninsula have prompted Chinese intellectuals and pol... more Since the early 2000s, crises on the Korean Peninsula have prompted Chinese intellectuals and policy elites into fierce debates about Beijing’s North Korea policy. This study first provides an overview of those testy exchanges and then delves into the contestations about the bilateral relationship as well as the underlying assumptions beneath. On the question of identification, the Chinese are torn between characterizing North Korea as an ally or just as a neighbourly friend. On the question of whether its usefulness justifies continued Chinese support, the debates have revolved around North Korea as a geopolitical buffer, even though the strategic underpinnings are questionable. In both cases the mainstream views are fraught with contradictions and inconsistencies, which will certainly continue to hobble China’s North Korea policy.
Why has the Western strategy of engagement towards China been less effective than initially heral... more Why has the Western strategy of engagement towards China been less effective than initially heralded? Juxtaposing theoretical advances in the International Relations (IR) scholarship against the evolution of China's domestic politics and foreign behaviour, this article critically examines the socialization scholarship, not only because of the tremendous amount of theoretical purchase constructivists have invested in it, but also because liberal-minded IR scholars have predictably relied upon this line of inquiry to endorse a strategy of engagement and integration towards an outsider power such as China. I argue that the effects of engagement/socialization are often overstated and oversold, because conventional constructivists, in their attempt to specify the conditions under which certain behavioural adaptation constitutes identity change, tend to obfuscate some issues of theoretical and methodological concern. Two approaches are under the spotlight. First, transnationalism, as it pertains to China, has a poor record of engendering and sustaining domestic political change, because the party-state, firmly in the driver's seat, fiercely rebuffs any foreign attempt that it deems to undermine its iron-clad hold on state power. Secondly, international institutions are not as transformative as claimed by constructivists, who conflate the distinction between agents and principals. Furthermore, the socialization perspective's penchant for positioning the state in question in a reactive mode can be an analytical straitjacket, in turn rendering it outdated and inadequate to capture the critically important dynamics and dimensions of a great power such as China in international politics and global governance. I call for a more compressive and eclectic approach that understands China as a proactive participant in international affairs.
In lieu of taking stock of the many problems presently plaguing Sino‐US relations, this research ... more In lieu of taking stock of the many problems presently plaguing Sino‐US relations, this research zeroes in on just one of them – the evolving situation on the Korean Peninsula that has both alarmed and captivated the world. Korea, prima facie , is a case that has the likely potential to erupt into an open conflict between China and the United States. Situated against the broad context of great power entanglement on the Peninsula, this paper examines the convergence, as well as divergence, of interests and strategic objectives for both China and the United States in terms of areas of cooperation and competition. It argues that their shared aversion to a war, and the complex, multilateral nature of the matter, distinguishes Korea from other disputes, particularly Taiwan and the South China Sea. Korea, therefore, is not at the center of a Sino‐US Thucydides Trap. Nevertheless, Sino‐US competition to shape the future of the strategic landscape of the Peninsula will undoubtedly continue and might even intensify.
In tackling the current nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, President Donald Trump has invest... more In tackling the current nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, President Donald Trump has invested—especially before the dramatic turn of events since early 2018—a great deal of political capital in President Xi Jinping in the hopes that he might rein in North Korea, China's traditional ally. However, expecting Beijing to ‘solve’ the problem is unrealistic. Chinese thinking on North Korea—as reflected in policy positions and domestic debates—has been marred by inconsistencies and overcaution and it is now further complicated by the intensifying geopolitical competition with the United States, which also embroils, to a varying degree, South Korea and Taiwan. Beijing has been strenuously walking a fine line between pressing Pyongyang and averting a war, all the while watching its back, particularly with regard to Taiwan and the South China Sea. Beijing's risk aversion over North Korea and its security competition with the US has led it into a geopolitical conundrum from which there is no clear exit.
Synopsis Instead of seeking the forgiveness of Japan's neighbours, Abe recast his war apology lar... more Synopsis Instead of seeking the forgiveness of Japan's neighbours, Abe recast his war apology largely in the context of current Sino-Japanese relations that shed unfavourable light on China. His no-more-apologies caveat bodes ill for reconciliation as Japanese revisionists unwind past apologies and repentance. Commentary IN THE intense anticipation of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's speech commemorating the 70th anniversary of Japan's World War II surrender, the question was whether he would apologise. It turned out that he raised the Japanese art of apology a notch. In the unusually lengthy statement, he sketched out a broad tapestry of history in which Japan "took the wrong course and advanced along the road to war". He touched on the key words of aggression, repentance, remorse and apology that are deemed indispensable for historical and political correctness. Those looking for something uniquely "Abe-esque," however, are immediately drawn to his caution that "We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologise". To the untrained Western ear, that Japan has a limited supply of apologies makes sense-not only because they have been repeatedly offered but also because Abe pledged to "inherit the past" and "pass it on to the future". So profuse are the regrets that China's refusal to let bygones be bygones would only prove how vengeful the Chinese still are towards the Japanese. Blaming the victims Targeting the Chinese but speaking to the international audience at large was what Abe had done; the speech made direct reference to China or the Chinese four times (but not including the Manchurian Incident), mentioned South Korea only once while North Korea and Japan's annexation of the whole Peninsular were conveniently neglected. Still, Abe did recount the good deeds of the
Japanese foreign policy since the late 1980s has exhibited many signs of liberal internationalism... more Japanese foreign policy since the late 1980s has exhibited many signs of liberal internationalism: a generous development assistance package despite its economic malaise, an expanded presence in international peacekeeping and peace-building missions, and a multi-faceted, people-centered approach to international security. This article, however, draws attention to the (non)liberal character of Japanese activism by shedding light on Japan's entanglement in democracy assistance, a trademark liberal internationalist project. Two features stand out in this juxta-position. First, democracy assistance has been seen as supplementary-rather than parallel-to the peace and development initiatives in Japan's diplomatic repertoire. Second, when democracy was indeed played up, the act nonetheless exposed the myriad innate contradictions between the liberal paradigm and Japan's nationalist impulses that transpired in its diplomatic offensives. Humanistic as it can be at times, Japan's global outreach is non-liberal at best because it is intellectually informed and motivated by a confluence of nationalist resurgence and realist power considerations.
Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught of ... more Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught of punishing acts—the trade war being a prime, but far from the only, example. This article, in addition to contextualizing their earlier optimism about the relations with the United States under President Trump, examines why Chinese leaders and analysts were surprised by the turn of events. It argues that three main factors contributed to the lapse of judgment. First, Chinese officials and analysts grossly misunderstood Donald Trump the individual. By overemphasizing his pragmatism while downplaying his unpredictability, they ended up underprepared for the policies he unleashed. Second, some ingrained Chinese beliefs, manifested in the analogies of the pendulum swing and the ‘bickering couple’, as well as the narrative of the ‘ballast’, lulled officials and scholars into undue optimism about the stability of the broader relationship. Third, analytical and methodological problems as well as political considerations prevented them from fully grasping the strategic shift against China in the US.
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North Korea fall short? What is the crux of the Korean security
problem? To understand peninsular security, I argue that a more
holistic approach is warranted to unpack and piece together the
many crosscutting and overlapping security dynamics in a cogent
and coherent manner. In this article, I first argue that the Korean
Peninsula should be understood as a security system writ large,
comprising the United States, China, and the two Koreas as
indispensable players in all major issues pertaining to peninsular
security. The second section introduces complex systems theory
as an analytical approach that injects more sophistication and
dynamic into the otherwise overly structural analysis typical of
the field. The third and fourth sections reconstruct the unfolding
of major events in terms of a positive feedback loop – namely,
how great power realpolitik and North Korea’s provocations
converged and ricocheted to cause the crisis in 2017, as well as a
negative feedback loop in which triangular interactions both
facilitated and obstructed US – North Korea wrangling. The
conclusion offers some preliminary assessments of how things
might play out in the future.
North Korea fall short? What is the crux of the Korean security
problem? To understand peninsular security, I argue that a more
holistic approach is warranted to unpack and piece together the
many crosscutting and overlapping security dynamics in a cogent
and coherent manner. In this article, I first argue that the Korean
Peninsula should be understood as a security system writ large,
comprising the United States, China, and the two Koreas as
indispensable players in all major issues pertaining to peninsular
security. The second section introduces complex systems theory
as an analytical approach that injects more sophistication and
dynamic into the otherwise overly structural analysis typical of
the field. The third and fourth sections reconstruct the unfolding
of major events in terms of a positive feedback loop – namely,
how great power realpolitik and North Korea’s provocations
converged and ricocheted to cause the crisis in 2017, as well as a
negative feedback loop in which triangular interactions both
facilitated and obstructed US – North Korea wrangling. The
conclusion offers some preliminary assessments of how things
might play out in the future.