James Titterton
dr.j.titterton@gmail.com
My research examines the practice and perception of deception in medieval warfare. As well as categorising the various deceptions employed by medieval combatants, my research seeks to analyse how deception in a military context is portrayed in contemporary narrative sources. I am interested in how medieval thinkers reconciled this behaviour with contemporary social values of honour, chivalry and Christian piety.
My research examines the practice and perception of deception in medieval warfare. As well as categorising the various deceptions employed by medieval combatants, my research seeks to analyse how deception in a military context is portrayed in contemporary narrative sources. I am interested in how medieval thinkers reconciled this behaviour with contemporary social values of honour, chivalry and Christian piety.
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Deception and trickery are a universal feature of warfare, from the Trojan horse to the inflatable tanks of the Second World War. The wars of the Central Middle Ages (c. 1000-1320) were no exception. This book looks at the various tricks reported in medieval chronicles, from the Normans feigning flight at the battle of Hastings (1066) to draw the English off Senlac Hill, to the Turks who infiltrated the Frankish camp at the Field of Blood (1119) disguised as bird sellers, to the Scottish camp followers descending on the field of Bannockburn (1314) waving laundry as banners to mimic a division of soldiers. This study also considers what contemporary society thought about deception on the battlefield: was it a legitimate way to fight? Was cunning considered an admirable quality in a warrior? Were the culturally and religious "other" thought to be more deceitful in war than Western Europeans? Through a detailed analysis of vocabulary and narrative devices, this book reveals a society with a profound moral ambivalence towards military deception, in which authors were able to celebrate a warrior's cunning while simultaneously condemning their enemies for similar acts of deceit. It also includes an appendix cataloguing over four hundred incidents of military deception as recorded in contemporary chronicle narratives.
As the descendent of a prominent Cambro-Norman family, Gerald’s attitude towards the Welsh was complex. Although he expressed sympathy for them, and wrote admiringly of some of their victories, he also celebrated the Anglo-Norman conquests and the ‘civilising’ influence they brought. His attitude to the Irish was clearer: they were barbarians who needed to be repressed and firmly ruled. His military narratives reflect these differing attitudes. While he occasionally praised the Welsh for their cunning and unorthodox tactics, he invariably portrayed the Irish as faithless and cowardly, even when they employed stratagems similar to those of the Anglo-Normans or Welsh. This reflects the ambiguous place of ruses in medieval thought: neither inherently legitimate or illegitimate, stories of their use could be adapted by historians to further their own narrative agenda. A tactic that was laudable when employed by a chronicler’s heroes could just as easily be portrayed as treacherous when it was used by the villains.
The incidents themselves are often improbable, likely the product of soldiers' gossip or exaggeration, but this does not mean they are devoid of historical merit. Contemporary historians clearly gave them credence, possibly because they resembled the exemplary stories of Classical authors such as Valerius Maximus and Frontinus. As well as being colourful tales in their own right, these incidents give us an insight into what contemporaries thought was plausible battlefield conduct and, more importantly, what was admirable or shameful behaviour for a knightly commander. Winning by main strength in a dashing cavalry charge was, of course, glorious but stories of ambushes, traps and disguises illustrated the utility of prudence and showed a measured approach to warfare that agreed with authoritative literature on the subject.
First recorded in the eleventh century by the Norman historian Dudo of St. Quentin, who claimed it was used by the Danish raider Hasting to sack the Italian city of Luna, the story endured in the Norman cultural sphere. It is attributed to Harold Hardrada in Snorri Sturluson’s Heimskringla, to Robert Guiscard by Geoffrey Malaterra, to Roger I of Sicily by Otto of Freising and to Bohemond I of Antioch by Anna Komnena. My paper examines how this tale was adapted by different chroniclers to suit their own narrative purposes. While some portrayed it as a treacherous and sacrilegious act, others celebrated it as a skilful stratagem in keeping with the advice of Roman authors such as Vegetius and Frontinus, as well a display of the special cunning associated with the Norman gens.
The first half of my paper gives an overview of the variety of deceptions employed in the History. Combatants are portrayed as using many different forms of ruse to gain an advantage over their enemies, such as feigning flight and laying ambushes, or to escape from danger, such as using disguise or distracting their enemy's attention. Far from being a simple affair of knights jousting with one another in an open field, Orderic presents a dynamic form of warfare in which combatants used mobility and stratagem to outmanoeuvre their enemy whenever possible.
Having established the use of military ruses in the History, the second half of my paper analyses how the author used language and context to portray specific incidents. The medieval attitude towards such deceptions was far from simple. For example, one might expect an individual betraying a stronghold to a besieging force to be portrayed as totally despicable but the evidence from the History suggests a more flexible mind set. What was treasonous to one man could be simple prudence to another. Catching one's enemy in an ambush could demonstrate cowardice or strategic skill. Who employed the ruse against whom could also influence how it was portrayed. The use of adjectives such as 'cunning', 'prudent' and 'skilful' provide further ambiguity, being used to describe both the virtuous and the wicked, depending on the context.
Deception and trickery are a universal feature of warfare, from the Trojan horse to the inflatable tanks of the Second World War. The wars of the Central Middle Ages (c. 1000-1320) were no exception. This book looks at the various tricks reported in medieval chronicles, from the Normans feigning flight at the battle of Hastings (1066) to draw the English off Senlac Hill, to the Turks who infiltrated the Frankish camp at the Field of Blood (1119) disguised as bird sellers, to the Scottish camp followers descending on the field of Bannockburn (1314) waving laundry as banners to mimic a division of soldiers. This study also considers what contemporary society thought about deception on the battlefield: was it a legitimate way to fight? Was cunning considered an admirable quality in a warrior? Were the culturally and religious "other" thought to be more deceitful in war than Western Europeans? Through a detailed analysis of vocabulary and narrative devices, this book reveals a society with a profound moral ambivalence towards military deception, in which authors were able to celebrate a warrior's cunning while simultaneously condemning their enemies for similar acts of deceit. It also includes an appendix cataloguing over four hundred incidents of military deception as recorded in contemporary chronicle narratives.
As the descendent of a prominent Cambro-Norman family, Gerald’s attitude towards the Welsh was complex. Although he expressed sympathy for them, and wrote admiringly of some of their victories, he also celebrated the Anglo-Norman conquests and the ‘civilising’ influence they brought. His attitude to the Irish was clearer: they were barbarians who needed to be repressed and firmly ruled. His military narratives reflect these differing attitudes. While he occasionally praised the Welsh for their cunning and unorthodox tactics, he invariably portrayed the Irish as faithless and cowardly, even when they employed stratagems similar to those of the Anglo-Normans or Welsh. This reflects the ambiguous place of ruses in medieval thought: neither inherently legitimate or illegitimate, stories of their use could be adapted by historians to further their own narrative agenda. A tactic that was laudable when employed by a chronicler’s heroes could just as easily be portrayed as treacherous when it was used by the villains.
The incidents themselves are often improbable, likely the product of soldiers' gossip or exaggeration, but this does not mean they are devoid of historical merit. Contemporary historians clearly gave them credence, possibly because they resembled the exemplary stories of Classical authors such as Valerius Maximus and Frontinus. As well as being colourful tales in their own right, these incidents give us an insight into what contemporaries thought was plausible battlefield conduct and, more importantly, what was admirable or shameful behaviour for a knightly commander. Winning by main strength in a dashing cavalry charge was, of course, glorious but stories of ambushes, traps and disguises illustrated the utility of prudence and showed a measured approach to warfare that agreed with authoritative literature on the subject.
First recorded in the eleventh century by the Norman historian Dudo of St. Quentin, who claimed it was used by the Danish raider Hasting to sack the Italian city of Luna, the story endured in the Norman cultural sphere. It is attributed to Harold Hardrada in Snorri Sturluson’s Heimskringla, to Robert Guiscard by Geoffrey Malaterra, to Roger I of Sicily by Otto of Freising and to Bohemond I of Antioch by Anna Komnena. My paper examines how this tale was adapted by different chroniclers to suit their own narrative purposes. While some portrayed it as a treacherous and sacrilegious act, others celebrated it as a skilful stratagem in keeping with the advice of Roman authors such as Vegetius and Frontinus, as well a display of the special cunning associated with the Norman gens.
The first half of my paper gives an overview of the variety of deceptions employed in the History. Combatants are portrayed as using many different forms of ruse to gain an advantage over their enemies, such as feigning flight and laying ambushes, or to escape from danger, such as using disguise or distracting their enemy's attention. Far from being a simple affair of knights jousting with one another in an open field, Orderic presents a dynamic form of warfare in which combatants used mobility and stratagem to outmanoeuvre their enemy whenever possible.
Having established the use of military ruses in the History, the second half of my paper analyses how the author used language and context to portray specific incidents. The medieval attitude towards such deceptions was far from simple. For example, one might expect an individual betraying a stronghold to a besieging force to be portrayed as totally despicable but the evidence from the History suggests a more flexible mind set. What was treasonous to one man could be simple prudence to another. Catching one's enemy in an ambush could demonstrate cowardice or strategic skill. Who employed the ruse against whom could also influence how it was portrayed. The use of adjectives such as 'cunning', 'prudent' and 'skilful' provide further ambiguity, being used to describe both the virtuous and the wicked, depending on the context.