SATS (Northern European Journal of Philosophy), 2023
This text studies the corporeality of attentive reading. It relies and builds upon philosopher Je... more This text studies the corporeality of attentive reading. It relies and builds upon philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy’s suggestion that there is, each time, a recitative voice within the heart of our advancement through a textual body. This text exam- ines the intriguing !gure of recitative voice by paying attention to two bodily vari- ations of reading: reading aloud and reading silently. Nancy’s recitative voice, as a sonorous, resonant, oral, buccal and vocal notion, can help us in explicating how our bodies condition our experiences of reading, yet ultimately he remains rather implicit on how we advance through textual bodies. This short text argues that we can explicate the bodily weight implicit to reading, if we interpreted it as a recitative act. When we read aloud, our experience of a text consists of an advancement of our conjoined gaze and voice through the letters, words and sentences making up our text; when we read silently, our closed and silent mouth is still conjoined with our advancing gaze, advancing as desirous for speech and with words already grasped, even when no words are folded in (or with) exhaled warm air.
What happens to (or in) “me”, if “I” cannot trust the “vegetative” automaticity of my body? What ... more What happens to (or in) “me”, if “I” cannot trust the “vegetative” automaticity of my body? What happens, if I “get stuck” on breathing or blinking “consciously”? If such is the case and if I do feel trapped in paying attention to my breathing, blinking or to my heartbeat, then to what exactly am I attending to? Am I attending to the movement of some specific muscles? Am I attending to my attention or attentiveness itself as a process? Or to an experience of suffocation, if I do not consciously continue maintaining the circulation of air? Or, am I attending to my thoughts concerning these particular bodily processes? How does it feel when a bodily process overtakes my whole life?
Voisiko nukahtamista ajatella leikkinä? Eli, toisin sanoen, voisiko nukahtamista ajatella toimena... more Voisiko nukahtamista ajatella leikkinä? Eli, toisin sanoen, voisiko nukahtamista ajatella toimena, joka ei pyri, tähtää, johda tai viittaa mihinkään ulkopuolellaan odottavaan tulokseen tai hyötyyn.1 Tai, vieläkin tarkemmin, voisiko nukahtamisen ymmärtää ruumiillisena leikkinä, jossa nukutan itseni leikkien, imitoiden, esittäen tai matkien paikalleen juurtunutta nukkuvaa ruumista? Jos vastaan kyllä ja päätän ajatella nukahtamista ruumiillisena leikkinä, niin millaisesta leikistä onkaan kyse? Kuka, mikä, miten ja millainen on nukkuvaa ruumista leikkivä “itse” tai “minä”? Ja voiko kukaan todella nukuttaa “itseään”, eli liittyykö uni nukahtamiseen vai kuuluuko uni ainoastaan itselleen?
In this text, I explicate and expand on philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy’s (1940–2021) philosophical an... more In this text, I explicate and expand on philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy’s (1940–2021) philosophical analysis of listening bodies, most notably in the sense(s) of visceral spatiality and sonorous directionality. I examine how resonant bodies listen and also touch (and to a lesser extent taste, smell and see) resonances penetrating within and throughout their bodily depths and visceral hollows. For this end, I analyse how bodily processes referred to as “somatic sounds” vibrate and resonate throughout visceral tubes, fluids, joints, caverns, tissue and bones and I look into the sonorous nature of these processes by interpreting them as tactile and sonorous interruptions of our bodily silence. Ultimately, I argue that a listening “self” is not a hollow, reverberative and a sonorous cavern, as suggested at times by Nancy in Listening, but a visceral body with sensitive ears, which allow us to have spatial resonant experiences.
Aloitan seuraavilla väitteillä: ensinnäkin, äänellä ei ole erottuvaa ulkopuolta, -pintaa tai sivu... more Aloitan seuraavilla väitteillä: ensinnäkin, äänellä ei ole erottuvaa ulkopuolta, -pintaa tai sivua. Näin ollen en voi kuunnella ääntä sen ulkopuolelta, eli pysytellen äänestä erillään. Toiseksi, en voi pysäyttää ääntä paikoilleen, vaan ääni on aina joko syttymäisillään, soimassa, kaikumassa tai poissa. Toisin sanoen ääni soi paikassa ja ajassa, eikä näitä piirteitä voi erottaa siitä.
What happens, when I read a text and notice all of the sudden that my sight has skimmed through m... more What happens, when I read a text and notice all of the sudden that my sight has skimmed through multiple sentences without me paying any attention to the text? First, my attention may have shifted from the narrative to mental images of daydreaming or I may have been immersed in an affective atmosphere. In any case, my sight has continued traversing the text without “me” being aware of its narrative. Whatever may have caused the inattentiveness, the following philosophical questions can be raised: How should we account for a such oscillation between objects encapsulating our attention and also between attention and inattentiveness? Can we describe and account for the “residue” of focal attention: the inattentive continuation of our sight which still travels and skims through the sentences? What does this common phenomena tell us about the function of attention and the structures of selfhood and how should it be analysed phenomenologically? In circumstances such as described above, is “my ego” somehow “split” between attending to the new focal object (e.g. mental images or contents of day dreaming) and inattentively following the text? Can we describe such “inattentive” phenomena with phenomenological methods?
In this article, I will argue that certain types of focal changes in experiential attention, as described above, can be phenomenologically accounted for only if the concept of attention is understood, not as a binary concept, but as a degree concept. Second, I will argue that what has been conceptualised as “inattentiveness” needs to be considered in detail and specified by distinctions and that some modes of inattentiveness must be understood, not merely as a negation or lack of attention, but rather as directional activities in their own right.
Firstly, I am going to briefly describe the core elements of the phenomena of the ”mind-wandering” by presenting two case studies: the experience of reading, interrupted by various disruptions, and the experience of the so-called highway hypnosis. Second, I am going to introduce the practical-experiential approach to examining human experiencing developed by Natalie Depraz, Francis Varela and Pierre Vermersch in On Becoming Aware (2003). Here I will focus especially on their analysis of attention and their interpretation of the epoche. Finally, I will use Depraz et al.’s concept of procedural approach to the phenomena of attention to demonstrate that also inattentive phenomena are experientially analysable and that inattentive directionality is part of the phenomenon of mind wandering.
Talk given at the NoSP 2023 conference in Reykjavik
How does it feel when I turn to, into or toward something intriguing, instead of something else? ... more How does it feel when I turn to, into or toward something intriguing, instead of something else? How am I weighted (pesée) or touched (touché) upon, when I feel intruded or surprised? How is “my” curious, caring or intrigued being-toward (être-á) (-at, -into, -to) determined by the singular plurality of my corporeal existence? Or, in still other words, how do I experience the élan of turning-and-being-toward something said or heard, something I ponder or think or upon someone I love? In one of his last published works titled Sexistence (2018/2021) philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy (1940–2021) develops an ontological analysis of how we are driven to things, others and ourselves in (or with) our desire (desir). In this short talk, which summarily presents a few key ideas that I take up from Nancy in the final chapter of my dissertation that deals with the “corporeality” of attention and is done quite soon.
The phenomenologically intriguing question concerning the character of the self within the “world... more The phenomenologically intriguing question concerning the character of the self within the “world” of dreamless sleep has been a lively topic in the last few decades. From Jean-Luc Nancy’s challenging statement that there is no phenomenology of sleep in The Fall of Sleep (Tombe de Sommeil)1 to Nicholas de Warrens response in The Inner Night: Towards a Phenomenology of Dreamless Sleep2 and to Anthony Steinbock’s recent work on the concept of “limit-experience” in Limit-Phenomena and Phenomenology in Husserl,3 the questions concerning consciousness, ego, unconscious, sleep and dreaming have found many different answers in the plural field of phenomenological approaches. I start my presentation by recapitulating the main elements of Aristotle’s discourse on sleep in his On Sleep by taking a brief look at Aristotle’s concept of the sensibility which pertains to both waking life and dreamless sleep. This influential concept might be understood as operating as a common background for the contemporary phenomenologically oriented thought on sleep. After this I will present shortly Nancy’s statement concerning the (in-)possibility for the phenomenology of sleep and de Warrens attempt at solving this problem.
Fragmentti Jean-Luc Nancyn esseestä “Il y a du rapport sexuel — et après”
Joni Puranen, tohtorik... more Fragmentti Jean-Luc Nancyn esseestä “Il y a du rapport sexuel — et après”
Joni Puranen, tohtorikoulutettava Jyväskylän yliopisto 21.–22.10.2021
What I want to suggest is, that already in the lived experience itself, e.g. in the act of readin... more What I want to suggest is, that already in the lived experience itself, e.g. in the act of reading, an another type of self-fragmentation plays out. Here I will rely on the concept of the “voice of the reader”, which I borrow from Husserl, Jean-Luc Nancy and Francis Ponge. With this, I want to suggest that the “voice” of the reader ringing out inside “me” is not exactly the same as the “me” who listens to the words and sentences that I read, and therefore follows the story.
Sleep is an interesting phenomena for the phenomenologically oriented philosophy because it allow... more Sleep is an interesting phenomena for the phenomenologically oriented philosophy because it allows us to study the concept of liminality in two distinct senses. First, we can look at the disruptions, edges or limits of what can be perceived, felt or more generally given-to-a-self. We can do this by studying closely the distinctions, clinical reports or non-pathological descriptions given for a plethora of phenomena related to sleep and self. Second, we can then propose questions related to the limits of the phenomenological methods employed in making these distinctions and descriptions. This presentation consists of two parts. First I am going to, very briefly, go through Jean-Luc Nancy’s project titled “ontology of the body” in relation to sleep. This project is a radical attempt to re-think the relation between corporeality and thinking on the basis of material ekstasis. The project, as Derrida notes, “resists, in the name of touch, all idealism and all subjectivism, whether it be transcendental or psychoanalytic.” I am going to show that these ontological distinctions are implicit to the less-technical language of the text Fall of Sleep. Second, I am going to lean on these distinctions in analysing a peculiar parasomnia called hypnagogic jerks.
SATS (Northern European Journal of Philosophy), 2023
This text studies the corporeality of attentive reading. It relies and builds upon philosopher Je... more This text studies the corporeality of attentive reading. It relies and builds upon philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy’s suggestion that there is, each time, a recitative voice within the heart of our advancement through a textual body. This text exam- ines the intriguing !gure of recitative voice by paying attention to two bodily vari- ations of reading: reading aloud and reading silently. Nancy’s recitative voice, as a sonorous, resonant, oral, buccal and vocal notion, can help us in explicating how our bodies condition our experiences of reading, yet ultimately he remains rather implicit on how we advance through textual bodies. This short text argues that we can explicate the bodily weight implicit to reading, if we interpreted it as a recitative act. When we read aloud, our experience of a text consists of an advancement of our conjoined gaze and voice through the letters, words and sentences making up our text; when we read silently, our closed and silent mouth is still conjoined with our advancing gaze, advancing as desirous for speech and with words already grasped, even when no words are folded in (or with) exhaled warm air.
What happens to (or in) “me”, if “I” cannot trust the “vegetative” automaticity of my body? What ... more What happens to (or in) “me”, if “I” cannot trust the “vegetative” automaticity of my body? What happens, if I “get stuck” on breathing or blinking “consciously”? If such is the case and if I do feel trapped in paying attention to my breathing, blinking or to my heartbeat, then to what exactly am I attending to? Am I attending to the movement of some specific muscles? Am I attending to my attention or attentiveness itself as a process? Or to an experience of suffocation, if I do not consciously continue maintaining the circulation of air? Or, am I attending to my thoughts concerning these particular bodily processes? How does it feel when a bodily process overtakes my whole life?
Voisiko nukahtamista ajatella leikkinä? Eli, toisin sanoen, voisiko nukahtamista ajatella toimena... more Voisiko nukahtamista ajatella leikkinä? Eli, toisin sanoen, voisiko nukahtamista ajatella toimena, joka ei pyri, tähtää, johda tai viittaa mihinkään ulkopuolellaan odottavaan tulokseen tai hyötyyn.1 Tai, vieläkin tarkemmin, voisiko nukahtamisen ymmärtää ruumiillisena leikkinä, jossa nukutan itseni leikkien, imitoiden, esittäen tai matkien paikalleen juurtunutta nukkuvaa ruumista? Jos vastaan kyllä ja päätän ajatella nukahtamista ruumiillisena leikkinä, niin millaisesta leikistä onkaan kyse? Kuka, mikä, miten ja millainen on nukkuvaa ruumista leikkivä “itse” tai “minä”? Ja voiko kukaan todella nukuttaa “itseään”, eli liittyykö uni nukahtamiseen vai kuuluuko uni ainoastaan itselleen?
In this text, I explicate and expand on philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy’s (1940–2021) philosophical an... more In this text, I explicate and expand on philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy’s (1940–2021) philosophical analysis of listening bodies, most notably in the sense(s) of visceral spatiality and sonorous directionality. I examine how resonant bodies listen and also touch (and to a lesser extent taste, smell and see) resonances penetrating within and throughout their bodily depths and visceral hollows. For this end, I analyse how bodily processes referred to as “somatic sounds” vibrate and resonate throughout visceral tubes, fluids, joints, caverns, tissue and bones and I look into the sonorous nature of these processes by interpreting them as tactile and sonorous interruptions of our bodily silence. Ultimately, I argue that a listening “self” is not a hollow, reverberative and a sonorous cavern, as suggested at times by Nancy in Listening, but a visceral body with sensitive ears, which allow us to have spatial resonant experiences.
Aloitan seuraavilla väitteillä: ensinnäkin, äänellä ei ole erottuvaa ulkopuolta, -pintaa tai sivu... more Aloitan seuraavilla väitteillä: ensinnäkin, äänellä ei ole erottuvaa ulkopuolta, -pintaa tai sivua. Näin ollen en voi kuunnella ääntä sen ulkopuolelta, eli pysytellen äänestä erillään. Toiseksi, en voi pysäyttää ääntä paikoilleen, vaan ääni on aina joko syttymäisillään, soimassa, kaikumassa tai poissa. Toisin sanoen ääni soi paikassa ja ajassa, eikä näitä piirteitä voi erottaa siitä.
What happens, when I read a text and notice all of the sudden that my sight has skimmed through m... more What happens, when I read a text and notice all of the sudden that my sight has skimmed through multiple sentences without me paying any attention to the text? First, my attention may have shifted from the narrative to mental images of daydreaming or I may have been immersed in an affective atmosphere. In any case, my sight has continued traversing the text without “me” being aware of its narrative. Whatever may have caused the inattentiveness, the following philosophical questions can be raised: How should we account for a such oscillation between objects encapsulating our attention and also between attention and inattentiveness? Can we describe and account for the “residue” of focal attention: the inattentive continuation of our sight which still travels and skims through the sentences? What does this common phenomena tell us about the function of attention and the structures of selfhood and how should it be analysed phenomenologically? In circumstances such as described above, is “my ego” somehow “split” between attending to the new focal object (e.g. mental images or contents of day dreaming) and inattentively following the text? Can we describe such “inattentive” phenomena with phenomenological methods?
In this article, I will argue that certain types of focal changes in experiential attention, as described above, can be phenomenologically accounted for only if the concept of attention is understood, not as a binary concept, but as a degree concept. Second, I will argue that what has been conceptualised as “inattentiveness” needs to be considered in detail and specified by distinctions and that some modes of inattentiveness must be understood, not merely as a negation or lack of attention, but rather as directional activities in their own right.
Firstly, I am going to briefly describe the core elements of the phenomena of the ”mind-wandering” by presenting two case studies: the experience of reading, interrupted by various disruptions, and the experience of the so-called highway hypnosis. Second, I am going to introduce the practical-experiential approach to examining human experiencing developed by Natalie Depraz, Francis Varela and Pierre Vermersch in On Becoming Aware (2003). Here I will focus especially on their analysis of attention and their interpretation of the epoche. Finally, I will use Depraz et al.’s concept of procedural approach to the phenomena of attention to demonstrate that also inattentive phenomena are experientially analysable and that inattentive directionality is part of the phenomenon of mind wandering.
Talk given at the NoSP 2023 conference in Reykjavik
How does it feel when I turn to, into or toward something intriguing, instead of something else? ... more How does it feel when I turn to, into or toward something intriguing, instead of something else? How am I weighted (pesée) or touched (touché) upon, when I feel intruded or surprised? How is “my” curious, caring or intrigued being-toward (être-á) (-at, -into, -to) determined by the singular plurality of my corporeal existence? Or, in still other words, how do I experience the élan of turning-and-being-toward something said or heard, something I ponder or think or upon someone I love? In one of his last published works titled Sexistence (2018/2021) philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy (1940–2021) develops an ontological analysis of how we are driven to things, others and ourselves in (or with) our desire (desir). In this short talk, which summarily presents a few key ideas that I take up from Nancy in the final chapter of my dissertation that deals with the “corporeality” of attention and is done quite soon.
The phenomenologically intriguing question concerning the character of the self within the “world... more The phenomenologically intriguing question concerning the character of the self within the “world” of dreamless sleep has been a lively topic in the last few decades. From Jean-Luc Nancy’s challenging statement that there is no phenomenology of sleep in The Fall of Sleep (Tombe de Sommeil)1 to Nicholas de Warrens response in The Inner Night: Towards a Phenomenology of Dreamless Sleep2 and to Anthony Steinbock’s recent work on the concept of “limit-experience” in Limit-Phenomena and Phenomenology in Husserl,3 the questions concerning consciousness, ego, unconscious, sleep and dreaming have found many different answers in the plural field of phenomenological approaches. I start my presentation by recapitulating the main elements of Aristotle’s discourse on sleep in his On Sleep by taking a brief look at Aristotle’s concept of the sensibility which pertains to both waking life and dreamless sleep. This influential concept might be understood as operating as a common background for the contemporary phenomenologically oriented thought on sleep. After this I will present shortly Nancy’s statement concerning the (in-)possibility for the phenomenology of sleep and de Warrens attempt at solving this problem.
Fragmentti Jean-Luc Nancyn esseestä “Il y a du rapport sexuel — et après”
Joni Puranen, tohtorik... more Fragmentti Jean-Luc Nancyn esseestä “Il y a du rapport sexuel — et après”
Joni Puranen, tohtorikoulutettava Jyväskylän yliopisto 21.–22.10.2021
What I want to suggest is, that already in the lived experience itself, e.g. in the act of readin... more What I want to suggest is, that already in the lived experience itself, e.g. in the act of reading, an another type of self-fragmentation plays out. Here I will rely on the concept of the “voice of the reader”, which I borrow from Husserl, Jean-Luc Nancy and Francis Ponge. With this, I want to suggest that the “voice” of the reader ringing out inside “me” is not exactly the same as the “me” who listens to the words and sentences that I read, and therefore follows the story.
Sleep is an interesting phenomena for the phenomenologically oriented philosophy because it allow... more Sleep is an interesting phenomena for the phenomenologically oriented philosophy because it allows us to study the concept of liminality in two distinct senses. First, we can look at the disruptions, edges or limits of what can be perceived, felt or more generally given-to-a-self. We can do this by studying closely the distinctions, clinical reports or non-pathological descriptions given for a plethora of phenomena related to sleep and self. Second, we can then propose questions related to the limits of the phenomenological methods employed in making these distinctions and descriptions. This presentation consists of two parts. First I am going to, very briefly, go through Jean-Luc Nancy’s project titled “ontology of the body” in relation to sleep. This project is a radical attempt to re-think the relation between corporeality and thinking on the basis of material ekstasis. The project, as Derrida notes, “resists, in the name of touch, all idealism and all subjectivism, whether it be transcendental or psychoanalytic.” I am going to show that these ontological distinctions are implicit to the less-technical language of the text Fall of Sleep. Second, I am going to lean on these distinctions in analysing a peculiar parasomnia called hypnagogic jerks.
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In this article, I will argue that certain types of focal changes in experiential attention, as described above, can be phenomenologically accounted for only if the concept of attention is understood, not as a binary concept, but as a degree concept. Second, I will argue that what has been conceptualised as “inattentiveness” needs to be considered in detail and specified by distinctions and that some modes of inattentiveness must be understood, not merely as a negation or lack of attention, but rather as directional activities in their own right.
Firstly, I am going to briefly describe the core elements of the phenomena of the ”mind-wandering” by presenting two case studies: the experience of reading, interrupted by various disruptions, and the experience of the so-called highway hypnosis. Second, I am going to introduce the practical-experiential approach to examining human experiencing developed by Natalie Depraz, Francis Varela and Pierre Vermersch in On Becoming Aware (2003). Here I will focus especially on their analysis of attention and their interpretation of the epoche. Finally, I will use Depraz et al.’s concept of procedural approach to the phenomena of attention to demonstrate that also inattentive phenomena are experientially analysable and that inattentive directionality is part of the phenomenon of mind wandering.
Joni Puranen, tohtorikoulutettava
Jyväskylän yliopisto
21.–22.10.2021
This presentation consists of two parts. First I am going to, very briefly, go through Jean-Luc Nancy’s project titled “ontology of the body” in relation to sleep. This project is a radical attempt to re-think the relation between corporeality and thinking on the basis of material ekstasis. The project, as Derrida notes, “resists, in the name of touch, all idealism and all subjectivism, whether it be transcendental or psychoanalytic.” I am going to show that these ontological distinctions are implicit to the less-technical language of the text Fall of Sleep. Second, I am going to lean on these distinctions in analysing a peculiar parasomnia called hypnagogic jerks.
In this article, I will argue that certain types of focal changes in experiential attention, as described above, can be phenomenologically accounted for only if the concept of attention is understood, not as a binary concept, but as a degree concept. Second, I will argue that what has been conceptualised as “inattentiveness” needs to be considered in detail and specified by distinctions and that some modes of inattentiveness must be understood, not merely as a negation or lack of attention, but rather as directional activities in their own right.
Firstly, I am going to briefly describe the core elements of the phenomena of the ”mind-wandering” by presenting two case studies: the experience of reading, interrupted by various disruptions, and the experience of the so-called highway hypnosis. Second, I am going to introduce the practical-experiential approach to examining human experiencing developed by Natalie Depraz, Francis Varela and Pierre Vermersch in On Becoming Aware (2003). Here I will focus especially on their analysis of attention and their interpretation of the epoche. Finally, I will use Depraz et al.’s concept of procedural approach to the phenomena of attention to demonstrate that also inattentive phenomena are experientially analysable and that inattentive directionality is part of the phenomenon of mind wandering.
Joni Puranen, tohtorikoulutettava
Jyväskylän yliopisto
21.–22.10.2021
This presentation consists of two parts. First I am going to, very briefly, go through Jean-Luc Nancy’s project titled “ontology of the body” in relation to sleep. This project is a radical attempt to re-think the relation between corporeality and thinking on the basis of material ekstasis. The project, as Derrida notes, “resists, in the name of touch, all idealism and all subjectivism, whether it be transcendental or psychoanalytic.” I am going to show that these ontological distinctions are implicit to the less-technical language of the text Fall of Sleep. Second, I am going to lean on these distinctions in analysing a peculiar parasomnia called hypnagogic jerks.