El Trabajo pretende demostrar el perfil de una futura Ley de Coparticipacion de Impuestos a trave... more El Trabajo pretende demostrar el perfil de una futura Ley de Coparticipacion de Impuestos a traves de la modelizacion de los posibles comportamientos estrategicos de los agentes involucrados en la toma de decisiones de esta problematica, utilizando herramientas de la Teoria de Decisiones. La hipotesis subyacente en el trabajo es que la materializacion de la Ley de Coparticipacion debe pasar por un proceso politico de negociacion el cual, al ser modelizado, muestra el poder de negociacion de los distintos agentes y las posibles estrategias que podrian seguir a los efectos de conseguir las coaliciones necesarias para lograr una nueva ley que favorezca a sus intereses.
By A. Neme and L. Quintas; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Cost of Implementat... more By A. Neme and L. Quintas; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Cost of Implementation.
In this paper we study a repeated game and the replicator dynamics to analyze the spread of a rum... more In this paper we study a repeated game and the replicator dynamics to analyze the spread of a rumor in a society formed by two populations. One population is informed about a rumor and communicates the rumor to the other population. According to the preferences of each individual, this rumor is communicated in its original or in a modified form. We analyze the stability of dynamic equilibria. We conclude that there are three possibilities for the spread of a rumor. The rumor may end up being disseminated in its original version or being distorted by the diffusers throughout the society, or a part of the population remains in the long term spreading the rumor in its original form and another in a distorted way.
Abstract This paper consider what payoff allocations can be outcomes of resales-proof trades of i... more Abstract This paper consider what payoff allocations can be outcomes of resales-proof trades of information with a monopolistic seller. The concept of resale-proofness has been introduced by M. Nakayama, L. Quintas, and S. Muto (1988, “Resale-Proof Trades of Information,” Discussin Paper 776, Northwestern University) in formulating a trade such that no agent has an incentive to resell when the resale is freely allowed. With appropriate modifications, we consider the core of such a trade, and derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the trade to have a single outcome: the monopolistic imputation. It is also shown that generally the sole seller cannot enjoy the monopolistic position in a resale-proof trade.
In this paper we study some properties and we characterize the Symmetrical Core. We analyze the r... more In this paper we study some properties and we characterize the Symmetrical Core. We analyze the relation of the Symmetrical Core with the Shapley value of a game modeling information transferal in a cooperative environment. This type of game was introduced by Galdeano et al. (Int Game Theor Rev 12(1):19–35, 2010) and it was also studied by Hou and Driessen (J Appl Math 2012:1–12, 2012). It consists of an information market game involving identical firms and an innovator having relevant information for the firms (e.g., a new technology).
El Trabajo pretende demostrar el perfil de una futura Ley de Coparticipacion de Impuestos a trave... more El Trabajo pretende demostrar el perfil de una futura Ley de Coparticipacion de Impuestos a traves de la modelizacion de los posibles comportamientos estrategicos de los agentes involucrados en la toma de decisiones de esta problematica, utilizando herramientas de la Teoria de Decisiones. La hipotesis subyacente en el trabajo es que la materializacion de la Ley de Coparticipacion debe pasar por un proceso politico de negociacion el cual, al ser modelizado, muestra el poder de negociacion de los distintos agentes y las posibles estrategias que podrian seguir a los efectos de conseguir las coaliciones necesarias para lograr una nueva ley que favorezca a sus intereses.
By A. Neme and L. Quintas; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Cost of Implementat... more By A. Neme and L. Quintas; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Cost of Implementation.
In this paper we study a repeated game and the replicator dynamics to analyze the spread of a rum... more In this paper we study a repeated game and the replicator dynamics to analyze the spread of a rumor in a society formed by two populations. One population is informed about a rumor and communicates the rumor to the other population. According to the preferences of each individual, this rumor is communicated in its original or in a modified form. We analyze the stability of dynamic equilibria. We conclude that there are three possibilities for the spread of a rumor. The rumor may end up being disseminated in its original version or being distorted by the diffusers throughout the society, or a part of the population remains in the long term spreading the rumor in its original form and another in a distorted way.
Abstract This paper consider what payoff allocations can be outcomes of resales-proof trades of i... more Abstract This paper consider what payoff allocations can be outcomes of resales-proof trades of information with a monopolistic seller. The concept of resale-proofness has been introduced by M. Nakayama, L. Quintas, and S. Muto (1988, “Resale-Proof Trades of Information,” Discussin Paper 776, Northwestern University) in formulating a trade such that no agent has an incentive to resell when the resale is freely allowed. With appropriate modifications, we consider the core of such a trade, and derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the trade to have a single outcome: the monopolistic imputation. It is also shown that generally the sole seller cannot enjoy the monopolistic position in a resale-proof trade.
In this paper we study some properties and we characterize the Symmetrical Core. We analyze the r... more In this paper we study some properties and we characterize the Symmetrical Core. We analyze the relation of the Symmetrical Core with the Shapley value of a game modeling information transferal in a cooperative environment. This type of game was introduced by Galdeano et al. (Int Game Theor Rev 12(1):19–35, 2010) and it was also studied by Hou and Driessen (J Appl Math 2012:1–12, 2012). It consists of an information market game involving identical firms and an innovator having relevant information for the firms (e.g., a new technology).
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