The problem of the nature of the objects of human knowledge was most clearly raised for the first... more The problem of the nature of the objects of human knowledge was most clearly raised for the first time by Plato. For him, our very understanding of the nature of knowledge depended on an adequate solution of this problem. Four things, among others, are noteworthy in Plato’s approach: (1) his sole concern with knowledge in a strictly subjective sense of this term, appearances to the contrary not-withstanding; (2) his firm commitment to infallibility as a necessary mark of (subjective) knowledge; (3) his view that perception is not a species of such knowledge; and (4) his view that the best candidates for objects of such knowledge are the (eternal and abstract) individual entities that he designated as ‘Forms’/‘Ideas’. In the course of the subsequent historical development of traditional epistemology (TE), it is only the doctrines (3) and (4) which have undergone radical modification, with the underlying basic assumptions staying intact and unquestioned. Thus while no philosopher from Aristotle onwards has ever subscribed to a Platonic doctrine of ‘Forms’ as objects of knowledge, or rejected perception as a pseudospecies of knowledge, there is discernible in TE a common commitment not only to the doctrines (1) and (2), but to the assumption that it is the individual things/processes of a suitable kind which alone can be the objects of our (subjective) knowledge.
Ever since its coming into existence as a relatively independent enterprise, science has been cha... more Ever since its coming into existence as a relatively independent enterprise, science has been characterized by a relentless dynamic quest for epistemologically effective and methodologically stable patterns of description/explanation. The task of critically selecting such relatively stable patterns of description has been from the very beginning entrusted to the system of scientific method. Thus the relatively short history of modern science is replete with interesting episodes of interaction between (a) the system of scientific method and (b) the scientific problems and the patterns of description proposed from time to time. As a consequence, two things are noteworthy in the growth of science ever since its inception in the modern period. First, the system of scientific method, which developed gradually to promote and regulate the selective growth and proliferation within the corpus of empirical science, has had to be an open system subject to constant negative-feedback-type evolutionary pressures from what it, as a rule, operates upon, viz., the open theory-problem interactive systems. Thus there is not only considerable historical evidence in favour of a constant growth of the system of scientific method in the past but also sufficient reason to believe in unlimited possibilities of its progressive transformation in the future. Secondly, considered as an interactive system of theoretical problems and their attempted solutions, science is best understood as a perpetually growing system not only in the usual specific theoretical sense of conceptual innovations that take place in its different fields, but also in the methodological sense of progressive transformations in its canonical patterns of description themselves.
At what point, one might ask, do the considerations about language assume crucial relevance to ou... more At what point, one might ask, do the considerations about language assume crucial relevance to our approach to the philosophical problems of science? Or are the linguistic and non-linguistic (= mathematical) aspects of science so disparate and wide apart that only one of them, but not both, carries methodological relevance in the context of the philosophy of science? An answer in the affirmative to the latter question is actually implied by the Sneed-Stegmuller type set-theoretic structuralist approach to the problems of the structure and growth of scientific knowledge.1 Scientific theories must be, on this view, treated as mathematical entities (= set-theoretic structures) of a certain kind before one attacks the philosophical problems concerning them, notably those of inter-theory relations, theory-reduction/replacement and theory-choice. Only on an approach as radical as this, so is it claimed, can we deal with the Kuhn-Feyerabend type problem of incommensurability. But how? This problem, we are told, is simply dissolved if we adopt this new radical approach. That is, different scientific theories cannot be cognitively compared, one with the other, so long as they are treated as structures consisting of true or false statements. On this view, then, there is no question of our considerations about language having a bearing on those about science and vice versa.
If my arguments (in Chapters 2 and 3) concerning the epistemic/developmental structures of our kn... more If my arguments (in Chapters 2 and 3) concerning the epistemic/developmental structures of our knowledge and its growth have followed any pattern at all, then these must now be developed further according to my thesis (in Chapter 3) that a sound methodological model of epistemic appraisal must be embedded in a sound model of epistemic structure, the latter entailing the former. It is possible to do this in more precise terms once it is clear that there is an intimate connection between the two problems of epistemic structure and epistemic appraisal. So intimate is the connection indeed that TE and the current methodologies, which are a variation on the former, treat them as a single problem. This is the familiar, but currently controversial, problem of the unit of scientific appraisal. This fact may explain why there is no explicit discussion of any such thing as what I call the problem of epistemic structure. But the complexity of the problem is revealed only if we realize that eve...
‘Perception’ is a general term of wide connotation. From (what might appropriately be called) an ... more ‘Perception’ is a general term of wide connotation. From (what might appropriately be called) an interaction-theoretic view of perception it is plausible, I think, both to look at its range as a continuum of interaction between the perceiving subject/individual and its environment on the one hand and at the whole range of its endproducts, on the other hand, as a range of apparent perceptual (anschaulichen) products subject to variable interpretation. Thus, as a continuum of interaction, perception ranges from the most intimate (types of) contact with objects/persons in one’s environment (including one’s stumbling on such objects, say, in poor visibility, etc.) to the most distantly related visual or auditory experience of them. The perceptual products correspondingly range from one’s visible excitement, tears in one’s eyes, cries of joy, sketching, painting, uttering sentences (including one-word sentences), reporting what one sees or hears and bodily movement towards objects, and so on.
The success of a sound philosophical theory of scientific knowledge depends, I believe, as much o... more The success of a sound philosophical theory of scientific knowledge depends, I believe, as much on its principles of formalization as on the availability of good examples that are of crucial relevance to such an enterprise. Consider, e.g., what Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) accomplished in the philosophical climate of his time by letting the principles of his philosophy spiral around the scientific theory dominant at that time. Who can say that Kant’s philosophy, with Newton’s physics as one of its ingredients, did not, however unintendedly, lead to better examples in our own time, say in the shape of Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity (STR) and general theory of relativity (GTR) on the one hand, and quantum mechanics on the other. Wherein lies, then, one might ask, the basic rationale for the philosophy of science within the broad framework of methodological essentialism? The answer is, I think, as follows. In the very process of appealing to the extant scientific theory in...
The problem which the present study raises and addresses itself to may be formulated by asking: W... more The problem which the present study raises and addresses itself to may be formulated by asking: What is the structural identity of science from the point of view of the problems of epistemic structure, growth of knowledge and epistemic appraisal. This is essentially to reformulate in one single question a whole complex set of questions of the kind that have always troubled the epistemologist as well as the methodologist of science in one way or another. The reformulation necessitates, on the one hand, another look at the traditional subjectivist enterprise of epistemology and the specific theories developed thereunder, and has the consequence of setting limits to radical alternatives to it, i.e., radical alternatives like those proposed by Karl Popper and W. V. O. Quine respectively. On the other hand, it facilitates a constructive and critical review of the current scene of controversy that centres around the Popper-Lakatos-Kuhn-Feyerabend debate concerning the rationality/non-rati...
As an abstract concept, the concept of a knowing subject is as old as epistemology and might be r... more As an abstract concept, the concept of a knowing subject is as old as epistemology and might be regarded as a lasting contribution of this philosophical enterprise. There is not a single theory of knowledge — whether in the East or in the West — which is not woven around it, or which does not employ it as a central concept. Thus, throughout the different epochs of philosophical thinking concerning the nature of human knowledge in different fields of learning, all attempts at its definition/ characterization invariably fall back upon this concept. This is as much true of Plato as it is of Rene Descartes, the two great system-builders in traditional epistemology (TE). Yet, while all this is true, the concept of a knowing subject remains the least analyzed concept in TE. Is it due to this concept’s fundamental role in TE? Or is there some other reason for the indifference to its analysis?
By reading, you can know the knowledge and things more, not only about what you get from people t... more By reading, you can know the knowledge and things more, not only about what you get from people to people. Book will be more trusted. As this structure and growth of scientific knowledge, it will really give you the good idea to be successful. It is not only for you to be success in certain life you can be successful in everything. The success can be started by knowing the basic knowledge and do actions.
... of the resolving power of physical field theories, in their pre-history from Aristotle to Kep... more ... of the resolving power of physical field theories, in their pre-history from Aristotle to Kepler ... imperatives in favour of one particular CSD or theory-problem interactive system as against ... over the kind of controversy that David Hume raised long ago concerning induction and human ...
I agree with Popper that falsifiability of a theory is a mark of the theory’s scientific characte... more I agree with Popper that falsifiability of a theory is a mark of the theory’s scientific character. But I disagree with him as regards the manner in which he formulates this principle and cannot accept the assumptions on which it is based. Particularly, there are two fundamental aspects to his formulation which must be examined: (1) His formulation implies a certain universal restriction on the very structure/form of a scientific theory - a restriction which would according to him guarantee its falsifiability and thereby achieve the greater aim of demarcation between science and non-science. (2) The only rationale, apart from the one in terms of its consequences, which Popper brings to bear on the falsifiability principle is offered essentially in terms of what is tantamount to a simplistic game-theoretic approach to science.
It is indisputable that epistemology has been, ever since antiquity, concerned with the resolutio... more It is indisputable that epistemology has been, ever since antiquity, concerned with the resolution of the complexities of human knowledge. But what are the salient features, if any, of this enterprise of traditional epistemology (TE) or the theories that have been developed under it (TE-theories)? Although of considerable independent philosophical interest, this vastly complex question assumes a crucial relevance against the current background of what may be termed ‘the radical alternatives to TE’ that have been recently proposed by Karl Popper and W. V. O. Quine respectively. Common to these proposals is the view that TE is totally misconceived; that the kinds of problems it raises and the solutions it offers are all fundamentally irrelevant to our proper understanding of human knowledge.
The successive ideal-type models of language, of its essential structure and function, which one ... more The successive ideal-type models of language, of its essential structure and function, which one finds in Russell’s logical atomism, early Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP)1 and Carnap’s earlier formulations of the principle of logical empiricism all proceed from what might be called the methodological framework of essentialism. For the problem they address themselves to is the problem of identifying/ defining the one and only one essential structure of our language (especially the languages of the sciences). And they do so with a view to effecting a clear and sharp demarcation between the cognitively/ factually meaningful languages and the ‘language’ which is not meaningful. This commonly shared philosophical concern with the essential logico-semantical structure — the logically necessary properties — of all languages is of course traceable to their deeper commitments to the equally essentialistic enterprise of traditional epistemology — i.e. the traditional probl...
What does then, one might now ask, empirical science aim at? An adequate answer to this question ... more What does then, one might now ask, empirical science aim at? An adequate answer to this question will depend on how we view a scientific theory, in its nature and function, in particular in its relations of interaction with scientific problems themselves. The contemporary debates about the nature of quantum mechanics as a physical theory, that originate from Albert Einstein’s penetrating criticisms of it,1 are, I believe, quite significant and instructive in this context. I shall refrain from going here into the philosophically interesting aspects of this unended debate about quantum mechanics, as I intend to do so elsewhere. It should suffice here to point out that one of the assumptions on which Einstein’s criticism is based relates to his idea of a complete physical theory.2 The questions about quantum mechanics that Einstein asked himself and tried to answer quite naturally raise then questions of a similar nature about scientific theory in general, such as the following: When i...
According to Popper, “it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by exp... more According to Popper, “it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience”.1 Thus, “not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation”.2 There can be no doubt as to the genuineness of the problem of demarcation. But in order to understand the full philosophical significance of a methodological requirement as sweeping as this, we must ask for its possible philosophical justification as follows: What kind of assumptions/presuppositions underlie Popper’s methodological thesis that it is not the possibility of its being verified as true but the possibility of its being falsified which makes a theory scientific? I think that the whole thesis rests on the presupposition that at no point in the growth of our knowledge is it possible for us to know/verify that a theory T is true. But refutation of T is a permanent possibility. Thus, the presupposition in question is not, in its turn, a methodological requirement but an objectivistic epistemological thesis3 concerning T. The two theses — one of them being methodological in nature and the other epistemological — should not be confused with each other, even if they may sound similar. The chief reason why I say that the one rests on the other is simply this. If we could not reasonably say of T what the epistemological thesis says in effect, the methodological rule of falsifiability would have no extra-methodological source of plausibility left whatever; it would be rendered arbitrary from an objectivistic epistemologicalpoint of view.4
This essay is dedicated to all the women, men and children who have, in the wake of terrorism let... more This essay is dedicated to all the women, men and children who have, in the wake of terrorism let loose in the lands of their birth and history, inherited from the twentieth century a life of exile. They have seen death and destruction by violent uprootment, by environmental deprivation, by the retreat of the state, and by the resultant disappearance of cultural, ecological and universal interconnectedness.
The problem of the nature of the objects of human knowledge was most clearly raised for the first... more The problem of the nature of the objects of human knowledge was most clearly raised for the first time by Plato. For him, our very understanding of the nature of knowledge depended on an adequate solution of this problem. Four things, among others, are noteworthy in Plato’s approach: (1) his sole concern with knowledge in a strictly subjective sense of this term, appearances to the contrary not-withstanding; (2) his firm commitment to infallibility as a necessary mark of (subjective) knowledge; (3) his view that perception is not a species of such knowledge; and (4) his view that the best candidates for objects of such knowledge are the (eternal and abstract) individual entities that he designated as ‘Forms’/‘Ideas’. In the course of the subsequent historical development of traditional epistemology (TE), it is only the doctrines (3) and (4) which have undergone radical modification, with the underlying basic assumptions staying intact and unquestioned. Thus while no philosopher from Aristotle onwards has ever subscribed to a Platonic doctrine of ‘Forms’ as objects of knowledge, or rejected perception as a pseudospecies of knowledge, there is discernible in TE a common commitment not only to the doctrines (1) and (2), but to the assumption that it is the individual things/processes of a suitable kind which alone can be the objects of our (subjective) knowledge.
Ever since its coming into existence as a relatively independent enterprise, science has been cha... more Ever since its coming into existence as a relatively independent enterprise, science has been characterized by a relentless dynamic quest for epistemologically effective and methodologically stable patterns of description/explanation. The task of critically selecting such relatively stable patterns of description has been from the very beginning entrusted to the system of scientific method. Thus the relatively short history of modern science is replete with interesting episodes of interaction between (a) the system of scientific method and (b) the scientific problems and the patterns of description proposed from time to time. As a consequence, two things are noteworthy in the growth of science ever since its inception in the modern period. First, the system of scientific method, which developed gradually to promote and regulate the selective growth and proliferation within the corpus of empirical science, has had to be an open system subject to constant negative-feedback-type evolutionary pressures from what it, as a rule, operates upon, viz., the open theory-problem interactive systems. Thus there is not only considerable historical evidence in favour of a constant growth of the system of scientific method in the past but also sufficient reason to believe in unlimited possibilities of its progressive transformation in the future. Secondly, considered as an interactive system of theoretical problems and their attempted solutions, science is best understood as a perpetually growing system not only in the usual specific theoretical sense of conceptual innovations that take place in its different fields, but also in the methodological sense of progressive transformations in its canonical patterns of description themselves.
At what point, one might ask, do the considerations about language assume crucial relevance to ou... more At what point, one might ask, do the considerations about language assume crucial relevance to our approach to the philosophical problems of science? Or are the linguistic and non-linguistic (= mathematical) aspects of science so disparate and wide apart that only one of them, but not both, carries methodological relevance in the context of the philosophy of science? An answer in the affirmative to the latter question is actually implied by the Sneed-Stegmuller type set-theoretic structuralist approach to the problems of the structure and growth of scientific knowledge.1 Scientific theories must be, on this view, treated as mathematical entities (= set-theoretic structures) of a certain kind before one attacks the philosophical problems concerning them, notably those of inter-theory relations, theory-reduction/replacement and theory-choice. Only on an approach as radical as this, so is it claimed, can we deal with the Kuhn-Feyerabend type problem of incommensurability. But how? This problem, we are told, is simply dissolved if we adopt this new radical approach. That is, different scientific theories cannot be cognitively compared, one with the other, so long as they are treated as structures consisting of true or false statements. On this view, then, there is no question of our considerations about language having a bearing on those about science and vice versa.
If my arguments (in Chapters 2 and 3) concerning the epistemic/developmental structures of our kn... more If my arguments (in Chapters 2 and 3) concerning the epistemic/developmental structures of our knowledge and its growth have followed any pattern at all, then these must now be developed further according to my thesis (in Chapter 3) that a sound methodological model of epistemic appraisal must be embedded in a sound model of epistemic structure, the latter entailing the former. It is possible to do this in more precise terms once it is clear that there is an intimate connection between the two problems of epistemic structure and epistemic appraisal. So intimate is the connection indeed that TE and the current methodologies, which are a variation on the former, treat them as a single problem. This is the familiar, but currently controversial, problem of the unit of scientific appraisal. This fact may explain why there is no explicit discussion of any such thing as what I call the problem of epistemic structure. But the complexity of the problem is revealed only if we realize that eve...
‘Perception’ is a general term of wide connotation. From (what might appropriately be called) an ... more ‘Perception’ is a general term of wide connotation. From (what might appropriately be called) an interaction-theoretic view of perception it is plausible, I think, both to look at its range as a continuum of interaction between the perceiving subject/individual and its environment on the one hand and at the whole range of its endproducts, on the other hand, as a range of apparent perceptual (anschaulichen) products subject to variable interpretation. Thus, as a continuum of interaction, perception ranges from the most intimate (types of) contact with objects/persons in one’s environment (including one’s stumbling on such objects, say, in poor visibility, etc.) to the most distantly related visual or auditory experience of them. The perceptual products correspondingly range from one’s visible excitement, tears in one’s eyes, cries of joy, sketching, painting, uttering sentences (including one-word sentences), reporting what one sees or hears and bodily movement towards objects, and so on.
The success of a sound philosophical theory of scientific knowledge depends, I believe, as much o... more The success of a sound philosophical theory of scientific knowledge depends, I believe, as much on its principles of formalization as on the availability of good examples that are of crucial relevance to such an enterprise. Consider, e.g., what Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) accomplished in the philosophical climate of his time by letting the principles of his philosophy spiral around the scientific theory dominant at that time. Who can say that Kant’s philosophy, with Newton’s physics as one of its ingredients, did not, however unintendedly, lead to better examples in our own time, say in the shape of Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity (STR) and general theory of relativity (GTR) on the one hand, and quantum mechanics on the other. Wherein lies, then, one might ask, the basic rationale for the philosophy of science within the broad framework of methodological essentialism? The answer is, I think, as follows. In the very process of appealing to the extant scientific theory in...
The problem which the present study raises and addresses itself to may be formulated by asking: W... more The problem which the present study raises and addresses itself to may be formulated by asking: What is the structural identity of science from the point of view of the problems of epistemic structure, growth of knowledge and epistemic appraisal. This is essentially to reformulate in one single question a whole complex set of questions of the kind that have always troubled the epistemologist as well as the methodologist of science in one way or another. The reformulation necessitates, on the one hand, another look at the traditional subjectivist enterprise of epistemology and the specific theories developed thereunder, and has the consequence of setting limits to radical alternatives to it, i.e., radical alternatives like those proposed by Karl Popper and W. V. O. Quine respectively. On the other hand, it facilitates a constructive and critical review of the current scene of controversy that centres around the Popper-Lakatos-Kuhn-Feyerabend debate concerning the rationality/non-rati...
As an abstract concept, the concept of a knowing subject is as old as epistemology and might be r... more As an abstract concept, the concept of a knowing subject is as old as epistemology and might be regarded as a lasting contribution of this philosophical enterprise. There is not a single theory of knowledge — whether in the East or in the West — which is not woven around it, or which does not employ it as a central concept. Thus, throughout the different epochs of philosophical thinking concerning the nature of human knowledge in different fields of learning, all attempts at its definition/ characterization invariably fall back upon this concept. This is as much true of Plato as it is of Rene Descartes, the two great system-builders in traditional epistemology (TE). Yet, while all this is true, the concept of a knowing subject remains the least analyzed concept in TE. Is it due to this concept’s fundamental role in TE? Or is there some other reason for the indifference to its analysis?
By reading, you can know the knowledge and things more, not only about what you get from people t... more By reading, you can know the knowledge and things more, not only about what you get from people to people. Book will be more trusted. As this structure and growth of scientific knowledge, it will really give you the good idea to be successful. It is not only for you to be success in certain life you can be successful in everything. The success can be started by knowing the basic knowledge and do actions.
... of the resolving power of physical field theories, in their pre-history from Aristotle to Kep... more ... of the resolving power of physical field theories, in their pre-history from Aristotle to Kepler ... imperatives in favour of one particular CSD or theory-problem interactive system as against ... over the kind of controversy that David Hume raised long ago concerning induction and human ...
I agree with Popper that falsifiability of a theory is a mark of the theory’s scientific characte... more I agree with Popper that falsifiability of a theory is a mark of the theory’s scientific character. But I disagree with him as regards the manner in which he formulates this principle and cannot accept the assumptions on which it is based. Particularly, there are two fundamental aspects to his formulation which must be examined: (1) His formulation implies a certain universal restriction on the very structure/form of a scientific theory - a restriction which would according to him guarantee its falsifiability and thereby achieve the greater aim of demarcation between science and non-science. (2) The only rationale, apart from the one in terms of its consequences, which Popper brings to bear on the falsifiability principle is offered essentially in terms of what is tantamount to a simplistic game-theoretic approach to science.
It is indisputable that epistemology has been, ever since antiquity, concerned with the resolutio... more It is indisputable that epistemology has been, ever since antiquity, concerned with the resolution of the complexities of human knowledge. But what are the salient features, if any, of this enterprise of traditional epistemology (TE) or the theories that have been developed under it (TE-theories)? Although of considerable independent philosophical interest, this vastly complex question assumes a crucial relevance against the current background of what may be termed ‘the radical alternatives to TE’ that have been recently proposed by Karl Popper and W. V. O. Quine respectively. Common to these proposals is the view that TE is totally misconceived; that the kinds of problems it raises and the solutions it offers are all fundamentally irrelevant to our proper understanding of human knowledge.
The successive ideal-type models of language, of its essential structure and function, which one ... more The successive ideal-type models of language, of its essential structure and function, which one finds in Russell’s logical atomism, early Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP)1 and Carnap’s earlier formulations of the principle of logical empiricism all proceed from what might be called the methodological framework of essentialism. For the problem they address themselves to is the problem of identifying/ defining the one and only one essential structure of our language (especially the languages of the sciences). And they do so with a view to effecting a clear and sharp demarcation between the cognitively/ factually meaningful languages and the ‘language’ which is not meaningful. This commonly shared philosophical concern with the essential logico-semantical structure — the logically necessary properties — of all languages is of course traceable to their deeper commitments to the equally essentialistic enterprise of traditional epistemology — i.e. the traditional probl...
What does then, one might now ask, empirical science aim at? An adequate answer to this question ... more What does then, one might now ask, empirical science aim at? An adequate answer to this question will depend on how we view a scientific theory, in its nature and function, in particular in its relations of interaction with scientific problems themselves. The contemporary debates about the nature of quantum mechanics as a physical theory, that originate from Albert Einstein’s penetrating criticisms of it,1 are, I believe, quite significant and instructive in this context. I shall refrain from going here into the philosophically interesting aspects of this unended debate about quantum mechanics, as I intend to do so elsewhere. It should suffice here to point out that one of the assumptions on which Einstein’s criticism is based relates to his idea of a complete physical theory.2 The questions about quantum mechanics that Einstein asked himself and tried to answer quite naturally raise then questions of a similar nature about scientific theory in general, such as the following: When i...
According to Popper, “it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by exp... more According to Popper, “it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience”.1 Thus, “not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation”.2 There can be no doubt as to the genuineness of the problem of demarcation. But in order to understand the full philosophical significance of a methodological requirement as sweeping as this, we must ask for its possible philosophical justification as follows: What kind of assumptions/presuppositions underlie Popper’s methodological thesis that it is not the possibility of its being verified as true but the possibility of its being falsified which makes a theory scientific? I think that the whole thesis rests on the presupposition that at no point in the growth of our knowledge is it possible for us to know/verify that a theory T is true. But refutation of T is a permanent possibility. Thus, the presupposition in question is not, in its turn, a methodological requirement but an objectivistic epistemological thesis3 concerning T. The two theses — one of them being methodological in nature and the other epistemological — should not be confused with each other, even if they may sound similar. The chief reason why I say that the one rests on the other is simply this. If we could not reasonably say of T what the epistemological thesis says in effect, the methodological rule of falsifiability would have no extra-methodological source of plausibility left whatever; it would be rendered arbitrary from an objectivistic epistemologicalpoint of view.4
This essay is dedicated to all the women, men and children who have, in the wake of terrorism let... more This essay is dedicated to all the women, men and children who have, in the wake of terrorism let loose in the lands of their birth and history, inherited from the twentieth century a life of exile. They have seen death and destruction by violent uprootment, by environmental deprivation, by the retreat of the state, and by the resultant disappearance of cultural, ecological and universal interconnectedness.
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