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WHAT WORKS

BURKINA FASO

Growth and Competitiveness Credits (1–4)

Report No. 127424
JUNE 26, 2018

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Report No.: 127424

PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

BURKINA FASO

First Growth and Competitiveness Credit (P126207)
(IDA-H6820, IDA-H7850)

Second Growth and Competitiveness Credit (P132210)
(IDA-H7850, IDA-H8300)

Third Growth and Competitiveness Credit (P146640)
(IDA-53270, IDA-H8300, IDA-H8950)

Fourth Growth and Competitiveness Credit (P151275)
(IDA56090, IDA-D0440, IDA-H8950)

July 31, 2018

Human Development and Economic Management

Independent Evaluation Group

Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF)

2012	$1.00	CFAF 510.52
2013	$1.00	CFAF 494.04
2014	$1.00	CFAF 494.45
2015	$1.00	CFAF 591.45

Abbreviations

AICB	Association Interprofessionnelle des Cotonculteurs du Burkina Faso
CAS	country assistance strategy
CPS	country partnership strategy
CSO	civil society organization
DGCOOP	director general in charge of cooperation
DPF	development policy financing
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
FAARF	Support Fund for Women's Income-Generating Activities
G&C	Growth and Competitiveness
GDP	gross domestic product
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA	International Development Association
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISR	Implementation Status and Results Report
PDO	project development objective
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PFM	public financial management
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
PRSCG	Poverty Reduction Support Credit and Grant
SCADD	Stratégie pour une Croissance Accélérée et pour le Développement Durable
SCD	Systematic Country Diagnostic
SONAGESS	Société Nationale de Gestion du Stock de Sécurité Alimentaire

All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated.

Fiscal Year

Government: January 1 – December 31

Director-General, Independent Evaluation	Ms. Caroline Heider
Director, Human Development and Economic Management	Mr. Auguste Tano Kouame
Manager, Country Programs and Economic Management	Mr. Pablo Fajnzylber
Task Manager	Mr. Felix Oppong

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Principal Ratings

Burkina Faso: Growth and Competitiveness Credit Series (I-IV)

Indicator	ICR*	ICR Review*	PPAR
Outcome	Moderately unsatisfactory	Moderately unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
Risk to development outcome	Moderate	Substantial	Moderate
Bank performance	Moderately unsatisfactory	Moderately unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
Borrower performance	Moderately unsatisfactory	Moderately unsatisfactory	Moderately unsatisfactory

Note: The Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible Global Practice. The ICR Review is an intermediate Independent Evaluation Group product that seeks to independently validate the findings of the ICR. PPAR = Project Performance Assessment Report.

Key Staff Responsible

Burkina Faso: First Growth and Competitiveness Credit (P126207)

Project	Task Manager/Leader	Sector Manager	Country Director
Appraisal	Samba Ba	Miria A. Pigato	Madani M. Tall
Completion	Ali Zafar	Lars Christian Moller	Pierre Frank Laporte

Burkina Faso: Second Growth and Competitiveness Credit (P132210)

Project	Task Manager/Leader	Sector Manager	Country Director
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Burkina Faso: Third Growth and Competitiveness Credit (P146640)

Project	Task Manager/Leader	Sector Manager	Country Director
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Project	Task Manager/Leader	Sector Manager	Country Director
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Completion	Samba Ba	Lars Christian Moller	Pierre Frank Laporte

IEG Mission: Improving World Bank Group development results through excellence in independent evaluation.

About This Report

The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the World Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the World Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEG annually assesses 20–25 percent of the World Bank's lending operations through fieldwork. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or World Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEG staff examine project files and other documents, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, interview World Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate, and apply other evaluative methods as needed.

Each PPAR is subject to technical peer review, internal IEG panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible World Bank country management unit. The PPAR is also sent to the borrower for review. IEG incorporates both World Bank and borrower comments as appropriate, and the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

About the IEG Rating System for Public Sector Evaluations

IEG's use of multiple evaluation methods offers both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. IEG evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (additional information is available on the IEG website: http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org).

Outcome: The extent to which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. *Relevance* includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current World Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, sector strategy papers, and operational policies). Relevance of design is the extent to which the project's design is consistent with the stated objectives. *Efficacy* is the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared with alternatives. The efficiency dimension is not applied to development policy operations, which provide general budget support. *Possible ratings for outcome:* highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, highly unsatisfactory.

Risk to Development Outcome: The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings for risk to development outcome:* high, significant, moderate, negligible to low, and not evaluable.

Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the World Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan or credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes). The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings for Bank performance:* highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. *Possible Ratings for borrower performance:* highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly unsatisfactory.

Preface

This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) evaluates the Growth and Competitiveness Credit Development Policy Financing series (I–IV) implemented in Burkina Faso between 2012 and 2015. The total cost of the four operations was $359 million equivalent. The first operation was approved by the Board of the International Development Association (IDA) on June 26, 2012, and the last on April 2, 2015. The series closed on December 31, 2015.

The development objectives of the four operations were to catalyze private sector growth and generate employment; improve transparency and accountability in public resource mobilization and management; and increase resilience and reduce vulnerability to shocks.

The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) prepared the report based on interviews, a review of World Bank files, and documents and data collected during a field visit to Burkina Faso in November 2017. The mission met with World Bank staff, government officials, beneficiaries of the reforms, donors, academia, and civil society groups. The evaluation also draws from interviews with the task team leaders and country manager of Burkina Faso. The series followed 11 budget support operations of the Poverty Reduction Support Credits and Grants 1–11 in Burkina Faso and was the only type of development policy operation financed by IDA resources during the period.

The cooperation and assistance of all stakeholders as well as the support of the World Bank Country Office in Burkina Faso are gratefully acknowledged.

Following standard IEG procedures, a copy of the draft PPAR was sent to the borrower for comments. No comments were received.

Summary

This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the extent to which the Growth and Competitiveness series of four operations between 2012 and 2015 achieved its development policy objectives. The series involved a total disbursement of SDR239.8 million (about $359 million) in the form of grants and credits. The first operation was approved by the Board of the International Development Association (IDA) on June 26, 2012, and the last on April 2, 2015. The series closed on December 31, 2015.

The development objectives of the series were to catalyze private sector growth and generate employment; improve transparency and accountability in public resource mobilization and management; and increase resilience and reduce vulnerability to shocks.

The outcome of the series is rated **unsatisfactory.**

The development objectives were **substantially** relevant. The series broadly supported the strategy presented in the government's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Stratégie pour la Croissance Accélérée et le Développement Durable [Durable (Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development; SCADD]). The SCADD program was realigned by the transitional government following an economic and political crisis, but the nature of the realignment and its impact on the program are not fully explained in the project documents. The sector strategies within the SCADD were not fully fleshed out and action plans had not always been developed. Some policy priorities emerged only in the Letters of Development Policy. In other cases, such as cotton, the program seems to have relied much more on the World Bank's 2010 Country Economic Memorandum than the subsequent government's program, calling into question government ownership.

The development objectives were broadly relevant to World Bank strategy for Burkina Faso. The 2010–12 country assistance strategy underpinned the first two operations and the 2012–16 country partnership strategy the two subsequent ones.

Relevance of design is rated **modest.** The choice of a programmatic DPF instrument was inappropriate in a challenging environment characterized by significant political turbulence. The design was insufficiently flexible to react to shocks and attempted to cover too many areas. The series supported the completion of reforms from previous endeavors at a time when the country context had begun to deteriorate and earlier gains had been eroded. Objectives were formulated differently under each operation. This, together with the breadth of the objectives, made it difficult to establish a clear chain of

causality. Many of the prior actions supported were too weak to achieve the broad objectives. Some prior actions were reversed and repeated.

Efficacy is assessed as **negligible** for the first objective and **modest** for the second and third. There is no evidence that the series catalyzed private sector growth or generated employment. Enhancement of public transparency and accountability was limited and uneven. There is little evidence of reduced vulnerability to shocks. Many outcome targets were not met. Some of those that were met were inadequate to ensure the attainment of the objectives. Some previous achievements were reversed.

The risk to development outcome is rated **moderate**. The limited achievements are unlikely to be reversed.

Bank performance is rated **unsatisfactory**. Quality at entry was undermined by attempting to support too many unrelated policy areas, in direct opposition to the recommendation of the country assistance strategy. Risks were identified but inadequately mitigated. Supervision did not address pertinent issues in a timely manner. The technical assistance provided was not sufficient to address capacity weaknesses.

Borrower performance is rated **moderately unsatisfactory**. The government maintained macroeconomic and fiscal stability despite severe shocks. However, resources made available for reform implementation were inadequate, as was reporting of results. Institutional and political turmoil undermined the implementation of reforms. Internal coordination was weak.

Lessons

- When political risks are high and capacity is strained, design is better focused on a few key priorities. This series covered too many areas, and some key binding constraints were not addressed. The series might have been more successful with a sharper focus on more realistic objectives accompanied by a simpler design.

- The success of budgetary support depends on the suitability of the instrument to the country environment. In a context of political turbulence and uncertainties about the government's ability to undertake long term reforms, the World Bank could have ended the programmatic series after the third operation and made the fourth operation a stand-alone. Alternatively, the World Bank could have implemented a series of stand-alone operations after the second programmatic series when it became apparent that the political and policy environment was rapidly changing.

- Lack of clarity on the respective roles and responsibilities of central and local governments and of the private sector undermines policy actions. It is important to ensure that there is a shared vision and that the need for reform is recognized and accepted by all parties. In this case, there was a lack of clarity among different stakeholders during implementation of the reforms on decentralization and fertilizer distribution.

- When monitoring and evaluation is not adequately resourced or implemented, there can be delays in the identification of problems and the application of remedies. Monitoring and evaluation weaknesses can be compensated by leveraging information available elsewhere, or through specific impact assessments and perceptions surveys.

- There may be a trade-off between the promise of continuous and predictable financing, urgently needed in times of crisis, and the strength of the reform program. In Burkina Faso the emphasis was on continuous financing even when reform performance was waning.

- The lack of broad consultations with stakeholders when the World Bank is designing a complex reform program could lead to unsatisfactory results. In this case, the lack of consultations with an important stakeholder association (the Confederation Paysanne du Faso) on fertilizer distribution affected the achievement of results of one of the first objectives. Also, some development partners and civil society organizations had limited knowledge of the reforms pursued in the Growth and Competitiveness series.

- Inadequately resourced implementing agencies will likely be unable to carry out agreed reforms. Under-resourcing may indicate low government commitment, which needs to be addressed through policy dialogue. It is also important to ensure that agencies have appropriate technical capacity and systems in place, and that potential political obstacles at the local level are being addressed.

Auguste Tano Kouame
Director
Human Development and Economic Management
Independent Evaluation Group

1. Background and Context

1. Burkina Faso is a low-income, landlocked country with about 16.7 million inhabitants. It is prone to large external shocks, resulting in part from the primary nature of its major exports (gold and raw cotton). Growth is hampered by natural and demographic factors, as well as its governance framework. In addition, poor policy choices and institutional weaknesses constrain economic performance. Almost 40 percent of the population lives in poverty and lacks productive jobs. The World Bank has provided development support to the Government of Burkina Faso for several decades. In total, the International Development Association (IDA) lent about $4.1 billion between 1980 and 2017, of which $1.45 billion was provided as development policy financing (DPF). In addition, the country benefited from $1.15 billion of IDA debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. Overall, the World Bank's investment lending has constituted a larger share of the portfolio than DPF, although the latter has become increasingly important over the past decade (see appendix B, table B.6).

2. The country was politically stable for over two decades until 2011. The period before 2011 was characterized by political and economic stability, during which Burkina Faso moved away from a centralized model toward market-oriented reforms and re-engagement with the international community. The government pursued reforms to address low agriculture productivity, limited expansion of productive nonfarm jobs, poor educational outcomes, lack of basic infrastructure, and insufficient human capital to escape the traps of poverty. After 2011, a series of domestic protests and political unrest complicated implementation of policy reforms (World Bank 2012a). The country suffered a political crisis that led to the removal of the president in October 2014 and installation of a transition government, which faced an attempted military coup in September 2015. Following popular protests against the transition government, a new president was democratically elected in November 2015. The new government continued to face agitation by labor unions demanding higher salaries through 2016 and 2017.

3. Domestic and external shocks periodically affected the economy and the fiscal balance. The location of the country made it prone to "Sahelian attacks," especially after 2011. The government increased its security budget to address this menace (estimated increase of 40 percent). In addition, the 2012 Sahelian food crisis led to an inflow of about 100,000 Malian refugees to Burkina Faso. These shocks, alongside the political instability, contributed to a decline in real gross domestic product (GDP) growth from 9 percent in 2012 to 6.6 percent in 2013 and 5 percent in 2014. The trend in GDP growth is volatile and averages about 5.5 percent between 2007 and 2016. Development partners

supported the government with $100 million of additional budget support (2012–14), but the impact of the crises lingered on throughout the series.

Figure 1. Evolution of Country Context in Burkina Faso



Source: Publicly available information.

4. Corruption was a significant contextual issue in Burkina Faso during the preparation of the series (World Bank 2012a). The program documents (program documents) indicated government acknowledgment of deep challenges concerning governance and openness, especially the perception of corruption. The judiciary had not been independent and had been perceived as being prone to political interference, though Burkina Faso had signed or ratified various regional and international instruments on the prevention of corruption, including the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. The government had created entities to help implement anticorruption policies and laws, but their implementation had been ineffective. The perception of corruption had persisted. In the Letter of Development Policy of the Growth and Competitiveness (G&C) first program document, the government committed to fight corruption.

5. The World Bank had no country manager for six months during the preparation of the series. The absence of the country manager adversely affected policy dialogue and the responsiveness of the World Bank to the crisis. Many donors indicated that their cohesion was weakened given the World Bank's convening power as the head of development partners in Burkina Faso.

Evolution of World Bank Development Policy Financing, 2001–15

6. The G&C series represents a continuation of IDA support in an increasingly difficult and complex national context. The World Bank provided continuous multiyear budget support through development policy financing operations (DPFs) totaling $1,174 million from 2001 to 2015. This includes Poverty Reduction Support Credits and Grants (PRSCGs) 1–6 of $310 million, PRSCG 7–11 of $505 million and to G&C 1–4 ($359 million). In addition, the country benefited from 100 percent multilateral debt write-off from the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, amounting to $1,154 million as debt relief after July 2006.

7. The PRSCG 1–6 of 2001–06 had moderately satisfactory results. The Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the series reports modest achievements of the objective of accelerating broad-based growth and employment and disappointing progress on private sector development. Also, achievements under the objective of ensuring access to basic social services were very limited. Reforms of the civil service had negligible impact. Some progress was made on budget management and fiduciary frameworks. However, the 2017 Public Expenditure Financial Accountability (PEFA) indicates that much of this progress has been reversed or has stalled.

8. The PRSCG 7–11 (2007–11) had moderately unsatisfactory results attributable to weak design and modest achievements on two objectives out of three. IEG's Implementation Completion and Results (ICR) Review of the series indicates that a considerable proportion of program targets across all objectives were not achieved. The outcomes were weak in decentralization and cotton sector restructuring, where government commitment was insufficient. The program made substantial progress in promoting higher efficiency, transparency, and accountability in the use of public resources. These gains were largely reversed during the crisis period (2012–15).

9. The World Bank team recognized the difficulties faced by previous series in adequately addressing reform objectives. In the first program document of the G&C series, the team acknowledged the difficulty of improving the overall competitiveness of the economy (World Bank 2012a, 2). It also noted that the successive PRSCG series had achieved limited results in support of decentralized social services. The World Bank decided to address key outstanding reform issues through the series of four operations that are the subject of this evaluation.

Macroeconomic and Other Developments

10. Burkina Faso maintained macroeconomic stability amid political instability and external shocks. On average, the fiscal deficit was 2.7 percent of GDP between 2012 and 2015, while inflation hovered around 1.2 percent. Real GDP growth was responsive to

the country context: it declined from 9 percent in 2012 to 4 percent in 2015, but rose to 5.9 percent in 2016. GDP growth is heavily influenced by the prices of Burkina Faso's commodity exports. Stronger exports of cotton and gold supported higher economic growth, especially in 2012 and 2013 (figure 2). However, GDP growth fell with lower gold and cotton prices in 2015. Although the share of gold mining in national output is low (mostly due to outdated national accounts that are in the process of being rebased), it nonetheless accounted for 58 percent of exports and 14 percent of fiscal revenues in 2014, down from a peak of 75 percent and 19 percent, respectively, in 2011–12, when international prices were nearly 30 percent higher.

Figure 2. Production and Prices of Gold and Cotton

a. Cotton production dropped due to erratic rainfall, whereas gold output remained robust …



b. … amid plummeting prices



Source: IMF 2017.

11. The government's fiscal situation has been stable, with moderate tax revenue performance, and lower than budgeted spending due to slow execution of the investment budget. The overall fiscal deficit remained below 5 percent from 2008 until 2016. Total revenue increased by 4 percentage points of GDP during 2008–2016, over 80 percent from tax revenue, because of significant administrative reforms since 2009 and new tax policies adopted after 2010. Nevertheless, much remains to be done in this area, which was covered by four out of nine structural benchmarks under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) seventh program review.[1] Furthermore, the January 2018 Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT) report identified significant weakness through the ratings of various indicators:[2] 16 D, 10 C, no B, and one A. The *Doing Business* rating also rates "paying taxes" poorly—153rd out of 190 countries.[3]

12. Tax revenues declined from 16.5 percent of GDP in 2013 to 15 percent in 2016, reflecting lower commodity prices. Nontax revenues have been stable at an average of 2 percent of GDP since 2012. The overall fiscal deficit declined from 3.5 percent of GDP in 2013 to 3.1 percent in 2016 in tandem with changes in tax revenues.

13. Burkina Faso benefits from substantial external assistance. Ahead of the G&C series under review, 27 donors jointly supported implementation of the government's strategy through budget support, sector programs, investment projects, capacity building, and technical assistance. Nine of these donors provided direct budget support. The World Bank is the largest contributor in the budget support group. Total grants averaged about 4.7 percent of GDP between 2008 and 2016. However, they fell from 5.4 percent of GDP in 2013 to 2.5 percent in 2016 due to concerns over the political situation and low government commitment to reforms. Program grants also fell to 1.1 percent of GDP in 2016 from 3.8 percent in 2011 (table 1).

Table 1. Macro and Fiscal Position of Burkina Faso, 2008–16 (percent of GDP)

Item	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total revenue and grants	17.1	19.4	20.1	21.8	22.7	23.9	21.4	19.4	19.6
Total revenue	13.1	13.5	15.6	16.5	17.7	18.5	17.3	15.9	17.1
Tax revenue	12.1	12.4	12.9	14.5	15.8	16.5	15.3	14.1	15
Nontax revenue	1.1	1.1	2.6	2.0	1.9	2.1	2	1.8	2.2
Grants	4	5.8	4.6	5.3	4.9	5.4	4.2	3.5	2.5
Project	1.6	2.2	1.2	1.5	2	3.4	2.6	1.6	1.4
Program	2.4	3.7	3.4	3.8	2.9	2	1.6	1.9	1.1
Expenditure and net lending	21.6	24.1	24.6	24.3	25.8	27.4	23.3	21.4	22.8
Current expenditure	12.3	12.5	12.1	13.1	14.7	13.6	14.4	14	15.6
Wages and salaries	5.4	5.7	5.6	5.9	5.9	5.9	7.1	7.1	7.7
Goods and services	2.6	2.4	2.1	2	2.1	2	1.7	1.7	1.8
Interest payments	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.9
Current transfers	4	4	4	4.6	5.9	5.1	4.9	4.6	5.2
Investment expenditure	8.9	11.5	11.1	10.2	11.1	14.2	9	7.6	7.3
Overall balance (1)	−4.5	−4.7	−4.5	−2.5	−3.1	−3.5	−1.8	−2	−3.1
Cash basis adjustment	0.4	2.4	0	0.3	0.3	0.8	1.2	−1.4	1.2
Overall balance (cash basis)	−4	−2.3	−4.6	−2.2	−2.8	−2.7	−0.6	−3.4	−1.9
Financing	3.9	2.5	4.5	2.1	2.7	2.7	0.7	3.3	1.9
Foreign financing	2.8	2.7	3.4	2.3	1.5	0.6	0.8	1.4	1.5
Domestic financing	1.1	−0.3	1	−0.2	1.1	2.1	−0.2	2	0.4
Other memorandum items									
Real GDP growth	5.2	3.2	7.9	4.2	9.0	6.6	4.2	4.0	5.9
Current account	−11.7	−4.6	−2.3	−1.2	−4.5	−11.0	−8.0	−8.0	−6.8
Consumer prices (annual average)	10.7	2.6	−0.6	2.7	3.8	0.5	−0.3	0.9	−0.2

Source: Compiled from IMF reviews (IMF 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2017).
Note: The program document did not have consistent macro data. GDP = gross domestic product.

14. Burkina Faso is at moderate risk of external debt distress. This status remained unchanged between 2013 and 2016 despite external shocks. The country's debt indicators remain within the thresholds, based on the results of the joint IMF–World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis of November 2016. This analysis reflects various changes that have

occurred since 2013, including new borrowing, both concessional and nonconcessional; lower discount rates; higher debt distress thresholds associated with the country's move from an institutional performance rating of "strong" to "medium," based on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment; and the use of end-2013 debt data.

15. The country's reform indicators, including those on governance, deteriorated after 2011. The overall Country Policy and Institutional Assessment fell from about 3.8 in 2012 to 3.6 in 2016 and has remained at the same level since.[4] Similarly, the score of the public sector management and institutions pillar[5] fell from 3.7 in 2011 to 3.5 in 2015, reflecting weakening property rights and rule-based governance, as well as the quality of budget and financial management. The score for economic management fell persistently from 4.5 in 2005 to 4.2 in 2012, and further declined to 3.8 in 2015 (see appendix B, figure B.1). Burkina Faso ranked 148 out of 190 countries for ease of doing business in 2018.

16. The country's reform indicators, including those on governance, deteriorated after 2011. The overall Country Policy and Institutional Assessment fell from about 3.8 in 2012 to 3.6 in 2016 and has remained at the same level since.[6] Similarly, the score of the public sector management and institutions pillar[7] fell from 3.7 in 2011 to 3.5 in 2015, reflecting weakening property rights and rule-based governance, as well as the quality of budget and financial management. The score for economic management fell persistently from 4.5 in 2005 to 4.2 in 2012, and further declined to 3.8 in 2015 (see appendix B, figure B.1). Burkina Faso ranked 148 out of 190 countries for ease of doing business in 2018.

2. Strategic Underpinning and Relevance of Growth and Competitiveness Grants and Credits

Relevance of Objectives

17. Relevance of objectives is rated **substantial.**

18. The four operations under the G&C series had multiple formulations of the project development objectives (PDOs):

- PDO of first and second operation: catalyze private sector growth and employment, improve governance and public resource management, and build resilience and reduce vulnerability.

- PDO of third operation: catalyze private sector growth and employment creation, improve governance and enhance public resource management, build economic resilience and reduce vulnerability to shocks.

- PDO of fourth operation: enhance the government's ability to reduce costs in the agriculture and transport sectors; improve transparency and accountability in public resource mobilization and management; and reduce vulnerability to shocks.

19. The first two operations had identical development policy objectives. The PDO of the third operation was formulated slightly differently, but not materially so. The PDO of the fourth operation was reformulated, narrower, and more specific. However, the essence of the objectives, the sectors focused on by the operations, and the reforms to be undertaken were similar to those of the other PDOs.

20. Drawing on the above formulations, this evaluation is based on the following objectives: catalyze private sector growth and generate employment; improve transparency and accountability in public resource mobilization and management; and increase resilience and reduce vulnerability to shocks. The objective of reducing costs in agriculture and transport sectors (in the fourth operation) is assessed as a part of the first objective.

21. The G&C series broadly supported the strategy presented in the government's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Stratégie pour la Croissance Accélérée et le Développement Durable). It remained the strategy of reference at closure. The SCADD program focused on sustained economic growth and employment. It was based on four strategic axes: promoting growth and reducing economic vulnerability; investing in human capital and social protection to increase economic resilience; improving governance and enhancing the efficiency of the public sector; and addressing cross-cutting priorities, such as gender, demography, and the government's capacity to implement development policies and programs. The SCADD was realigned by the transitional government, taking into consideration the postcrisis context. The program document for the fourth operation mentions that the transitional government decided to focus its efforts on four priority policy areas: defense and national security; justice sector reform; political, economic, and administrative governance; and social services delivery. However, it does not explain the nature of this realignment or its impact on the World Bank program.

22. The World Bank supported less than fully fleshed-out government sector strategies included in the SCADD.[8] In some instances, such as cotton and transport, it is unclear whether all the G&C pillars or policy areas were closely related to specific sectoral strategies and the extent to which relevant action plans had been developed. Instead, these policy areas were mentioned in the Letter of Development Policy prepared for each operation. Cotton sector reforms appeared to have been directly linked to the recommendations made in the 2010 Country Economic Memorandum,

which is not equivalent to being based on a fully articulated, government-owned strategy.

23. The G&C series was underpinned by two World Bank assistance strategies: the 2010–12 country assistance strategy (CAS) and the 2012–16 country partnership strategy (CPS), which in turn were aligned with the overarching themes of the Africa Region Strategy (World Bank 2009b, 2013a; also see World Bank 2015d). The CAS was the document of reference for the first and second operations in the series, whereas the subsequent operations were related to the CPS. The latter remained relevant at closing.

24. The CAS states that "the challenge … is to enhance the impact and visibility of World Bank interventions through a more selective and strategic program. This is particularly relevant in the context of budget support … future general budget support would benefit from more selective targeting of key reforms at the central level." The mix of reforms in the first and second operations was not fully aligned with this strategic goal. The CAS considered the possibility of topping-up budget support to allow for countercyclical financing—a measure intended to alleviate unforeseen crises (World Bank 2009b). Specific areas of intervention mentioned included decentralization and social safety nets.

25. The CPS contains limited strategic arguments for budget support in general and G&C specifically. The G&C series is conceptually consistent with the three pillars in the CPS: accelerate inclusive and sustainable economic growth; enhance governance for more efficient social service delivery; and reduce economic, social, and environmental vulnerabilities (World Bank 2015b, ix). However, the G&C priorities are imperfectly matched with those of the CPS. For instance, the CPS does not focus on judicial issues that are covered under G&C series. The CAS completion report included in the CPS does not highlight any specific lessons concerning budget support.

26. To conclude, budget support was envisaged as a key financing instrument by the World Bank in the CAS. The G&C series was broadly aligned with the strategies of the World Bank and government. However, the program's relevance fell short with respect to greater selectivity.[9] The alignment of the series with the CPS is weaker, as the strategic relevance and importance of the G&C series is not well described. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the program had **substantial** relevance to the CAS at entry, and to the CPS at exit, as well as the government's overall and available sectoral strategies both at entry and at closing.

Relevance of Design

27. Relevance of design is rated **modest.**

28. The results framework for the series was adversely affected by the varied formulation of objectives pursued under each operation, reversal and repetition of some prior actions, the choice of instrument, mitigation of shocks, and the scope of the program. The series attempted to implement uncompleted reforms from the previous Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSC) series (1–11) at a time when the country context had begun to deteriorate and earlier gains were eroded—notably for public financial management (PFM). Such a challenging environment called for a simple results framework, based on a few well-focused reform actions and clear linkages between prior actions, intermediate outputs, and outcomes.[10] In this case, the objectives pursued were broad, making it difficult to find a clear logical chain for the entire program. The chain of causality was somewhat clearer with the narrowing of the objectives in the fourth operation, especially on "public financial management" and on "vulnerability to shocks."

29. The PDO statements in the first three operations, though adopted from government priorities, were overly broad. Narrower, more specific objectives, such as those stated in the fourth operation, would have been more manageable. This was done for the fourth operation. For instance, the goals in the first three operations to catalyze private sector growth and employment were narrowed down in the fourth operation to reducing costs in agriculture and transport. This reflected the focus of the actual reforms undertaken during the first three operations.

30. The objectives were set too high, and the policy actions were too weak to achieve them. The difficulties that the country was experiencing should have been apparent to the World Bank team during the design phase. The PDOs are at least two logical steps removed from the areas supported by the operation and what would be realizable during the period covered, resulting in a broken chain of logic. The ICR recognizes this, but the issue is described as indicators not being at the right (high enough) level. However, higher-level targets would be difficult to achieve and to attribute to the program during the implementation period. Another issue is that the stated objective of private sector growth is misaligned with the program, which does not cover key constraints to private sector growth, such as investment climate and energy, although it includes unrelated elements, such as social protection. The revised PDO statement under C&G4 is more closely related to the program and appropriately more modest. However, it makes no mention of governance or vulnerability, which should have been kept in the statement.

31. The macroeconomic framework was assessed as adequate in all four operations. The program documents based their assessments on the assumption of high GDP growth of 7 percent per year (which proved optimistic and subject to downside risks), prudent fiscal policies, and stable monetary policy managed by the regional architecture. The program documents also mentioned balance of payments and fiscal risks, and high

risks of debt distress over the medium term (revised to moderate risk in PD4), despite earlier Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. debt write-off and continuous concessional financing by donors—all four G&C operations were financed through a grant, with an addition credit for the last two. Inflation was not seen as a risk thanks to regional monetary arrangements. The assessment in PD2 also noted additional challenges related to fiscal subsidies and the public investment program. Despite potential downside risks, the program documents did not present any sensitivity analysis (other than for debt). Since there was an IMF program, the series did not support macroeconomic reforms related to potential shocks.

32. The series was designed to cover four operations, rather than the three operations typical of programmatic series. The logic of reliance on a relatively long programmatic series given contextual uncertainties identified up-front as risks seems counterintuitive. During this review, the World Bank team justified this choice by indicating that the country was politically stable at the beginning of the series and it was almost impossible to predict the magnitude of the political upheaval during implementation. With the advantage of hindsight, a series of stand-alone DPFs after the second programmatic series, with some forward-looking design elements, such as possible triggers for subsequent support, may have been better suited to the changing political and economic environment in the country. The challenges of maintaining the programmatic approach despite the increased political instability are illustrated by the changing nature of the policy content of the program. Although cotton and PFM sector reforms represented continuity with past PRSC series, many of the other policy actions appear to have been added in a manner that seems inconsistent with a programmatic approach. Specifically, transport sector policy actions were only introduced under the third operation, judicial reform policy actions under the first and second operation (respectively two and one action) were not followed up later, and the microfinance reforms were not well connected to one another (except between the second and third operations). Furthermore, the announced possibility that World Bank DPF support would be used to deal with an unexpected crisis could have motivated a possible switch from the programmatic series to stand-alone DPF operations.

33. The relationship between expected outcomes, policy actions, and the PDOs is sometimes tenuous, especially as the program documents do not establish whether the most binding constraints[11] were being addressed. However, the subobjectives presented in the policy matrix strengthen the chain of logic somewhat as they are more closely related to the reforms being undertaken; the link was more credible even if the policy actions selected were not necessarily the most pressing ones, as in the case of contract disputes (discussed below). Specifically, taking the original pillars:

- Private sector–led growth and employment creation is much broader than the cotton sector, fertilizer distribution, customs, and trucking reforms.

Furthermore, the indicators were largely outputs, which do not capture the potential outcomes.

- The PFM measures are quite minimal.[12] The causal chain related to the commercial court appears sound[13] but falls short of measuring whether written judgments are executed—the goal of the reform. The chain is still weaker for mining, as the expected outcomes are either outputs or may not be attributable to the policy actions.

- There were too many outcome targets. The first objective had five targets, the second had nine, and the third had six. Some indicators were only remotely related to the objectives. For instance, increasing the number of certified professional truck drivers by 10 percent in relation to private sector employment.

- The policy actions taken under the third pillar (see appendix B, table B.7) appear to contribute to the development objectives. However, the expected outcomes are mostly formulated as outputs.

34. The revised PDOs under the fourth operation benefit from a stronger chain of logic because objectives are more modest and more closely associated with policy actions, which is nevertheless affected by some revised indicators being too input-oriented or not attributable to a significant extent. More specifically, three indicators were added under G&C 4 while seven were dropped. An indicator added was "the Annual Financial Reporting Sheets of microfinance institutions are made available each year no later than July." There was no auditing requirement and no follow-up required by the regulatory institution, and this was thus only a first step in the form of an output toward the objective of improved oversight of microfinance institutions. Another additional indicator was "annual increase of 10 percent in the number of certified professionals and ratio between trucking companies/individuals." The link is only partial with regard to the policy action "professionalism in the trucking industry is enhanced through the adoption and implementation/enforcing a legal framework for licensing road transport operators" as the 10 percent figure is not based on any analysis of potential supply response and it is unclear why individuals cannot meet the requirements of the law.

35. Some of the reforms undertaken were conceptually incomplete, limiting their contribution to the intended outcome of the program. For instance, the transfer of funds to local governments is one pillar of fiscal decentralization. However, without an assessment of the local capacity constraints and the composition of local government budgets, it is unclear if higher transfers would achieve the objective of reduced vulnerability to shocks. Officials of the Budget Department informed the mission that

government had reversed the policy due to low absorptive capacity of local governments, but no evidence that central government is more effective or that serious efforts were made to build subnational government capacity during the decade since the start of the decentralization process. This issue points to the lack of a clear shared vision between the government and the World Bank on the respective roles of central and subnational authorities.

36. In summary, design suffered from significant shortcomings, and relevance of design is rated **modest.**

3. Implementation

37. All four series were fully disbursed at effectiveness, and closed on schedule. A total of $359 million (SDR 240 million) was disbursed between 2012 and 2015. The first operation was approved by the Board as a grant of $90 million on June 26, 2012, declared effective on September 12, 2012, and closed as scheduled on December 31, 2012. The second operation was a grant of $70 million, approved on March 21, 2013, declared effective on September 11, 2013, and closed as expected on December 31, 2013. The third operation was financed through a Development Policy Credit of $50 million equivalent and an IDA grant of $50 million equivalent. It was approved on December 5, 2013, declared effective on December 20, 2013, and closed as expected on July 30, 2014. The fourth operation was also financed through a Development Policy Credit of $50 million equivalent and an IDA grant of $50 million equivalent. There were a few months delay in the approval of G&C 2 and G&C 4, which resulted in the series approval being completed in 2015 instead of 2014—this delay is not considered significant.

38. The series was implemented within a challenging and changing political and socioeconomic context, characterized by strikes, ousting of the sitting president, coup d'état, and a transitional government. The government's appetite for reforms had waned significantly, but there was an urgent need to external assistance to help maintain the macroeconomic situation and reduce the impact of the shocks. The World Bank used DPF as tool to support the government, following 11 PRSCs.

39. A total of 36 prior actions were implemented throughout the four operations. The Implementation Status and Results Report (ISR) indicated that the first 10 prior actions were completed on time. However, there were significant challenges during the second and third operations in governance, mining sector taxation, and justice sector reform. A prior action covering the completion of procedure-based audit of the customs clearance procedures in Ouagadougou was delayed, as was another on operationalizing the agricultural input fund in time for the 2014–15 agricultural season. There were difficulties completing the prior actions to revise the Mining Code and anticorruption law. The supervision report of the fourth operation noted that these challenges persisted

and that the threshold for the food and emergency food reserves had not been achieved. Supervision missions in December 2014 and January 2015 signaled the lack of resources for implementing agencies and delayed procurement processes that were likely to affect the national food security stock.

40. The over-ambition of the program and the difficulties likely to be faced in the governance and justice sectors were signaled in the first supervision report of the series. However, the reform agenda was not narrowed until the fourth operation when it had become obvious that many objectives would not be achieved.

41. The series maintained its seven focus areas throughout, even though some prior actions were dropped. The focus areas targeted by the G&C series were agriculture, mining, transportation, PFM, decentralized social service provision, judicial reform, food security, and microfinance. Each operation had a somewhat different composition of indicators in addition to some revisions of targets. The series had 30 targets of which 10 were dropped from the fourth operation and only 20 were assessed by the ICR.

42. Donor support to assist in the implementation of the reform program did not materialize to the extent expected. The budget support group was not fully functional during implementation of the series. During this assessment, donor representatives criticized the World Bank for not having used its convening power to revive the group, even though at the time the group was being led by another donor based on a "Troika system," where leadership rotates among stakeholders. There was a tendency for individual donors to pursue their own priorities without interaction with others. The World Bank's supervision missions discussed the program with donor agencies, but these discussions appear to have contributed little to enhancing coordination. The budget support group was virtually nonoperational at the time of the PPAR mission. Information on donor programs was not being collated.

43. Adequate public fiduciary systems, notably PFM, are required to ensure that budget support provided under DPFs and disbursed into consolidated accounts are used relatively effectively. The program partly internalizes this issue by covering PFM reforms (discussed under efficacy). The assessments in each program document focused on PFM and are based on various analytical works, including an out-of-date 2001 CFAA and 2005 CPAR, as well as progressively more relevant 2007, 2010, and 2013 PEFAs. The initial assessment in program documents for the first two operations seems overly enthusiastic: "the Bank has judged implementation performance of the PFM reform program to date and government's commitment to PFM improvements as exemplary." This statement is moderated in the subsequent two program documents: "The Bank has judged the overall implementation of the government's PFM reform program to be satisfactory." This assessment is substantially changed today now that the 2017 PEFA documents a general deterioration or stagnation in almost every aspect of PFM (see

World Bank 2017c). There was sound basis for the assessment at the beginning of the series as it reflected in the relatively good PEFA indicators (based on 2011–13 data), notably regarding procurement and not withstanding weaknesses in areas rated "D" in both 2010 and 2013 PEFAs,[14] including external controls. IEG's assessment of the PRSC 7–11 series also confirms substantial progress on fiduciary reforms.[15] However, the 2017 PEFA documented significant deterioration in almost every aspect of PFM. Although it is true that this report became available after program closing, the World Bank team should have been more aware of signs of deterioration of PFM and refocused the series on this policy area to preserve pervious achievements.

44. The program documents all include a statement such as "the activities supported by the proposed operation are not likely to have significant negative effects on the environment, forests, and other natural resources." The latter two program documents are even more positive citing the likelihood of positive or neutral impact. This argument is two-pronged: (i) the specific policy actions do not have a direct negative impact—secondary impact through microfinance, for example, is not considered; and (ii) IDA is providing separate support to facilitate better enforcement of environmental rules. In some countries, cotton production has been associated with environmental degradation, but this assessment identified a 2016 study[16] that linked agriculture poisoning to cotton production in Burkina. It would have been helpful for program documents to at least highlight this potential issue and how it may be mitigated—including through parallel World Bank investment lending. Nevertheless, overall, adequate attention appears to have been paid to environmental issues in the design of the program.

4. Achievement of the Objectives

45. Most of the objectives of the series were not achieved. This review discusses evidence related to each of the three objectives and 20 results indicators in the World Bank's results framework. It integrates additional information collected during the IEG mission and from independent sources for the assessment such as the PEFA and *Doing Business* reports.

Objective 1. Catalyze Private Sector Growth and Employment

46. Private sector growth depended only in part on the sectors targeted by the series.[17] The last operation significantly lowered the ambition of this objective, focusing as it did on transportation costs. Although these are undoubtedly important,[18] there is no evidence that they have been reduced.

47. The 2017 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) finds no link between increased agricultural production and higher employment (World Bank 2017a). It notes that the limited creation of productive jobs in Burkina Faso is a result of the poor performance of

the agricultural sector. Agriculture employs 80 percent of the population but contributes only 15 percent of the GDP growth. The SCD links increased employment with industrial and services sectors. The contribution of the industrial sector rose by 5 percent, and that of the services sector increased by 8 percent during 2008–2017. The share of employment in agriculture was reported to have fallen by 12.5 percent between 2005 and 2014. The increased share of employment in the industrial and service sectors cannot be attributed to the program because it did not include policy reforms that focused on those sectors.

48. A proxy outcome target of private sector growth is the credit to the private sector as a percent of GDP. Although this indicator appears to be weak, the IEG mission did not get data for other stronger indicators of private sector growth. Information from the IMF indicates that credit to the private sector increased from 24.8 percent in 2012 to 28.4 percent of GDP in 2016. However, the PPAR mission was informed that businesses relocated from Burkina Faso to neighboring countries due to political and economic shocks between 2012 and 2015. Table 2 presents additional indicators not measured by the program.

Table 2. Selected Financial Sector Indicators (annual percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)

Indicator	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Credit to the private sector	24.1	26.3	18.9	7.0	7.5
Broad money (M3)	15.9	11.3	11.9	19.9	12.2
Private sector credit/GDP	N/a	24.8	29.1	28.8	28.4
FDI inflow (percent of GDP)	N/a	3.5	2.3	2.0	2.5

Sources: IMF 2014, 2016, and 2017.
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; GDP = gross domestic product.

49. No evidence was found that private sector employment in Burkina Faso increased through measures supported by the series. The 2017 United Nations Development Programme African Economic Outlook reported that the government was still the main employer in 2016 and unemployment remained at 6.6 percent in 2014 (9.3 percent among women and 4 percent among men).[19] Most rural jobs occupied barely 5 percent of workers' time and underemployment in agriculture was 64 percent.

Subobjective 1.1

4.1 Subobjective 1.1 was to increase resilience, productivity and employment in the agricultural sector in G&C 1–3 and greater efficiency in the agricultural input market in G&C 4.

Table 3. Achievement of Agricultural Sector Outcome Targets

Indicator[a]	Revised	Achieved
Capitalization of the stabilization fund is at least CFAF 6 billion	No	Yes
Capitalization of the input fund is at least CFAF 10 billion	No	Yes
Improved fertilizer distribution to the private sector increased by 30,000 tons	No	No (only 2.7 percent of target)

Sources: World Bank 2012a, 2013f, 2013g, 2015d, 2017e.
Note: a. Unchanged throughout.

50. This subobjective primarily targeted continuing reforms in the cotton sector by (i) reducing price uncertainty through creation and capitalization of a stabilization fund; (ii) establishing and capitalizing an input fund; and (iii) improving efficiency in the fertilizer market through increased private participation in the sector. The latter measure would also help other sectors, notably rice and maize, even though the state had a different mechanism for distributing inputs to the cereal farmers. Appendix B, table B.7, provides the list of prior actions that supported this objective.

51. Although the use of genetically modified cotton seeds was not supported by the program, it was widely assumed that it was (see World Bank 2013f; this is not mentioned or explained in later program documents or the ICR). However, although there were initial gains in productivity, by 2014 it had become apparent that these seeds had lower yields, produced lower quality cotton (shorter fibers) and could not prevent more resistant parasites (Jeune Afrique 2017).[20] However, these issues do not seem to have affected the design of the series.

52. The mission's interactions with the Association Interprofessionnelle des Cotonculteurs du Burkina Faso (Interprofessional Association of Cotton Farmers of Burkina Faso; AICB)[21] indicated that the price of cotton seeds and the price of inputs were the main factors determining output. The capitalization of the stabilization fund enabled the AICB to regulate the prices of the seeds and inputs paid by the farmers. Data received from AICB show that cotton production increased from 834,322 tons in 2011/12 farming year to 1,415,510 tons in 2014/15.[22] AICB stated that the program had contributed to this through reducing the cost of inputs. However, production subsequently slightly declined to 1,172,976 tons in 2015/16 (though about 41 percent higher than 2011/12 farming year). AICB noted that the stabilization fund may not be able to withstand a prolonged period of low prices (appendix B, figure B.2) as its recapitalization would compete with other demands on government resources. Furthermore, the AICB was unable to indicate the optimal level of capitalization that would enable the fund to withstand a major international price shock.

53. The AICB confirmed to the mission that the targets for the capitalization of the stabilization (CFAF 6 billion) and input funds (CFAF 10 billion) were achieved by the end of 2015. The stabilization fund was expected to align more closely the prices paid to

farmers with world cotton prices, whereas the input fund was meant to help credit-constrained farmers deal with uncertainty about input prices. The capitalization of the stabilization fund was a precondition for the release of the funds for the input fund by the World Bank. The cotton companies raised the CFAF 6 billion to help stabilize prices and the incomes of producers. The fund changed the behavior of farmers who had switched from the production of cotton to other cereals and gave them an incentive to reengage in cotton production—though the cost effectiveness could not be judged by this assessment. AICB stated that the purchase of inputs was the largest cost for cotton farmers and that guaranteed prices enabled them to calculate their potential income. It also improved the cash flow of the cotton companies, as they did not have to commit funds for the purchase of cotton seeds. Rather, suppliers now give the companies input credits at low interest rates. This is important because the inputs are given to producers on credit and payments are deducted only after harvests are sold. The input fund guaranteed the payment of funds to suppliers, thereby taking over any form of risks of default. AICB argued that the reformed had helped to reduce the cost structure of the cotton companies.

54. The third outcome target was not achieved. The prior action was "continued involvement of the private sector in the fertilizer distribution process, by the issuance of invitations to private suppliers to bid on at least 6,900 metric tons of fertilizer to be purchased by the recipient for distribution to rice and maize producers." It aimed to improve the role of the private sector in the distribution of fertilizer. However, the government perceived the measure differently: that it was to help the government to recover unpaid debt incurred in the distribution of inputs. The Ministry of Agriculture used the reform to change the mind-set of peasant farmers who thought the inputs were donations from government. Civil society indicated to the mission that the reform failed because of the noninvolvement of an important stakeholder association, the Confederation Paysanne du Faso.[23]

55. During the mission, the government referred to the perceived lack of capacity by the private sector as a reason to resume the distribution of fertilizer in villages in 2015, reversing a 2014 policy action under the program. However, data from the Ministry of Agriculture showed that the private sector was more effective than government as it distributed twice as much fertilizer in 2014 compared with the previous and subsequent years (see appendix B, table B.1).

56. The reform was not successful in reaching peasant farmers for several reasons. First, there was no study to ascertain the potential impact of the reforms. Second, the private sector was given insufficient time to settle into the distribution of fertilizer. The network for distribution was still being built when the policy was reversed. Third, the Confederation Paysanne du Faso was not involved in distribution or the selection of the beneficiaries.[24] The new distribution mechanism established by the government, and

relying on the Ministry of Agriculture, Regional Chambers of Agriculture, Territorial Communities, Producers, and Village Committees, is viewed as inefficient by civil society organizations (CSOs). The report that many farmers with critical needs appear not be receiving the distributed fertilizer.

57. In summary, although the measures supported by the operation were relevant to the development agenda there is no evidence that employment increased or that private sector growth was catalyzed. The cotton companies and some cotton producers might have benefited from the interventions, but there is no data indicating who the beneficiaries were or by how much they benefited. AICB assumes that the income of cotton farmers is less volatile but has no data to confirm this. Neither the governance of the funds nor the exit strategy appears to have been adequately considered.

Subobjective 1.2

58. Subojective 1.2 was to reduce transportation and transaction costs for cross-border trade (cut transport costs in G&C 1–3; and improved formalization in the overland transport sector G&C 4).

59. Table 4 shows that of the five targets used to measure this subobjective, three were dropped.[25] Neither of the remaining two had been achieved by the time of the PPAR mission. The relevant prior action was "an audit of customs clearance procedures in Ouagadougou is completed and recommendations to improve customs administration are adopted."

Table 4. Status of Results Indicators for Subobjective 1.2

Indicator	Revised	Achieved
Average waiting time for customs clearance in Ouaga Inter reduced by 50 percent	No	No
Government continues to refine the operational structure of the guarantee scheme	Dropped	No
Private firms begin expressing interest in joining the new scheme	Dropped	No
Percent of axle overloading	Dropped	No
Annual increase of 10 percent in the number of certified professionals and ratio between trucking companies or individuals	Added G&C 4	No

Sources: World Bank 2012a, 2013f, 2013g, 2015d, 2017e.

60. The 2017 SCD argues that trucking is dominated by many small, poorly organized, and inefficient operators who rely on intermediaries and market organizers to find freight (World Bank 2017a). The sector is characterized by low profitability. The reform aimed at building the capacity of truck owners and drivers to increase efficiency. It also attempted to address the issue of import-carrying trucks returning empty due to the lack of exports. In the past, the government gave subsidies for the replacement of old trucks, but the sector continues to be inefficient. The government commitment to this reform was limited by the truck owners' perception of interference with private

business. In a context of a breakdown in dialogue between government and the private sector, there was a lack of trust and of champions to get this reform implemented. The instrument for the professionalization of trucking company owners and driver was a government decree. However, the decree had not been implemented by the time of the IEG mission, since the framework for doing so was still incomplete.

61. According to the ICR, customs clearance time (at Ouaga Inter) had been reduced from an average of four days to one. However, the PPAR mission found the average delay to be three days. Customs officials could not confirm the validity of the one day reported by the ICR. They indicated that a study (on handling and lifting goods) had been planned for 2018 to determine the average time for customs clearance. They attributed the continued delays to underinvoicing and late submission of inaccurate information. Other stakeholders interviewed by the mission attributed delays to the treatment by customs of most goods as high risk, which need to be inspected. They argued that it is practically impossible to achieve same-day clearance.

Assessment of Efficacy for Objective 1

62. There is no evidence that the objective was attained. Many intermediate indicators proposed in the program documents were dropped or not met.[26] The capitalization of the stabilization and input funds was important in strengthening and stabilizing the cotton sector, but insufficient to have an impact on the development objective as defined originally, or as revised under G&C 4. Sustainability is also doubtful. Moreover, initiatives to increase private sector participation in the fertilizer distribution and formalization of trucking were unsuccessful; the former policy was subsequently reversed. Improvements in customs clearance did not materialize. The mission was informed that the authorities lack the resources to implement the reforms. Complementary capacity building and technical assistance could have led to better results. The efficacy rating for the objective is rated **negligible.**

Objective 2. Improve Governance and Public Resource Management

63. The series had nine results indicators, measuring the success of the objective.[27] Two results indicators covered the mining sector, five focused on the justice sector, and two were on PFM. Four other indicators were dropped during the series (see appendix B, table B.8).

Subobjective 2.1

64. Subobjective 2.1 was to build transparency and accountability in the mining sector in G&C 1–3 and greater transparency in the mobilization and management of the mining sector fiscal revenues in G&C 4.

Table 5. Results Indicators on the Mining Sector

Indicator	Revised	Achieved
Public revenues generated by the mining sector are increased to 4 percent of GDP	No	No (2.7 percent of GDP)
The number of mining companies submitting validated data for EITI reports is increased to six	No	Achieved and exceeded
The number of physical inspections of gold exports by customs officials increased by 15 percent, enhancing the accuracy of export data	Dropped	No

Sources: World Bank 2012a, 2013f, 2013g, 2015d, 2017e.
Note: EITI = Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative; GDP = gross domestic product.

65. Mining was one of the sectors that contributed the most to growth[28] during 2006–13 (16 percent), generating about 10,000 jobs plus those in artisanal mining, which complements rural income. About 60 international companies are currently active in a range of mining activities throughout Burkina Faso. The 2017 SCD identified the three most important priorities of the mining sector as maximizing joint investment projects in infrastructure, creating synergies through the development of backward and forward linkages between large multinational firms and local small and medium enterprises, and securing tax and nontax revenue. The operation covered the last priority using prior actions focused on monthly reporting of consolidated data on mining, reconciling the data among the key stakeholders, and publishing the results. This is appropriate given that the first two areas require an in-depth sectoral approach over the medium to long term.

66. The operation also supported the preparation of a new Mining Code (a prior action), which after delays due to the need to revise it and undertake public consultations, was approved by the National Assembly in 2015 (thereby going beyond the Letter of Development Policy). IEG was informed that the Code is deemed satisfactory by the World Bank. The full impact of the Code cannot yet be assessed, but its adoption is a significant step forward in adhering to international best practices for fiscal, environmental, and social standards. The Mining Code supported the creation of a local development fund for mining communities which is funded by a share of the mining revenues. The authorities explained to the IEG mission that the Code had led to a better reconciliation of data on mining revenues among the relevant stakeholders, even though its enactment faced strong resistance from powerful groups with vested interests in the status quo. The Code orients the sector toward the country's development and should benefit local communities. The results indicator aimed at increasing mining revenues to 4 percent of GDP was not achieved due to the fall in the international price of gold. There were also conflicts in some mining areas, where mining company equipment was seized and burned.

67. The second prior action for increasing the mining revenue was the "adoption by the recipient of a mechanism of monthly reporting of consolidated data on mining

revenues designed to ensure better coordination between the recipient's ministries responsible for finance and for mining, to improve collection of public revenues generated by mining activities in the country; and issuance of said data for the last quarter of FY 2011." Mining revenues rose from 1.8 percent in 2011 to 3.3 percent in 2012. The authorities noted that better data contributed to this increase (figure 3). However, the target (4 percent of GDP) was inappropriate for many reasons. Its attainment or otherwise was largely due to factors beyond the control of the program; the goal of doubling the contribution of mining revenues to GDP was unrealistic; GDP (the denominator) was itself growing; expansion of production was a private sector decision; and international prices (notably gold) were subject to fluctuation (dollar prices in 2015/16 were below their level in 2011).

Figure 3. Mining Revenue in Burkina Faso, 2011–16



Source: GDP from national Institute of Statistics and demography, Mining revenue from director general office, Treasury and public accounts – Ministry of Economy and Finance.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

68. The prior action for the publication of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) report was "a public dissemination of the second EITI report, that provides comprehensive statements on mining revenues collected in 2010 (licenses, royalties, income tax, and so on.) from all operating mines (materiality decided by the EITI multistakeholder group)." The government continued publishing the other EITI reports.

69. With the aim of improving transparency, the EITI Unit (the government entity in charge of EITI matters) confirmed that eight reports had been produced as of end 2016. The quality of the report shared with the mission was satisfactory. The specific results indicator concerned an increase in the number of companies submitting data for the EITI from a baseline of zero to a target of six. The EITI Unit compiles these data and disseminates it in reports covering 11 productions and 12 research companies between 2011 and 2016 (see appendix B, table B.2). According to the unit, the reports, in French and six local languages, are distributed widely across the country and discussed on

radio and television stations. They cover issues such as mining cadaster, discharge of mining companies, project supported by mining companies, and role of customs in mining. This helps mining communities to identify projects undertaken with mining revenues and thus contributes to reducing the occurrence of conflicts in mining areas.[29] In total, 23 companies submitted data for production of eight EITI reports.

70. This review considers progress achieved in this area as significant and attributable to the operation, notably the dissemination of the EITI reports.

71. The indicator on the inspections of gold exports was dropped because it was not associated with a prior action and therefore not attributable to the program. The IEG mission was informed that the mining companies were not providing accurate information to customs officers when exporting their products.

Subobjective 2.2

72. Subobjectived 2.2 was to enhance judicial efficiency and openness in G&C 1–3 and improved functioning of the justice sector and anticorruption tools in G&C 4.

Table 6. Status of Results Indicators on the Justice Sector

Indicator	Revised	Achieved
A general decline in corruption indicators is observed over time (G&C 4 Burkina Faso's score in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index is increased to 40 or higher)	Yes	No in 2015 Exceeded in 2016 and 2017
An increase of at least 50 percent of mediation cases at CAMC-O in 2012 and 25 percent in 2013	Dropped	Technical assistance project supported framework and law
Number of Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature elected members per grade increased by 50 percent	Added G&C 4	Achieved
A 20 percent decrease in the time required to obtain a court ruling	No	Not achieved
A 20 percent reduction in the time needed to enforce contracts	No	Not achieved: remained unchanged
Percent of judgments written down in commercial courts is at least 75 percent	No	Achieved and exceeded

Sources: World Bank 2012a, 2013f, 2013g, 2015d, 2017e.
Note: CAM-CO = Centre d'Arbitrage de Médiation et Conciliation de Ouagadougou (Commercial Arbitration, Mediation, and Conciliation Center of Ouagadougou); G&C = Growth and Competitiveness series.

73. The main policy actions under this subobjective aimed to improve the legal and institutional framework governing the justice system, with emphasis on elements related to the investment climate. The core reform (prior action) undertaken to support this objective was the preparation of the anticorruption law. Like the mining law, it suffered from a setback and delay, but was adopted by the National Assembly in 2015, completing the policy action.

74. The target of a 50 percent increase in the number of Superior Council Magistrates elected to their positions was achieved. The mission received a copy of the relevant

decree indicating the number of persons per grade. The authorities attributed this achievement to the change in government and the decision of the new administration to respond to demands for a fairer and more transparent justice system. There has also been an important step in the separation of powers, in that the President of the Republic and the Minister of Justice are no longer presiding over the Superior Council of Magistrates. They are only observers on the council. This change could also be partly attributed to strong demands by CSOs, which perceived the change as business friendly and a significant step toward accountability and good governance. The related prior action was "measures are adopted to improve the functioning of the Superior Council of the Magistracy, including an increase in its number of elected members."

75. Three prior actions aimed at reducing the time required to obtain a court ruling and to enforce contracts, as shown in appendix B, table B.7. The ICR reports that the time to obtain a court ruling was reduced from two years (730 days) to 120 days. However, information provided the Ministry of Justice indicates that the baseline was not accurate. The ministry could not confirm the data presented in the ICR. The mission was informed that the average time for making decisions in five courts increased from 247 days in 2011 to 293 days in 2016. The breakdown in different courts in presented in figure 4 and appendix B, table B.3.

Figure 4. Average Time for Making a Decision in the Courts



Source: Tableau de bord statistique 2016 de la Justice, 2017 Edition.

76. No information was available on the time taken to enforce contracts. The government did not implement the related reforms. The indicator on enforcement of contract is associated with the performance of the commercial tribunal and corresponds to an element of the *Doing Business* indicator where Burkina Faso's ranking is low (163rd out of 190 economies in 2017).[30] The number of days remained unchanged throughout the operation and since. The mission was informed that the indicator was inappropriate since it did not focus on the main issue, which is the high cost of contract enforcement as

a percentage of the value claimed (in 2017, this was 81.7 percent, and much higher than the Subsaharan average of 44.0 percent).

77. An intermediate indicator concerning the number of judgments written by the commercial court rose from 62.4 percent in 2011 to 100 percent in 2015 and 2016. Although the target was achieved, it appeared to have little impact on the time needed for contract enforcement.

78. The submission to National Assembly of a law designed to establish a suitable regulatory and legal framework for the promotion of mediation as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism (subsequently adopted) was a prior action for the first operation. It was an important and potentially effective reform, although its precise outcome is hard to assess. The original indicator of a 50 percent increase in mediated cases was dropped because it was not monitored by the government. Information on results were not readily available, though according to the public information page of the Centre d'Arbitrage de Médiation et Conciliation de Ouagadougou (Commercial Arbitration, Mediation, and Conciliation Center of Ouagadougou),[31] the claims being currently arbitrated or mediated are quite significant (equivalent to about $500 million in arbitration and $4 billion in mediation).

79. In summary, moderate, though uneven, progress was achieved in relation to this subobjective through policy actions supported by the series.

Subobjective 2.3

80. Subobjective 2.3 was to strengthen public financial management in G&C 1–3 and enhanced PFM systems in G&C 4.

Table 7. Status of Results Indicators Related to Public Financial Management

Indicator	Revised	Achieved
The average execution rate of the line ministries' investment budgets is increased by more than 50 percent	No	Not confirmed
Number of physical spot checks of contracts subject to competitive bidding increased by 50 percent	No	Yes
Greater transparency and accountability in PFM is achieved	Dropped	n.a.
Number of [court of account] judges that will remain in office for at least a year is 12	Dropped	n.a.

Sources: World Bank 2012a, 2013f, 2013g, 2015d, 2017e.
Note: n.a. = not applicable; PFM = public financial management.

81. The most recent independent assessment of PFM in Burkina Faso is found in the 2017 PEFA report.[32] This report is based mostly on 2014–16 data and can be compared with the previous PEFA report, issued in 2013, which relied on 2010–12 data. These two reports (using the same 2011 methodology) thus provide both baseline and target information pertaining to PFM during the period when the G&C series was implemented. The picture that emerges is one of significant deterioration in most

indexes. Improvements occurred only for revenues (PI-3.1 from D to B). This implies that, overall, not only was the goal of greater transparency and accountability in PFM (an indicator dropped at the fourth operation) not achieved, but the overall situation deteriorated significantly during series implementation. The deterioration was partly caused by the political turmoil. Moreover, the series focused only on certain aspects of PFM, so the overall decline is partly attributable to factors outside the scope of the program.

82. The series focused mainly on four dimensions of PFM, internal and external audit, the execution rate of the investment budget, and procurement.

83. The ICR reports that the average execution rate of the line ministries' investment budget went up from 30.0 percent to 61.2 percent exceeding the target of 50.0 percent. However, some of this improvement appears to be in line with more realistic budgeting of capital public expenditures, which were reduced during the series (to 7.6 percent of GDP from a high point of 14.3 percent of GDP in 2013). Allocation of resources more in line with absorptive capacity may explain the improvements as much as the impact of any policy action—appointment of financial controllers in line ministries and increased procurement thresholds. The PEFA points to a closer relationship between investment budgets and the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework. Although this indicates a closer relationship between selection of investments and sectoral strategies it does not appear that recurrent budget implications are being factored in; to the extent that they are not, fiscal sustainability of the investment program would be undermined.

84. The Budget Department attributes the low execution rate of investment budgets to cumbersome procurement processes (especially of some donor-funded projects) and the lack of proper planning by some ministries. Although reforms had been undertaken to accelerate the execution of government-funded investment projects through the introduction of program-based budgeting,[33] the government has no control over donor processes that would allow them to speed disbursements to line ministries. No information was available on the total budget and actual execution (government plus donor) of line ministries to enable the mission to make a judgment about whether the indicator had been achieved. Achievement would seem improbable in view of the 2017 PEFA indicator (PI-2). Composition of actual expenditure), which showed a deterioration in budget execution from C in 2010 to D in 2016.

85. A closer look at the indicator pertaining to spot checks on competitive bidding suggests that it may have been met in form. The relevant PEFA indicator for procurement (PI-19) shows an overall deterioration (from B+ to C+). In particular, there is a significant decline in reliance on competitive bidding (PI-10) (ii) indicator falls from A to D, due in part to absence of adequate information). Further information collected during the mission confirms that the indicator was met partly because it was not ambitious. The office of the

General Director for Control of Public Contracts and Financial Commitments confirmed the department's obligation by law to ensure that at least 250 contracts are subjected to competitive bidding every year. This target, which was achieved without undertaking significant reforms, was higher than the one specified in the results framework as a baseline (200). Results cannot in any event be attributed to the series, since no special resources were provided by the Director of Budget to the Control Office to undertake the reform. In 2015, 400 contracts (valued at CFAF 20 million) were inspected. The 2015 physical control covered all 13 regions of Burkina Faso. This evaluation considers the indicator met but the intended impact of enhanced PFM systems was not achieved due to lack of ambition.

86. The external audit indicator was related to an intermediate target that aimed to increase tenure for Court of Accounts judges. This indicator was not reported in the ICR. The PEFA sheds additional light on this and suggests no progress (PI-26 remains D+). However, a subindicator (PI-26) (i), "operationalization of the Court of Accounts") shows improvements (from D to C), reflecting possible contributions from the G&C program.

87. The PEFA reports no change in the internal audit indicator (PI-26 D+). However, related to policy actions supported by the series, specifically the appointment of financial controllers in line ministries, the scope of internal control has improved (PI-26 (i) from D to C).

88. In summary, although actions supported by the series appear to have resulted in minor improvements in PFM, the overall system has become notably weaker reversing previous achievements and undermining the program development objectives.

Assessment of Efficacy for Objective 2

89. The PDO for the fourth operation refers to improved resource mobilization. Other than in mining, the program did not include a specific policy actions aimed at targeting this area. This was in part because it was largely covered by the IMF program. Nevertheless, according to the 2017 TADAT report,[34] significant weaknesses could have been addressed by the operation had there been greater focus on resource mobilization.

90. There was significant progress toward meeting the mining subobjectives, as reflected in indicators specified in the results framework, updated with recent data as needed, or derived from other sources. Furthermore, the depth of the actions is reflected in three important laws (arbitration, mining, and anticorruption) being approved by parliament and the progress made with the EITI reporting, all with the support of the series. However, progress with respect to the second and third objectives was partial or inadequate. Overall progress toward the second program objective is assessed as **modest.**

Objective 3. Increase Resilience and Reduce Vulnerability to Shocks

Subobjective 3.1

91. Subobjective 3.1 is to increase access to decentralized basic services in G&C 1–3 and improved funding transfers for decentralized social service provision in G&C 4.

Table 8. Status of Results Indicators on Decentralization

Decentralization Indicator	Revised	Achieved
5 percent of the national budget is transferred to local governments under the budget law	No	Met 2014, not met 2015 Policy reversed
The population's general satisfaction with the quality of public services delivered by local governments improves	Dropped	Survey not undertaken

Sources: World Bank 2012a, 2013f, 2013g, 2015d, 2017e.

92. Key to the goal of reducing the population's vulnerability to shocks is to increase the availability and quality of basic public services. To this end, a greater focus on local service delivery is part of stated government policy. Nonetheless, the 2017 SCD states that "80 percent of public revenues are controlled by central administration, despite extended administrative decentralization/de-concentration initiatives in 13 regions, 45 provinces, 350 departments, 359 communes, and 8,000 villages; and over half of Burkina Faso's public employees are in Ouagadougou, even though this city is home to only around 15 percent of the country's total population." The SCD also identifies the need to bring services closer to beneficiaries, though increased financial allocations to decentralized services capacity building and by complementary actions, such as expanding the mandate for the delivery of investments and social expenditure to local governments (World Bank 2017a). The SCD appears to consider that strategic and legal framework for decentralization to be adequate but that implementation lags (World Bank 2017a, 146).[35] It concludes that "despite progress over the years, the implementation of these reforms has been slow and uneven, with on average only 5 percent of the national budget being transferred to the communes, often with significant delays."

93. The 2015 policy reversal concerning increased resource transfers to subnational authorities arose from the central government's perception of the inability of local entities to absorb the funds sent to them.[36] The government decided to limit transfers to about 4 percent of the national budget while building local capacity to use the funds. In addition, the central government needed the funds to close the fiscal gap and thus found it imprudent to leave large unused balances in the accounts of the local governments. Besides, the allocations are based on need rather than a law. It is noted that the local governments were affected by the social revolts, including their suspension during the implementation period of the series.

Subobjective 3.2

94. Subobjective 3.2 is to increase access to microfinance/ promote gender equality in G&C 1–3 and increased women's access to microfinance and improved oversight of microfinance institutions in G&C 4.

95. The SCD highlights limited rural access to microfinance as a key constraint facing farmers. Furthermore, although microfinance institutions have expanded rapidly, only 9.4 percent of households' report using them, with 7.8 percent using the *Caisse Populaire*.[37] Although microinstitutions had approximately 1.35 million members at the beginning of 2015, the volume of credit they provide is equivalent to only 5 percent of total credit.

Table 9. Indicators Covering the Microfinance Sector

Indicator	Revised	Achieved
Number of active borrowers increased by at least 10 percent	No	Yes
FAARF has a total loan portfolio of more than CFAF 5 billion	Yes, G&C 4 (minor)	Yes
The Annual Financial Reporting Sheets of microfinance institutions are made available each year no later than July	New G&C 4	Yes
Number of women-owned businesses to increase by 5 percent	Dropped	n.a.

Sources: World Bank 2012a, 2013f, 2013g, 2015d, 2017e.
Note: FAARF = Support Fund for Women's Income-Generating Activities; G&C = Growth and Competitiveness series; n.a. = not applicable.

96. The prior actions supported under the program were mainly focused on promoting the expansion of credit to women by a single credit institution, the Support Fund for Women's Income-Generating Activities (FAARF) established in the 1990s.[38] They included adoption of a microfinance strategy under G&C 1 and audit of all microfinance institutions under G&C 4. Little detail is available in the program documents concerning the financial and institutional soundness of FAARF. PD2 provides information on lending numbers and recovery rates, which are estimated at 96.3 percent, but information on the fund's operating costs and profitability are not provided. Prior actions sought to increase capitalization of FAARF by about $1 million (from $6.7 million) and its loan portfolio from CFAF 4.5 billion to CFAF 5 billion (loan portfolio of about $10 million; based on World Bank 2017e). Expansion of its geographical coverage was a prior action under G&C 3. According to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the targeted increase in the loan portfolio had already been exceeded by the end of 2012, implying that the target may have been too low.

97. Of the four indicators in table 10, three were met and one was dropped for lack of data. However, the dropped target was the only outcome-oriented indicator closely related to the subobjective. Additional information provided to IEG indicates that the growth in number of borrowers and loans exceeded the program targets—the number of beneficiaries increased from 85 to 148 thousand between 2011 and 2016, and the loan

portfolio almost doubled during the same period. This expansion well outpaced the capital increase. Furthermore, the expansion appears to have been through increasingly smaller loans, as measured by the loan portfolio divided by the number of beneficiaries, which typically would raise FAARF's cost of doing business and its viability, given that a fixed processing cost accompanies each loan. According to the managers of the fund, the recovery in 2016 was about 98 percent, as both women groups and individual ensure that payment schedules are followed to qualify for more loans in subsequent years. Little information is available on the quality of FAARF's portfolio or the scheme's sustainability (the mission was unable to obtain a recent audit of FAARF).

98. The target concerning financial reporting was also met, indicating progress toward increased transparency of the microfinance system through improved communication of financial information.

99. The goals related to increasing women's access to credit were largely met. However, financial sustainability remains uncertain and the impact of the loans on businesses cannot be assessed, notably because the relevant indicator was dropped.

Subobjective 3.3

100. Subobjective 3.3 is to strengthen food security in G&C 1–3 and increased response capacity of the food security system in impoverished and vulnerable areas in G&C 4.

Table 10. Status of Indicators on Food Security

Indicator	Revised	Achieved
Emergency food stock increased to at least 25,000 tons	Yes, G&C 4	Not Achieved
The national food reserve increase to at least 50,000 tons	No	Not Achieved

Sources: World Bank 2012a, 2013f, 2013g, 2015d, 2017e.
Note: G&C = Growth and Competitiveness series.

101. Although alleviating the risk of food insecurity implies increasing agricultural productivity (see discussion of objective 1), a more immediate goal is to increase food supply to vulnerable households. The scheme of maintaining emergency food reserves that could be quickly distributed to poor household was already operational and by 2012 one million people had benefited from it. The approach underpinning the policy action was to replenish food stocks that had been drawn down during previous periods. It should be noted that the scheme itself was not assessed as part of program preparation and therefore it was not known whether it was efficient and effective. Nonetheless, the series supported this area in response to the 2013–14 food security and Malian refugee crises. The G&C series was innovative in getting the World Bank to intervene in an area not traditionally covered under the development policy operation series but which could potentially impact the lives of the very poor. The migration of more than100,000 Malians refugees into Burkina Faso in the 2011–14 period contributed

to increased fiscal pressures and the World Bank's budget support was relevant in curtailing a deterioration of the fiscal situation.

102. The institution in charge of the operational activities on national food security (La Société Nationale de Gestion du Stock de Sécurité Alimentaire; SONAGESS) indicated to the IEG mission that the indicators could not be attained due to lengthy procurement processes, the obligation to obtain the food from only local producers, and a depletion in SONAGESS resources. As indicated by the ICR, data provided by SONAGESS showed that the national food security stock was temporarily exceeded in 2013 (59,000 tons of cereals). The one-time increase in the national food security stock (59,000 tons of cereal in 2013) could not be sustained due to continued strong demand and a subsequent fall in supply. The objective to strengthen food security was, therefore, not met. SONAGESS acknowledged the need for more robust systems to respond to prolonged food crises. Such reforms would include changes in the procurement system, budgetary flexibility during food crises, rapid response transport systems, software for monitoring food security, liberalization of the purchases (including options to restock using imports), and building of warehouses in vulnerable areas.

Assessment of Efficacy for Objective 3

103. Progress toward the third objective of the program was uneven and the majority of intended targets were dropped or not met. The capacity of local governments to spend the funds allocated to them remains weak. Some progress was made toward enhanced financing of women's groups but those advances may not be sustainable. The capacity of government to respond to food crises has not yet been strengthened and the series did not address the binding constraints. In view of these limited results the efficacy for the third objective is rated **modest.**

5. Ratings

Outcome

104. The overall outcome is rated **unsatisfactory.**

105. The objectives of the series were substantially relevant because, they were aligned with the overall strategies of the World Bank and the government. The design is rated modest as it was undermined by many issues, including lack of focus and selectivity, excessive complexity, and weaknesses in the chain of logic. The program had three objectives, which were sharpened and reduced in scope for the fourth and last operation in the series. Efficacy is assessed as negligible for the first objective (there is no evidence that the series catalyzed private sector growth or generated employment); and modest for the second and third (limited and uneven progress in improving transparency and accountability in public resource mobilization and management, and

in increasing resilience and reducing vulnerability to shocks). A significant number of indicators were not met. Some of those that were met were inadequate to measure attainment of objectives. Information gathered by the PPAR mission indicates reversal of previous achievements in many areas, such as PFM and the role of the private sector.

Risk to Development Outcome

106. The risk to development outcome is rated **moderate.**

107. The limited achievements under two out of the three objectives are unlikely to be reversed. Where progress was more significant, it was underpinned by laws that probably will not be revoked. However, there is a risk that their implementation may be delayed or incomplete, due to resistance from vested interest and slow adoption of complementary regulations.

108. A broader risk concerns the role of government, which is already overextended. It is still directly involved in economic activities rather than acting as a facilitator and regulator. This is seen, for instance, in microfinance (FAARF) and more clearly in fertilizer distribution.

109. The political crisis during the first half of 2010 culminated in the September 2015 coup. It was resolved with the election of a new government, which could restore a more stable environment for policy reforms. However, the country remains vulnerable to attacks from extremists. In March 2018, militants attacked the French embassy and the military's headquarters. In 2017, Islamist extremists opened fire on diners at a Turkish restaurant popular with foreigners in Ouagadougou. These attacks are likely to increase the government's budget on security and shift attention from structural policy reforms. On balance, this assessment deems the risks to development outcomes as moderate.

110. Macroeconomic risks are also present. The country remains dependent on the export of two commodities and on external development assistance that can be volatile and affect fiscal and external balances. The continued limited diversification of the economy and untapped potential of the private sector due to an unfavorable investment climate exacerbate this problem.

Bank Performance

111. The Bank performance is rated **unsatisfactory.**

Quality at Entry

112. Quality at entry is rated **unsatisfactory.**

113. The World Bank's program in Burkina Faso had been responsive to domestic pressures and aligned to the political cycles of the government. A major lesson emanating from the PRSC series was the importance of alignment of the World Bank's financial support with the national budget. This commitment implied delivering budget support within the calendar year to enable the government finance development project to the close the fiscal gap. The officials of Budget Department of the Ministry of Finance commended the flexibility of the World Bank in delivering financing predictably and on time during the calendar year. However, predictability may have been at the expenses of implementing a more ambitious, if narrower, range of policy actions that addressing binding constraints. In this series, the World Bank identified factors that could reduce the impact of the reforms, but it did not put in measures to improve the likelihood of success (including using a simpler design). Moreover, as highlighted under design, quality at entry was undermined by the series tackling to many unrelated policy areas, ignoring the lesson stated in the CAS to avoid such dispersion.

114. The continued use of budget support during periods of crisis indicates the desire to provide more predictable resources at the expense of credible reforms. All three objectives required structural reforms, many of which had not been thoroughly assessed. The government's ability to undertake reforms during crisis was not well diagnosed by the World Bank, in particular, the capacity to manage the Sahelian food crisis, addressing increasing social and economic instability, and accomplishing complex and sensitive reforms under a transitional government (World Bank 2015d, vi).

115. Nevertheless, various elements of the program design that affected quality at entry unfavorably have already been discussed elsewhere, especially with respect to relevance of objectives and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). These areas share a common element that affected quality at entry: lack of timely midprogram adjustment in view of realities in the field—despite late changes to PDOs and some results. The other strengths and weaknesses are discussed below.

116. The first program document identified three main categories of broad risks: macroeconomic, political economy, and climatic risks. This assessment was sound but was undertaken at a level that was too general. More specific risks associated with the specific policy areas should have been considered but were not. These would have included unwillingness of government to continue direct involvement in certain activities where the private sector would have comparative advantage, resistance from vested interests, complementary donor funding, and line ministries wishing to retain resources and their prerogatives, thus slowing down decentralization. The impact of the materialization of the political economy risk on government capacity and staff turnover was also understated, contributing to a deterioration of the PFM environment. The fourth program document presented a more comprehensive assessment of risks and

rated overall risk as substantial. However, this assessment should have resulted in a reconsideration of program design, but this was only done marginally.

117. World Bank procedures for DPFs also call for a review of environmental and poverty and social impacts. The four program documents clearly and credibly explain the positive aspects of the program on reducing poverty. However, the program documents for the first two operations (section 6.A.) state that "the GCG series will rely on poverty monitoring through the use of household surveys." This was supposed to help in collecting indicators and improve the targeting of measures under the program. This statement was dropped in the two later program documents and, based on poverty data collected in 2009 (prior to the series), replaced by a less proactive statement: "although the government has made important strides in combating poverty, much more can be done to speed up the pace of poverty reduction." The ICR does not mention the use of surveys to steer the program and affect its design from one operation to the other, and there was not any refocus on "doing much more" in line with the aforementioned statement. This disconnect diminishes the quality at entry. It should also be noted that trucking has known to be a potential vector for spread of human immunodeficiency virus–acquired immune deficiency syndrome, but this was not mentioned.[39] Similarly, the fact that improved judicial access may help "empower the poor" is not analyzed or discussed—even though the program targets commercial dispute it can be helpful to micro, small, and medium enterprises. That these issues are not mentioned constitutes a gap in the analysis.

118. Many other areas contribute to quality at entry, as follows:

- **Analytical underpinning.** All the operations provided analytical basis on which the series had been designed. The first program document lacks reference to relevant sector studies, including those undertaken by development partners. This improves under each operation, even though the relevance of some of the earlier studies may have decreased by the fourth operation and some of the analytical work should have been updated. Furthermore, the links between the studies and policy actions are not well-established for the first two operations, but become clearer thereafter. Finally, as noted in various parts of the efficacy section, some of the policy areas where chosen in an ad hoc manner due to lack of proper assessment of institutions or schemes that were being supported.

- **Integration of lessons learned.** This area constitutes a weakness throughout the program. Specifically, the operation did not incorporate key factors of success, which would have improved the possibility achieving the objectives. Little consideration was given to lessons from the past—those learned in other countries and by other donors. There is also no reference to relevant

IEG evaluations (ICR Reviews for PRSC 7–11, or relevant thematic evaluations) or studies by Operations Policy and Country Services (notably triennial reviews of DPFs). Also, lessons learned under earlier operations within the series were not cited till the very last one, and then only in broad terms. Finally, it is unclear how these lessons have affected the design of the series, notably in the one referring to the need for greater selectivity and depth, which according to this assessment was a weakness in design.

- **Link to other operations.** Each program document listed World Bank operations in related policy areas. However, the complementarity and division of labor with these operations was unclear. Furthermore, although some of the operations cited appeared to be of marginal relevance, an important regional transport DPF was not duly referenced. An issue that becomes apparent in the analysis and discussed under lessons learned was the need for complementary technical assistance. This was an important issue for Burkina Faso, but the program did not use technical assistance for measure such as those on food security.

- **Donor harmonization and stakeholder consultation.** The mission found that collaboration with donors was quite limited. The operation was designed at a time when donors has stopped meeting regularly. Very limited consultations were made with the budget support group. Many donors complained about the weak coordination during the mission, including duplication of reforms in the energy sector of ongoing operations. The mission found that links at sectoral level with other development partners' programs or projects is not established and this constitutes a shortcoming. The framework laid out in G&C 1 promised to benefit from the budget support group. However, the rotational leadership of the budget support group limited the extent to which the World Bank could harness the support of the group to improve the design of the series. At the time of the mission, the donors had not been able to agree on a joint policy assessment framework. Also, some influential stakeholders (CSOs and academia) were not consulted on the World Bank's program. It was a missed opportunity to get their inputs to improve the design of the operation. Some of the objectives were not achieved because the World Bank could not distinguish the higher-level politically motivated objectives from the actual reforms needed until during the PD4.

- **Risk assessment.** The presentation of risks in the first three program documents was generally terse and incomplete. It did not cover risks associated with undertaking the specific policy actions—including resistance from vested interests or policy reversals, and nonimplementation. The last program document presents an analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats that is more complete, but still lacked specificity in areas related to sector reforms—for instance, risks of nonpayment by microfinance beneficiaries should have been mentioned. More fundamentally, lack of conviction of government to allow the private sector to play a greater role in the rural economy (fertilizer distribution) or identified advantages of decentralization. The program appropriately identified sources of risks and possible exogenous shocks but could not put in place mitigating measures to reduce their effects—other than through financial support through the operation. The main risks identified include: political economy risks, macroeconomic shocks, climate-change risks, disaster risks, implementation capacity risk, and environmental and social risks. The risks that materialized affected the implementation of the reform. Materialization of political risks overwhelmed the implementation of reforms championed by the government bureaucrats.

- Key documents were apparently not available in French, which limited access by government counterparts and other stakeholders. The office of the director general in charge of cooperation (DGCOOP) informed the IEG mission of its limited capacity to comprehend large documents written in languages other than French. In this case, the issue went beyond translation of key World Bank documents to compass the lack sharing of these documents with DGCOOP. For instance, none of the government officials, donors, CSOs, and academia had seen the ICR for this operation. They had no idea about the performance of the previous series.

Quality of Supervision

119. Quality of supervision is rated **unsatisfactory.**

120. In DPF series it is hard to distinguish between supervision activities and preparation of the next operation, which tend to take place together. This assessment has taken the view that each program document, even when part of a series, is based on a stand-alone appraisal process and therefore covers the main elements of the operations under quality at entry.

121. Nevertheless, a few important points emerge from documentary reviews and interviews with stakeholders. An ISR was prepared for each operation. The first three ISRs were brief and uninformative. The ratings were misleading and unrealistic. For instance, the first two operations were rated "highly satisfactory," followed by "satisfactory" and "moderately satisfactory" ratings respectively for the third and fourth. As evidenced by the ICR and this assessment, the team significantly overstated the performance of the operation. These rating obscured the possibility of identifying the design weaknesses. World Bank management and the government were not adequately

informed of the challenges being experienced. More candid discussions on the performance of the operations could have helped improve the performance. As correctly cited in the ICR: "One significant shortcoming was the weak monitoring of the results framework as reflected in ISRs. ISRs did not report on most results indicators. Even the ISR for the last operation included only the 10 indicators that had achieved their targets." Donors complained of their limited involvement and knowledge of the reforms pursued by the World Bank. They acknowledged having meetings with supervision missions which focused on data collection rather than partnering with them on key challenges.

Borrower Performance

122. Borrower performance is rated **moderately unsatisfactory.**

123. The operation was implemented by the Government of Burkina Faso. It was led by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which collaborated with various line ministries and implementing agencies. For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture collaborated with the association of cotton companies and SONAGESS on the reforms related to the sector. The technical departments of sector ministries carried out the day-to-day process required to implement most reforms. This assessment found no distinction between government and implementing agencies' performance. Relevant to borrower performance is the clear leadership role of the World Bank in designing the operations using its previous knowledge products. Thus, more responsibility for the shortfalls of the series accrues to the World Bank.

124. Reforms that required the submission of laws, especially in the mining and judicial sectors, benefited from effective collaboration between the sector ministries and the implementing agencies. However, the implementing agencies were not committed to the reforms, they were not monitoring results indicators in the World Bank's program as part of the day-to-day activities.

125. The borrower worked with the IMF to maintain macroeconomic and fiscal stability, and kept external debt at sustainable levels, despite economic and political shocks. Another positive aspect was that many of the prior actions were achieved on time. However, a few reforms were either modified or delayed. For instance: the Mining Code approval was delayed due to insufficient consultations with stakeholders; the effort to increase private sector involvement in fertilizer distribution was unsuccessful, except in 2012; reduction in the time for customs clearance was not implemented; and the trucking reforms and complementary actions were not implemented as designed.

126. Another area of weakness was government reporting of results, which can also be traced back to inadequate M&E design. More fundamentally, although out of the direct control of the borrower, institutional and political turmoil affect implementation of

reforms, as did the central government's preference to remain involved in delivery of services that should have been devolved to subnational governments or to the private sector.

127. The coordination and monitoring of the results of the reforms was led by the office of the director general in charge of cooperation (DGCOOP). This office did not follow or have information on the reforms pursued by the World Bank. The office had fundamental challenges in interpreting World Bank documents that were sent to them in English. They also lacked the capacity and logistics needed to effectively monitor various reforms. The main role undertaken more effectively at the time of the mission was the facilitation of policy dialogue. However, the underlying technical work was not being done, shared, or used. The Ministry of Economy and Finance deferred the oversight responsibilities over policy reforms to the DGCOOP without realizing that very little was being done. The office of DGCOOP also expected the line ministries to monitor their own reforms. In other words, there was no government oversight of the reforms. The situation weakened the coordination of policy reforms on the government side, and policy dialogue were carried out bilaterally between line ministries and development partners (with DGCOOP as an observer).

Monitoring and Evaluation

128. M&E is rated **modest.**

129. The G&C series supported multisectoral reforms and accounted for a substantial part of IDA financing to Burkina Faso during the period reviewed.[40]As such it would have been a significant contributor to delivery of the World Bank's intended strategic outcomes. Given this consideration, the operation's M&E assumes importance. The various elements of M&E design, implementation, and use are discussed below.

130. M&E design is assessed by considering: quality of results indicators as formulated in the original documents and as revised subsequently; consistency with other World Bank targets; and comprehensiveness of the system. The design of the M&E had significant shortcomings, and there were some weaknesses in the results framework.

131. Part of the design issue stems from the shortcomings in the chain of logic already discussed under relevance of design. The focus here is on the indicators themselves and how they relate to actions and subobjectives. The original definition of the program listed 24 indicators in its results framework, which is more numerous than is considered good practice. A few indicators were revised and a handful of others were dropped. Appendix B, table B.7, of this report presents the M&E (results framework) and changes brought to it from one operation to the next.

132. Most indicators included baselines and targets. A few were vague, such as "satisfaction with public service delivery," which has neither a baseline or target, and lack of explanation regarding how it will be measured. A notable weakness in the indicators is that most capture only partial aspects of the intended result, typically in the form of an output that contributes to the stated outcome. For instance, fiscal transfers alone will not result in improved services and improvement of justice will require that judgments are promptly executed when rendered, and not just issued. In many cases, the materiality of the indicators and targets was unclear and the actual indicators did not provide good measures of the intended results. Examples of the latter are the mining revenue to GDP target, which had attribution issues since both GDP and revenues may fluctuate due to factors outside the program's scope, and the time taken to enforce contracts was not the appropriate focus. The materiality issue affected close to 50 percent of the targets.

133. Shortcomings in initial indicators should have been apparent to World Bank management and the task team during implementation and addressed in subsequent operations. However, this was not identified as an issue. Other than changes in some indicators at the last operation caused by reformulation of the PDOs, no fundamental changes and improvements were made to the M&E framework during program implementation.

134. A further shortcoming of the M&E is that it did not include any impact assessments or surveys, which would seem required given the nature of outcomes in some policy areas—an example is the measure of the indicator on "building resilience and reducing vulnerability," or on employment generation. The government could not undertake such assessments on its own. The issue could have been addressed through parallel technical assistance, M&E of other related World Bank projects, or analytical work undertaken by other donors. However, this was not foreseen in M&E design. Furthermore, there was no attempt ex post to draw on relevant surveys that could shed light on the impact of some of the policy actions, such as the household consumption survey.

135. The first program document, box 4.1, stated a key lesson that "the current donors' harmonization framework requires further work to rationalize the unified joint policy matrix, which should become more focused on the government's own strategic milestones. Future work will help design the Performance Assessment Framework of the government's new medium-term development strategy. There is also a need to further streamline the role of the various M&E frameworks at the sector level" (World Bank 2012a, 12). This lesson was repeated in the second program document but dropped from the last two, without any evidence that it had been integrated in program implementation.

136. M&E arrangements reflected the multisector nature of the program. DGCOOP monitored the government program with the donors while a directorate (for M&E) in the Ministry of Economy and Finance was responsible for monitoring the entire government program. The effectiveness of this arrangement is not apparent in operational documents and IEG did not find evidence that the directorate monitored the indicators for the series. Neither did DGCOOP monitor the results of this series. The ICR also cited difficulties in collecting data as a problem that was not addressed during implementation.[41]

137. There was limited use of M&E information, because data collection and availability was problematic and some indicators were not used. Furthermore, additional sources that might have informed program impact was not sought or consulted. In general, the IEG mission found no data for indicators that were not selected from existing government M&E frameworks.

138. The quality of M&E is rated **modest.**

6. Lessons

- When political risks are high and capacity is strained, design is better focused on a few key priorities. This series covered too many areas, and some key binding constraints were not addressed. The series might have been more successful with a sharper focus on more realistic objectives accompanied by a simpler design.

- The success of budgetary support depends on the suitability of the instrument to the country environment. In a context of political turbulence and uncertainties about the government's ability to undertake long term reforms, the World Bank could have ended the programmatic series after the third operation and made the fourth operation a stand-alone. Alternatively, the World Bank could have implemented a series of stand-alone operations after the second programmatic series when it became apparent that the political and policy environment was rapidly changing.

- Lack of clarity on the respective roles and responsibilities of central and local governments and of the private sector undermines policy actions. It is important to ensure that there is a shared vision and that the need for reform is recognized and accepted by all parties. In this case, there was a lack of clarity among different stakeholders during implementation of the reforms on decentralization and fertilizer distribution.

- When M&E is not adequately resourced or implemented, there can be delays in the identification of problems and the application of remedies. M&E weaknesses can be compensated by leveraging information available elsewhere, or through specific impact assessments and perceptions surveys.

- There may be a trade-off between the promise of continuous and predictable financing, urgently needed in times of crisis, and the strength of the reform program. In Burkina Faso the emphasis was on continuous financing even when reform performance was waning.

- The lack of broad consultations with stakeholders when the World Bank is designing a complex reform program could lead to unsatisfactory results. In this case, the lack of consultations with an important stakeholder association (the Confederation Paysanne du Faso) on fertilizer distribution affected the achievement of results of one of the first objectives. Also, some development partners and civil society organizations had limited knowledge of the reforms pursued in the G&C series.

- Consultation with all important stakeholders is critical to inform program design. In this case, development partners, civil society organization, and academia complained to the PPAR mission about inadequate consultation by the World Bank.

- Inadequately resourced implementing agencies will likely be unable to carry out agreed reforms. Under-resourcing may be an indication of low government commitment, which needs to be addressed through policy dialogue. It is also important to ensure that agencies have appropriate technical capacity and systems in place, and that potential political obstacles at the local level are being addressed.

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[1] http://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr17222.ashx.
[2] http://www.tadat.org/files/BK_Final_PAR_2018.pdf
[3] http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/burkina-faso.
[4] http://datatopics.worldbank.org/cpia.
[5] This pillar covers property rights and rule-based governance; quality of budgetary and financial management; efficiency in revenue mobilization; quality of public administration; and transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector.

[6] http://datatopics.worldbank.org/cpia/

[7] This pillar covers property rights and rule-based governance; quality of budgetary and financial management; efficiency in revenue mobilization; quality of public administration; and transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector.

[8] The following sector strategies had been formulated by the government, and were presumably deemed by the World Bank to provide an adequate basis for some of the policy actions: (i) National Justice Sector Policy Reform 2010–19 and its associated Triennial Action Plan; (ii) PFM strategy; (iii) the National Microfinance Strategy, formulated under Growth and Competitiveness (G&C) series 2; and (iv) the National Plan for the Organization and Coordination of Emergency Relief and Recovery. In addition, important strategic considerations are reflected in Burkina Faso joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and implementing the General Code for Local Governments.

[9] Internal inconsistencies within the country assistance strategy (CAS), the analysis of which is outside the scope of this assessment, may have contributed to this problem.

[10] Based on research presented in World Bank 2015e and 2018b.

[11] Such as competitiveness of private sector, limited market size; barriers to entry and competition; a shortage of skills; limited access to external financing; and complexity of administrative and tax procedures.

[12] One of the indicators (transparency international index) is not easily matched with the reforms.

[13] This is in part because experience within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) indicates that issuance of timely judgment and their execution constitute a major problem.

[14] See section 3.8 of the 2013 PEFA: https://pefa.org/sites/default/files/assements/comments/BF-Jun14-PFMPR-Public.pdf.

[15] The Implementation Completion and Results Report Review rates "promoting higher efficiency, transparency and accountability in the use of public resources" as substantial (World Bank 2015a).

[16] https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c210/6432e962f3126b349bd15decf1b6b48fca57.pdf.

[17] The G&C 4 objective to "reduce cost in the agriculture and transport sectors" is assessed in this section.

[18] As confirmed by the 2017 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD; World Bank 2017a). The SCD goes on to note that although changes to the law had been enacted with a view to reducing transport costs, regulations that would have permitted application of the new law' were not in place; nor were they in place at the time of the Project Performance Assessment Report mission.

[19] http://www.oecd.org/dev/africa.

[20] Farmers are now reverting to the older types of seed, which require additional inputs.

[21] Interprofessional Association of Cotton Farmers of Burkina Faso (AICB) is the umbrella body overseeing the work of three cotton buying companies (Société Cotonnière du Gourma, Faso Coton, and Sofitex [Société Burkinabè des Fibres Textiles]), national farmers union (Ensemble Burkina), cotton producers, the state, and other stakeholders (for example, research institutions).

[22] This is despite falling international prices over this period.

[23] This private association represents 14 peasant farmer organizations. It engages with the government on key policy issues that affect its members.

[24] See appendix B, table B.7 for list of prior actions.

[25] The government adopted some alternative goals. For instance, instead of a guarantee scheme, the government granted exemptions of custom fees and value-added tax on imported trucks/vehicles with an expanded deadline to December 31, 2013.

[26] Three were not met and three were dropped.

[27] The G&C 4 objective to "improve the transparency and accountability in public resource mobilization and management" is assessed in this section.

[28] Table 2 of the SCD provides a breakdown of the contribution of each sector to growth (World Bank 2017a).

[29] The EITI Unit explained that the government's Administrative Council decides which companies must report data based on production capacity. The 2010 EITI report mentions the conflicts that existed before the operation.

[30] http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/burkina-faso#enforcing-contracts.

[31] https://camco.bf.

[32] https://pefa.org/sites/default/files/BF-DeC 17-PFMPR-Public%20with%20PEFA%20Check.pdf

[33] Data provided to the mission shows that the average execution rate for government funds was 81 percent in 2011 and 78 percent in 2015 (see appendix B, table B.4).

[34] http://www.tadat.org/files/BK_Final_PAR_2018.pdf

[35] According the PD1, among the 11 competencies mentioned for devolution to local governments, only 4 have been transferred to urban municipalities.

[36] Information provided to the mission by the Director of Budget of the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

[37] The largest microfinance institution of Burkina Faso, with over one million clients.

[38] FAARF provides credit to women with no collateral at low interest rates (about 10 percent). It aims to empower women who are vulnerable to economic hardship.

[39] This was recognized by the World Bank, and impact at the level of West Africa was mitigated by a series of World Bank projects evaluated in 2006 by the Independent Evaluation Group.

[40] The country benefited from debt write-off through Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. The latter, which is equivalent to budget support, resulted in reduced IDA country allocation. IDA budget support was in practice above what was provided under various development policy operations.

[41] The ICR mentions an implementation workshop held after the closing date of the last operation (World Bank 2017e).

Appendix A. Basic Data Sheet

Burkina Faso: First Growth and Competitiveness Credit (P126207)

Table A.1. Key Project Data

Financing	Appraisal Estimate *($, millions)*	Actual or Current Estimate *($, millions)*	Actual as Percent of Appraisal Estimate
Total project costs	90.00	89.30	99.2
Loan amount	90.00	89.30	99.2
Cofinancing	—	—	—
Cancellation	—	—	—

Table A.2. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

Disbursements	FY13	FY14	FY15	FY16
Appraisal estimate *($, millions)*	90.00	90.00	90.00	90.00
Actual *($, millions)*	89.30	89.30	89.30	89.30
Actual as percent of appraisal	99.2	99.2	99.2	99.2
Date of final disbursement: 12/31/12				

Table A.3. Project Dates

Event	Original	Actual
Initiating memorandum	01/12/2012	01/12/2012
Negotiations	05/04/2012	05/04/2012
Board approval	06/26/2012	06/26/2012
Signing	07/25/2012	06/26/2012
Effectiveness	09/12/2012	09/12/2012
Closing date	12/31/2012	12/31/2012

Table A.4. Staff Time and Cost

	World Bank Budget Only	
Stage of Project Cycle	Staff time *(no. weeks)*	Cost[a] *($, thousands)*
Lending		
FY12	64.63	333,364
Total lending	64.63	333,364
Supervision/ICR		
FY13	0	0
Total supervision	0	0
Total lending and supervision	64.63	333,364

Note: ICR = Implementation Completion and Results Report.
a. Including travel and consultant costs.

Table A.5. Task Team Members

Name	Title[a]	Unit	Responsibility or Specialty
Lending			
Ali Zafar	Sr. Economist	GMF08	Team Leader
Mariam Diop	Sr. Economist	GMF09	Sr. Economist
Kolie Ousmane Maurice Megnan	Sr. Financial management Specialist	GGO26	Sr. Financial management Specialist
Jean Gaspard Ayi	Consultant	GHN07	Consultant
Valerie Nussenbaltt			
Celestin Bado			
Koffi Nouve	Sr. Agriculture Economist		Sr. Agriculture Economist
Djibrilla Adamou Issa	Senior Financial Specialist	AFMCG	Senior Financial Specialist
Aguiratou Savadogo Tinto	Sr. Transport Specialist	GTI08	Sr. Transport Specialist
Adja Dahourou	Sr. Private Sector Specialist	GTC07	Sr. Private Sector Specialist
Magueye Dia	Sr. Private Sector Specialist	GTC07	Sr. Private Sector Specialist
Setareh Razmara			
Boubacar Bocoum	Lead Mining Specialist	GEEX2	Lead Mining Specialist
Serdar Yilmaz	Lead Public Sector Management Specialist	GGO27	Lead Public Sector Management Specialist
Bronwyn Grieve	Lead Public Sector Management Specialist	GGO27	Lead Public Sector Management Specialist
Adama Ouedraogo	Sr. Education Specialist	GED07	Sr. Education Specialist
Ousmane Haidara	Senior Health Specialist	GHN13	Senior Health Specialist
Andrew Dabalen	Lead Poverty Specialist	GPV07	Lead Poverty Specialist
Nicolette DeWitt			
Aissatou Diallo	Sr. Finance Officer	WFALN	Sr. Finance Officer
Elisée Ouedraogo	Sr. Agriculture Specialist	GFA01	Sr. Agriculture Specialist
Corinne Ilgun			
Catherine Marie Z. Compaore	Team Assistant	AFMBF	Team Assistant
Michel Valois	Consultant	GFM01	Consultant
Judite Fernandes	Language Program Assistant		Language Program Assistant
Elianne Tchapda	Program Assistant	ITSNI	Program Assistant

Note: ICR = Implementation Completion and Results Report.
a. At time of appraisal and closure, respectively.

Burkina Faso: Second Growth and Competitiveness Credit (P132210)

Table A.6. Key Project Data

Financing	Appraisal Estimate *($, millions)*	Actual or Current Estimate *($, millions)*	Actual as Percent of Appraisal Estimate
Total project costs	70.0	70.5	100.7
Loan amount	70.0	70.5	100.7
Cofinancing	—	—	—
Cancellation	—	—	—

Table A.7. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

Disbursements	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17
Appraisal estimate *($, millions)*	70.0	70.0	70.0	70.0
Actual *($, millions)*	70.5	70.5	70.5	70.5
Actual as percent of appraisal	100.7	100.7	100.7	100.7
Date of final disbursement: 12/31/2013				

Table A.8. Project Dates

Event	Original	Actual
Initiating memorandum	11/06/2012	11/06/2012
Negotiations	02/07/2013	02/07/2013
Board approval	03/21/2013	03/21/2013
Signing	04/12/2013	04/12/2013
Effectiveness	09/11/2013	08/19/2013
Closing date	12/31/2013	12/31/2013

Table A.9. Staff Time and Cost

	World Bank Budget Only	
Stage of Project Cycle	Staff time *(no. weeks)*	Cost[a] *($, thousands)*
Lending		
FY13	52.91	374,411
Total lending	52.91	374,411
Supervision or ICR		
FY14	0	0
Total supervision	0	0
Total lending and supervision	52.91	374,411

Note: ICR = Implementation Completion and Results Report.
a. Including travel and consultant costs.

Table A.10. Task Team Members

Name	Title[a]	Unit	Responsibility or Specialty
Lending			
Adja Mansora Dahourou	Sr. Private Sector Specialist	GTC07	Sr. Private Sector Specialist
Aguiratou Savadogo Tinto	Sr. Transport Specialist	GTI08	Sr. Transport Specialist
Ali Zafar	Sr. Economist	GMF08	Sr. Economist
Bronwyn Grieve	Lead Public Sector Management Specialist	GGO27	Lead Public Sector Management Specialist
Catherine Marie Z. Compaore	Team Assistant	AFMBF	Team Assistant
Elisée Ouedraogo	Sr. Agriculture Economist	GFA01	Sr. Agriculture Economist
Jean Gaspard Ntoutoume Ayi	Consultant	GHN07	Consultant
Koffi Nouve	Sr. Agriculture Economist		Sr. Agriculture Economist
Mariam Diop	Sr. Economist	GMF08	Sr. Economist
Serdar Yilmaz	Lead Public Sector Specialist	GGO27	Lead Public Sector Specialist

Note: ICR = Implementation Completion and Results Report.
a. At time of appraisal and closure, respectively.

Burkina Faso: Third Growth and Competitiveness Credit (P146640)

Table A.11. Key Project Data

Financing	Appraisal Estimate *($, millions)*	Actual or Current Estimate *($, millions)*	Actual as Percent of Appraisal Estimate
Total project costs	100.0	100.3	100.3
Loan amount	100.0	100.3	100.3
Cofinancing	—	—	—
Cancellation	—	—	—

Table A.12. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

Disbursements	FY15	FY16	FY17	FY18
Appraisal estimate *($, millions)*	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Actual *($, millions)*	100.3	100.3	100.3	100.3
Actual as percent of appraisal	100.3	100.3	100.3	100.3
Date of final disbursement: 06/30/2014				

Table A.13. Project Dates

Event	Original	Actual
Initiating memorandum	09/10/2013	09/10/2013
Negotiations	10/31/2013	10/31/2013
Board approval	12/05/2013	12/05/2013
Signing	12/09/2013	12/09/2013
Effectiveness	12/20/2013	12/20/2013
Closing date	06/30/2014	06/30/2014

Table A.14. Staff Time and Cost

	World Bank Budget Only	
Stage of Project Cycle	**Staff time *(no. weeks)***	**Staff time *(no. weeks)***
Lending		
FY14	36.39	199,535
FY15	12.35	37,929
Total lending	48.74	237,464
Supervision or ICR		
FY15	1.06	17,480
Total supervision	1.06	17,480
Total lending and supervision	49.80	254,944

Table A.15. Task Team Members

Name	Title[a]	Unit	Responsibility or Specialty
Lending			
Ali Zafar	Sr. Economist	GMF08	Sr. Economist
Johannes G. Hoogeveen	Lead Economist	GPV07	Lead Economist
Samba Ba	Sr. Economist	GMF08	Sr. Economist
Abdoulaye Gadiere	Sr. Environmental Specialist	GEN07	Sr. Environmental Specialist
Adja Mansora Dahourou	Sr. Private Sector Specialist	GTC07	Sr. Private Sector Specialist
Aguiratou Savadogo Tinto	Sr. Transport Specialist	GTI08	Sr. Transport Specialist
Boubacar Bocoum	Lead Mining Specialist	GEEX2	Lead Mining Specialist
Catherine Marie Z. Compaore	Team Assistant	AFMBF	Team Assistant
Elisée Ouedraogo	Sr. Agriculture Economist	GFA01	Sr. Agriculture Economist
Jeremy Robert Strauss	Sr. Private Sector Specialist	GTC07	Sr. Private Sector Specialist
Judite Fernandes	Language Program Assistant		Language Program Assistant
Koffi Nouve	Sr. Agriculture Economist		Sr. Agriculture Economist
Mamate Tiendrebeogo	Sr. Procurement Specialist	GGO01	Sr. Procurement Specialist
Mariam Diop	Sr. Economist	GMF08	Sr. Economist
Serdar Yilmaz	Lead Public Sector Specialist	GGO27	Lead Public Sector Specialist
Yele Maweki Batana	Sr. Economist	GPV07	Sr. Economist
Mamata Tiendrebeogo	Sr. Procurement Specialist	GGo01	Sr. Procurement Specialist
Kolie Ousmane Maurice Megnan	Sr. Financial Management Specialist	GGO26	Sr. Financial Management Specialist
Roch Levesque	Sr. Counsel		Sr. Counsel

Note: ICR = Implementation Completion and Results Report.
a. At time of appraisal and closure, respectively.

Burkina Faso: Fourth Growth and Competitiveness Credit (P151275)

Table A.16. Key Project Data

Financing	Appraisal Estimate *($, millions)*	Actual or Current Estimate *($, millions)*	Actual as Percent of Appraisal Estimate
Total project costs	100.0	99.0	99.0
Loan amount	99.9	99.0	99.0
Cofinancing	—	—	—
Cancellation	—	—	—

Table A.17. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

Disbursements	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY19
Appraisal estimate *($, millions)*	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Actual *($, millions)*	99.0	99.0	99.0	99.0
Actual as percent of appraisal	99.0	99.0	99.0	99.0
Date of final disbursement: 12/31/2015				

Table A.18. Project Dates

Event	Original	Actual
Initiating memorandum	09/30/2014	09/30/2014
Negotiations	02/02/2015	02/02/2015
Board approval	04/02/2015	04/02/2015
Signing	04/15/2015	04/15/2015
Effectiveness	06/15/2015	06/30/2015
Closing date	12/31/2015	12/31/2015

Table A.19. Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	World Bank Budget Only	
	Staff time *(no. weeks)*	Cost[a] *($, thousands)*
Lending		
FY15	30.51	177,180
FY16	0	0
Total lending	30.51	177,180
Supervision or ICR		
FY16	10.41	78,445
FY17	1.22	4,271
Total supervision	11.63	82,716
Total lending and supervision	42.14	259,896

Note: ICR = Implementation Completion and Results Report.
a. Including travel and consultant costs.

Table A.20. Task Team Members

Name	Title[a]	Unit	Responsibility or Specialty
Lending			
Samba Ba	Sr. Economist	GMF08	Sr. Economist
Michael G. Nelson	Operations Officer	OPSPQ	Operations Officer
Mariam Diop	Sr. Economist	GMF08	Sr. Economist
Mamate Tiendrebeogo	Sr. Procurement Specialist	GGO01	Sr. Procurement Specialist
Ngor Sene	Sr. Financial Management Specialist	GGO26	Sr. Financial Management Specialist
Aguiratou Savadogo Tinto	Sr. Transport Specialist	GTI08	Sr. Transport Specialist
Boubacar Bocoum	Lead Mining Specialist	GEEX2	Lead Mining Specialist
Elisée Ouedraogo	Sr. Agriculture Economist	GFA01	Sr. Agriculture Economist
Nicolas Ahouissoussi	Sr. Agriculture Economist	GFA01	Sr. Agriculture Economist
Serdar Yilmaz	Lead Public Sector Specialist	GGO27	Lead Public Sector Specialist

Note: ICR = Implementation Completion and Results Report.
a. At time of appraisal and closure, respectively.

Appendix B. Figures and Tables

Figure B.1. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Ratings by Cluster in Burkina Faso



Source: Data from World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment website.

Figure B.2. Production of Cotton by Company in Burkina Faso (2004–16)



Source: Data from the Interprofessional Cotton Association of Burkina Faso.
Note: SOCOMA = Société Cotonnière du Gourma; Sofitex = Société Burkinabè des Fibres Textiles.

Figure B.3. Cotton Production and Prices, 1985–2015



Source: World Bank 2017a.

Figure B.4. Corruption Index with the Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine Zone



Source: Transparency International 2017.

Table B.1. Distribution of Fertilizer by Type and Year

Type or Mode of Distribution	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Sum of quantities of NPK ceded to subsidized producers	8,172	15,919	16,096	7,131	17,110	10,266	7,801
Sum of quantities of urea sold to subsidized producers	6,139	6,229	3,100	4,829	9,769	2,129	4,489
Sum of DAP quantities ceded to subsidized producers	NA	NA	681	1,607	1,918	316	261
Sum of quantities of Burkina phosphate ceded to producers at subsidized prices per year	NA	NA	400	241	39	23	164
Sum of plows transferred to subsidized producers	NA	8,368	12,975	25,642	18,130	10,976	9,243
Sum of carts ceded to subsidized producers	NA	729	1,108	2,824	1,626	1,367	1,425
Sum of animals ceded to subsidized producers	NA	NA	14,921	NA	11,688	8,187	3,598
Sum of quantities of improved seeds sold per year	7,554	14,228	6,243	9,292	14,357	6,164	3,915

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Burkina Faso.

Table B.2. Number of Mining Companies Reporting Data for EITI Reports

Year	Companies Submitting Report	Operating Companies	Share of Companies Retained in Total State Mining Revenues
2011	18	6	represents 98 percent of the total contribution of the mining sector to the state budget in 2011
2012	26	6	represents 98.75 percent of the total contribution of the mining sector to the state budget in 2012
2013	29	8	99.59 percent of the total contribution of the mining sector to the state budget in 2013
2014	18	7	97 percent of the total contribution of the mining sector
2015	23	9	98 percent of the total contribution of the mining sector to the state budget in 2015

Source: Ministry of Finance, Burkina Faso.
Note: EITI = Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

Table B.3. Time for Processing Court Cases in Burkina Faso

Type of Court	*2011*	*2012*	*2013*	*2014*	*2015*	*2016*
High Courts: Average Time to Process a Civil Case	86	81	78	99	81	67
Trial courts-average time to render a decision	71	42	72	60	83	91
Courts of Commerce-Average rate to make a commercial decision	276	242	230	204	213	217
Courts of labor-average rate for making a decision	455	455	365	575	455	425
Administrative courts-average rate for making a decision	485	485	545	515	515	665
Average time for court cases	274.6	261	258	290.6	269.4	293

Source: Ministry of Justice, Burkina Faso (Tableau de bord statistique 2016 de la justice, 2017 edition).

Table B.4. Written Judgment in Commercial Courts

Judgment	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Decisions rendered	319	282	311	297	372	444
Decisions written	199	277	302	283	372	442
Rate (percent)	62.4	98.2	97.1	95.3	100.0	99.5

Source: Ministry of Justice (Tableau de bord statistique 2016 de la justice, 2017 Edition).

Table B.5. Execution of The Public Investment from 2011 to 2016

Year	Budget Allocation (A) *(CFAF, thousands)*	Revised Allocation (B) *(CFAF, thousands)*	Actual Expenditure *(CFAF, thousands)*	Rate of Execution (A) *(percent)*	Rate of Execution (B) *(percent)*
2011	538,759,488	482,910,032	390,852,005	73	81
2012	672,661,294	826,506,901	484,352,743	72	59
2013	811,667,976.	795,715,836	626,265,413	77	79
2014	859,191,327	840,087,719	475,511,502	55	57
2015	676,158,305	505,884,921	371,292,225	55	73
2016	695,015,048	566,453,727	442,997,567	64	78

Source: Director of Budget, Burkina Faso.
Note: Government sources only are used. CFAF = CFA franc.

Table B.6. Lending by Instrument

Fiscal Year	DPF Lending (A) *($, millions)*	IPF Lending (B) *($, millions)*	PforR	A/B *(percent)*	Total
1980		35		0	35
1981		62		0	62
1982		33		0	33
1983		18.5		0	18.5
1984		7.4		0	7.4
1985		61.9		0	61.9
1988		17.9		0	17.9
1989		42		0	42
1990		22.2		0	22.2
1991	80	60.5		57	140.5
1992	28	81		26	109
1993		18.7		0	18.7
1994	25	55.5		31	80.5
1995		47		0	47
1997		47.4		0	47.4
1998		41.3		0	41.3
1999	15	5.2		74	20.2
2000	25			100	25
2001		136.7		0	136.7
2002	45	76.6		37	121.6
2003	35	125.1		22	160.1
2004	110	10		92	120
2005	60	75.58		44	135.58
2006	60	136.6		31	196.6
2007		84		0	84
2008	90	73.8		55	163.8
2009	200	80		71	280
2010	90	40		69	130
2011		220		0	220
2012	215	88.9		71	303.9
2013	70	215		25	285
2014	100	220.95		31	320.95
2015	100	130		43	230
2016		165	40	0	205
2017	100	120		45	220
Total	1,448	2,654.73	40	35	4,142.73

Source: World Bank Business Intelligence.
Note: DPF = Development Policy Financing; IPF = Investment Policy Financing.

Table B.7. Growth and Competitiveness Grant Prior Actions and Status

Prior Actions	Implementation Status and Evidence
GCG1	
1. Application, for the Cotton Seasons 2011–12 and 2012–13, of a producer price formula, based on international cotton prices, designed to ensure that cotton farmers are paid an appropriate price; and capitalization of the Cotton Price Stabilization Fund in an amount of at least seven billion CFA Francs (CFAF 7,000,000,000).	**Implemented** **Evidence:** AIC Decision fixing the floor price for cotton (April 12, 2011); newspaper announcement of the producer price (April 16, 2012); bank statement confirming the amount on deposit in the stabilization fund (April 17, 2012)
2. Continued involvement of the private sector in the fertilizer distribution process, by the issuance of invitations to private suppliers to bid on at least 6,900 metric tons of fertilizer to be purchased by the recipient for distribution to rice and maize producers.	**Implemented** In January 2012 the procurement was launched, and the fertilizer has been imported **Evidence:** Ministry bidding documents; results of the procurement authority evaluation proposing award of contracts (March 15, 2012)
3. Adoption by the recipient of a mechanism of monthly reporting of consolidated data on mining revenues designed to ensure better coordination between the recipient's ministries responsible for finance and for mining, to improve collection of public revenues generated by mining activities in the country; and issuance of said data for the last quarter of FY 2011.	**Implemented** Consolidated revenue reports prepared for last quarter 2011 **Evidence:** Ministry of Finance reports on mining sector revenues for the months of December 2011 (January 20, 2012); November 2011 (December 12, 2011); and October 2011 (November 11, 2011); minutes of ministry meeting on monitoring of the sector (March 2012)
4. Submission to Parliament of a law designed to establish a suitable regulatory and legal framework for the promotion of mediation as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.	**Implemented** The bill has been submitted to Parliament in May, 2012. **Evidence:** Draft law and cover letter from Minister of Justice transmitting the draft law to the Parliament (May 9, 2012)
5 Publication of statistics covering the period FY10 and FY11 on the activities of the recipient's courts of first instance (tribunaux de grande instance), including average time required for a final disposition, rate of case disposition, annual budget allocation, and percentage of judgments rendered in writing.	**Implemented** The Ministry of Justice has validated and uploaded the core statistics on its website. Evidence: www.cns.bf; 2011 and 2010 statistics and budgetary allocations
6. Devolution, on a pilot basis, of budget and expenditure management to the recipient's line ministries, through the establishment and operationalization of budget oversight and verification units in the recipient's ministries responsible for agriculture, health, infrastructure, secondary and higher education, and justice.	**Implemented** The five units have all been established. **Evidence:** Decree establishing budget verification units (October 7, 2011); MEF order (*arrêté*) on organization and functioning of these units (October 25, 2011); 5 joint MEF/line ministry orders (*arrêté conjoint*) (March 15, 19, 23, 29, 2012)
7. Approval by the recipient's high judicial council of the nomination of qualified and experienced members to the recipient's Court of Aaccounts (Cour des Comptes) to enable the full staffing of said court.	**Implemented** The CSM has approved MEF's nominations. **Evidence:** Signed minutes of the CSM meeting on May 17, 2012, stating that four persons were retained as "presidents de chambres" of the Court of Accounts, and 11 persons were "retained to be nominated" as counselors at the Court of Accounts

Prior Actions	Implementation Status and Evidence
8. Adoption of a regulatory framework for the organization of municipalities (l'organigramme type des communes) designed to further the predictability of intergovernmental transfers and afford enhanced capacity of local governments. Decentralization	**Implemented** Government has adopted the framework. **Evidence:** 4 joint MEF/MATD orders (arrêté conjoint) on the organization of rural municipalities; urban municipalities; special status urban municipalities; and regional administrations (April 6, 2012)
9. Adoption of a national strategy for the period FY 2012 through FY 2016, designed to promote the economic and financially sound development of microfinance throughout the recipient's territory, targeted to groups underserved by financial intermediaries.	**Implemented** Government has adopted the strategy. **Evidence:** Decree adopting the strategy and its action plan (January 24, 2012), copy of the strategy and action plan
10. Adoption of an action plan to strengthen and rationalize the recipient's institutional arrangements for food security to ensure adequate food reserves and an efficient and effective response in the event of food shortages.	**Implemented** Council of Ministers has adopted the action plan. **Evidence:** Publication of minutes of council meeting May 16 in newspaper; Letter from Minister of Finance confirming council adoption of the Food Security Plan (May 22, 2012).
GCG2	
1. Creation, operationalization and capitalization of the input fund based on the manual prepared by the producer association AICB and associated legal documents (capitalization of at least 10 billion CFA).	**Implemented** by December 2012 **Evidence:** Manual; supplemental budget showing budget line
2. Completion of procedure-based audit of the customs clearance procedures in Ouagadougou to improve customs administration.	Moved to GCG3 December 2013 **Evidence:** Validated audit
3. Public dissemination of the second EITI report, that provides comprehensive statements on mining revenues collected in 2010 (licenses, royalties, income tax, and so on.) from all operating mines (materiality decided by the EITI multistakeholder group)	**Implemented** by November 2012 Evidence: EITI Report published
4. Adoption of a ministerial order to formalize both the process for the collection and publication of statistics of the recipient's courts and the procedural manual for collecting statistics, including statistics on average time required for a final disposition, backlog rates, average time for written judgments and average time for formal enforcement of judgments.	**Implemented** by December 2012 **Evidence:** Decree (arête) approved by Ministry of Justice
5. Adoption of a national mechanism to monitor corruption trends and evaluate anticorruption reform efforts by the semiautonomous agency ASCE (Autorité supérieure de contrôle d'Etat) through the annual collation and analysis of sectoral data, audit information (from the ASCE and the Cour des Comptes) and surveys produced by the state and civil society.	**Implemented** by December 30, 2012 Decree (arête) validating anti- corruption tool
6. Submission to Parliament of a law relating to fiscal transparency to ensure that the legal framework for public finance complies with selected WAEMU Directives on Code of Transparency.	**Implemented** by Jan 15, 2012 **Evidence:** Decree establishing code submitted to Parliament

Prior Actions	Implementation Status and Evidence
7. Completion of institutional and financial audit of the recipient's Court of Accounts (Cour des Comptes) to enable its adequate functioning.	Moved to CGC-4 December, 2014 **Evidence:** Finalization of audit report of Cours de Comptes by Ministry of Justice
8. Increase resource transfers to local collectivities to 4 percent of national budget to ensure local governments have sufficient funds to fulfill mandates as established per the Code General des Collectivites Territoriales.	**Implemented** by December, 2012 **Evidence:** Budgetary line (*loi de finance*) allocating resources to local communities
6. Submission to Parliament of a law relating to fiscal transparency to ensure that the legal framework for public finance complies with selected WAEMU Directives on Code of Transparency.	**Implemented** by Jan 15, 2012 **Evidence:** Decree establishing code submitted to Parliament
9. Support to female microfinance by scaling up the women's fund (FAARF) to include financing of business creation and working capital.	**Implemented by December 2012 Evidence:** Capitalization of FAARF by CFAF 500 million
10. Implementation of PNOCSUR plan approved by CM to adequately stock warehouses in food-deficit parts of the country and feed vulnerable populations to ensure effective response to food crisis.	Implemented by December 2012 **Evidence:** Stockage of boutiques in deficit areas
GCG3	
1. The agricultural input fund becomes operational in time for the 2014–15 agricultural season.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** A letter from the commercial bank contracted to operate the input fund (ECOBANK) indicating the share guarantees of each cotton company for the acquisition of inputs has been submitted to the World Bank (Sept 20, 2013).
2. An audit of customs clearance procedures in Ouagadougou is completed and recommendations to improve customs administration are adopted.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** A Ministerial Decree validating the audit and authorizing the adoption of the audit-recommendation action plan has been signed (Ministerial Decree 2013- 0264/MEF/SG/DGD, July 23, 2013).
3. Support the renewal of the trucking fleet through an extension of effectiveness deadline of the 2012 Decree for exemption of imports of trucks to December 31, 2013.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** A Ministerial Decree authorizing until December 2013 the tax-free import of tanker trucks, freight trucks, and taxis. Tax-exemption certificates are issued for import of vehicles (September 2013).
4. A revised Mining Code reflecting international best practices for managing the fiscal, environmental, and social impacts of the natural resource sector is submitted to National Assembly.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** A letter acknowledging the submission of the draft Mining Code to National Assembly has been received (October 7, 2013).
5. A draft Anticorruption Law designed to strengthen penalties for bribery, tighten regulations on gift-giving to public officials, and more precisely and comprehensively define both the nature of corrupt practices and the sanctions against them is submitted to National Assembly.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** A letter acknowledging the submission of the draft Anticorruption Law to National Assembly has been received (October 7, 2013).

Prior Actions	Implementation Status and Evidence
6. A financial controller is appointed for each ministry and each national public administrative institution.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** A decree appointing financial controllers for each ministry and national public administrative agency has been signed (October 2, 2013).
7. Transfers to local communities are increased to 4 percent of the national budget; local governments have sufficient funds to fulfill mandates established by the General Code for Local Communities.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** 2013 Financial Management Law, which allocates 4.4 percent of the budgeted expenditure to local communities, has been signed (September 20, 2013).
8. Improve access to finance for women by expanding the Support Fund for Women's Income-Generating Activities (FAARF).	**Implemented** **Evidence:** The FAARF exceeded these targets during the first nine months of 2013, when it reported more than 83,500 beneficiaries and a loan portfolio exceeding CFAF 4.6 billion (September 20, 2013).
9. The PNOCSUR plan is implemented, ensuring that government warehouses are adequately stocked and that national agencies have sufficient capacity to address the needs of vulnerable populations and respond effectively to future food crises.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** Contracts to acquire 35,000 tons of cereals were approved by the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of the Budget, and these expenditures were included in the national budget (October 2013).
GCG4 Prior Actions	
1. Multiple private sector-operated open markets for the sale of fertilizer and other agricultural inputs to farmers are piloted.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** Contracts signed with cotton firms to acquire fertilizer and other inputs have been approved by the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of the Budget (June 2014).
2. Formalization in the trucking industry is enhanced through the adoption of a legal framework for licensing overland transport operators.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** A decree defining qualitative criteria for access to the profession has been signed (July 2, 2014), and has been amended on January 27, 2015 to comply with the WAEMU legislation.
3. A revised draft of the Mining Code is resubmitted to the National Transition Council (CNT); including the creation of a local development mining fund financed by a share of mining revenues, and resources from the fund are allocated to regions and communities where mining companies operate.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** The World Bank has provided comments and feedback on the draft Mining Code, which was adopted by the Cabinet on October 15, 2014, and submitted to the National Assembly. A revised draft was adopted by the Council of Ministers on February 18, 2015 and submitted to the CNT on February 23, 2015.
4. A draft anticorruption law designed to strengthen penalties for bribery, tighten regulations on gift-giving to public officials, and more precisely and comprehensively define both the nature of corrupt practices and the sanctions against them is submitted to National Transition Council (CNT).	**Implemented** **Evidence:** The World Bank has provided comments and suggestions on the draft anticorruption law, which was adopted by the Council of Ministers on January 7, 2015 and was submitted to the CNT on January 20, 2015.
5. Measures are adopted to improve the functioning of the Superior Council of the Magistracy, including an increase in its number of elected members.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** A letter acknowledging the submission of the draft law related to the Superior Council of the Magistracy to National Assembly has been received (June 28, 2014).

Prior Actions	Implementation Status and Evidence
6. A revised legal framework for procurement is adopted, and prior-review thresholds are increased at least by 25 percent.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** A ministerial decree reforming procurement methods and increasing prior-reviews thresholds has been signed (July 2, 2014).
7. Transfers to local communities are increased to 5 percent of the national budget; local governments have sufficient funds to fulfill the mandates established under the General Code for Local Communities.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** The 2014 Financial Management Law allocates 5 percent of total budgeted expenditures to local communities.
8. All microfinance institutions, including the Support Fund for Women's Income-Generating Activities (FAARF), perform annual audits and provide accurate statements to the relevant authorities.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** The consolidated certified financial reports of FAARF-affiliated microfinance institutions have been sent to the government (July 2014).
9. Measures are implemented to promote greater involvement by private firms in strategic food-import and distribution systems.	**Implemented** **Evidence:** Contracts have been signed with five private operators for 30 000 tons cereals to complete the national food reserve (50,000 tons) and for the emergency food stocks (25,000 tons). Copies of these contracts have been submitted to the World Bank on December 31, 2014.

Note: CSM = Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature; G&C = Growth and Competitiveness series; WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.

Table B.8. Growth and Competitiveness Series Results Framework Indicators

	G&C 1	G&C 2	G&C 3	G&C 4
Catalyze private sector growth and employment				
1	Capitalization of the stabilization fund is at least 6 billion CFA	Capitalization of the stabilization fund is at least 6 billion CFA	Capitalization of the stabilization fund is at least 6 billion CFA	Capitalization of the stabilization fund is at least CFAF 6 billion
2	Capitalization of the input fund is at least 10 billion CFA	Capitalization of the input fund is at least 10 billion CFA	Capitalization of the input fund is at least 10 billion CFA	Capitalization of the input fund is at least CFAF 10 billion
3	Improved fertilizer distribution to the private sector increased by 30,000 tons	Improved fertilizer distribution to the private sector increased by 30,000 tons	Improved fertilizer distribution to the private sector increased by 30,000 tons	Improved fertilizer distribution to the private sector increased by 30,000 tons
4	Waiting time for customs clearance in Ouaga Inter reduced by two days	Waiting time for customs clearance in Ouaga Inter reduced by two days	Change: Average waiting time for customs clearance in Ouaga Inter reduced by 50 percent	Average waiting time for customs clearance in Ouaga Inter reduced by 50 percent
5				New: Annual increase of 10 percent in the Number of certified professionals and Ratio between trucking companies / individuals

	G&C 1	G&C 2	G&C 3	G&C 4
6			New: The government continues to refine the operational structure of the guarantee scheme	Dropped
7			New: Private firms begin expressing interest in joining the new scheme	Dropped
8	Axle overloading goes down to 25 percent	Dropped		
Improve governance and public resource management				
9	Mining revenue/ GDP is 4 percent	Mining revenue/ GDP is 4 percent	Public revenue generated by the mining sector is increased to 4 percent of GDP	Public revenues generated by the mining sector are increased to 4 percent of GD
10	Physical inspections of gold exports by customs officials increases	Physical inspections of gold exports by customs officials increases	**Revised:** The number of physical inspections of gold exports by customs officials increased by 15 percent enhancing the accuracy of export data	Dropped
11				New: Number of CSM elected members per grade increased by 50 percent
12	Number of mining companies submitting validated data for EITI reports increased to 6	Number of mining companies submitting validated data for EITI reports increased to 6	The number of companies submitting validated data for EITI reports is increased from 0 to 6	The number of mining companies submitting validated data for EITI reports is increased from 0 to 6
13	50 mediation cases at CAMC-O in 2012 and 75 cases in 2013	50 mediation cases at CAMC-O in 2012 and 75 cases in 2013	Revised: At least an increase of 50 percent of mediation cases at CAMC-O in 2012 and 25 percent in 2013	Dropped
14	Percent of judgments written down increased to 85 percent	Percent of judgments written down increased to 85 percent	Revised: Percent of judgments written down in commercial courts is at list (sic) 75 percent	Percent of judgments written down in commercial courts is at list (sic) 75 percent
15	A 20 percent decrease in delays in judgment times	A 20 percent decrease in delays in judgment times	A 20 percent decrease in the time required to obtain a court ruling	A 20 percent decrease in the time required to obtain a court ruling (to 584 days)

	G&C 1	G&C 2	G&C 3	G&C 4
16	A 20 percent reduction in contract enforcement days	A 20 percent reduction in contract enforcement days	A 20 percent reduction in the time needed to enforce contract	A 20 percent reduction in the time needed to enforce contracts (to 372 days)
17			New: A general decline in corruption indicators is observed over time	Revised: Burkina Faso's score in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index is increased to 40 or higher
18	Average execution rate of the line ministries investment budgets increased to more than 50 percent	Average execution rate of the line ministries investment budgets increased to more than 50 percent	The average execution rate of the line ministries' investment budgets is increased by more than 50 percent	The average execution rate of the line ministries' investment budgets is increased by more than 50 percent
19	Number of physical spot checks of contracts subject to competitive bidding increases to 300	Number of physical spot checks of contracts subject to competitive bidding increases to 300	Revised: Number of physical spot checks of contracts subject to competitive bidding increased by 50 percent	Number of physical spot checks of contracts subject to competitive bidding increased by 50 percent
20			New: Greater transparency and accountability in PFM is achieved	Dropped
21	Number of judges that will remain for at least a year is 12	Number of judges that will remain for at least a year is 12	Number of judges that will remain in office for at least a year is 12	Dropped-no data yet
Reduce vulnerability				
22	Transfer to decentralized units is 5.0 percent of budget	Transfer to decentralized units is 5.0 percent of budget	Revised: Sufficient funds are allocated from the national budget to local governments to fulfill the mandates established by the Budget Law	**Revised back to original:** 5 percent of the national budget is transferred to local governments under the Budget Law
23	At least 10 percent of the population is satisfied with public services	At least 10 percent of the population is satisfied with public services	Revised: The population's general satisfaction with the quality of public services delivered by local governments improves	Dropped
24	Number of active borrowers increases to 150,000	Number of active borrowers increases to 150,000	Revised: Number of active borrowers increased by at least 10 percent	Number of active borrowers increased by at least 10 percent

	G&C 1	G&C 2	G&C 3	G&C 4
25			New: The Support Fund for Women's Income-Generating Activities (FAARF) reaches over 80,000 beneficiaries nationwide	The Support Fund for Women's Income-Generating Activities (FAARF) reaches more than 80,000 beneficiaries nationwide
26			New: ...with a total loan portfolio of more than CFAF 4.5 billion	...with a total loan portfolio of more than CFAF 5 billion
27	Number of women-owned businesses to increase by 5 percent	Number of women-owned businesses to increase by 5 percent	Number of women-owned businesses to increase by 5 percent	Dropped
28				New: The Annual Financial Reporting Sheets of microfinance institutions are made available each year no later than July
29	The food stocks in the country increase to at least 50,000 tons for main stock and 10,000 for emergency stock	The food stocks in the country increase to at least 50,000 tons for main stock and 10,000 for emergency stock	The national food reserve and emergency food stocks are increase to at least 50,000 and 10,000 tons, respectively	Revised: The national food reserve and emergency food stocks are increase to at least 50,000 and 25,000 tons, respectively
30	Stocking of food in 50 of the warehouses in food-deficit parts of the country	Stocking of food in 50 of the warehouses in food- deficit parts of the country	Dropped	

Note: G&C = Growth and Competitiveness series.

Table B.9. Evolution of Pillars

	Operation 1	Operation 2	Operation 3	Operation 4
Pillar 1	Catalyze Private Sector Growth and Employment	Catalyze Private Sector Growth and Employment	Catalyze Private Sector Growth and Employment Creation	Reduce costs in the agriculture and transport sectors
Pillar 2	Improve Governance and Public Resource Management	Improve Governance and Public Resource Management	Improve Governance and Strengthen the Management of Public Resources	Improve the transparency and accountability in public resource mobilization and management
Pillar 3	Build Resilience and Reduce Vulnerability	Build Resilience and Reduce Vulnerability	Build Economic Resilience and Reduce Vulnerability to Shocks	Reduce Vulnerability to Shocks

Appendix C. List of Department Contacted

Government of Burkina Faso

Alice Zida Thiombiano, Ministry of Economy and Finance-SP/ITIE

Amos Kienou, Ministère de l'Agriculture- DG/DGESS/

Bayala Firmin, Chargé d'études/DGCOOP

Belemkoabga Lucien, Agent/DSCVM-INSD

Die Yacouba, DGCOOP/DSPP

Guinko Jean Pierre, Ministère du Commerce de l'Industrie et de l'Artisanat, SP-SFCL

Guire Sidiki, Chargé des rapports SP/ITIE

Ilboudo Diallo Micheline. Ministry of Economy and Finance, DGA/DGD

K. I. Abraham, DG/DGCMEF

Kabore Fati, Agent/DGESS Ministère de la promotion de la femme

Kaboret Aimé Roger, Ministry of Agriculture, SONAGESS

Kere Souleymane, Directeur de la Coordination des projets et programmes/DGESS Ministère de la Justice

Ki Abdoulaye, DGEP

Kinda Mahamadi, SP-SFCL

Nabalma Christian, Agent à la direction de suivi des accords internationaux/Ministère de la Justice

Nabole Souleymane, Ministry of Economy and Finance, DG/DGESS/MINEFID

Nana Adama, Directeur de la législation et de la règlementation/DGD

Ouattara Adama, DGESS/MINEFID

Ouattara Soma , SP-SFCL

Ouedraogo Aissata, Ministère des transports/Direction des transports urbains

Ouedraogo Alidou, Directeur de la Coopération douanière/DGD

Ouedraogo Emile, Chargé du TOFE/DGTCP

Ouedraogo Roger, SP/PMF

Ouedraogo Théodore G., Agent/FAARF

Ouedraogo Zakaria, Chef de Service Informatique /DGD

Oula Damien Ouattara, Directeur du suivi, de l'évaluation et de la capitalisation (DSEC)

Rouamba G. Clémence, Ministère des transports/DGESS

Sanfo Arouna, Chef de service de la programmation budgétaire/DPB/DGB

Sanogo Abdoulaye, Agent à la Direction de l'Accès à la Justice et de l'Aide aux victimes (DAJAV)/Ministère de la Justice

Sawadogo Abdoulaye, SONAGESS

Sawadogo Kimsegninga, Chargé de l'information et de la communication SP/ITIE

Sawadogo T. Paul, Directeur Régional du Centre Sud/DGD

Semde Rulin M., SONAGESS

Serge L. M. P. Toe., Chef des services des études/DGTCP

Soulama Vieux Rachid, Ministry of Economy and Finance-DG/DGB

Zida/Thiombiano Alice, Secrétaire permanente SP/ITIE

Zombra Adamou, Chargé de décaissement/DGTCP

Zongo Lambert, Chef de département/Premier Ministère/SP-PNDES

Zoure Françoise, Chargé de validation et de Suivi-évaluation SP/ITIE

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Kante F. Cheick, Country Manager

Samba Ba, Sr. Economist

Diop Mariam, Chargé des operations

Ouedraogo Inoussa, Senior Private Sector Specialist

Ouedraogo Elisée, Senior Agriculture Economist

Sawadogo Aguiratou Tinto, Senior Transport Specialist

Development Partners

M. Facinet Sylla, Economiste-Pays Principal en charge du Burkina Faso & Niger, Banque Africaine de Développement

Sebre Dramane, European Union delegation

Thomas Huyghebaert, European Union delegation, Head of governance and private sector, Burkina Faso

Civil Society, Academia, and Private Sector

Jean W. Pierre Guinko, Secrétaire Permanent du Suivi de la Filière Coton Liberalisée Ministère du Commerce, de l'Industrie et de l'Artisanat

Kohoun Joseph, CIFOEB

Porgo Issoufou, Confédération paysanne su Faso/Secrétaire Permanent

Pr Ouedraogo Idrissa, Centre d’etude de documentation et de recherche economiques et sociales (CEDRES)

Sylvestre Bassono, Private sector- exports

Thomas R. Ouedraogo, Center for Democratic Governance

Wetta Claude, RENLAC