[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/itse15/127156.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Can Internet news media firms make good deals with Internet portals by making coalitions?

Author

Listed:
  • Lee, Seungjoo
  • Kwon, Youngsun
Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Lee, Seungjoo & Kwon, Youngsun, 2015. "Can Internet news media firms make good deals with Internet portals by making coalitions?," 26th European Regional ITS Conference, Madrid 2015 127156, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:itse15:127156
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/127156/1/Kwon.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. AUMANN, Robert J. & DREZE, Jacques H., 1974. "Cooperative games with coalition structures," LIDAM Reprints CORE 217, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Antonio Magaña & Francesc Carreras, 2018. "Coalition Formation and Stability," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 467-502, June.
    2. Grabisch, Michel & Sudhölter, Peter, 2018. "On a class of vertices of the core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 541-557.
    3. Sun, Ning & Trockel, Walter & Yang, Zaifu, 2008. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 853-860, July.
    4. Sylvain Béal & Mostapha Diss & Rodrigue Tido Takeng, 2024. "New axiomatizations of the Diversity Owen and Shapley values," Working Papers 2024-09, CRESE.
    5. Montero, M.P., 2002. "Two-Stage Bargaining with Reversible Coalitions : The Case of Apex Games," Other publications TiSEM 7dba0283-bc13-4f2c-8f5e-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Tejada, O. & Álvarez-Mozos, M., 2018. "Graphs and (levels of) cooperation in games: Two ways how to allocate the surplus," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 114-122.
    7. Joosung Lee, 2015. "Multilateral Bargaining in Networks: On the Prevalence of Inefficiencies," Working Papers 2015.53, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. Toshiji Miyakawa, 2009. "Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 291-306, May.
    9. Sylvain Béal & Anna Khmelnitskaya & Philippe Solal, 2018. "Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 563-587, February.
    10. Geoffroy de Clippel & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1413-1436, November.
    11. Elena Parilina & Artem Sedakov, 2016. "Stable Cooperation in a Game with a Major Player," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(02), pages 1-20, June.
    12. Caulier, Jean-François & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2015. "Allocation rules for coalitional network games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 80-88.
    13. Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Market games and clubs," MPRA Paper 33968, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2010.
    14. Greys Soši'{c}, 2006. "Transshipment of Inventories Among Retailers: Myopic vs. Farsighted Stability," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(10), pages 1493-1508, October.
    15. Tobias Hiller, 2021. "Hierarchy and the size of a firm," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 68(3), pages 389-404, September.
    16. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006. "Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core," Working Papers 2006.72, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    17. Julia Belau, 2011. "Outside Options In Probabilistic Coalition Situations," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(04), pages 417-442.
    18. van den Brink, J.R., 1999. "An Axiomatization of the Shapley Value Using a Fairness Property," Other publications TiSEM 0090365c-9bab-4367-b660-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. David Lowing, 2023. "Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 320(1), pages 261-291, January.
    20. André Casajus & Rodrigue Tido Takeng, 2022. "Second-order productivity, second-order payoffs, and the Owen value," Post-Print hal-03798448, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    News Content; Internet Portal; Revenue Sharing; Coalition; Core; Nash Strong Equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:itse15:127156. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.itseurope.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.