of Thesis The aim of this thesis is to introduce and elaborate a new conception of the relation b... more of Thesis The aim of this thesis is to introduce and elaborate a new conception of the relation between wholes and parts. Wholes, I propose, can be conceived of as 'Unities', in contrast to their currently familiar conception as 'sums'. Following a clue given in the distinction which Plato draws in the Theaetetus (203c-205e) between two conceptions of a complex entity, I argue that a similar distinction can be coherently developed in modern terms. Part I is preoccupied with general conceptual and historical background. Some theoretical constraints on any theory of wholes and parts are challenged and found to be merely apparent. In Part II the conception of wholes as sums is presented, and it is extensively argued that modern discussions of wholes generally presuppose this conception. This presupposition is shared not only by authors who subscribe to the 'classical' mereological theories of Lesniewski, and Goodman, but also by theorists of holistic sympathies ...
... Paris Stuart Silvers, Clemson University Barry Smith, State University of New York at Buffalo... more ... Paris Stuart Silvers, Clemson University Barry Smith, State University of New York at Buffalo Nicholas D. Smith, Lewis & Clark College The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume. Page 7. WHOLES, SUMS AND UNITIES by ARIEL MEIRAV University of ...
The paper argues that four-dimensionalism is incompatible with the existence of “additively cumul... more The paper argues that four-dimensionalism is incompatible with the existence of “additively cumulative” properties, including mass, volume, and electrical charge. These properties add up over disjoint objects: for example, the mass of a whole composed of two disjoint objects is a sum of the individual masses of the objects. The difficulty with such properties for four-dimensionalism stems from the way this theory makes persistence depend on the existence of disjoint objects at disjoint times. I consider various possible responses to this difficulty and conclude that they all fail.
The principle of Summation, which is a technically sharpened version of the familiar claim that a... more The principle of Summation, which is a technically sharpened version of the familiar claim that a whole is a sum of its parts, is presented by Peter van Inwagen as a trivial truth. I argue to the contrary, that it is incompatible with the natural assumption that a whole may gain or lose parts non-instantaneously. For, as I show, the latter assumption implies that something can be determinately a whole without being determinately a sum of parts, and this, in turn, indicates the falsity of Summation. I point out that the tension between Summation and the possibility of non-instantaneous gain or loss of parts compels us to rethink the relations between the concepts of whole and sum, and may have far reaching consequences for the mereology of physical objects.
Both traditional accounts of hope and some of their recent critics analyze hope exclusively in te... more Both traditional accounts of hope and some of their recent critics analyze hope exclusively in terms of attitudes that a hoper bears towards a hoped-for prospect, such as desire and probability assignment. I argue that all of these accounts misidentify cases of despair as cases of hope, and so misconstrue the nature of hope. I show that a more satisfactory view is arrived at by noticing that in addition to the aforementioned attitudes, hope involves a characteristic attitude towards an external factor, on whose operation the hoper takes the prospect's realization to depend causally.
of Thesis The aim of this thesis is to introduce and elaborate a new conception of the relation b... more of Thesis The aim of this thesis is to introduce and elaborate a new conception of the relation between wholes and parts. Wholes, I propose, can be conceived of as 'Unities', in contrast to their currently familiar conception as 'sums'. Following a clue given in the distinction which Plato draws in the Theaetetus (203c-205e) between two conceptions of a complex entity, I argue that a similar distinction can be coherently developed in modern terms. Part I is preoccupied with general conceptual and historical background. Some theoretical constraints on any theory of wholes and parts are challenged and found to be merely apparent. In Part II the conception of wholes as sums is presented, and it is extensively argued that modern discussions of wholes generally presuppose this conception. This presupposition is shared not only by authors who subscribe to the 'classical' mereological theories of Lesniewski, and Goodman, but also by theorists of holistic sympathies ...
... Paris Stuart Silvers, Clemson University Barry Smith, State University of New York at Buffalo... more ... Paris Stuart Silvers, Clemson University Barry Smith, State University of New York at Buffalo Nicholas D. Smith, Lewis & Clark College The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume. Page 7. WHOLES, SUMS AND UNITIES by ARIEL MEIRAV University of ...
The paper argues that four-dimensionalism is incompatible with the existence of “additively cumul... more The paper argues that four-dimensionalism is incompatible with the existence of “additively cumulative” properties, including mass, volume, and electrical charge. These properties add up over disjoint objects: for example, the mass of a whole composed of two disjoint objects is a sum of the individual masses of the objects. The difficulty with such properties for four-dimensionalism stems from the way this theory makes persistence depend on the existence of disjoint objects at disjoint times. I consider various possible responses to this difficulty and conclude that they all fail.
The principle of Summation, which is a technically sharpened version of the familiar claim that a... more The principle of Summation, which is a technically sharpened version of the familiar claim that a whole is a sum of its parts, is presented by Peter van Inwagen as a trivial truth. I argue to the contrary, that it is incompatible with the natural assumption that a whole may gain or lose parts non-instantaneously. For, as I show, the latter assumption implies that something can be determinately a whole without being determinately a sum of parts, and this, in turn, indicates the falsity of Summation. I point out that the tension between Summation and the possibility of non-instantaneous gain or loss of parts compels us to rethink the relations between the concepts of whole and sum, and may have far reaching consequences for the mereology of physical objects.
Both traditional accounts of hope and some of their recent critics analyze hope exclusively in te... more Both traditional accounts of hope and some of their recent critics analyze hope exclusively in terms of attitudes that a hoper bears towards a hoped-for prospect, such as desire and probability assignment. I argue that all of these accounts misidentify cases of despair as cases of hope, and so misconstrue the nature of hope. I show that a more satisfactory view is arrived at by noticing that in addition to the aforementioned attitudes, hope involves a characteristic attitude towards an external factor, on whose operation the hoper takes the prospect's realization to depend causally.
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