Oct 16, 2012 · Self-confirming price prediction strategies are effective in simultaneous auction games with both complementary and substitutable preference structures.

We introduce a concept of self-confirming prices, and show that within an independent private value model, Bayes–Nash equilibrium can be fully characterized.

We aim to fill this gap by providing computationally feasible methods for constructing bidding strategies for the SimOSSB-auction environment, which we justify ...

Bidding in simultaneous auctions is challenging because an agent's value for a good in one auction may depend on the outcome of other auctions; that is, bidders ...

We introduce a concept of self-confirming prices, and show that within an independent private value model, Bayes–Nash equilibrium can be fully characterized as ...

Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions · Michael P. Wellman, Eric Sodomka, A. Greenwald · Published in Games Econ. Behav.

An extensive empirical game-theoretic analysis demonstrates that self-confirming price prediction strategies are effective in simultaneous auction games with ...

Results from empirical game-theoretic analysis of five simultaneous one-shot sealed-bid auction games. see associated paper for details.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors define a concept of self-confirming prices, and show that within an independent private value model, ...

In particular, we produce one such strategy that finds near-optimal bids, thereby outperforming all previously studied bidding heuristics in these environments.