Jan 21, 2019 · Our goal is to 1) compute an estimate for IC regret in an auction, 2) provide a measure of certainty around the estimate of IC regret, and 3) ...

In this paper we investigate the problem of measuring end-to-end Incentive Compatibility (IC) regret given black-box access to an auction mechanism.

Mar 3, 2019 · They design an A/B experiment to determine whether an auction is incentive compatible in both single-shot and dynamic settings (the latter ...

Abstract. In this paper we investigate the problem of measuring end-to-end Incentive Compatibility (IC) regret given black-box access to an auction mechanism.

In this paper we investigate the problem of measuring end-to-end Incentive Compatibility (IC) regret given black-box access to an auction mechanism.

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In this paper we investigate the problem of measuring end-to-end Incentive Compatibility (IC) regret given black-box access to an auction mechanism.

In this paper we investigate the problem of measuring end-to-end Incentive Compatibility (IC) regret given black-box access to an auction mechanism.

Feb 10, 2020 · This week's paper is about online learning methods to measure the difference in utility between bidding truthfully and following the optimal ...

Jan 13, 2020 · Zhe Feng, Okke Schrijvers, and Eric Sodomka. 2019. “Online Learning for Measuring Incentive Compatibility in Ad Auctions.