Metaphysics through Semantics: The Philosophical Recovery of the Medieval Mind. Essays in Honor of Gyula Klima, 2023
Can the Proslogion argument for God's existence be parodied to demonstrate the existence of the w... more Can the Proslogion argument for God's existence be parodied to demonstrate the existence of the worst evil? This is what Duns Scotus contends in one of his works, where he presents such a parody as evidence for the argument's unsoundness. Elsewhere, however, Scotus defends a "touched-up" version (coloratio) of Anselm's argument. In my reconstruction, Scotus's touched-up argument includes three stages: first, a demonstration that that than which a greater cannot be thought is a possible object of thought; second, a demonstration that that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought to exist and so can exist; third, a demonstration that that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists. Contrary to what has sometimes been maintained, I argue that Scotus's argument does not make any illegitimate shift from logical to real possibility. I also contend that one of the most characteristic aspects of Scotus's touchedup argument is that the comparison between existing in the intellect and existing in reality (arguably the weakest point in standard reconstructions of Anselm's argument) plays no role in it, and that accordingly Scotus's argument is immune from his own parody of Anselm's argument.
In this paper, I consider Duns Scotus's treatment of accidents existing without substances (= hom... more In this paper, I consider Duns Scotus's treatment of accidents existing without substances (= homeless accidents) in the Eucharist to shed light on how he thinks Aristotle's metaphysics should be modified to make room for miracles. In my reconstruction, Duns Scotus makes two changes to Aristotle's metaphysics. First, he distinguishes a given thing's natural inclinations (its "aptitudes") from the manifestations of those inclinations. Second, he argues that it is up to God's free decisions (organized in systematic policies) whether a thing's aptitudes manifest or do not manifest themselves in any given situation. In this way, Duns Scotus tries to find a point of equilibrium between the necessary causal order he attributes to Aristotle and his followers, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, God's freedom to break the natural order at any moment.
Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales, 2020
Throughout the Middle Ages and Early modern period, "being in the intellect" and "intelligible be... more Throughout the Middle Ages and Early modern period, "being in the intellect" and "intelligible being" were taken to be key features of objects of thought. Duns Scotus's striking claim that the intellect produces its objects in intelligible being has triggered a debate among his interpreters on the ontological status of intelligible being. That debate, however, has obscured what is arguably an even more striking aspect of Duns Scotus's position: not all objects of thought have intelligible being; rather, intelligible being characterizes only the objects of what Duns Scotus called 'abstractive cognition', where objects are made present to the intellect through a representation (the so-called 'intelligible species'). By contrast, if a certain thing is present to the intellect "by itself," that thing is indeed an object of thought (specifically of an "intuitive" as opposed to an "abstractive" thought) but has no intelligible being. Starting from this insight, this paper provides a roadmap to Duns Scotus's views on the role intelligible being plays in human cognition, divine cognition, and the intersection between the two. One of its main claims is that Duns Scotus's position can be correctly grasped once the mystery surrounding the notion of presence is dispelled by calling attention to its links with the Aristotelian theory of action and passion.
The disagreement between Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on divine illumination is usually re... more The disagreement between Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on divine illumination is usually recognized as a high point in the history of medieval epistemology. Still, there is much obscurity surrounding that debate, including the specific nature of the disagreement between those two thinkers. In this paper, I argue that the point at issue is the relationship between sense and intellect. Henry of Ghent, who posits a close tie between sense and intellect, holds that the senses are the only natural source of both content and certainty for the intellect. By contrast, Duns Scotus holds that, in our natural state, the senses are the source of content but not of certainty for the intellect, which can achieve knowledge of the truth of first principles true by virtue of the meaning of their terms independently of the sensory input it receives.
Scotus’s views on objective being — i.e. the special way objects of thought are supposed to be in... more Scotus’s views on objective being — i.e. the special way objects of thought are supposed to be in the mind — have been recently interpreted in different ways. In this paper, I argue that Scotus’s apparently contradictory statements on objective being can be made sense only if they are read against the background of his theory of essence. Specifically, I claim that a key point of Scotus’s position is that objects of thoughts are in the mind but have mind-independent identity (they are in the mind but not of the mind). I defend my interpretation by focusing on a usually neglected passage from Scotus’s Questions on the Metaphysics where Scotus provides an unusually explicit (if short) account of what he takes ‘to be objectively in the intellect’ to mean.
Scotus held that any non-complex occurrent cognitive state belongs to one of two kinds. The first... more Scotus held that any non-complex occurrent cognitive state belongs to one of two kinds. The first kind includes perceptual states and is typically exemplified by the state of seeing a color. Scotus called those states 'intuitive acts', where an act is an occurrent state as opposed to an ability or disposition (e.g. my seeing a color right now as opposed to my ability to see a color) and 'intuitive' comes from the Latin verb intueri, 'to see'. The second kind is best illustrated by the state of imagining a color, but imagining a sound or a taste would be equally good examples. Scotus called those states 'abstractive acts', because he thought that their defining characteristic was that, unlike intuitive acts, they "abstract" from the existence of their objects, i.e. maintain their identity whether their objects exist or not. This essay has four sections. First, I consider Scotus’s definition (or rather, definitions) of intuitive and abstractive cognition. Second, I turn to what is probably Scotus’s most innovative but also most controversial contribution to this issue, namely his contention that the intellect and not just the sensory power is capable of intuitions. Third, I present Ockham’s criticism of Scotus’s account. Fourth, I sum up the main points I made in the previous sections.
Metaphysics through Semantics: The Philosophical Recovery of the Medieval Mind. Essays in Honor of Gyula Klima, 2023
Can the Proslogion argument for God's existence be parodied to demonstrate the existence of the w... more Can the Proslogion argument for God's existence be parodied to demonstrate the existence of the worst evil? This is what Duns Scotus contends in one of his works, where he presents such a parody as evidence for the argument's unsoundness. Elsewhere, however, Scotus defends a "touched-up" version (coloratio) of Anselm's argument. In my reconstruction, Scotus's touched-up argument includes three stages: first, a demonstration that that than which a greater cannot be thought is a possible object of thought; second, a demonstration that that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought to exist and so can exist; third, a demonstration that that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists. Contrary to what has sometimes been maintained, I argue that Scotus's argument does not make any illegitimate shift from logical to real possibility. I also contend that one of the most characteristic aspects of Scotus's touchedup argument is that the comparison between existing in the intellect and existing in reality (arguably the weakest point in standard reconstructions of Anselm's argument) plays no role in it, and that accordingly Scotus's argument is immune from his own parody of Anselm's argument.
In this paper, I consider Duns Scotus's treatment of accidents existing without substances (= hom... more In this paper, I consider Duns Scotus's treatment of accidents existing without substances (= homeless accidents) in the Eucharist to shed light on how he thinks Aristotle's metaphysics should be modified to make room for miracles. In my reconstruction, Duns Scotus makes two changes to Aristotle's metaphysics. First, he distinguishes a given thing's natural inclinations (its "aptitudes") from the manifestations of those inclinations. Second, he argues that it is up to God's free decisions (organized in systematic policies) whether a thing's aptitudes manifest or do not manifest themselves in any given situation. In this way, Duns Scotus tries to find a point of equilibrium between the necessary causal order he attributes to Aristotle and his followers, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, God's freedom to break the natural order at any moment.
Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales, 2020
Throughout the Middle Ages and Early modern period, "being in the intellect" and "intelligible be... more Throughout the Middle Ages and Early modern period, "being in the intellect" and "intelligible being" were taken to be key features of objects of thought. Duns Scotus's striking claim that the intellect produces its objects in intelligible being has triggered a debate among his interpreters on the ontological status of intelligible being. That debate, however, has obscured what is arguably an even more striking aspect of Duns Scotus's position: not all objects of thought have intelligible being; rather, intelligible being characterizes only the objects of what Duns Scotus called 'abstractive cognition', where objects are made present to the intellect through a representation (the so-called 'intelligible species'). By contrast, if a certain thing is present to the intellect "by itself," that thing is indeed an object of thought (specifically of an "intuitive" as opposed to an "abstractive" thought) but has no intelligible being. Starting from this insight, this paper provides a roadmap to Duns Scotus's views on the role intelligible being plays in human cognition, divine cognition, and the intersection between the two. One of its main claims is that Duns Scotus's position can be correctly grasped once the mystery surrounding the notion of presence is dispelled by calling attention to its links with the Aristotelian theory of action and passion.
The disagreement between Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on divine illumination is usually re... more The disagreement between Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on divine illumination is usually recognized as a high point in the history of medieval epistemology. Still, there is much obscurity surrounding that debate, including the specific nature of the disagreement between those two thinkers. In this paper, I argue that the point at issue is the relationship between sense and intellect. Henry of Ghent, who posits a close tie between sense and intellect, holds that the senses are the only natural source of both content and certainty for the intellect. By contrast, Duns Scotus holds that, in our natural state, the senses are the source of content but not of certainty for the intellect, which can achieve knowledge of the truth of first principles true by virtue of the meaning of their terms independently of the sensory input it receives.
Scotus’s views on objective being — i.e. the special way objects of thought are supposed to be in... more Scotus’s views on objective being — i.e. the special way objects of thought are supposed to be in the mind — have been recently interpreted in different ways. In this paper, I argue that Scotus’s apparently contradictory statements on objective being can be made sense only if they are read against the background of his theory of essence. Specifically, I claim that a key point of Scotus’s position is that objects of thoughts are in the mind but have mind-independent identity (they are in the mind but not of the mind). I defend my interpretation by focusing on a usually neglected passage from Scotus’s Questions on the Metaphysics where Scotus provides an unusually explicit (if short) account of what he takes ‘to be objectively in the intellect’ to mean.
Scotus held that any non-complex occurrent cognitive state belongs to one of two kinds. The first... more Scotus held that any non-complex occurrent cognitive state belongs to one of two kinds. The first kind includes perceptual states and is typically exemplified by the state of seeing a color. Scotus called those states 'intuitive acts', where an act is an occurrent state as opposed to an ability or disposition (e.g. my seeing a color right now as opposed to my ability to see a color) and 'intuitive' comes from the Latin verb intueri, 'to see'. The second kind is best illustrated by the state of imagining a color, but imagining a sound or a taste would be equally good examples. Scotus called those states 'abstractive acts', because he thought that their defining characteristic was that, unlike intuitive acts, they "abstract" from the existence of their objects, i.e. maintain their identity whether their objects exist or not. This essay has four sections. First, I consider Scotus’s definition (or rather, definitions) of intuitive and abstractive cognition. Second, I turn to what is probably Scotus’s most innovative but also most controversial contribution to this issue, namely his contention that the intellect and not just the sensory power is capable of intuitions. Third, I present Ockham’s criticism of Scotus’s account. Fourth, I sum up the main points I made in the previous sections.
Uploads
Papers