Books by Mattia Riccardi
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Papers by Mattia Riccardi
Synthese
Some Kant scholars argue that appearances and things in themselves are distinct things (Two Objec... more Some Kant scholars argue that appearances and things in themselves are distinct things (Two Objects View). Others argue that they are the same things (One Object View). This last view is often understood as the claim that appearances and things in themselves are numerically identical (Numerical Identity). However, Walker (2010) and Stang (2014) show that Numerical Identity clashes against Kant’s claim that we lack knowledge of things in themselves (Noumenal Ignorance). I propose a weaker version of the One Object View that is not couched in terms of Numerical Identity and, consequently, avoids the problem raised by Walker and Stang. My case is based on a sustained analogy with perceptual experience that aims at showing that appearances and things in themselves are the same things in the following sense: the very same things can be presented under the mode of sensory intuition or (possibly) under the mode of intellectual intuition. Those things presented under the mode of sensory int...
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The Monist, 2021
I argue that Nietzsche puts forward a pandispositionalist view that can be seen as the conjunctio... more I argue that Nietzsche puts forward a pandispositionalist view that can be seen as the conjunction of two basic claims: that powers are the basic constituents of reality, on the one hand, and that the only properties things possess are relational qua dispositional, on the other hand. As I believe that such a view is, at least in part, motivated by his rejection of Kant’s notion of things in themselves, I start by sketching the metaphysics of Kant’s transcendental idealism (section 2) and by presenting Nietzsche’s critical reaction to it (section 3). After that, I start to work out Nietzsche’s pandispositionalist view by considering first the case of physical reality (section 3) and second that of psychological reality (section 5). I then argue that in both cases that view does not conflict with Nietzsche’s naturalism (section 6). In the last part of the paper I explore how his notion of will to power fits into such a pandispositionalist picture. Here, I shall argue, some serious ten...
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Synthese, 2017
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Nietzsche on Consciousness and the Embodied Mind, 2018
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Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 2018
This essay is one of ten contributions to a special editorial feature in The Journal of Nietzsche... more This essay is one of ten contributions to a special editorial feature in The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 49.2 (Autumn 2018), in which authors were invited to address the following questions: What is the future of Nietzsche studies? What are the most pressing questions its scholars should address? What texts and issues demand our urgent attention? And as we turn to these issues, what methodological and interpretive principles should guide us? The editorship hopes this collection will provide a starting point for discussions about the most fruitful directions for Nietzsche scholarship to take and the most promising avenues for building on the best recent work.
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Inquiry, 2017
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British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2015
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2015
Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A qu... more Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A question in its own right concerns possible historical antecedents of the position. So far, Frege and Husserl are the most prominent names that have been mentioned in this regard. In my paper I shall argue that Max Scheler deserves a particularly relevant place in the genealogy of disjunctivism for three main reasons. First, Scheler’s view of perceptual experience is distinctively disjunctivist, as he explicitly argues that perceptions and hallucinations differ in nature. Second, his version of the position is philosophically interesting in its own right. This is so primarily, though not exclusively, in virtue of the positive story he tells us about perceptual content. Third, Scheler’s case proves particularly instructive to the question of whether intentionalism and disjunctivism constitute a fundamental, unbridgeable divide.
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Inquiry, 2014
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Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 2014
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The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 2014
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Nietzscheforschung, 2007
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Nietzscheforschung, 2006
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Internationale Konferenz der Nietzsche-Gesellschaft in Zusammenarbeit mit der Kant-Gesellschaft, Naumburg an der Saale, 26.-29. August 2004, 2000
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Cadernos Nietzsche, 2014
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In this paper I argue that Nietzsche’s view on consciousness is best captured by distinguishing d... more In this paper I argue that Nietzsche’s view on consciousness is best captured by distinguishing different notions of consciousness. In other words, I propose that Nietzsche should be read as endorsing pluralism about consciousness. First, I consider the notion that is preeminent in his work and argue that the only kind of consciousness which may fit the characterization Nietzsche provides of this dominant notion is self-consciousness (Sconsciousness). Second, I argue that in light of Nietzsche’s treatment of perceptions and sensations we should conclude that he takes each of such state type to involve a specific kind of consciousness which differs from Sconsciousness. I label these two additional kinds of consciousness perceptual consciousness (Pconsciousness) and qualitative consciousness (Qconsciousness), respectively. I conclude with some remarks on how, in Nietzsche’s picture, these three different kinds of consciousness might relate.
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forthcoming in M. Griffiths, N. Levy, & K. Timpe (eds). The Routledge Companion to Free Will. New York: Routledge.
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Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A qu... more Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A question in its own right concerns possible historical antecedents of the position. So far, Frege and Husserl are the most prominent names that have been mentioned in this regard. In my paper I shall argue that Max Scheler deserves a particularly relevant place in the genealogy of disjunctivism for three main reasons. First, Scheler’s view of perceptual experience is distinctively disjunctivist, as he explicitly argues that perceptions and hallucinations differ in nature. Second, his version of the position is philosophically interesting in its own right. This is so primarily, though not exclusively, in virtue of the positive story he tells us about perceptual content. Third, Scheler’s case proves particularly instructive to the question of whether intentionalism and disjunctivism constitute a fundamental, unbridgeable divide.
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Books by Mattia Riccardi
Papers by Mattia Riccardi