Paper 2024/650
Hash-based Direct Anonymous Attestation
Abstract
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) was designed for the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and versions using RSA and elliptic curve cryptography have been included in the TPM specifications and in ISO/IEC standards. These standardised DAA schemes have their security based on the factoring or discrete logarithm problems and are therefore insecure against quantum attackers. Research into quantum-resistant DAA has resulted in several lattice-based schemes. Now in this paper, we propose the first post-quantum DAA scheme from symmetric primitives. We make use of a hash-based signature scheme, which is a slight modification of SPHINCS+, as a DAA credential. A DAA signature, proving the possession of such a credential, is a multiparty computation-based non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. The security of our scheme is proved under the Universal Composability (UC) model. While maintaining all the security properties required for a DAA scheme, we try to make the TPM's workload as low as possible. Our DAA scheme can handle a large group size (up to $2^{60}$ group members), which meets the requirements of rapidly developing TPM applications.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Proceedings of PQCrypto 2023, LNCS, volume 14154
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-031-40003-2_21
- Keywords
- Post-quantum cryptographyHash-based signaturesDirect anonymous attestation
- Contact author(s)
-
liqun chen @ surrey ac uk
changyu dong @ gzhu edu cn
nada elkassem @ surrey ac uk
c newton @ surrey ac uk
yalan wang @ surrey ac uk - History
- 2024-04-29: approved
- 2024-04-28: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/650
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/650, author = {Liqun Chen and Changyu Dong and Nada El Kassem and Christopher J.P. Newton and Yalan Wang}, title = {Hash-based Direct Anonymous Attestation}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/650}, year = {2024}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-40003-2_21}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/650} }