Paper 2023/569
From Polynomial IOP and Commitments to Non-malleable zkSNARKs
, EURECOM, IMDEA Software, University of Edinburgh, EURECOMAbstract
We study sufficient conditions for compiling simulation-extractable zkSNARKs from information-theoretic interactive oracle proofs (IOP) using a simulation-extractable commit-and-prove system for its oracles. Specifically, we define simulation extractability for opening and evaluation proofs of polynomial commitment schemes, which we then employ to prove the security of zkSNARKS obtained from polynomial IOP prove systems, such as Plonk and Marlin. To instantiate our methodology we additionally prove that KZG commitments satisfy our simulation extractability requirement, despite being naturally malleable. To this end, we design a relaxed notion of simulation extractability that matches how KZG commitments are used and optimized in real-world prove systems. Only the proof that KZG satisfies this relaxed simulation extractability property relies on the algebraic group model (AGM) and random oracle (RO). We thus isolate the use of (and thus the reliance on) these strong heuristics.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in TCC 2023
- Keywords
- polynomial commitmentsnon-malleabilitysimulation-extractabilityzero-knowledgecommit-and-proveIOP
- Contact author(s)
-
antonio faonio @ eurecom fr
dario fiore @ imdea org
markulf kohlweiss @ ed ac uk
russol @ eurecom fr
michal @ nethermind io - History
- 2023-10-09: revised
- 2023-04-22: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/569
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/569,
author = {Antonio Faonio and Dario Fiore and Markulf Kohlweiss and Luigi Russo and Michal Zajac},
title = {From Polynomial {IOP} and Commitments to Non-malleable {zkSNARKs}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/569},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/569}
}
