

Subverting Cryptographic Hardware used in Blockchain Consensus

or

Algorithm-Substitution Attacks on Cryptographic Puzzles

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Abstract

In this work, we study and formalize security notions for algorithm substitution attacks (ASAs) on *cryptographic puzzles*. Puzzles are difficult problems that require an investment of computation, memory, or some other related resource. They are heavily used as a building block for the consensus networks used by cryptocurrencies. These include primitives such as proof-of-work, proof-of-space, and verifiable delay functions (VDFs). Due to economies of scale, these networks increasingly rely on a small number of companies to construct opaque hardware or software (*e.g.*, GPU or FPGA images): this dependency raises concerns about cryptographic subversion. Unlike the algorithms considered by previous ASAs, cryptographic puzzles *do not rely on secret keys* and thus enable a very different set of attacks. We first explore the threat model for these systems and then propose concrete attacks that (1) selectively reduce a victim’s solving capability (*e.g.*, hashrate) and (2) exfiltrate puzzle solutions to an attacker. We then propose defenses, several of which can be applied to existing cryptocurrency hardware with minimal changes. We also find that mining devices for many major proof-of-work cryptocurrencies already demonstrate errors exactly how a potentially subverted device would. Given that these attacks are relevant to all proof of work cryptocurrencies that have a combined market capitalization of around a few hundred billion dollars (2022), we recommend that all vulnerable mining protocols consider making the suggested adaptations today.

1 Introduction

Security for cryptographic systems depends on the existence of a trusted implementation. Unfortunately, recent experience shows that implementers cannot always be trusted. Examples of cryptographic subversion are increasingly common, ranging from backdoors in cryptocurrency wallets [1, 2] to software packages [3] and smart contracts [4]. In several famous examples, highly-motivated attackers surreptitiously modified the implementation of cryptographic algorithms as a means to subvert the operation of security systems that depend on them [5, 6, 7]. In the research literature such attacks are known as *algorithm substitution attacks* (ASAs) and have been the subject of much formal study [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. In an algorithm substitution attack, an attacker modifies a cryptographic implementation to replace a cryptographic algorithm or protocol with an adversarial replacement. The subverted device is then adopted by an honest user who is unaware of the substitution.

Cryptographic Puzzles. *Cryptographic puzzles* are difficult problems that require an investment of computation, memory or some other related resource [19]. Puzzles were originally proposed for spam prevention or avoidance of DoS attacks [20] but have more recently been adopted by cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Chia and Filecoin for the purpose of *mining*, i.e., achieving consensus and minting new coins [21, 22]. In each of these systems, solvers reap substantial economic rewards from solving puzzles. The dark side of this arrangement is that these financial incentives provide strong motivation for the development of sophisticated attacks [23].¹

In this work we consider the problem of implementing and mitigating ASAs against cryptographic puzzle-solving hardware and software. The field of cryptocurrency mining is uniquely vulnerable to these attacks due to the fact that nearly all popular mining hardware (and much software) is manufactured by a small number of companies, and that many of these companies also operate their own competing mining operations (see figure 4) [25, 26]. Cryptographic puzzle algorithms are also significantly different from the algorithms considered in previous work on ASAs, and therefore support both different attacks and defenses. Most notably, cryptographic puzzles typically do not make use of secret keys. Hence both the attacker goals and defenses must necessarily be quite different. Rather than exfiltrating secret keys, adversaries are instead motivated to devise attack strategies that improve their own ability to extract profits or consensus control over a cryptocurrency network, for example, by selectively reducing the solving-rate of the victim’s hardware or extracting puzzle solutions. The elegant work of Russell et al. [17] also discusses related problems, but focuses on correcting subverted hash functions (random oracles), with applications to proof-of-work. One important question we address is: how does an adversary use, and benefit from, these subversions in the first place? We focus on a different primitive that in some cases may also be built from hash functions, but we also address puzzle functions that are built from alternative components, including VDFs.

Attack setting: cryptocurrency mining. While ASAs can be applied to any application of puzzles, in this work we focus primarily on the setting of cryptocurrency mining. These operations typically use large collections of puzzle-solving devices to evaluate solutions, and thus mine new blocks in a cryptocurrency network. For many proof-of-work networks like Bitcoin, the most popular mining device (and possibly the only profitable ones) are specialized mining ASICs (Application-Specific Integrated Circuits) that are typically purchased inside an enclosure. Other systems rely on FPGA or GPU devices that use specialized implementations [27]: while these implementations can technically be reviewed by experts, the cost of these specialized reviews is often prohibitive. In addition to purchase price of the hardware and software, the potential victim must also contribute substantial resources in the form of electricity (for proof-of-work) or other resources such as RAM or hard disk drives (for memory-hard proof-of-work [28] and proof-of-space constructions [24, 29, 30].)

Mining operations can be organized in various configurations, which we consider in this work:

Individual mining. In the most traditional setting, a cryptocurrency node operated by the miner obtains puzzle instances by running the cryptocurrency network’s software on a computer: the software then presents these instances to the possibly-subverted mining devices for solving. In this setting we make the optimistic assumption that the cryptocurrency node’s software operates as expected, and only the specialized mining devices are subverted. The challenge

¹While some examples of cryptographic puzzles such as proof-of-work have historically had negative environmental impact through extremely high energy consumption, not all [24] cryptographic puzzles share this downside.

for a subversion attacker in this setting is that a remote attacker may not have direct access to send and receive messages to/from the subverted devices: all communication with the device must be in the form of correctly-structured puzzle inputs and solutions that pass through the cryptocurrency network.

Pool mining. While the above setting is popular, it is not the only setting in which mining hardware is used. A second popular configuration allows mining devices to participate in a *mining pool* with many other miners [31]. Mining pools allow miners to distribute the risk of mining operations, improving the predictability of mining rewards. A significant feature of this setting is that the miner (or the device itself) receives puzzle instances from a central *pool coordinator*: pessimistically, this coordinator may collude with the subversion attacker. This latter setting can greatly increase the attacker’s freedom to communicate with the subverted devices, since the attacker need not filter communications via the cryptocurrency network.

Definitions, attacks and defenses. The challenge in an ASA is to subvert a cryptographic implementation *in a manner that the victim cannot easily detect*. To this end, previous ASA definitions [32, 9] require that the subverted algorithm’s behavior should remain cryptographically indistinguishable from that of the real one, either prior to the initiation of an attack or even (in some stronger definitions) while the attack is ongoing [16, 33]. At the same time, an attacker with knowledge of the subversion algorithm must execute practical attacks against the device. These requirements are somewhat contradictory, however, since they imply that a successful attack must produce useful real-world consequences while also producing no effects that a victim can detect.

Most previous work on ASAs avoids this contradiction by carefully limiting the scope of the model: in these works the attacker’s purpose is typically the exfiltration of cryptographic secrets. In real-world settings, the theft of a useful secret key will often result in side effects that can be detected (such as the creation of forged certificates or intercepted communications). However many classical ASA definitions typically leave such side effects “outside the model”. By contrast, puzzle-solving devices have no long-term cryptographic secrets to steal: the attacker’s goal in our setting is primarily to hijack the power of the puzzle-solving device. The attacker can achieve this either by diverting a portion of the device’s solving power towards the attacker, or simply by reducing the device’s effectiveness. These different goals require deeper consideration. A key aspect of the attacks we propose and study is that the loss of puzzle-solving ability has consequences that a sufficiently observant defender may notice. Our definitions address this in two ways: first, we require that subverted devices be indistinguishable from honest ones at least *prior to the initiation of an attack* by a remote subversion attacker (in some previous works, this is called the *offline* case.) Within our framework, we further consider the extent to which a defender can detect an ongoing attack solely due to measurements of puzzle-solving ability (the “online” case.) From a definitional perspective, modeling these effects requires that we extend previous ASA notions to incorporate a notion of time or resource usage.

Using this definitional framework for our analysis, we find that in many existing networks, subversion attacks can run for an extended period before any defender can be confident that an attack is underway. Moreover, real-world devices have various features that can make such attacks even more difficult to detect. For example, popular ASIC-based puzzle-solving devices routinely produce unexplained hardware failures on a small fraction of inputs. While these errors are most likely due to overheating and manufacturing errors, *they are also precisely the symptom one might*

Antminer S19 Pro			
Number of hash boards	Number of chips	Number of hardware errors	Operating frequency
1	114	108	525
2	114	982	525
3	114	132	525

Figure 1: Hardware errors as they appear to a miner [34], more examples in Appendix B

expect from a subverted device.² These findings motivate better techniques to detect and prevent subversion attacks in deployed systems.

Our contributions. More concretely, our contributions are as follows:

- We provide a simplified and general definition of cryptographic puzzles that suffices to analyze ASA attacks on real-world examples of cryptographic puzzles such as proof-of-work, verifiable delay functions and proof of space protocols.
- We formalize security notions for algorithm-substitution attacks (ASAs) on cryptographic puzzle schemes. We next analyze which attacks succeed in the real-world. Furthermore, we extend previous ASA definitions to our setting by considering oracles that allow timing and resource usage of operations to be reported.
- We devise realistic threat models under which we propose two different algorithm-substitution attacks on cryptographic puzzles. These include *load-shedding attacks*, which affects puzzle solving abilities of subverted devices on an unpredictable set of subverted inputs set by the attacker, as well as *leeching attacks* in which a subverted device exfiltrates puzzle solutions to an attacker.
- Using our framework, we provide concrete estimates for attack success probabilities and costs for the Bitcoin network. Since, this is the most widely-deployed application of cryptographic puzzles in the real world. We demonstrate how such an attacker can benefit from these two algorithm-substitution attacks when deployed against Bitcoin’s proof-of-work mining.
- Finally, we provide countermeasures that, if appropriately utilized, render many of our proposed attacks ineffective. These countermeasures to protect existing proof-of-work implementations and a masking protocol for Pietrzak’s VDF construction can be instantiated with no changes to the underlying puzzle or consensus networks and at a minimal cost.
- We implement one of our proposed countermeasures, an efficient masking protocol for the Pietrzak repeating-squaring VDFs. The resulting overhead is a miniscule fraction of the VDF evaluation time.

²See Appendix B for examples.

1.1 Technical Overview

In this work we focus on subversion attacks for cryptographic puzzles. We use the term *puzzle* to generalize a wide variety of schemes with the following structure: a puzzle solving algorithm draws in *puzzle instances* that are typically generated by a consensus protocol. These instances are then processed using a (possibly probabilistic) resource-intensive solving algorithm to produce a solution. On solving the puzzle within certain constraints (for example, being the first participant to find a valid solution), the puzzle solver is granted certain privileges in the consensus network and/or is financially rewarded. Both effects produces a clear incentive for an attacker to subvert puzzle-solving devices.

Formalizing puzzles. Our first objective is to re-formalize the notion of a *cryptographic puzzle*. While previous works have offered such formalization, they have in the past been tightly coupled to specific constructions such as the proof-of-work hash puzzles used by Bitcoin. Our goal is to identify a formalization that can be applied to a much broader category of puzzles used in practical systems. Our definitions simplify the definitions from the work of Groza and Warinschi [19]. However in our formalization, we generalize each of these systems to a puzzle defined over a specific *resource*: the minimum amount of the puzzle resource required to find a valid puzzle solution is determined by a difficulty parameter. In Section 2, we demonstrate the utility of this definition by showing that many important primitives such as proof-of-work, VDFs, and proof-of-space fit the definitions of a cryptographic puzzle as described in Section 2.1.

Attacker goals and threat model. The real-world examples of these puzzles are deployed in settings where puzzle evaluators reap the rewards from solving these puzzles. In many cases (such as sequential work puzzles), the fastest evaluator to find the puzzle solution is the only one who receives the reward. Therefore, we focus on attacks with the following goals: either to force the subverted evaluation hardware/software to malfunction/fail on certain puzzle instances, or else to exfiltrate solutions to the attacker. In all attack settings, we require that such subversion should not be detected by the owner of the hardware during testing: we realize this by postulating a remote attacker that may *initiate* an attack either by providing malicious puzzle instances, or else by providing some alternative “trigger” to the hardware. Once an attack has begun, we further consider the attacker’s ability to detect that attack. We note that for many deployed puzzles, attack detection is challenging and may involve some statistical uncertainty, and that moreover an attacker may reap substantial rewards from the attack before a defender can be certain that one is underway.

We define our threat model for the real-world attacks accordingly in Section 3.1. Informally, we consider two settings. In each one, a remote attacker interfaces with a subverted device (or devices) in order to trigger the attack and (optionally) receive exfiltrated results. The key difference between our two settings is in how a remote attacker communicates with the device:

Direct input model. In the first setting, a remote attacker has the ability to feed puzzle inputs to the victim’s subverted mining device directly. This model captures hardware that is connected to a *mining pool* in which the operator is under the attacker’s control.

Blockchain input model. In this model the remote attacker must communicate with the subverted hardware via puzzle instances read/written from the chain (Figure 2).




Figure 2: a) **Direct input model.** In our first setting, a victim owns the mining/evaluation hardware which in turn communicates with an attacker-controlled *pool operator* through the victim’s mining/evaluation software. The victim’s software is provided with puzzle inputs directly from the pool operator to whom it submits its work. The pool operator in turn communicates with the consensus network/chain. b) **Blockchain input model.** The victim owns the subverted mining/evaluation hardware which in turn communicates through the victim’s mining/evaluation software. This software reads puzzle inputs from the blockchain directly, and posts any solutions found.

Attack strategies. Based on our threat model we propose two attack strategies as described below. The attack strategies are valid even if the devices are sold with the subversions out of the box. However, we do focus more on variants of the attacks which are *input-induced*: this means that the malicious manufacturer/attacker uses trigger puzzle instances to send the puzzle solving/mining device into “subverted” mode. The benefit of this approach is that *prior to receiving any of these inputs* the device will behave indistinguishably from an honest implementation. Following the receipt of a valid trigger, the device enters an attack mode that may persist indefinitely or for a finite duration set by the attacker.³ We identify two specific forms of attack that can be initiated by this trigger:

Load-shedding attack. (§4.1, §4.3.2) Our load-shedding attack follows a simple strategy. When the device encounters an attacker-formulated trigger, it silently rejects valid puzzle solutions according to a pre-specified strategy⁴. Assuming that the subverted devices make up a significant fraction of the overall network hashrate, this can reduce the overall hashrate and consequently increase the fraction of total hashrate that is provided by unsubverted devices (see Figure 6).

Leeching attack. (§4.2) During the course of an active leeching attack, the subverted device attempts to exfiltrate valid puzzle to the remote attacker. Such an attacker can then leverage these solutions to engage in a selfish mining [36] strategy, or to mount attacks against other networks. In *mining pools*, devices are asked to output low-difficulty solutions periodically as “proof” that the device is contributing to the pool. These partial solutions allow for the creation of a subliminal channel that can be used to exfiltrate high-difficulty solutions when

³While input-induced attacks have been studied in previous work [17, 35], the process of triggering the subverted devices in the setting of blockchains has not received much scrutiny. We study this setting and come up with new ways to trigger subverted devices, sometimes even affecting the entropy on the blockchain to do so, as demonstrated in Section 4.3.2.

⁴Alternatively it can just slow down the puzzle-solving process

they are found. We devise a specialized subliminal channel scheme that can be embedded into partial solutions.

Detecting active attacks. Classical ASA security definitions require that subversion must be undetectable even to a strong (i.e., polynomial-time) defender. The attacks we discuss in this work cannot fully achieve this goal, at least in the phase after an attack has been activated: each attack has a potentially detectable effect on the solution-rate of a target device. However the fact that an attack is detectable in theory does not mean that it can be detected *in practice*. Thus in this work we consider the time and resource requirements that are necessary to detect real-world attacks on puzzle hardware.

Our investigation focuses primarily on non-deterministic schemes such as the Bitcoin proof-of-work: our goal is to evaluate the time and resource requirements that a defender must commit in order to achieve reasonable confidence that a device is under attack. Surprisingly, we find that *for owners of individual devices* (or even large collections of subverted devices) the time required to achieve high confidence in detecting an attack can exceed the working lifetime of the device(s) in question. More generally, this asymmetry between a subversion attacker and its individual victims makes it much more likely that attacks will go undetected, motivating more sophisticated forms of collaborative testing. Finally, we observe 1 that many deployed puzzle-solving devices also manifest high error rates on certain inputs, which makes attack detection even more challenging.

Countermeasures. Finally, we devise counter-measures (Section 5) against these attacks. We first consider various testing regimes aimed at detecting these attacks. We then proceed to proving some general results on defense against ASAs on cryptographic puzzles. Our most promising technique makes use of a trusted pre-processing step that produces *unpredictable* transformations of the puzzle instance before feeding the instance to the puzzle solver. Since many of our attacks are activated by specific inputs (“triggers”), pre-processing works by preventing adversaries from supplying valid triggers to the device. We further observe that several common puzzles deployed in cryptocurrency systems (e.g., Bitcoin) already feature pre-processing stages that can be easily adapted to provide this security, although in practice such adaptations may not be commonly used. Thus, mining operations can defend against these attacks with only minor changes, none of which affect the consensus network or break existing mining hardware. ***We recommend that all miners consider making this adaptation today.*** We further demonstrate pre-processing defenses for algebraic puzzle protocols such as VDFs: this “masking” countermeasure does not require **any** changes to the protocol. The puzzle instance can be masked before being fed to the puzzle solving device and then the output of the puzzle solving device can be unmasked to obtain a valid solution for the original puzzle instance. This masking approach adds an insignificant overhead to puzzle solving.

Finally, we consider the problem of developing puzzles that are more amenable to attack detection. As noted above, many puzzle schemes make testing extremely challenging in settings where (high-difficulty) puzzle solutions are difficult to find. We propose a new property for puzzle schemes called *test-friendliness* that enables a defender to deterministically produce puzzle instances with known solutions: a critical feature of this property is that the device must be unable to distinguish test puzzle instances from those generated by the network, and similarly the testing capability must not undermine the usefulness of the puzzle in the network. We discuss a simple modification of the Bitcoin puzzle that satisfies this property.

Real-world concerns. Finally, we conclude by discussing real-world concerns (Section 6) which

are relevant to the attacks we propose and beyond. Our basic results demonstrate that we are considering our attackers in a very strong defensive model. Namely, that the detection adversary is very powerful and can detect most input-induced attacks which affect all but a negligible fraction of the puzzle input domain. We choose this approach to be conservative: clearly this represents a lower-bound on the complexity of the attack strategy. We stress that this means that real-world attackers are likely to be even more capable than the attackers we consider in this paper. However, we also note that our countermeasures are **independent** of the strength of the detecting adversary and hence continue to work regardless of this variable.

1.2 Related work

Previous work on ASAs [32, 9, 13, 15, 33] focuses on algorithms that employ secret keys, such as decryption and digital signing algorithms. In this setting, the attacker’s primary goal is usually to exfiltrate cryptographic secrets from the device: indeed, some proposed defenses have been aimed solely at increasing the cost of this exfiltration [37]. While much work has examined key-dependent algorithms, a small number of works have examined cryptographic algorithms that do not employ secret keys: ASAs and defenses for primitives such as hash functions have been studied in some detail by recent works [16, 18, 17]. While these works provide defenses for subverted hash functions and random oracles (and mention cryptocurrency mining as an application), our work focuses on puzzle schemes as the base-level primitive. Our threat model allows to explore the success probabilities of various attack strategies, i.e., what subversions serve the adversary’s interest. An important result (See 4.3.2) is that subverted hash functions (and subverted cryptographic puzzles in general) don’t always result in successful attacks. Hence, studying the threat model, the application setting and real-world defenses like modifying existing proof-of-work implementations (like Bitcoin’s, see Section 5.2.1) is a major goal of this work. Figuring out which attacks are actually successful and benefit the subverting adversary the most is a first step towards coming up with real-world defenses. Another work which gives rise to some countermeasures to our attacks is the paper [38] on scratch-off puzzles. Scratch-off puzzles make mining pools obsolete by ensuring that the puzzles have a property making them “non-outsourcable” so that the mining operator wouldn’t know if one of the members of the pool found a solution.

2 Cryptographic Puzzles

To provide background for the attacks in this work, we require a general definition of cryptographic puzzles that captures the various cryptographic primitives that are used as puzzles. Our definitions simplify and extend a previous definition by Groza and Warinschi [19]: they study cryptographic puzzles with different difficulty requirements for puzzle solving from the perspective of puzzle generation. For a detailed discussion on puzzle difficulty bounds we refer readers to their work.⁵ Our goal is to generalize and simplify the cryptographic puzzle definitions to capture a variety of common puzzles, including client puzzles [39, 20], proof of work, verifiable delay functions (VDFs) and proof of space. In all applications, these puzzles require some amount of resource to solve.

⁵Groza and Warinschi’s definitions consider other properties of the puzzle from the perspective of the puzzle evaluator such as *optimality*, which tightly bounds the success probability of puzzle solving and *fairness*, which bounds the probability of an evaluator finding a puzzle solution after some number of computational steps. These puzzle properties are extremely meaningful, but not directly relevant to our work.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Setup($1^\lambda, \Delta$) \rightarrow pp: The puzzle generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1^λ and a difficulty parameter Δ. It outputs public parameters pp which fix the domain of the unprocessed input \mathcal{X}_{pre}, pre-processed input domain \mathcal{X}, range \mathcal{Y} of the puzzle and other information required to compute a puzzle or verify a puzzle solution. All the following algorithms implicitly take pp as an input. • Pre(x', aux) \rightarrow x: The puzzle pre-processing algorithm (optional) takes a puzzle input x' from the unprocessed input domain \mathcal{X}_{pre} and an auxiliary input aux. It outputs a processed puzzle input $x \in \mathcal{X}$. If no pre-processing options are presented, this is just an identity map where $x' = x$ and $\mathcal{X}_{\text{pre}} = \mathcal{X}$. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eval(x, aux) \rightarrow y/\perp: The puzzle evaluation algorithm takes an input x from the pre-processed input domain and the auxiliary information aux which was used for pre-processing. It outputs a puzzle solution y if there exists a valid solution for the input, auxiliary input pair (x, aux), otherwise outputs \perp. • Verify(x, aux, y) \rightarrow 0/1: The puzzle verification algorithm takes a pre-processed puzzle input x, the auxiliary information aux which was used for pre-processing and an input from the range y. It outputs either 0 or 1.
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Figure 3: Cryptographic Puzzle Algorithms

The nature of this resource varies between puzzles: total computation cycles in proof-of-work, sequential-time for VDFs, and storage space for proof-of-space puzzles. Our definition is designed to generalize over various types of resources as well.

Definition 2.1 (Cryptographic Puzzles). A cryptographic puzzle is a tuple (**Setup**, **Pre**, **Eval**, **Verify**) comprising the possibly probabilistic algorithms defined in Figure 3.

As in previous works, we omit an explicit puzzle-sampling algorithm and specify that puzzles are sampled uniformly from the domain \mathcal{X}_{pre} . We also slightly modify previous definitions to *split* the puzzle evaluation algorithm into a new (optional) *pre-processing* algorithm **Pre** and an evaluation algorithm **Eval**. This modification captures previous definitions, and will be used in several of our later constructions.

Cryptographic puzzles must satisfy the correctness, soundness and resource requirement definition as defined below.

Definition 2.2 (Correctness). A cryptographic puzzle is correct if $\forall \lambda, \Delta, \text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \Delta)$, and $\forall x \in \mathcal{X}$ if $y \leftarrow \text{Eval}(x, \text{aux})$ then $\text{Verify}(x, \text{aux}, y) = 1$.

Definition 2.3 (Soundness). We require that an adversary can not get a verifier to accept an incorrect puzzle solution.

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \Delta) \\ y \neq \text{Eval}(x, \text{aux}) \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{l} (x, y, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \Delta, \text{pp}) \\ \text{Verify}(x, \text{aux}, y) = 1 \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Furthermore, the difficulty parameter Δ defines resource requirements for finding a correct puzzle solution.

Definition 2.4 (Resource-requirement). We require that no PPT adversary can solve the puzzle and consume less than $\Theta_{\text{avg}}(\Delta)$ of the puzzle resource while doing so in the average-case and $\Theta_{\text{best}}(\Delta)$ in the best-case.

1. **Average-case.** Let $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{avg}}(\Delta)$ represent the *average-case* resource requirement for adversary \mathcal{A} to solve a puzzle with difficulty parameter Δ . For a large number n of puzzle instances, $\{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$, let indicator $\mathbb{I} = 1$ if $\text{Verify}(x_i, \text{aux}_i, y_i) = 1 \forall i \in \{n\}$ and $\mathbb{I} = 0$ otherwise.

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \Delta), x_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{X} \\ \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{avg}}(\Delta) < \Theta_{\text{avg}}(\Delta) \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{l} (y_i, \text{aux}_i) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \Delta, \text{pp}, x_i) \\ \mathbb{I} = 1 \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

2. **Best-case.** Let $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{best}}(\Delta)$ represent the *best-case* resource requirement for adversary \mathcal{A} to solve a puzzle with difficulty parameter Δ . It holds true $\forall x \in \mathcal{X}$:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \Delta), x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{X} \\ \text{Verify}(x, \text{aux}, y) = 1 \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{l} (y, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \Delta, \text{pp}, x) \\ \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{best}}(\Delta) < \Theta_{\text{best}}(\Delta) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Note that the pre-processing phase can be optional, in which case unprocessed and pre-processed input are the same and consequently $\mathcal{X}_{\text{pre}} = \mathcal{X}$ and the auxiliary information $\text{aux} = \text{nil}$. A similar worst-case resource requirement can be defined similarly.

2.1 Cryptographic Puzzles in the Real World

To make the above discussion more concrete, we now consider several real-world cryptographic primitives that instantiate the cryptographic puzzle formalism.

Nakamoto Proof-of-Work. The Nakamoto proof-of-work (PoW) is a costly, time-consuming computation that miners conduct to select the node that produces the next consensus block. While several currencies employ proof-of-work, we will focus on the Bitcoin proof-of-work (Section A) as a specific example. At the time of writing, Bitcoin provides a 6.25 BTC *block reward* to the miner who solves this puzzle ($> \$ 100\text{k.}$) The Bitcoin proof of work can be formalized as a cryptographic puzzle as described in Appendix D.1.

Verifiable Delay Functions. A verifiable delay function (VDF) [40, 41, 42, 43, 44] is a specialized puzzle where computing the solution on any instance requires running a fixed number of *sequential* steps: at the same time, the output of the puzzle can be efficiently verified. VDF definitions and security requirements are available in Appendix D.1. Multiple applications of VDFs [22] have sparked a coalition called “VDF Alliance” funded by the Ethereum Foundation, Protocol Labs and others. VDFs can also be formalized in our framework as demonstrated in Appendix D.5.

Proof of Space. Proof of Space (abbreviated as PoSpace) [24, 29, 30] is a puzzle that was developed as an alternative to Bitcoin’s proof of work. Unlike standard PoW algorithms, proof of space puzzles use disk space as the puzzle resource rather than computation. PoSpace definitions and security requirements are presented in Appendix D.1. PoSpace can also be formalized as a cryptographic puzzle as demonstrated in Appendix D.7.

Real-world resources. Our resource-requirement definition 2.4 captures the said notion in real-world puzzle applications. Bitcoin’s proof of work has a dynamic average-case resource requirement for puzzle evaluation. This is because the overall hashrate of the network keeps changing but the protocol changes difficulty/resource requirements such that the proof-of-work puzzle is solved once every 10 minutes. The best case resource requirement is trivial, there could be a bitcoin proof of work instance for which just computing one hash gives a valid solution. For VDFs and PoSpace

on the other hand, the aim is to have the average-case and best-case requirement be the same. This gives a more uniform domain of puzzle instances with respect to resource requirement for evaluating solutions.

3 Modeling ASAs against Cryptographic Puzzles

3.1 Threat Model

This work primarily focuses on the use of puzzle solving hardware as a means to secure consensus networks. Within this setting, we focus on two primary threat models. In each setting we assume that the hardware is subverted by a malicious manufacturer. The mining device/puzzle solving owner is an honest party and the malicious manufacturer remotely tries to leverage the subversion to mount an attack. The malicious party can do this in two ways. They can directly control the inputs to the device if they also run a mining pool. This might seem like a high requirement to mount an attack but is already the case for most popular networks⁶. However, even if this is not the case, the malicious party can always communicate to the subverted device through the blockchain as the input to the device is determined to a certain degree by the previous block header.

Direct input model The setting is motivated by mining pools where the miner contributes its computation to a pool with a malicious pool operator. The malicious pool operator is aware of the exact way in which the manufacturer subverted the puzzle evaluation hardware. The miner sends its work shares/puzzle solutions to the pool operator rather than communicating directly with the blockchain as represented in Figure 2.⁷

Blockchain input model In this setting the malicious manufacturer and the miner both have access to the blockchain as represented in Figure 2. The goal of the malicious party is to use the blockchain to feed biased inputs to the miner’s device to leverage the subversion.

Both of the above models draw inspiration from the current state of the popular blockchain networks. In networks such as Bitcoin, reports have claimed that approximately two-thirds of the mining hardware market is controlled by Bitmain, as illustrated in Figure 4. They also run the two of the largest mining pools. We stress that there is no reason to believe that Bitmain would subvert hardware. Nonetheless, this sort of hardware dominance provides exactly the conditions in which ASA attacks can occur and go undetected. For all proof-of-work based cryptocurrencies (and some others)⁸ utilize the concept of pooled mining.

⁶Bitmain [26] is one of the largest application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) chip manufacturer for mining and it also operates BTC.com and Antpool which have historically been the two largest mining pools for Bitcoin

⁷In proof-of-work pooled mining, the miner just receives a hash output (supposed to be $H(\text{hashMerkleRoot}, \text{hashPrevBlock})$) and a nonce range and iterates over the nonce range to compute a double hash $H(\text{nonce}, H(\text{hashMerkleRoot}, \text{hashPrevBlock}))$. However, since a hash function has no structure, the malicious pool operator can send any input which looks like a hash. It can then use this *direct input to trigger subverted behavior on the next n puzzle instances etc.*

⁸For Chia (Proof of Space), pooled mining is very common. However, Chia encourages its miners to only work with mining pools which utilize its open-source Chia Pool operator software. In the past, there have been pools which had private code and a separate Chia client[47], which was speculated to have malicious intent.




Figure 4: Left: Market Share for Bitcoin mining ASIC manufacturers [45] and Right: Bitcoin blocks mined by various mining pools in 2021-22 [46]. AntPool (15.4%) and BTC.com (5.4%) together account for the highest control of hashpower and are run by the largest manufacturer (Bitmain).

3.2 Security against ASAs

When an ASA is mounted, an attacker replaces the standard algorithms $P = (\text{Setup}, \text{Pre}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$ with the subverted algorithms $\bar{P} = (\bar{\text{Setup}}, \bar{\text{Pre}}, \bar{\text{Eval}}, \bar{\text{Verify}})$. The attacker goals are as described earlier. The challenge for an attacker in mounting an ASA is to construct a subverted scheme that cannot be detected. Subversion in this setting refers to the adversarial goal of \mathcal{A} to reduce the puzzle-solving ability of \mathcal{D} and the goal of \mathcal{D} is to detect if its running a subverted version of the algorithm Eval to solve the puzzle. Following the footsteps of other works on ASAs we define the goals of the subverting adversary/attacker \mathcal{A} via the subversion game $\text{Sub}_{P, \bar{P}}^{\mathcal{A}}$ and the detecting adversary/detector \mathcal{D} via the detection game $\text{Det}_{P, \bar{P}}^{\mathcal{D}}$. We first describe the detection game $\text{Det}_{P, \bar{P}}^{\mathcal{D}}$ (figure 5) played between a challenger and a detecting adversary \mathcal{D} . Our oracles also output a counter cnt indicating the time taken to compute the response, unlike previous work on ASAs, this adds another challenge for the attacker. To formalize this, we use the following definitions. The work of Russel, Tang, Yung and Zhou [16] serves as an inspiration for the online/offline detection paradigm.

We now define the subversion game $\text{Sub}_{P, \bar{P}}^{\mathcal{A}}$ (figure 5) played between a challenger and a subverting adversary \mathcal{A} . This game captures the notion that \mathcal{A} can easily find out if a device is subverted, simply because it crafted the subversion.

Definition 3.1 (Subversion resistance). A cryptographic puzzle scheme $P = (\text{Setup}, \text{Pre}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$ is subversion resistant against an algorithm-substitution attack if for the subverted puzzle algorithms $\bar{P} = (\bar{\text{Setup}}, \bar{\text{Pre}}, \bar{\text{Eval}}, \bar{\text{Verify}})$ all subverting adversaries/attacker \mathcal{A} have a negligible advantage in the subversion game $\text{Sub}_{P, \bar{P}}^{\mathcal{A}}$, i.e., $\forall(\lambda, \Delta, \mathcal{A})$:

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Sub}}(1^\lambda, \Delta) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

A detector is motivated to check its puzzle-solving device for possible subversion. This notion is captured by the following detection games:

Definition 3.2 (Offline Detectability). An algorithm-substitution attack against a cryptographic puzzle scheme $P = (\text{Setup}, \text{Pre}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$, where the subverted puzzle algorithms are represented by $\bar{P} = (\overline{\text{Setup}}, \overline{\text{Pre}}, \overline{\text{Eval}}, \overline{\text{Verify}})$, is considered detectable if there exists a detection adversary with non-negligible advantage in the detection game $\mathbf{Det}_{P, \bar{P}}^{\mathcal{D}}$, i.e., $\forall(\lambda, \Delta), \exists \mathcal{D}$ such that:

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\mathbf{Det}}(1^\lambda, \Delta) > \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

for all negligible functions $\text{negl}(\cdot)$.

To capture the notion that a detector might stay vigilant and check device behavior when the device is puzzle-solving “online”, we describe an online detection game $\mathbf{Det}^+_{P, \bar{P}}^{\mathcal{D}}$ (figure 5) which aims at capturing the attacker-subverted device interaction when the device is online and the attacker is trying to leverage the subversion.

Definition 3.3 (Online Detectability). An algorithm-substitution attack against a cryptographic puzzle scheme $P = (\text{Setup}, \text{Pre}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$, where the subverted puzzle algorithms are represented by $\bar{P} = (\overline{\text{Setup}}, \overline{\text{Pre}}, \overline{\text{Eval}}, \overline{\text{Verify}})$, is considered detectable if there exists a detection adversary with non-negligible advantage in the online detection game $\mathbf{Det}^+_{P, \bar{P}}^{\mathcal{D}}$, i.e., $\forall(\lambda, \Delta), \exists \mathcal{D}$ such that:

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\mathbf{Det}^+}(1^\lambda, \Delta) > \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

for all negligible functions $\text{negl}(\cdot)$.⁹

Equipped with these definitions, we are now ready to define security against ASAs.

Definition 3.4 (Security against ASAs). A cryptographic puzzle scheme $P = (\text{Setup}, \text{Pre}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$ is considered secure against algorithm-substitution attacks if for all possible subversions $\bar{P} = (\overline{\text{Setup}}, \overline{\text{Pre}}, \overline{\text{Eval}}, \overline{\text{Verify}})$ of P if the scheme is subversion resistant against the attack in the sense of definition 3.1 or the attack is detectable in the sense of definition 3.2 (the scheme is *only online secure* if the attack is only online detectable in the sense of definition 3.3).¹⁰

The role of state. There might be attacks which leverage the use of state in the subverted puzzle algorithms. Since our model (Section 3.1 assumes a malicious manufacturer for the puzzle solving hardware/software, the only algorithm where state can be utilized for attacks is the subverted evaluation algorithm $\overline{\text{Eval}}$. Therefore, we term an attack *stateful* if it requires $\overline{\text{Eval}}$ to maintain state between invocations, and *stateless* otherwise. If the the attack is stateless then the state update function st_{upd} for the oracle running the subverted algorithm outputs the same state that it takes as input.

The adversarial model of a PPT detector is inspired from previous work [9, 11, 12, 13, 14] on ASAs. Considering our focus on cryptographic puzzles and that most such puzzles are utilized in a blockchain setting, we further discuss the consequences of the detector and attacker strengths in Section 2.1.

⁹Note that if an attack is only online detectable then it is stronger as it requires a stronger detector

¹⁰Offline detectability (3.2) implies online detectability (3.3) trivially as an adversary winning the offline detectability game can just ignore the extra oracle access in the online detection game $\mathbf{Det}^+_{P, \bar{P}}^{\mathcal{D}}$




Figure 5: The detection games $\text{Det}_{\mathcal{P}, \bar{\mathcal{P}}}^{\mathcal{D}}$, $\text{Det}_{\mathcal{P}, \bar{\mathcal{P}}}^{+\mathcal{D}}$ and the subversion game $\text{Sub}_{\mathcal{P}, \bar{\mathcal{P}}}^{\mathcal{A}}$

4 Attacks

We now describe our general attack strategies, followed by the challenges in the two different threat models/attack settings as described in Section 3.1. While we emphasize attacks that are input-induced attacks in the black-box setting, even if the devices are sold in the subverted state (no trigger needed to subvert), the attack strategies would still work well. Such a setting is reflected

in scenarios where a puzzle solver buys some puzzle-solving hardware from an untrusted party. A simple example of an input-induced attack is to have a set of hard-coded triggers in the puzzle evaluation hardware/software on which the evaluation fails/does not proceed as expected. However, in this case, the set of such triggers will need to be negligibly small compared to the puzzle input domain in order to avoid detection.

Trigger strategy. At manufacturing time, the untrusted party must select a set of trigger inputs $\bar{\mathcal{X}}$, where $\bar{\mathcal{X}} \subset \mathcal{X}$ such that if $x \in \bar{\mathcal{X}}$ then the evaluation algorithm misbehaves, as specified by the subversion. Therefore, in both our attack settings for a cryptographic puzzle $P = (\text{Setup}, \text{Pre}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$ the subverted puzzle algorithms are of the form $\bar{P} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Pre}, \bar{\text{Eval}}, \text{Verify})$. Due to the black-box nature of the attack setting, any detector can only detect the subversion through oracle access.

$\bar{P}.\bar{\text{Eval}}(\text{pp}, x, \bar{\mathcal{X}})$: *The subverted puzzle evaluation algorithm takes as input the public parameters pp , an input from the domain x , and a set $\bar{\mathcal{X}} \subset \mathcal{X}$. If $x \in \mathcal{X} \setminus \bar{\mathcal{X}}$ it outputs a puzzle solution y . Otherwise, the evaluation algorithm fails to produce an output.*

4.1 Load-Shedding Attack

The goal of a load-shedding attack is to slow down the solution-rate of the puzzle solving algorithm. Depending on the application, the attacker could make it so that the subverted device just discard the puzzle solution (such as the proof-of-work puzzle solution) or just reduce puzzle-solving ability slightly (would cause slightly extra delay for VDFs). If an attacker can cause this to happen across a large enough fraction of a network’s device capacity, the overall network solution-rate reduces and unsubverted devices will comprise a higher percentage of the network’s capacity. Furthermore, load-shedding can be combined with strategies such as selfish mining [36, see Appendix A] to enable efficient consensus attacks on certain networks even when the attacker directly possesses a relatively small fraction of the hashrate (see Figure 6). If this happens only occasionally, the attacker may be able to repeat this attack undetected for a long period of time. A similar attack strategy (without accompanying analysis) is proposed in [17], our attack can be considered an extension of this. The attack strategy proposed by [17] is that the hash function is different from an implementation on certain inputs, we extend the idea to make such difference actually beneficial to the adversary.

We first prove some **general results** on load-shedding attacks where the size of the adversarially hard-coded bad inputs is negligible in the security parameter. This models the setting where the detector \mathcal{D} is testing its hardware to ensure proper performance. Since, the set of bad inputs is negligibly small, the probability of detection is negligibly low. However, when the attacker plays the subversion game, it can easily detect whether the challenger is operating a subverted evaluation algorithm. This is because the attacker knows the set of hard-coded bad inputs. ¹¹

Theorem 4.1. *For all load-shedding attacks where $\frac{|\bar{\mathcal{X}}|}{|\mathcal{X}|} < \text{negl}(\lambda)$, there exists no PPT detector \mathcal{D} which wins the offline detection game $\text{Det}_{P, \bar{P}}^{\mathcal{D}}$ with non-negligible advantage.*

Proof. The set of subverted inputs $\bar{\mathcal{X}}$ is a random subset of the set of inputs \mathcal{X} . Given that $\frac{|\bar{\mathcal{X}}|}{|\mathcal{X}|} < \text{negl}(\lambda)$, for a PPT detector \mathcal{D} , the advantage of winning the detection game $\text{Det}_{P, \bar{P}}^{\mathcal{D}}$ is same as the probability of querying the evaluation oracle on at least one input $x \in \bar{\mathcal{X}}$. Let event E be

¹¹We assume for theorems 4.1-4.3 that the puzzle evaluator does not utilize the puzzle pre-processing algorithm and feeds puzzle inputs without pre-processing to the evaluation hardware/software.




Figure 6: Percentage (effective) increase in attacker hashrate plot as a function of the attacker’s original hashrate (δ) and the percentage of subverted devices. This assumes that the subverted devices, are unable to find a puzzle solution when under a load-shedding attack *in the direct input model*.

the query instance when \mathcal{D} queries the evaluation oracle on an input $x \in \bar{\mathcal{X}}$. Let $\Pr[\bar{E}] = 1 - \Pr[E]$ be the probability of event \bar{E} (complement of event E), i.e., for query x of \mathcal{D} , $x \notin \bar{\mathcal{X}}$. Let q be the number of queries that \mathcal{D} asks. Then,

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{Det}}(1^\lambda, \Delta) &= 1 - (\Pr[\bar{E}])^q \\
&= 1 - (\Pr[x \in \mathcal{X} \setminus \bar{\mathcal{X}}])^q = 1 - (1 - \text{negl}(\lambda))^q \\
&\approx 1 - (1 - q \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda)) = q \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda)
\end{aligned}$$

Since, q is the number of queries \mathcal{D} asks, $q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$. Therefore,

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{Det}}(1^\lambda, \Delta) = q \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda) = \text{negl}'(\lambda)$$

Theorem 4.2. *For all load-shedding attacks, there exists a PPT attacker \mathcal{A} which wins the subversion game $\text{Sub}_{\mathcal{P}, \bar{\mathcal{P}}}^{\mathcal{A}}$ with non-negligible advantage.*

Proof. The attacker \mathcal{A} leverages its knowledge of the set of subverted inputs $\bar{\mathcal{X}}$. Upon receiving the public parameters pp and the subverted algorithms $\bar{\mathcal{P}} = (\bar{\text{Setup}}, \bar{\text{Pre}}, \bar{\text{Eval}}, \bar{\text{Verify}})$, in the query phase, the attacker first queries on inputs $x \in \mathcal{X} \setminus \bar{\mathcal{X}}$. After this, the attacker picks $x' \in \bar{\mathcal{X}}$ as a query. Using the expected response time from querying on the unsubverted set of inputs, the attacker decides whether its querying the subverted oracle or not based on the (timed) query response received for the subverted input x' . This is because the unsubverted oracle would respond with a correct solution in the expected time.

Theorem 4.3 (offline-security). *All cryptographic puzzle schemes $P = (\text{Setup}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$ are susceptible to subversion via any load-shedding attacks where $\frac{|\bar{x}|}{2^\lambda} < \text{negl}(\lambda)$.*

Proof. This follows from Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 under definition 3.4. \square

Online-security against Load-shedding. We discuss this issue separately as the online-security of a puzzle-solving device against a load-shedding attack depends on the real-world use-case. For example, for proof-of-work, most mining devices operate within an acceptable error range of puzzle-solving ability. If the drop in performance is within the range, the device owner can possibly blame it to physical conditions (temperature etc.) in which the device is hosted. Depending on how often the adversary mounts a load-shedding attack, the drop in puzzle-solving ability can still be in the acceptable range and its never detected. However, a load-shedding attack would be online detectable in the sense of definition 3.3 as in an ideal world the device has a given, set puzzle-solving ability and deviation from that would be evidence for the detector that the device is subverted.

More realistic adversarial constraints. The above theorems are focused on load-shedding attacks which load-shed with negligible probability. These might seem like ineffective attacks but they are important to study because they are of relevance to both our threat models. In the direct input model, the adversary decides and picks the puzzle inputs. And in the blockchain input model, the puzzle inputs can be adversarially biased and even adversarially decided. Therefore, it is important to consider the potential of the adversary biasing the blockchain’s state in order to increase the likelihood of the hard-coded attack instances being fed to the puzzle solving device. Furthermore, a stateful variant of the attack needs to be considered as well. If a stateful attack induces an attack trigger over the course of multiple blocks, even an adversary with limited capabilities can attempt to bias the blockchain’s state by a few bits every block. The goal of the adversary then becomes to bias the blockchain’s entropy which has been studied in some detail. We discuss this further in Section 4.3.2.

4.2 Leeching Attack

The goal of the adversary with the leeching attack is to compromise the puzzle evaluation hardware in such that (when triggered) it exfiltrates puzzle solutions to the attacker.¹² While we use Bitcoin mining as a high-impact example, this attack is relevant to almost all proof-of-work based cryptocurrencies. The subverted evaluation algorithm tries to exfiltrate the first solution it finds to the puzzle without outputting it, and continues to find the second solution which it then outputs. We describe the exfiltration process and the attack in detail below. Such exfiltration is not unrealistic because the puzzle evaluation hardware is an online device, ex. bitcoin mining rigs [48, Page 5]. Clearly, in the example of selfish mining such an attack is very beneficial. *Now, the attacker does not need to own a third of the hashrate but instead just needs to subvert enough devices to reach the attack threshold.*

In proof-of-work mining, many miners pool their efforts with different mining pools. Each mining pool has its own software, and the pools have a *pool operator* who uses an algorithm to split work into *shares* that are farmed out to workers. Let the block reward minus the fee charged by the pool operator be B . Each worker then is paid reward $R = B \cdot \frac{n}{N}$, where n is fraction of work their shares represent and N is the total amount of work represented by all shares. To prove that workers are contributing, they must output solutions found at much lower difficulty levels

¹²This can be thought of as a variant of load-shedding but with exfiltration

Assume that $\mathcal{T}_{x,\text{aux}}(x, \text{aux})$ represents the communication transcript between the pool operator and the puzzle solving/mining device, given a puzzle input x and auxiliary information aux .

- $\text{Exf}(sk, y, \mathcal{T}_{x,\text{aux}}) \rightarrow \bar{\mathcal{T}}_{x,\text{aux}}$: The exfiltration algorithm takes as input a secret key sk for symmetric encryption, a puzzle solution $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ and the communication transcript for the corresponding puzzle input, auxiliary information pair (x, aux) . It outputs a $\bar{\mathcal{T}}_{x,\text{aux}}$ to replace $\mathcal{T}_{x,\text{aux}}$.
- $\text{Ret}(sk, \bar{\mathcal{T}}_{x,\text{aux}}) \rightarrow y/\perp$: The retrieve algorithm takes as input a secret key sk for symmetric encryption and the communication transcript $\bar{\mathcal{T}}_{x,\text{aux}}$ for the corresponding puzzle input, auxiliary information pair (x, aux) . It outputs a puzzle solution $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ or \perp .

- $\bar{\text{P}}.\bar{\text{Eval}}(sk, x, \text{aux}, \bar{\mathcal{X}})$: The subverted puzzle evaluation algorithm takes a secret key sk for symmetric encryption, an input from the domain x , auxiliary information aux and a set $\bar{\mathcal{X}} \subset \mathcal{X}$.

- If $x \in \mathcal{X} \setminus \bar{\mathcal{X}}$:
 - * Compute a puzzle solution y_1 .
 - * Run the exfiltration algorithm $\text{Exf}(sk, y_1, \mathcal{T}_{x,\text{aux}})$.
 - * Compute and output a puzzle solution y_2 and auxiliary information aux . Such that $y_2 \neq y_1$.
- Else output a puzzle solution y and a proof π .

Figure 7: The exfiltration process

(this assumes a puzzle that can find low-difficulty solutions while also searching for high-difficulty solutions, a property that is not common to all puzzles.) These low-difficulty solutions are used as a subliminal channel for exfiltration. The exact exfiltration process and the exfiltration game are presented in figure 7.

We again proceed by first proving some **general results** on leeching attacks where the size of the adversarially hard-coded bad inputs is negligible in the security parameter.

Theorem 4.4. *For all leeching attacks where $\frac{|\bar{\mathcal{X}}|}{2^\lambda} < \text{negl}(\lambda)$, there exists no PPT detector \mathcal{D} which wins the offline detection game $\text{Det}_{\bar{\text{P}}, \bar{\text{P}}}^{\mathcal{D}}$ with non-negligible advantage.*

Proof sketch. Proof arguments are exactly the same as the proof for Theorem 4.1.

Theorem 4.5. *For all leeching attacks, there exists a PPT attacker \mathcal{A} which wins the subversion game $\text{Sub}_{\bar{\text{P}}, \bar{\text{P}}}^{\mathcal{A}}$ with non-negligible advantage.*

Proof sketch. Proof arguments are exactly the same as the proof for Theorem 4.2.

Theorem 4.6 (offline-security). *If there exists a secure exfiltration channel E , all cryptographic puzzle schemes $\text{P} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Pre}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$ are susceptible to subversion via any leeching attacks where $\frac{|\bar{\mathcal{X}}|}{2^\lambda} < \text{negl}(\lambda)$.*

Proof sketch. Since this attack and exfiltration becomes relevant in the online phase, in the offline phase, security depends on testing the device on a trigger element $x' \in \bar{\mathcal{X}}$. This, along with the fact that any subverting adversary can win the subversion game $\text{Sub}_{\bar{\text{P}}, \bar{\text{P}}}^{\mathcal{A}}$ (Theorem 4.5), viewed under definition 3.4, completes our proof. \square

Online-security against Leeching. Similar to online-security of load-shedding, we discuss this issue separately as the online-security of a puzzle-solving device against this attack depends on the real-world use-case. In proof-of-work, most mining devices have been exhibiting “hardware errors” (Appendix B), these are inputs on which the device hardware does not produce an output. From the resources compiled in Appendix B, we can see that accumulating a few hundred errors

after running a mining device for a few days is considered acceptable by the community. Mining device owners across the world have discussed this issue and the general consensus is that this is due to pushing the devices to the absolute edge of performance. This is exactly how things would appear to a device owner if a leeching attack was underway.

Leeched Selfish-Mining Attack against Bitcoin. The following attack strategy can be employed by a Bitcoin mining pool operator who also manufactures mining hardware or colludes with the manufacturer. Let the set of devices manufactured by this manufacturer be \mathcal{D} , a subset $\bar{\mathcal{D}}$ of \mathcal{D} are subverted.slac

1. Embed the subverted set of inputs $\bar{\mathcal{X}}$ in the hardware during manufacturing.
2. Use the work shares (low-difficulty solutions) as a secure exfiltration channel \mathcal{E}
3. On receiving an exfiltrated puzzle solution, follow the selfish-mining attack strategy and secretly mine on this fork of the blockchain on devices in the set $\mathcal{D} \setminus \bar{\mathcal{D}}$.

The following is a concrete method to utilize the malicious pool operator and the subverted hardware for exfiltration:

1. Given m work shares, utilize them to communicate a n -bit string
2. Submit work shares such that the low-order bit of the i 'th work share is also the i 'th bit of the (encoded, see figure 7) puzzle solution

All the bits of the solution can be leaked even if ≈ 300 work shares are used. As a point of reference, consider that all Bitcoin mining pools currently set the work share difficulty for each device such that one work share is generated every 2-3 seconds [49]. Given the Bitcoin block time of 10 minutes, each miner is sending up to 300 work shares per block to its pool operator. *This amount of communication is enough to exfiltrate all the bits of a proof of work, encrypted or unencrypted.*

4.3 Attack Settings

We now discuss the challenges in the two different threat models.

4.3.1 Direct Input Model

In the direct input model, an attacker can mount both load-shedding and leeching attacks. The attacker directly send puzzle inputs to the subverted device. If there is a way to exfiltrate puzzle solutions (for example, in the form of lower-level difficulty solutions as used in proof-of-work to demonstrate contribution of efforts) then these allow for leeching attacks as well. The attacker has complete control over what is input into the device. This allows the attacker to trigger the device whenever it chooses to do so. There are many clever strategies an attacker can combine with load-shedding to go undetectable. For example, the attacker could have subverted the device so that on observing a trigger, the device's puzzle-solving ability only declines for the next hour for example. This gives the attacker the fine-grained ability to trigger devices temporarily, the idea is to go undetected but continually benefit from the subversion.

4.3.2 Blockchain Input Model

In the blockchain input model, an attacker can only mount a load-shedding attack. The attacker is leveraging the fact that the mining device reads from the blockchain. Therefore, the adversary’s influence on the blockchain’s state determines the strength of any such attack. The communication channel here only goes from the attacker to the subverted device via the blockchain. Hence, no exfiltration of puzzle solutions and, consequently, no leeching attacks are possible. We operate with the simple assumption that any such adversary will own some fraction of the puzzle-solving resource in the blockchain’s network.

The adversary’s attempt to bias the blockchain is then captured by the following game $\delta_{\text{bias}}^{\mathcal{A}}$ played between a set of honest miners/puzzle solvers and an adversary \mathcal{A} . The goal of the adversary is to bias the probability distribution of the extract of a *decisive block*, which is a future block of interest to the adversary. The adversary holds influence over a δ fraction of the blockchain network’s puzzle solving resource. The adversary wins if the extract x of the decisive block B , $\text{Ext}(B) = x$ falls in a subset favorable to the adversary. We denote this via the indicator function, \mathbb{I} where $\mathbb{I}(x) = 1$ if $x \in \mathcal{F}$ and $\mathbb{I}(x) = 0$ otherwise, for \mathcal{F} being the favorable set for the adversary. Clearly, the size of the set of favorable set \mathcal{F} affects the adversary’s success. This model is inspired from the work of Pierrot and Wesolowski [50] which models an adversary who biases a blockchain’s entropy. The assumption that each new block has some min-entropy follows from the work of Bonneau, Clark and Goldfeder [51]. We describe the models in these related works in Appendix C.

Definition 4.1 (δ -bias Ability). An adversary \mathcal{A} has δ -bias ability if for $s_{\mathcal{A}}$ being the number of puzzle solutions per second the adversary can calculate and s being the number of puzzle solutions per second all miners combined (including \mathcal{A}) can calculate,

$$\delta = \frac{s_{\mathcal{A}}}{s}$$

This is a lower bound of bias considering the hashrate controlled by the attacker. The attacker might collude with or bribe other parties to increase their bias ability.

Challenges w.r.t Load-shedding. In this setting, if an attacker aims to mount a load-shedding attack, they leverage their influence over the blockchain. Therefore, we first focus on the probability with which such an adversary can bias the blockchain’s inputs based on their bias ability. Assuming the puzzle solvers start solving for a solution as soon as the a next potential block is broadcast, the adversary’s goal is to broadcast a block favorable to it. In the process, the adversary might throw away some a valid puzzle solutions it finds. The variable μ represents the favorable set \mathcal{F} as a fraction of the puzzle domain size. From the work of Pierrot and Wesolowski [50, Section 3.3], we borrow the following result which gives us the probability with which as adversary \mathcal{A} with δ -bias ability wins the $\delta_{\text{bias}}^{\mathcal{A}}$ game:

$$\Pr[\delta_{\text{bias}}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1] = \sum_{a>0} (\delta(1 - \mu))^a \mu = \frac{\mu}{1 - \delta(1 - \mu)}$$

Similar to the cited work, we note that when $\delta \geq 0$ and $\mu \leq 1$, the above probability is better than μ .

As is clear from the calculation above, when μ is negligibly small compared to the security parameter, this attack does not work very well. However, we now discuss a variant of the attack which improves this success probability by making the attack stateful.

Stateful Load-shedding. In the stateful variant of the attack, the attacker makes the subversion stateful. This is an extremely crucial attack variant to consider due to the fact that an adversary mounting a stateful attack does not need a lot of influence over the blockchain’s state. For example, a simple strategy can be to pick the low-order bit in the block header, subvert the puzzle solving device so that if it sees n consecutive blocks such that the low-order bits form a particular n -bit string (some $x \in \bar{\mathcal{X}}$) then it fails to compute the puzzle solution completely or becomes much slower. However, some constraints remain the same. The subverted set of inputs $\bar{\mathcal{X}}$ still has to be negligibly small in order to avoid getting detected. There could be many different ways to trigger failure based on states. The main issue is that now the attacker can feed in triggers slowly, block by block, to make the device fail eventually. Similar to previous attacks, the more influence the attacker holds over the blockchain’s state, the stronger the attack. We show some general results on stateful load-shedding attacks in the blockchain input model.

More formally, the adversary’s aim is to bias the blockchain’s state over n blocks, such that for some encoding Enc , $\text{Enc}(B_n) = 1$, where B_n represents the state of the blockchain over the last n blocks. Assuming an error-correcting code such that given a message length of k -bits and some failure rate p , it encodes the message in n -bits such that even if $p.k$ bits of the encoding get flipped, the message can still be decoded successfully. Therefore, for the attacker to successfully trigger a stateful load-shedding attack, it needs to win the following δ_{bias}^A game (K)-out-of- n times (where $K = n - p.k$). The goal of the adversary is to bias the blockchain such that the extract of the decisive block $\text{Ext}(B) = 1$, here $\text{Ext}(B) = 1$ if the low-order bit of the block header is 1. This happens with probability $1/2$, therefore the favorable set of the adversary is $1/2$ of the possible outcomes. This gives us that $\mu = 1/2$. Let P_A be the win probability in the δ_{bias}^A game as defined above,

$$P_A = \frac{\mu}{1 - \delta(1 - \mu)} = \frac{\frac{1}{2}}{1 - \frac{\delta}{2}} = \frac{1}{2 - \delta} \text{ as } \mu = \frac{1}{2}$$

Therefore, given that the stateful load-shedding attack succeeds if the adversary wins the above game at least (K)-out-of- n times (where $K = n - p.k$). Let the string $s \in \{0, 1\}$ represent the results of n consecutive δ_{bias}^A games played by the adversary. The i -th bit of s represents the result of the i -th δ_{bias}^A game. Let s_1 represent the number of 1s in s , and s_0 represent the number of 0s in s . The attack success probability:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[s_1 \geq K] &= \Pr[s_0 < K] \\ &= 1 - \left(\sum_{i=1}^{K-1} \binom{n}{i} \left(\frac{1}{2 - \delta} \right)^i \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{2 - \delta} \right)^{n-i} \right) = 1 - \frac{1}{(2 - \delta)^n} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{K-1} \binom{n}{i} (1 - \delta)^{n-i} \right) \end{aligned}$$

As a result of this strategy, probability of subversion increases drastically while probability of detection does not change at all. We plot the values of K , n , the (Reed-Solomon) encoding parameters, the probability of success, next to different values of the adversarial resource fraction δ in Table 1. Note that such an attack can not be detected by any detection adversary (Theorem 4.1) and any attacker can figure out if the puzzle-solving device is running a subverted variant of the puzzle evaluation algorithm by simply checking if the encoding of the blockchain’s state in the last n blocks, $\text{Enc}(B_n)$ is a part of the subverted/trigger set $\bar{\mathcal{X}}$.

Attacker hashrate (δ)	RS Encoding Parameters RS(n, K)	Stateful Success Probability $1 - \frac{1}{(2-\delta)^n} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{K-1} \binom{n}{i} (1-\delta)^{n-i} \right)$	Stateless Success Probability
0.05	RS(520, 256)	0.83	$\text{negl}(\lambda)$
0.10	RS(526, 256)	0.96	$\text{negl}(\lambda)$
0.15	RS(533, 256)	0.997	$\text{negl}(\lambda)$
0.20	RS(541, 256)	0.9997	$\text{negl}(\lambda)$
0.25	RS(549, 256)	≈ 1	$\text{negl}(\lambda)$

Table 1: Attack success probabilities and Reed-Solomon Encoding Parameters (with 1-bit symbols) for the stateful Load-shedding attack (in the blockchain input model), depending on attacker hashrate for a 256-bits trigger. Note that the attacker can have multiple triggers, but the number of triggers $\bar{\mathcal{X}}$ has to be negligible in terms of the security parameter to avoid detection. This also assumes that attacker hashrate never goes below δ for n consecutive blocks, changes will decrease probability of success.

5 Securing Puzzles against ASAs

We now know that the attacks can be dangerous and hard to detect. In this section, we look at the different ways to defend against such attacks. The two key directions we look at are: (i) testing regimes to figure out if a device is subverted and (ii) countermeasures against these attacks, which make it so that the attacker does not benefit from/can not trigger the subversion.

5.1 Testing

The best example of wide-scale use of puzzle evaluators in the real-world is proof-of-work mining hardware. Currently, there is no standardized testing against flaws, other than computing the number of operations per second. However, in light of our proposed attacks, owners of such devices might be interested in testing for subversions. However, every time period a mining device is not actually being used for mining, it is incurring an economic loss to its owner. More testing in this sense also benefits mining device manufacturers who also use their manufactured devices. Ironically, this can result in a paradox where distrust in the manufacturer benefits the attacker. The following techniques can be used to test for subversion:

Black-box statistical testing. A natural approach to detecting load-shedding and leeching attacks is to perform statistical tests to verify that the device is producing solutions at the expected rate. However, this test can be time-consuming in networks (such as Bitcoin) where individual puzzle-solving devices find full-difficulty solutions only at long intervals.

To evaluate the time and resources required to execute this testing strategy, we model this strategy for a hypothetical load-shedding attack against Bitcoin’s proof-of-work in Figure 8. Suppose the hashrate of the miner is δ . We assume a 100% load-shedding attack (i.e., the victim’s subverted device(s) never find a valid solution at the target difficulty.) We then determine the number of blocks b that the victim will process before they can determine with some chosen level of confidence that an attack may be underway. Here we pick a confidence level of 0.05 and the statistical test is: at what (smallest) value of b is it true that $\delta^b < 0.05 = p$. When the miner

is load-shed at lower values (e.g., 50% or 33% of solutions are discarded) this analysis must be adjusted accordingly. Taking as example the case when the device is load-shed half of the time, the expected number of blocks found is $e = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \delta \cdot b$. Thus testing requires roughly number of blocks b such that $\sum_{x=0}^e \binom{b}{e} \cdot \delta^x \cdot (1 - \delta)^{b-x} < 0.05 = p$. Naturally this test has some element of statistical variation: a test can be unlucky and the results could make a subverted device appear to be performing properly or vice-versa.

While we select conservative parameters for our test, our results in Figure 8 demonstrate a fundamental asymmetry between attacker and defender: while the attacker benefits from load shedding across the full network, individual victims may find it extremely costly and time consuming to test their own devices. A possible solution to this problem is for many individual mining parties to share measurements and communicate their own test results each other. For individual devices the attacks may *never* be detected: if the attacker decides to trigger the subversion shortly after the device is sold, it could take longer than the device’s lifespan to complete a test.

Use existing puzzles with known solutions. In any proof-of-work cryptocurrency, solutions at the required difficulty level are found at least every few minutes. To test the mining devices, one can simply supply randomness ranges for the known solution in the past blocks, along with the other information (for Bitcoin proof-of-work this is the Merkle tree root of proposed block and the previous block hash as described in Section A). This strategy can detect obvious subversion. Unfortunately, this strategy may have some limitations: a subversion attacker who knows a set of past solutions at the time of device manufacture (or even subsequently, assuming an appropriate subliminal channel to the device) may be able to configure the device to succeed on these known inputs, which may render this testing strategy ineffective.

Devising testing-friendly puzzles. Many standard puzzle schemes require an unpredictable resource investment in order to solve a randomly-chosen puzzle instance. As noted above, this can make testing challenging: for example, the Bitcoin puzzle (at current network difficulty levels) is sufficiently resource-intensive that a single device may never encounter a valid solution to a network-selected puzzle instance. This can make it particularly challenging to test devices.

An alternative approach to this problem is to devise puzzles that feature a property that we refer to as *test-friendliness*. A test-friendly puzzle is one that has a specialized algorithm `Testgen` that, on input some chosen test parameter ρ , produces a puzzle instance x with a known solution that can be found after approximately ρ resource-units by a solver executing a known strategy. Critically, such puzzle instances must be at least computationally *indistinguishable* from random puzzle instances that have similar resource requirements: this ensures that a subverted device cannot distinguish testing instances from “lucky” random instances generated by a network.¹³

A simple example of a test-friendly puzzle for Bitcoin includes the description of a modified programmable hash function $H_{r,p}$ as part of the puzzle instance. This function has the simple property that $H(r) = p$, where p is a valid puzzle solution and r is some input that a puzzle solver will identify in ρ units of time using a known test strategy. Such puzzles are relatively easy to construct using standard hash functions: simply define $H_{r,p}(x) = H(x) \oplus T$ where T is an additional string with length equal to the hash function’s range. To program a specific pair r, p the tester simply computes $T \leftarrow H(r) \oplus p$. It is easy to see that if H is modeled as a random oracle

¹³Naturally such indistinguishability may not hold against *attacker-chosen* puzzle instances. We address defenses against this in the next section.




Figure 8: Time taken to statistically detect a (load-shedding) subverted device. Estimates based on Bitcoin mining 2022. We assume that the overall hashrate of the network is $\approx 200\text{m TH/s}$ and stays constant. We assume it is profitable to use a mining device for 18 months $\approx 80\text{k blocks}$ [52]. The **current cost** of buying a device with 100 TH/s hashrate is around \$1000-2000. Such a device currently consumes around 3 KW/h of power. Assuming a very conservative \$0.10 per KW/h of electricity, we get cost of around \$200,000 to have statistical confidence (p-value = 0.05) if the device is subverted. The reason for this is that regardless of your hashrate, the event used for the testing the hypothesis (whether the device is subverted) happens once every block, across the whole network. The cost is spent over 600 blocks (≈ 4 days) for a miner with a hashrate of 1m TH/s, and over 600,000 blocks (\approx a decade) for a device with 100 TH/s. We plot the differences in the testing time based on the %-age of time the attacker load-sheds the subverted miner. While the lines are closer on the logarithmic scale, the testing time jumps up by 300% if the device is load-shed only half the time and $\approx 900\%$ if its load-shed only a third of the time.

and T is chosen uniformly at random, the resulting function produces output that is statistically identical to a random oracle. Hence, provided that a fresh T is sampled uniformly by a network every few days, such instances can be used safely as valid puzzle instances. Consequently, the implementations should provide T as an input parameter. We omit a detailed analysis of this approach, but we note that it is similar to a proposal by Russell *et al.* [17] and benefits from the same analysis.

5.2 Unpredictable Puzzle Pre-processing

The unpredictability of the pre-processing that the puzzle construction supports captures how much control and flexibility the evaluator has, once a puzzle instance is received. If the evaluator has a lot of flexibility then the auxiliary information `aux` used by the pre-processing algorithm is a crucial part of the algorithm. So much so that without knowledge of the randomness utilized in pre-processing,

it could be hard to predict the pre-processed input. Such a mechanism is a countermeasure against all input-induced attacks. Given that the set of subverted inputs $\bar{\mathcal{X}}$ is small enough, if the pre-processing algorithm has the unpredictability property as defined below, then the adversary is not able to trigger the subverted device with non-negligible probability. Unpredictable pre-processing prevents any adversary from knowing exactly what bits are input to the subverted device, which is all that is needed to prevent an adversary benefiting from an input-induced attack. Note that this is a generalization of defenses as proposed in [17] and their countermeasure is a special case of unpredictable pre-processing for hash functions only. And that cryptographic puzzles in general might allow for different techniques to achieve this, as shown by our protocol for masking Pietrzak VDFs.

Definition 5.1 (Unpredictable Pre-processing). The pre-processing algorithm Pre has the unpredictability property if no PPT adversary \mathcal{A} can distinguish the output of the algorithm from a random string with non-negligible probability, given only the unprocessed puzzle input and no knowledge of the randomness used to generate aux .

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} x \leftarrow \text{Pre}(x', \text{aux}), r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{X}_{\text{Pre}} \\ b' = b \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{l} b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}, \text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \Delta) \\ b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \Delta, \text{pp}, x', b.x + (1 - b).r) \end{array} \right] - \frac{1}{2} \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Now, while the identity function is a valid candidate for the pre-processing algorithm Pre , it clearly does not have the unpredictability property. The Bitcoin proof-of-work (Section A) puzzle is a good example of puzzles with unpredictable pre-processing.

Theorem 5.1. *In the direct input model, if the evaluator uses a puzzle pre-processing algorithm not satisfying the unpredictability property, all cryptographic puzzle schemes $\mathbf{P} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$ are susceptible to subversion via any stateless load-shedding attacks where $\frac{|\bar{\mathcal{X}}|}{2^\lambda} < \text{negl}(\lambda)$.*

Proof. This is a corollary of Theorem 4.3.

Theorem 5.2. *In the direct input model, if the evaluator uses a puzzle pre-processing algorithm satisfying the unpredictability property, then there exists no PPT attacker \mathcal{A} which wins the subversion game $\text{Sub}_{\mathbf{P}, \bar{\mathbf{P}}}^{\mathcal{A}}$ with non-negligible advantage for any input-induced attack where $\frac{|\bar{\mathcal{X}}|}{2^\lambda} < \text{negl}(\lambda)$.*

Proof sketch. If the puzzle pre-processing algorithm satisfies the unpredictability property then the adversary can only distinguish the input fed to the device from a random string with negligible probability. Therefore, the input to the device is effectively random for the adversary and hence it can feed the device a subverted input to the device with probability $|\bar{\mathcal{X}}/\mathcal{X}| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Theorem 5.3. *In the direct input model, all cryptographic puzzle schemes $\mathbf{P} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Pre}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$ utilizing a puzzle pre-processing algorithm satisfying the unpredictability property are secure against subversion via all input-induced attacks.*

Proof sketch. We split the proof into two parts:

1. if the size of the set of subverted inputs $|\bar{\mathcal{X}}|$ is a non-negligible function of λ then the detector \mathcal{D} detects the subverted inputs with non-negligible probability just by polynomial testing
2. if $|\bar{\mathcal{X}}| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ then the attacker \mathcal{A} can not win the subversion game $\text{Sub}_{\mathbf{P}, \bar{\mathbf{P}}}^{\mathcal{A}}$ with non-negligible probability by Theorem 5.2

In either case, by definition 3.4, all cryptographic puzzle schemes $P = (\text{Setup}, \text{Pre}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$ utilizing a puzzle pre-processing algorithm satisfying the unpredictability property are secure against subversion via all input-induced attacks. \square

5.2.1 Protecting proof-of-work against ASAs

To ensure that the pooled mining protocols with pool operators allow unpredictable pre-processing of the proof-of-work puzzle input we suggest a new standardized protocol for pooled mining under pool operators (and not peer-to-peer mining). Such standardization also demands that a public implementation of such a protocol is utilized. While the protocol described above is specifically for Bitcoin’s proof-of-work, small modifications make it applicable to most proof-of-work cryptocurrencies.

Current pooled mining protocol [53]. The pool operator creates a candidate block by aggregating and creating a Merkle tree of transactions to be included, adding a coinbase transaction and linking the proposed candidate to the previous block. The coinbase transaction is the first transaction verified transaction on the list of verified transactions in a proposed block. Its value corresponds to the current block reward. The miners participating in the pool then iterate over different values of the time and nonce fields as specified in the block hash algorithm (in Section A) to find proof-of-work solutions.

Our proposed pooled mining protocol. The main change we propose is that the coinbase transaction should be modified by the miners. The coinbase transactions have extra fields for data and `extraNonce` which can be modified to provide up to 100 bytes [54] of extra space to iterate over for miners. The goal of this suggested change is to allow miners the flexibility of picking the inputs to their mining devices. As demonstrated by the trigger example for the direct input model (Section 3.1), allowing the pool operator to pick the exact string input to the mining device allows for the load-shedding and leeching as described in the previous sections. Modifications to the coinbase are not a new concept and enforcing such changes can be done by the mining software. We spare the details here as similar changes have been suggested in the mining protocol by SlushPool [55], although due to reasons such as efficient mining work allotment etc. We also recommend that all proof-of-work cryptocurrencies instruct users to only use pools with open-source mining software. Similar ASAs can be mounted at the software level as well and there is no clear way to prevent it if the mining software is closed source.

Theorem 5.4. *proof-of-work pre-processing as specified above satisfies the unpredictability property as defined in definition 5.1.*

Proof sketch. If the number of bits modified by the miner, before inputting the resulting hash to the mining device is some linear function $f(\lambda)$ in the security parameter, then probability of the pool operator correctly estimating the exact input to the mining device is $\text{negl}(\lambda) = \frac{1}{2^{f(\lambda)}}$. Considering that the proof-of-work pre-processing as specified above allows upto 100 bytes of entropy to be used by the miners, it satisfies the unpredictability property as defined in definition 5.1.

5.2.2 Masking Pietrzak’s VDFs

Verifiable delay functions (VDFs) are now being utilized by multiple blockchain protocols¹⁴ [22, 30]. We now discuss a method to mask the VDF input from a puzzle solving device in case the input was adversarially biased to cause input-induced attacks. This is one way to ensure unpredictable puzzle pre-processing for VDFs. We demonstrate a masking protocol using Pietrzak’s VDF construction [41]. Our masking protocol changes the original scheme minimally and the extra computation incurred is also minimal, as demonstrated in Table 2. Our implementation is adapted from Bertron’s work [56]. The numbers reflect computation times on a machine running Intel’s i9-13900K CPU with a 32GB RAM. Note that these should be used for reference as when such a protocol is utilized at scale, it will be using specialized, blazing fast hardware [57, 43] for the computation.

Pietrzak’s VDF construction builds on the RSW [58] time-lock puzzle construction. The RSW time-lock puzzle is a simple construction which takes an element $x \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ and the main goal of the puzzle evaluation algorithm is to calculate $y = x^{2^T} \pmod{N}$, where T specifies the puzzle difficulty. To convert this into a VDF, Pietrzak’s work builds a protocol where a prover \mathcal{P} convinces a verifier \mathcal{V} that it solved an RSW puzzle. For reasons unrelated to our discussion, the VDF protocol utilizes the quadratic residue group (QR_N^+, \circ) instead (\mathbb{Z}_N^*, \cdot) . We refer interested reader’s to [41, Sec 2.2] for a detailed discussion. The protocol proceeds as follows:

- The prover \mathcal{P} and the verifier \mathcal{V} have an RSW puzzle (N, x, T) as common input along with the security parameter λ . Here $T \in \mathbb{N}$, $N = p \cdot q$ is the product of safe primes and the input $x \in QR_N^+$.
- The prover \mathcal{P} computes T sequential squarings of the input x in the quadratic residue group

¹⁴A full decription of Ethereum’s Beacon Chain protocol is available in Appendix E.

Algorithm 1 Our Masked Halving Subprotocol

- 1: **Prover masking** on input (N, x, T, y) :
 - 2: Picks a pre-evaluated b^{2^T} for a VDF instance b s.t.
 - 3: $\alpha = \{b^{2^T}, b^{2^{T/2}}, \dots, b^2\}$,
 - 4: $\beta = \{(b^{2^T})^{-1}, (b^{2^{T/2}})^{-1}, \dots, (b^2)^{-1}\}$
 - 5: is precomputed
 - 6: Sets $x_b = x \cdot b$
 - 7:
 - 8: **VDF solver** \mathcal{D} on input (N, x_b, T) :
 - 9: Computes $\gamma = \{x_b^{2^T}, x_b^{2^{T/2}}, \dots, x_b^2\}$
 - 10: Sends γ to **Prover**
 - 11:
 - 12: **Prover unmask**s by computing $y = y_b \cdot (b^{2^T})^{-1} = \gamma[0] \cdot \beta[0]$
 - 13: \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V} now have (N, x, T, y)
 - 14:
 - 15: At each halving step:
 - 16: \mathcal{P} computes:
 - 17: $\mu = x_b^{2^{T/2}} \cdot (b^{2^{T/2}})^{-1}$, $x' := x^r \cdot \mu$, $y' := \mu^r \cdot y$
 - 18: \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V} interaction continues as specified
-

Algorithm 2 Halving Subprotocol from [41]

```
1: On input  $(N, x, T, y)$ 
2: Set  $\mathcal{V}_{\text{dec}} = \text{nil}$ 
3: while  $\mathcal{V}_{\text{dec}} == \text{nil}$  do
4:   if  $T = 1$  and  $y = x^{2^T}$  then
5:      $\mathcal{V}_{\text{dec}} = 1$ 
6:   else if  $T > 1$  then
7:      $\mathcal{P}$  computes  $\mu = x^{2^{T/2}}$  and sends it to  $\mathcal{V}$ 
8:     if  $\mu \notin QR_N^+$  then
9:        $\mathcal{V}_{\text{dec}} = 0$ 
10:      break
11:     else
12:        $\mathcal{V}$  samples a random  $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_{2^\lambda}$  and sends it to  $\mathcal{P}$ 
13:       if  $\text{var}$  is even then
14:          $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V}$  output  $(N, x', T/2, y')$ 
15:       else
16:          $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V}$  output  $(N, x', \frac{T+1}{2}, y'^2)$ 
17:       end if
18:     end if
19:     Set  $T = T/2$ 
20:   end if
21: end while
22: Here  $x' := x^r \cdot \mu \left( = x^{r+2^{T/2}} \right)$  and  $y' := \mu^r \cdot y \left( = x^{r \cdot 2^{T/2} + 2^T} \right)$ 
```

QR_N^+ and sends $y = x^{2^T}$ to the verifier \mathcal{V} .

- The prover \mathcal{P} and the verifier \mathcal{V} then iteratively engage in the “halving protocol” as described below. This subprotocol starts with the common input (N, x, T, y) and the output is either $(N, x', \lceil T/2 \rceil, y')$ or the verifier outputs 0/1 and the protocol stops.

In the VDF hardware setting, the squarings and the halving protocol steps are computed in the hardware/computing device. The VDF computing device gets as input (N, x, T) and the randomness r for each round of the halving protocol. It outputs the puzzle solution y and the halving protocol outputs for each round. We present our masked halving protocol in Figure 1 and show its correctness. The goal is to ensure that no adversary who manufactured/subverted this device can feed in inputs and expect them to malfunction. Therefore, in the masked halving protocol there is another party the VDF computing device \mathcal{D} , other than the prover \mathcal{P} and the \mathcal{V} . The masking ensures that each puzzle input to the VDF computing device is transformed unpredictably before the device sees it. The prover \mathcal{P} wants to utilize the VDF computing device \mathcal{D} to evaluate the VDF and an accompanying proof while ensuring that the device can not guess the original input.

$ N $	2^T	Evaluation + Proving time (w/o Masking)	Pre-computation Cost ($\lceil \log(T) \rceil$ inverses)	Masking delay ($\lceil \log(T) \rceil$ multiplications)
512	2^8	1.1 ms	1.6×10^{-3} ms	2.4×10^{-5} ms
	2^{16}	21 ms	2.3×10^{-3} ms	3.1×10^{-5} ms
	2^{24}	1.6 s	3.1×10^{-3} ms	4.2×10^{-5} ms
	2^{32}	51 s	3.2×10^{-3} ms	4.4×10^{-5} ms
1024	2^8	3.7 ms	2.7×10^{-3} ms	4.0×10^{-5} ms
	2^{16}	79 ms	3.6×10^{-3} ms	5.1×10^{-5} ms
	2^{24}	5.9 s	5.3×10^{-3} ms	6.7×10^{-5} ms
	2^{32}	96 s	5.5×10^{-3} ms	6.9×10^{-5} ms
2048	2^8	17 ms	1.4×10^{-2} ms	1.9×10^{-4} ms
	2^{16}	586 ms	1.9×10^{-2} ms	2.6×10^{-4} ms
	2^{24}	15.4 s	3.3×10^{-2} ms	2.7×10^{-4} ms
	2^{32}	244 s	3.5×10^{-2} ms	3.0×10^{-4} ms

Table 2: Extra delay/computation required for Masked VDFs. For different lengths of N (RSA modulus) and exponentiations T , masking delay is a very small fraction of online delay, overhead $\frac{\log(T)}{T}$ decreases with increasing T .

Masked Halving Correctness. The only change to the original halving protocol by the masked halving protocol is that instead of directly computing $y = x^{2^T}$, masked halving computes $x_b = x \cdot b$ and then computes $y_b = x_b^{2^T}$. To unmask the final result, we compute $y = y_b \cdot (b^{2^T})^{-1}$. If b was a previous instance then b^{2^T} is known already. Furthermore, during the evaluation of b^{2^T} the intermediate steps can be stored in memory as $\alpha = \{b^{2^T}, b^{2^{T/2}}, \dots, b^2\}$. The terms in $\beta = \{(b^{2^T})^{-1}, (b^{2^{T/2}})^{-1}, \dots, (b^2)^{-1}\}$ can be pre-computed by the evaluator. In each halving now, to compute μ the evaluator computes $x_b^{2^{T/2}} \cdot (b^{2^{T/2}})^{-1} = x^{2^{T/2}}$ which is the value of μ in the original halving protocol. This is the only change in the halving process, making masked halving correct and minimally taxing.

6 Practical Concerns

Beyond the attacks we propose and analyze, following are real-world concerns relevant to puzzle-solving devices:

Limits of testing. Previous work [9] models the oracles in the detection game as instantaneous response oracles. While they point out that the goal of their model is not to evade all forms of detection, these factors are crucial for real-world attack considerations. Keeping that in mind, our attacks still work in the model where the detector considers oracle response times. However there may also exist “out of model” attacks that still can not be detected via our testing regime.

Very strong attackers. Such attackers can come up with numerous attack strategies which are not input-induced. For example:

- **Simple timer-based attack.** The attacker fits a small clock in the puzzle solving device. After a certain time T , the device’s puzzle solving ability drops by some fraction. Notice that such drops are explained as device aging etc. It is not clear how this attack can be detected

in the real world. Another attack in a similar vein is one where the device’s puzzle solving ability drops after computing a certain number of puzzle solutions (at any difficulty level).

- **Subverting only real-world difficulty parameters.** If we use the example of proof of work mining. The testing of mining devices currently includes testing the number of hashes computed per second and checking solutions outputted at lower difficulty levels. An attacker can ensure that the device is subverted only on puzzle instances of difficulty levels relevant in real-world applications. The detector could then try to verify the devices behavior on puzzles at real-world difficulty parameters where the solution is already known, for example, known bitcoin blocks (by feeding in a small nonce range and Merkle root of the proposed block). The attacker can easily counter such detection by ensuring the device never fails on existing blocks since this is a set of a few hundred thousand puzzle instances. The detector is then only left with the option to test the device on the freshly mined blocks available after the purchase of the device.

“Stronger” input-induced attacks. Many of the attacks we describe and analyze throughout the paper are input-induced attacks where the trigger inputs are a negligible fraction of the puzzle input domain. This is mainly to ensure that a polynomial-time detector cannot detect these attacks, since it cannot find the input triggers that initiate an attack. A subversion attacker might not need to hide its inputs in practice. For example, it might adopt a strategy where it has a long-enough time window to reap the benefits of the subversion before being detected.

Real-world detection costs. We model our detector as a PPT party which detects all input-induced attacks except ones which succeed on a negligibly small set of inputs. However, in the real-world there are many other factors to consider. Polynomial sampling might result in detection but this implies a costly testing period in the real world. The puzzle solver is losing valuable evaluation time every testing cycle. This economic disincentivization of testing means that in the real world, an attacker can increase its input-induced attack surface. There are also device life-cycles to consider, for example, a bitcoin mining rig has a life-cycle of less than a couple of years [59, 52]. The attacker can mount attacks which are active only once in the life-cycle of the hardware.

7 Conclusion

The main focus of our work has been on attacks under the following assumptions.

1. **Strong detector.** In this work we considered defenders (“detection adversaries”) with powerful defensive capabilities, namely the ability to perform statistical tests on hardware that require polynomial resources (time, queries, bandwidth.)
2. **Blackbox device access.** The puzzle solving/evaluation device can be accessed as a black-box. The detector can try to test it on different difficulty and security parameters. Future work should consider whether stronger models could allow better attacks or defenses against puzzle solving hardware.

Beyond the attacks we propose and analyze, there are several real-world concerns relevant to puzzle-solving devices such as the limits of testing, some out of model attacks which are hard to

prevent and other carefully crafted subversion strategies. We provide a discussion on all of these concerns and consider stronger input-induced attacks and attackers in Section 6. We hope this discussion serves as motivation for future work.

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A Background

Hashrate/Hashpower. In a proof-of-work based consensus network, for example, the network of Bitcoin miners, the *hashrate* of the network is the total number of SHA-256 hashes that can be calculated by all the devices participating in the network. This is an important metric because the difficulty of the Bitcoin proof-of-work is determined as a function of the network’s hashrate [60]. It is adjusted every 2 weeks according to changes in the network hashrate. The hashrate of an individual miner then is the total number of hashes the individual miner (device) can compute. This again is an important metric because a proof-of-work based consensus is subject to a number of attacks when a single attacker controls a large fraction of the network’s hashrate.

51% attacks and Selfish Mining. A number of attacks have been proposed against proof-of-work blockchains. The most well-known is the 51% attack [23], which refers to a situation where a single party/cooperation has control of a majority of the network hashrate and can therefore “fork” and roll back transactions. A related attack called selfish mining [36] has the attacker mine a parallel competing blockchain fork, without publishing it. This attacker then continues to mine on this secret fork while the honest miners continue to mine on the previous “stale” version of the blockchain. The attacker can now judiciously make blocks from its secret branch public. This renders the computational effort of the honest miners moot, while also earning mining rewards for the attacker disproportionate to its hashrate. An attacker requires 1/3 of the network’s hashrate to successfully mount such an attack.

Bitcoin block hashing algorithm. In the real world, the Bitcoin proof-of-work solution consists of the following fields [21]:

- Version (32-bits): Block version number
- hashPrevBlock (256-bits): Hash of the previous block
- hashMerkleRoot (256-bits): Merkle tree root of all the transactions to include in the proposed block
- time (32-bits): Proposed block timestamp as seconds since 1970 – 01 – 01T00 : 00 UTC
- diff (32-bits): Difficulty target
- nonce (32-bits): the nonce for which $H(\text{nonce}, H(\text{hashMerkleRoot}, \text{hashPrevBlock}))$ has the correct number of preceding 0’s as specified by diff

B Hardware Errors in Mining Devices

Hardware errors in mining devices reflect the inputs on which the mining ASIC fails to compute. Figure 1 shows how these errors appear on the mining software [34], with very little information on why the error occurred and on what particular input. We found this issue to be rampant across ASIC-based mining devices across networks such as Bitcoin, Litecoin etc. Following is a list of discussions from various forums on mining operations which report this as a concern, as evidence:

- From 2014-present, multiple reports ([Bitcoin](#), [Litecoin](#)) on Reddit’s mining forums on mining devices with hardware error rates ranging from a few every hour to a few every minute

- From a 2015 [discussion](#) on another bitcoin mining forum: Multiple users report high hardware error rate stats
- From April, 2020: High failure rates reported for latest Bitcoin mining devices on Cointelegraph [61]

C Malleability of Blockchain’s Entropy

We adopt the model of an adversary who malleates a blockchain’s entropy from the work of Pierrot and Wesolowski [50]. This model is specifically applicable to a proof of work based blockchain. They first start by assuming that the underlying hash function used for proof of work is secure. For d being the difficulty of the proof of work, each new block contains d bits of computational min-entropy, this was first justified in [51]. We know that there exists a cryptographic extractor [62] Ext , which maps each block’s d bits of min-entropy to $\lfloor d/2 \rfloor$ of near-uniform bits.

The adversary’s attempt to mine favorable blocks is then captured by the following game played between a set of honest miners and an adversary \mathcal{A} . The goal of the adversary is to bias the probability distribution of the extract of the *decisive block*, which is a future block of interest to the adversary. The adversary holds influence over a δ fraction of the blockchain. For $s_{\mathcal{A}}$ being the number of hashes per second the adversary can calculate and s being the number of hashes per second all miners combined (including \mathcal{A}) can calculate,

$$\delta = \frac{s_{\mathcal{A}}}{s}$$

The game starts when a fixed *initial block*, indexed 0 is received and ends when block height $n + f$ is reached. Here n is the block height of the decisive block and it takes f additional blocks to finalize the decisive block. This is to ensure that there are no forks of the blockchain which would alter the decisive block. The adversary wins if the extract x of the decisive block B , $\text{Ext}(B) = x$ falls in a subset favorable to the adversary. We denote this via the indicator function, \mathbb{I} where $\mathbb{I}(x) = 1$ if $x \in \mathcal{F}$ and $\mathbb{I}(x) = 0$ otherwise, for \mathcal{F} being the favorable set for the adversary.

Our interest lies in the setting where the extractor Ext is private and set by the adversary \mathcal{A} . The extractor values are used by the adversary who mounts the load shedding attack as a trigger. The load shedding adversary therefore uses the blockchain to signal the mining evaluation hardware/software to malfunction.

D Real-world Cryptographic Puzzles

See figure [D](#).

E Ethereum’s Beacon Chain

Ethereum plans on using VDFs as a source of unpredictable randomness. An example of this requirement in Ethereum 2.0 is the following. A small group of validators are required to progressively build a chain of randomness, this chain is termed the “Beacon-chain” [22, 43]. Assuming a global clock and splitting time into contiguous 8-second blocks and 128-slot epochs, one value O is generated per epoch \mathcal{E} . This generated random value is used to select a validator who then

gets the opportunity to propose the next block to be added to the blockchain and consequently reaps the block reward. In the ideal scenario, with unbiased randomness the frequency with which a validator is selected is directly proportional their stake in the system. However, if a malicious actor is successful in biasing the randomness they can sample strings such that they can select the one which benefits them most. Currently the randomness O is obtained from the reveals of a RANDAO commit-reveal scheme used to generate a random number where the commits are inputs produced by the validators during epoch \mathcal{E} . In a RANDAO commit-reveal scheme, every beacon chain proposer is committed to 32 bytes of local entropy. (In practice a chain of commit-reveals is setup with a hash onion for validator registration.) Beacon chain proposers may reveal their local entropy by extending the canonical beacon chain with a block. Honest proposers are expected to keep their local entropy private until their assigned slot. The beacon chain maintains 32 bytes of on-chain entropy by XOR-ing the local entropy revealed at every block. However such a commit-reveal scheme is biasable: a malicious validator that controls the last reveal can choose to reveal or not, giving them some control over the choice of O based on their decision. Therefore, one proposed way to make O unbiased is to pass O through a *verifiable delay function* (VDF) which is guaranteed to be slow to compute. This is done so that all validators must choose whether to reveal or not *before* they know the output of the VDF.

Let $B(\cdot, b_i)$ be a function which produces biasable randomness on input an epoch i and the 32 bytes of local entropy b_i from the beacon chain proposer selected for this round. Then the randomness beacon $R(\cdot)$ output for epoch i is computed as follows:

$$B(i, b_i) = B(i - 1, b_{i-1}) \oplus b_i$$

$$R(i) = \text{VDF.Eval}(pp, B(i - T, b_{i-T}))$$

Assuming it takes real world time T for the commodity hardware to compute the VDF output. This construction ensures that the VDF input is available at the same time to all parties interesting in computing its output. The Ethereum foundation may spend over \$15 million [57] for the development of specialized hardware to provide to the validators, in order to achieve lowest evaluation time for any VDF parameters.

Definition D.1 (Bitcoin Proof of Work as a Cryptographic Puzzle). Bitcoin proof of work can be formalized as a cryptographic puzzle as follows:

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \Delta) \rightarrow \text{pp}$: The security parameter 1^λ contains the specifications for the hash function (SHA-256) used for Bitcoin’s proof of work including the number of bits of security it provides. The difficulty parameter is an integer which indicates minimum amount of leading zeroes required for a valid proof of work solution.
- $\text{Pre}(x', \text{aux}) \rightarrow x$: The unprocessed puzzle input x' is the previous block header/proof of work. The auxiliary input aux is the Merkle tree root of the transactions confirmed and included in the proposed block. The pre-processed input is computed as $x = H(\text{aux}, x')$.
- $\text{Eval}(x, \text{aux}) \rightarrow y/\perp$: The evaluation algorithm checks if for any input r in the nonce range, the hash $H(r, x)$ has $\geq \Delta$ many preceding zeroes. If it finds such a solution it outputs $y = r$, otherwise outputs \perp .
- $\text{Verify}(x, \text{aux}, y) \rightarrow 0/1$: If $H(y, x)$ has $\geq \Delta$ many preceding zeroes, output 1 and 0 otherwise.

It is worth noting that in the real world, the pre-processing phase can possibly be completely predictable. Typical bitcoin mining logic is to include transactions with the highest miner fees. If this is the case then the input to the `Eval` algorithm become predictable. Since the inputs to `Eval` are the inputs to the mining rig, this opens up the possibility of input-induced attacks which we discuss in Sections 4 and 4.3.2. However, this does not imply that Bitcoin proof of work is a bad cryptographic puzzle construction. This particular issue can be easily fixed by introducing some entropy into the process of selecting transactions.

Definition D.2 (Verifiable Delay Functions). A verifiable delay function (VDF) consists of the following algorithms:

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \Delta) \rightarrow \text{pp}$: The VDF generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1^λ and a difficulty parameter Δ and outputs public parameters pp which fix the domain \mathcal{X} and range \mathcal{Y} of the VDF and other information required to compute a VDF or verify a solution.
- $\text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x) \rightarrow (y, \pi)$: The VDF evaluation algorithm takes as input the public parameters pp , an input from the domain x . It outputs a VDF solution y and a proof π .
- $\text{Verify}(\text{pp}, x, y, \pi) \rightarrow 0/1$: The VDF verification algorithm takes as input the public parameters pp , an input from the domain x , an input from the range y and a proof π . It outputs either 0 or 1.

Additionally, VDFs must satisfy the correctness, soundness and sequentiality definitions as defined below.

Definition D.3 (Correctness). A verifiable delay function is correct if $\forall \lambda, \Delta, \text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \Delta)$, and $\forall x \in \mathcal{X}$ if $(y, \pi) \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x)$ then $\text{Verify}(\text{pp}, x, y, \pi) = 1$.

Definition D.4 (Soundness). We require that an adversary can not get a verifier to accept an incorrect VDF solution.

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{Verify}(\text{pp}, x, y, \pi) = 1 \\ y \neq \text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x) \end{array} \mid \begin{array}{l} \text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \Delta) \\ (x, y, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \Delta, \text{pp}) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Definition D.5 (VDF as a Cryptographic Puzzle). A VDF can be formalized as a cryptographic puzzle as follows:

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \Delta) \rightarrow \text{pp}$: This algorithm has inputs and outputs exactly similar to as described in `VDF.Setup()`.
- $\text{Pre}(x', \text{aux}) \rightarrow x$: Set $\text{aux} = \text{nil}$ and $x = x'$.
- $\text{Eval}(x, \text{aux}) \rightarrow y/\perp$: The evaluation algorithm proceeds exactly as described in `VDF.Eval()`. The output y is a tuple consisting of a VDF solution s and its proof π , $y = (s, \pi)$.
- $\text{Verify}(x, \text{aux}, y) \rightarrow 0/1$: Outputs the result from computing `VDF.Verify(pp, x, s, pi)`.

VDF security is described using a sequentiality game played between a challenger and an adversary as defined below:

Definition D.6 (Sequentiality). The sequentiality game captures the notion that no adversary should be able to compute the output for `Eval` on a random challenge in time less than the requisite time t even with arbitrary parallelism. For an exact description of the game and more details we refer readers to Boneh et al’s [40] work.

Definition D.7 (Proof of Space). A proof of space is defined using the following algorithms:

- $\text{Init}(N, pk) \rightarrow S$: The initialization algorithm takes as input a space parameter $N \in \mathcal{N}$ (where $\mathcal{N} \subset \mathbb{Z}^+$ is the set of valid parameters) and a public key pk for a signature scheme. It outputs $S = (S.\Lambda, S.N, S.pk)$ where S consists of the space taxing file the prover needs to store.
- $\text{Prove}(S, c) \rightarrow \pi$: The prove algorithm on an input S and a challenge $c \in \{0, 1\}^w$ in the challenge space, outputs a proof π .
- $\text{Verify}(S, c, \pi) \rightarrow 0/1$: The verify algorithm accepts the proof and outputs 1 if it is a valid proof of space for the given input, challenge pair. Otherwise it outputs 1.

Additionally, a PoSpace must satisfy the completeness and security definitions as defined below.

Definition D.8 (PoSpace Completeness). Perfect completeness implies that $\forall N \in \mathcal{N}, c \in \{0, 1\}^w$,

$$\Pr[\text{Verify}(S, c, \pi) = 1] = 1$$

where $S \leftarrow \text{Init}(N, pk)$ and $\pi \leftarrow \text{Prove}(S, c)$.

Definition D.9 (PoSpace Security). Informally, proof of space security states that an adversary who stores a file of size considerably less than N bits should not be able to produce a valid proof when given a random challenge without using a significant amount of computation. For an exact description of the game and more details we refer readers to [24, 29].

Figure 9: Real world puzzle definitions under the Cryptographic Puzzle lens