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Sable Communications of California v. FCC

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Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 19, 1989
Decided June 23, 1989
Full case nameSable Communications of California, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al.
Citations492 U.S. 115 (more)
109 S. Ct. 2829; 106 L. Ed. 2d 93; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3135; 57 U.S.L.W. 4920; 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 969; 16 Media L. Rep. 1961
Case history
PriorAppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
Holding
Since the First Amendment does not protect obscene speech, the ban was legitimate. However, sexual expression that is simply indecent is protected. Therefore, banning adult access to indecent messages "far exceeds that which is necessary" to shield minors from dial-a-porn services.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr. · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall · Harry Blackmun
John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia · Anthony Kennedy
Case opinions
MajorityWhite, joined by unanimous (parts I, II, IV); Rehnquist, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy (part III)
ConcurrenceScalia
Concur/dissentBrennan, joined by Marshall, Stevens

Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the definition of "indecent material" and whether it is protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.[1] The Court invalidated part of a federal law that prohibited "dial-a-porn" telephone messaging services by making it a crime to transmit commercial telephone messages that were either "obscene" or "indecent".[2][3][4]

Obscenity versus indecency

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The often tough question of what it is that makes material indecent or obscene was an important aspect of this case.[5] The murky line between these two categories has been difficult to determine. In Butler v. Michigan (1957), when dealing with the sale of books containing adult material, the Court "reversed a conviction under a statute which made it an offense to make available to the general public materials found to have a potentially harmful influence on minors".[6][7] This case, however, did not deal with definitions. A case that did, which is one of the most crucial cases to this debate, was Miller v. California (1973), which involved the mailing of sexually explicit advertising brochures.[8][9]

From this case, the Miller test was established as a way to determine whether a work can be considered obscene. The test has three major criteria:

  • Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would deem the work as appealing to the prurient interest,
  • Whether the work depicted sexual conduct, as defined by state law, in a patently offensive way,
  • Whether the work as a whole lacked serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

All three parts must be fulfilled for the material to be considered obscenity.[8][10]

History of Dial-a-Porn

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The first attempt to deal with dial-a-porn services occurred with subsection 223(b) in the 1934 Communications Act.[11] With 223(b), it became illegal to make obscene or indecent phone calls to anyone who was either under 18 years old, or had not given consent. To regulate this, the FCC required dial-a-porn services to operate only between 9 p.m. and 8 a.m., and receive payment with a credit card. In 1984, the case of Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113 (2nd Cir. 1984) (Carlin I) deemed the time channeling to not be effective because it did not allow adults access to dial-a-porn services between 8 a.m. and 9 p.m., but still could allow access to minors who could not be stopped from calling between the current legal hours.[6][12]

After getting rid of these time restrictions in 1985, the FCC began to use a system of user identification access codes, in addition to credit cards, to regulate these dial-a-porn services. They later added message scrambling, which made use of a descrambling device that was only available to adults to actually listen to dial-a-porn phone calls. The combination of these three regulatory practices were finally supported as being effective enough to protect minors after Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (2nd Cir.) (Carlin III).[6]

Case

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In 1988, Congress amended subsection 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 to ban indecent and obscene interstate commercial phone messages, regardless of age. This made the business of Sable Communications, who had been in the dial-a-porn industry since 1983, illegal. The federal parties had argued that the only way to prevent children's access to dial-a-porn messages was through the complete ban of their telephone services. Sable Communications argued that the "legislation creates an impermissible national standard of obscenity, and that it places message senders in a 'double bind' by compelling them to tailor all their messages to the least tolerant community".[13][14]

The Court said that if the government wants to protect children in this regard, it must do so by technological means, rather than by a total ban on the transmission of these messages.[15] Although some children might be able to defeat these devices, a banning these services would have the impermissible effect of "limiting the content of adult telephone conversations to that which is suitable for children to hear".[13][16]

Ruling

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A judge of the United States District Court for the Central District of California upheld the ban on obscene messages, but ordered the Act's enforcement against indecent ones.[2] The Court upheld the district court ruling. Since the First Amendment does not protect obscene speech, as the Court found in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), the ban on obscene speech was legitimate. However, sexual expression that is simply indecent is protected.[17] Therefore, banning adult access to indecent messages "far exceeds that which is necessary" to shield minors from dial-a-porn services.[2][18]

Words from the Court
Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment...The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest. We have recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors. This interest extends to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards.[19]
The Government may serve this legitimate interest, but to withstand constitutional scrutiny it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms...It is not enough to show that the Government's ends are compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.[20]

Significance

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The court drew a sharp distinction between speech that meets the legal definition of "obscene" and speech that is "indecent" (sexually charged but not rising to the level of "obscene"). The court held that obscene speech could be restricted, but that merely indecent speech was protected by the First Amendment. The court also recognized a real need for governmental interest in shielding children from speech that could be obscene to minors, but not for adults. However, the court stressed that these limitations must be limited so they can distinguish what is and what is not restricted, carefully protecting the rights of adults to receive protected speech, even if that protected speech is indecent.[21]

Notes

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  1. ^ Rubens, Suzanne D. (Winter 1990). "First Amendment: Disconnecting Dial-a-Porn: Section 223(b)'s Two-Pronged Challenge to First Amendment Rights". The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. 80 (4): 968–995. doi:10.2307/1143687. JSTOR 1143687.
  2. ^ a b c "Sable Communications of California v. FCC". oyez.org. Retrieved 2011-03-14.
  3. ^ Mackey, Thomas C. (2002). Pornography on Trial: A Reference Handbook. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. pp. 97. ISBN 978-1-57607-275-2.
  4. ^ "Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n.". Quimbee.com. Retrieved 2011-04-30.
  5. ^ Harris, Eugenia. "What about 'indecency' can sexually explicit comics that aren't obscene or child pornography be regulated to protect children?". firstamendmentcenter.org. Retrieved April 30, 2011.[permanent dead link‍]
  6. ^ a b c Benjamin, Stuart Minor; Lichtman, Douglas Gary; Shelanski, Howard A.; Weiser, Phillip J. (2006). Telecommunications Law And Policy. Carolina Academic Press. ISBN 1-59460-139-9.
  7. ^ Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
  8. ^ a b Finkelman, Paul (2006). Encyclopedia of American Civil Liberties. Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. ISBN 0-415-94342-6.
  9. ^ Merryman, John Henry; Urice, Stephen K.; Elsen, Albert E. (2007). Law, Ethics, and the Visual Arts (7 ed.). Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. p. 687. ISBN 978-90-411-2517-0.
  10. ^ Cohen, Henry (2003). Obscenity: Constitutional Principles and Federal Statutes. Nova Science Pub Inc. p. 2. ISBN 1-59033-749-2.
  11. ^ Clark, Matthew D. (2002). Obscenity, Child Pornography and Indecency. Nova Science Pub Inc. p. 19. ISBN 1-59033-396-9.
  12. ^ Zuckman, Harvey L.; Corn-Revere, Robert L. Henry; Frieden, Robert M.; Kennedy, Charles H. (1999). Modern Communications Law. St. Paul, MN: Gale Cengage. p. 5. ISBN 0-314-21176-4.
  13. ^ a b "Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n.". lawschool.courtroomview.com. Retrieved 2011-03-14.
  14. ^ Simon, Glenn E. (Spring 1998). "Cyberporn and Censorship: Constitutional Barriers to Preventing Access to Internet Pornography by Minors". The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. 88 (3): 1019. doi:10.2307/3491360. JSTOR 3491360.
  15. ^ Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
  16. ^ Paglin, Max D. (1999). The Communications Act: A Legislative History of the Major Amendments, 1934-1996. Silver Spring, MD: Pike & Fischer, Inc. p. 134. ISBN 0-937275-05-0.
  17. ^ "Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton", Oyez.org. Retrieved 2011-04-30.
  18. ^ Levesque, Roger J. R. (2007). Adolescents, Media, and the Law: What developmental science reveals and free speech requires. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 195. ISBN 978-0-19-532044-2.
  19. ^ "Action for Children's Television v. Federal Communications Commission, 58 F. 3d 654 (1995) (Edited Version)". cba.uni.edu. Retrieved 2011-03-31.
  20. ^ Lappin, Todd (Spring 1996). "The First Amendment, New Media, and the Supreme Court". Wired. Retrieved March 31, 2011.
  21. ^ "Sable Communications v. FCC". Censorship-Free Libraries. October 19, 2009. Retrieved May 1, 2011.
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