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Diogofmaciel (talk | contribs) m Added reference links to RBMK |
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Along with colleagues like Viktor Alekseyevich Sidorenko, Legasov became concerned about the quality of equipment, poor construction, the lack of training of operators and the lack of training simulators.<ref name="tapes"/>
{{blockquote|[Our nuclear systems] were painfully lacking in good control systems and extremely poor in diagnostic systems... I have not seen a single group in the Soviet Union that raised and considered [the analysis of nuclear safety] with any degree of competence... As for the [[RBMK]] reactor, you know, in reactor circles, it was considered a bad reactor. Viktor Alekseyevich Sidorenko had repeatedly criticised it. But this reactor was not considered bad because of safety reasons. From a safety point of view, it even stood out as being better, as I understood from the discussions. It was considered bad because of economic reasons... When I looked at this device, I was confused by, for example, an unusual and, in my opinion, insufficient construction of safety systems, that would work in extreme situations. [I began] to speak about the necessity of the next generation of reactors to be safer; say TTER reactors or liquid salt reactors that I was trying to present as the next steps towards safer reactors. But this caused a storm in the Ministry. A storm of indignation.<ref name="tapes"/>}}
[[File:Valery Legasov — IAEA 02790061 (5613133650) (cropped).jpg|thumb|Valery Legasov]]
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After 10 May, the situation had somewhat stabilized and Legasov was able to spend less time at the accident site but still frequently visited.<ref name="alimov">G. Alimov interview with Legasov, Izvestia newspaper, 1987</ref> Upon returning from Chernobyl for the second time on 12 May, he was a changed man, suffering from severe grief and radiation sickness.<ref name="higginbotham"/> Spending four months in and around Chernobyl,<ref name="spiegel"/> he received a high dose of radiation. He was assigned to compile a report for the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] about the causes and aftermath of the accident. Some in the [[Ministry of Medium Machine Building]] (Sredmash) opposed his appointment, fearing Legasov would be difficult to control, since the nuclear establishment wanted to divert blame to others if possible.<ref name="higginbotham"/>
Legasov attended a turbulent meeting with the Politburo, on 3 July in which the causes of the accident and flaws in the [[RBMK]] reactor were discussed.<ref name="spiegel" /> In attendance was the former plant director [[Viktor Bryukhanov]], [[RBMK]] designer Alexandrov and [[Efim Slavsky]] of Sredmash. Bryukhanov was accused of mismanagement and that operator error was the primary cause of the accident, while design flaws were also a factor.<ref name="higginbotham"/> Gorbachev was furious and accused the designers of covering up dangerous problems with the Soviet nuclear industry for decades.<ref name="higginbotham"/> Legasov only spoke up to admit that scientists had failed in their duty<ref name="higginbotham"/> and that he had been warning about the safety problems of the [[RBMK]] reactor for years but nothing had been done.<ref name="spiegel" />
With the first draft of Legasov's report received by the Central Committee, some were shocked and one minister forwarded it to the KGB with the recommendation that the authors be prosecuted.<ref name="higginbotham"/> To find fault with the reactor design would directly implicate senior members of the Soviet government.<ref name="higginbotham"/>
[[Image:IAEA 02790060 (5612554949).jpg|thumb|Legasov (second from right) at a Vienna press conference, August 1986]]
In August 1986, Legasov presented the report of the Soviet delegation at a special meeting of the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] in [[Vienna]]. His report was noted for its great detail and relative openness in discussing the extent and consequences of the tragedy,<ref>{{cite journal|first1=Bella |last1=Belbéoch |url=http://www.akademia.ch/sebes/textes/1998/98BelbeochB.html |title=Responsabilites Occidentales Dans les Consequences Sanitaires de la Catastrophe de Tchernobyl, en Bielorussie, Ukraine et Russie |journal=Radioprotection et Droit Nucléaire |year=1998|pages=247–261|language=fr|trans-title=Western responsibility regarding the health consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe in Belarus, the Ukraine and Russia}}<br />English translation1:<br />{{cite book |first1=Michael |last1=Fernex |first2=Bella |last2=Belbéoch |title=The Chernobyl catastrophe and health care |chapter=Western responsibility regarding the health consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe in Belarus, the Ukraine and Russia |chapter-url=http://ru.indymedia.org/usermedia/text/10/western_responsability.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110726002457/http://ru.indymedia.org/usermedia/text/10/western_responsability.html |archive-date=2011-07-26 |access-date=2019-05-26}}</ref> disclosed to Western media some defects in the [[RBMK]] reactor design such as the positive [[void coefficient]], as well as problems with operator training.<ref name="tomwilkie">{{Cite magazine|first=Tom|last=Wilkie|date=28 Aug 1986|title=Soviet engineers admit failings in reactor design|magazine=New Scientist}}</ref> Some details were censored by the Central Committee, including the full extent of the design flaws,<ref name="higginbotham"/> the institutional and cultural problems that led to the accident,<ref name="higginbotham"/> the full extent of the fallout,<ref name="higginbotham"/> as well as the ineffective efforts in dropping liquid nitrogen into the reactor.<ref name="adamovich"/> The report ran to 388 pages and was presented by Legasov to the conference in a 5-hour presentation, which many in the audience found disturbing.<ref name="patterson">{{cite journal|title=Chernobyl - the official story|journal=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|date=Nov 1986|first=Walter C.|last=Patterson|volume=42|issue=9|page=34|doi=10.1080/00963402.1986.11459439|bibcode=1986BuAtS..42i..34P}}</ref> Legasov noted that the operators were able to disable the reactor safety systems and stated that improvements to existing [[RBMK]] reactors were underway.<ref name="tomwilkie"/>
{{quote|I did not lie in Vienna... but I did not tell the full truth.<ref name="higginbotham"/>}}
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