Valery Legasov: Difference between revisions

| name = Valery Alekseyevich Legasov

| birth_place = [[Tula, Russia|Tula]], [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Russian SFSR]], [[Soviet Union]]

Valery Alekseyevich Legasov was born on September 1, September 1936, in [[Tula, Russia|Tula]], [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Russian SFSR]], into a family of civil workers.<ref name="newtimes">{{cite book|title=New Times|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=G_FVAAAAYAAJ|page=58|year=1996|publisher=New Times Publishing House}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UoPVBgAAQBAJ|title=Producing Power: The Pre-Chernobyl History of the Soviet Nuclear Industry|first1=Sonja D. |last1=Schmid|year=2015|publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0-262-02827-1}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|journal=American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies|year=1988|page=24|title=The Current Digest of the Soviet Press|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=byrvAAAAMAAJ}}</ref> He attended secondary school in [[Kursk]].<ref name="newtimes" /> In 1949–1954, he attended School No. 56 in Moscow and graduated with a gold medal.<ref name="newtimes" /> While he was a shy student, he excelled in both academic work and social activities being elected secretary of his school's [[Komsomol]] committee.<ref name="legasova"/> During 1953, he proposed reforms to the Komsomol committee to address what he perceived as indifference and passivity of its members.<ref name="legasova">{{cite book|first=Margarita|last=Legasova|title=Academician Valery Alekseevich Legasov|publisher=Spektra|date=2010}}</ref> These ideas were quickly quashed by the authorities. His headmaster observed that Legasov "is a grown up man, a future statesman, a talented organizer. He can be a philosopher, а historian, an engineer..."<ref name="legasova"/> The school now bears his name, and his bronze bust stands at the entrance. For two years he worked as a released secretary of the [[Central Committee of the Komsomol]],{{Clarify|date=September 2023|reason=What is a "released secretary"?}} he was elected to the bureau of the Soviet District Committee of the Komsomol and to the Moscow City Committee of the Komsomol.{{citation needed|date=January 2021}} In 1961, he graduated from the Faculty of Physicochemical Engineering at the [[D. Mendeleev University of Chemical Technology of Russia|Mendeleev Moscow Institute of Chemistry and Technology]],<ref name="Marples">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JJqvCwAAQBAJ|title=Ukraine under Perestroika: Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt|first1=David|last1=Marples|page=21|year=1991|publisher=Springer |author-link1=David R. Marples|isbn=978-1-349-10880-0}}</ref> where he learned how nuclear fuel is processed, handled and disposed of.<ref name="tapes"/>

In 1976, Legasov was elected a corresponding member of the [[Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union]].<ref>{{Cite book|title=Biographical Dictionary (in Russian)|publisher=Moscow State University|year=2004|isbn=5-211-05034-7|location=Moscow|page=448}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Zubacheva|first=Ksenia|date=2019-06-04|title=Who was Valery Legasov, the Soviet scientist that saved the world from Chernobyl?|url=https://www.rbth.com/history/330459-valery-legasov-chernobyl|access-date=2020-10-20|website=www.rbth.com|language=en-US}}</ref> From 1978 to 1983, he was a professor at the [[Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology]].<ref name="schmid">{{cite book |last1=D. Schmid |first1=Sonja |title=Producing Power: The Pre-Chernobyl History of the Soviet Nuclear Industry |date=2015 |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0-262-02827-1 |page=[https://archive.org/details/producingpowerpr0000schm/page/182 182] |url=https://archive.org/details/producingpowerpr0000schm|url-access=registration }}</ref> In 1981, he became a full member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, in the Department of Physical Chemistry and Technology of Inorganic Materials.{{citation needed|date=May 2019}} He was a member of the Science and Technology Council of the [[Ministry of Medium Machine Building]].<ref name="tapes"/> From 1983 until his death, he worked as chair of the department of Radiochemistry and Chemical Technology at the Faculty of Chemistry at Moscow State University.<ref name="schmid"/> In 1983,<ref name="schmid"/> he became the first deputy director for scientific work of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy.<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ogYAAAAAMBAJ|title=A Soviet Expert Discusses Chernobyl|year=1987|journal=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|volume=43|issue=6|page=32|bibcode=1987BuAtS..43f..32L|last1=Legasov|first1=Valery|doi=10.1080/00963402.1987.11459553}}</ref> His colleague Yu. A. Ustynyuk said of Legasov: "His main quality, which set him sharply apart from all the great organizing scientists I knew, was his exceptional dedication to the cause. Work was the manmain, almost the only meaning of his life."<ref name="legasova"/>

[[ImageFile:IAEA 02790015 (5613115146).jpg|upright|thumb|Reactor 4 several months after the disaster.]]

Reactor 4 of Chernobyl nuclear plant [[Chernobyl disaster|exploded on 26 April 1986 at 1:23:45 a.m]], releasing a massive amount of radiation and contaminating a large area. By that time, Legasov was the first deputy director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy. Although not a reactor specialist, he became a key member of the government commission formed to investigate the causes of the disaster and to plan the mitigation of its consequences. Legasov was told he was assigned to a government commission that was looking into the accident.<ref name="tapes" />

At [[Vnukovo International Airport|Vnukovo airport]], Legasov met [[Boris Shcherbina]], the head of the government commission dealing with the accident response.<ref name="tapes" /> When the team reached Pripyat, Legasov was put in charge of containing the radiation.<ref name="tapes" /> Viktor Alekseyevich Sidorenko called for immediate evacuation of Pripyat, which Legasov supported, as the situation was expected to deteriorate in the town, and this decision was approved by Shcherbina. To make direct measurements of the reactor, Legasov was driven in an [[armored personnel carrier]] to the site which established the reactor had shut down.<ref name="legasova" /><ref name="tapes" /> Despite lacking information about the state of the reactor, Legasov proposed and managed the effort to extinguish the reactor fire which would otherwise release a massive amount of radiation,<ref name="chemistryandlife" /> although the team was in continual discussions with other scientists by telephone.<ref name="tapes" /> One Kurchatov scientist warned him that the helicopter drops might not be effective but Legasov replied that they had to be seen to do something.<ref name="higginbotham" /> Legasov admired the leadership of Shcherbina, particularly his ability to grasp what the specialists were telling him and his decision making.<ref name="tapes" /> [[Nikolay Antoshkin]], an air force general involved in the liquidation remembers: "I met Valery Alekseyevich as soon as he arrived. From that moment on, a working friendship, which then grew into a deeper friendship, was formed with him and with other comrades. I liked him from the very beginning. I was filled with trust and respect for him. ... Valery Alekseyevich himself flew over the reactor by helicopter 5-65–6 times a day. Scientists, smart, literate, and when it was necessary to go forward, they found themselves without means of protection. ... He was a man of courage, understanding everything, but at the same time defenseless."<ref name="legasova" /> At one point, Antoshkin scolded Legasov for taking too many personal risks when he was key to the operation.<ref name="legasova" /> On the second or third day, Legasov suggested organizing an information group to collect and disseminate accurate information to the press, but this did not occur, and he later observed that the press often interviewed the most famous person present rather than the most knowledgeable, introducing many inaccuracies and omissions in reporting.<ref name="tapes" /> Legasov received many telegrams from around the world containing advice ranging from benevolent to provocative.<ref name="adamovich" />

On 2 May, he and other commission members reported to visiting high-ranking officials that this was no ordinary industrial accident but would require a significant containment effort, as well as a review of the future of the other reactors.<ref name="tapes" /> This resulted in huge resources being allocated to Chernobyl. Most of the first government commission were replaced by new staff due to radiation exposure.<ref name="higginbotham" /> When the first government commission group returned to Moscow, Legasov was asked to stay by Scherbina but was replaced by his scientific rival [[Evgeny Velikhov]] in the formal hierarchy.<ref name="tapes" /><ref name="higginbotham" /> The team began to be concerned with small areas of reactor activity, as well as the integrity of the concrete pad. Velikhov in particular was concerned that the reactor remains could melt deep into the ground, as shown in the US film ''[[The China Syndrome]]''.<ref name="higginbotham" /> Water in the lower barboteur was drained but Legasov was convinced that an explosion was not possible,<ref name="tapes" /> in contrast to what some scientists and politicians feared.<ref name="higginbotham" /> He also considered the possibility of ground water contamination to be extremely low, but precautionary work was initiated to cool the reactor using an underground system.<ref name="tapes" /> Legasov considered these containment steps to be excessive but understandable, while also providing the infrastructure for the eventual construction of a shelter sarcophagus over the reactor.<ref name="tapes" /> He opposed a plan to extend the underground cooling system outside the reactor 4 building, as well as other projects he considered to be redundant.<ref name="tapes" /> Legasov was impressed by the operation of the [[KGB]] in the area but considered the [[Ministry of Emergency Situations (Russia)|Civil Defence group]] to be in shambles. He was also concerned at the lack of safety literature distributed to the population.<ref name="tapes" /> Legasov thought people worked together efficiently and this put them in good spirits.<ref name="tapes" />

On 5 May, Legasov was summoned to meet with the [[Politburo]] in Moscow, including [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], to report on progress.<ref name="tapes" /> Legasov and [[Anatoly Alexandrov (physicist)|Anatoly Alexandrov]] described the meltdown scenarios, and Legasov agreed with the plan to tunnel under the reactor to provide cooling.<ref name="higginbotham" /> After the meeting, Scherbina told him that he could work from Moscow but was quickly ordered back to Chernobyl.<ref name="tapes" /> Legasov reassured Gorbachev by phone that the scale of contamination was understood and the reactor was not a continuing threat to other countries.<ref name="tapes" /> Legasov developed a plan to extinguish the reactor fire using nitrogen gas pumped throughout the plant's pipe network but the pipes were too badly damaged to be effective.<ref name="higginbotham" /> Around 9–10 May, Gorbachev requested a chronology of events and the cause of the accident in preparation for an interview, which Legasov provided in writing with a few edits from other investigators.<ref name="tapes" />

After 10 May, the situation had somewhat stabilized and Legasov was able to spend less time at the accident site but still frequently visited.<ref name="alimov">G. Alimov interview with Legasov, Izvestia newspaper, 1987</ref> Upon returning from Chernobyl for the second time on 12 May, he was a changed man, suffering from severe grief and radiation sickness.<ref name="higginbotham" /> Spending four months in and around Chernobyl,<ref name="spiegel" /> he received a high dose of radiation. He was assigned to compile a report for the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] about the causes and aftermath of the accident. Some in the [[Ministry of Medium Machine Building]] (Sredmash) opposed his appointment, fearing Legasov would be difficult to control, since the nuclear establishment wanted to divert blame to others if possible.<ref name="higginbotham" />

Legasov attended a turbulent meeting with the Politburo, on 3 July in which the causes of the accident and flaws in the [[RBMK]] reactor were discussed.<ref name="spiegel" /> In attendance was the former plant director [[Viktor Bryukhanov]], RBMK designer Alexandrov and [[Efim P. Slavsky|Efim Slavsky]] of Sredmash. Bryukhanov was accused of mismanagement and that operator error was the primary cause of the accident, while design flaws were also a factor.<ref name="higginbotham" /> Gorbachev was furious and accused the designers of covering up dangerous problems with the Soviet nuclear industry for decades.<ref name="higginbotham" /> Legasov only spoke up to admit that scientists had failed in their duty<ref name="higginbotham" /> and that he had been warning about the safety problems of the RBMK reactor for years but nothing had been done.<ref name="spiegel" />

With the first draft of Legasov's report received by the Central Committee, some were shocked and one minister forwarded it to the KGB with the recommendation that the authors be prosecuted.<ref name="higginbotham" /> To find fault with the reactor design would directly implicate senior members of the Soviet government.<ref name="higginbotham" />

[[ImageFile:IAEA 02790060 (5612554949).jpg|thumb|Legasov (second from right) at a Vienna press conference, August 1986]]

In August 1986, Legasov presented the report of the Soviet delegation at a special meeting of the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] in [[Vienna]]. His report was noted for its great detail and relative openness in discussing the extent and consequences of the tragedy,<ref>{{cite journal|first1=Bella |last1=Belbéoch |url=http://www.akademia.ch/sebes/textes/1998/98BelbeochB.html |title=Responsabilites Occidentales Dans les Consequences Sanitaires de la Catastrophe de Tchernobyl, en Bielorussie, Ukraine et Russie |journal=Radioprotection et Droit Nucléaire |year=1998|pages=247–261|language=fr|trans-title=Western responsibility regarding the health consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe in Belarus, the Ukraine and Russia}}<br />English translation1:<br />{{cite book |first1=Michael |last1=Fernex |first2=Bella |last2=Belbéoch |title=The Chernobyl catastrophe and health care |chapter=Western responsibility regarding the health consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe in Belarus, the Ukraine and Russia |chapter-url=http://ru.indymedia.org/usermedia/text/10/western_responsability.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110726002457/http://ru.indymedia.org/usermedia/text/10/western_responsability.html |archive-date=2011-07-26 |access-date=2019-05-26}}</ref> disclosed to Western media some defects in the RBMK reactor design such as the positive [[void coefficient]], as well as problems with operator training.<ref name="tomwilkie">{{Cite magazine|first=Tom|last=Wilkie|date=28 Aug 1986|title=Soviet engineers admit failings in reactor design|magazine=New Scientist}}</ref> Some details were censored by the Central Committee, including the full extent of the design flaws,<ref name="higginbotham" /> the institutional and cultural problems that led to the accident,<ref name="higginbotham" /> the full extent of the fallout,<ref name="higginbotham" /> as well as the ineffective efforts in dropping liquid nitrogen into the reactor.<ref name="adamovich" /> The report ran to 388 pages and was presented by Legasov to the conference in a 5-hour presentation, which many in the audience found disturbing.<ref name="patterson">{{cite journal|title=Chernobyl -– the official story|journal=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|date=Nov 1986|first=Walter C.|last=Patterson|volume=42|issue=9 |page=34|doi=10.1080/00963402.1986.11459439|bibcode=1986BuAtS..42i..34P}}</ref> Legasov noted that the operators were able to disable the reactor safety systems and stated that improvements to existing RBMK reactors were underway.<ref name="tomwilkie" />

{{quote|I did not lie in Vienna... but I did not tell the full truth.<ref name="higginbotham" />}}

The conference was a public relations triumph for the Soviets as it reassured Western governments and scientists that the disaster was being contained<ref name="patterson" /> and that the Soviets could competently manage nuclear power in the future.<ref name="higginbotham" />

He had a lengthy stay in hospital during the fall of 1987, including experiencing acute [[appendicitis]],<ref>{{cite magazine|title=Saga of the Peaceful Atom|magazine=Nature and Man|date=April 1989}}</ref> during which he attempted suicide.<ref name="ebel"/> During his stay, journalist [[Ales Adamovich]] interviewed Legasov and he expressed concerns that a similar nuclear accident could still occur.<ref name="ebel"/> Legasov had an article on industrial safety entitled "From Today to Tomorrow" published in ''[[Pravda]]'' on 5 October 1987, but it received little interest.<ref name="ebel"/> He gave interviews to ''[[Novy Mir]]'' and ''[[Yunost]]'' in which he changed his public stance and expressed his concern that cultural failings and Soviet science losing its way had led inevitably to nuclear disaster.<ref name="higginbotham"/> After a colleague said his leadership was still needed, he said "No, you don't understand. I know that it can be difficult; you need to endure, wait it out. And here is a completely different situation – everything inside me is burned..."<ref name="legasova"/> and on another occasion "I'm now like the mythical Midas, only he turned everything he took into gold, and as for me – everything turns into air, even worse, into a vacuum. Whatever I touch – everything is ruined: no one needs anything! And there is still so much to do!"<ref name="chemistryandlife"/>

Some in the scientific community were still displeased by Legasov and his legacy. A former colleague of Legasov said "There is no need to idealize Legasov. ... He is no better or worse than any manager of this rank, and he followed the accepted rules of the game, moving up the career and scientific ladder... he took on too much, especially in recent years. A chemist, he dared to define the topics of physics laboratories and departments. At the same time, he was not always right, he ordered what to do and how to do it. Who would like that? So they voted him down at the elections to the Academic Council. Physicists make up the majority. And you, chemists, are now making him almost a great martyr... And in Chernobyl he screwed up enough - theenough—the shelter of the fourth unit turned out to be far from optimal."<ref name="chemistryandlife" /> Legasov's defenders counter this saying "His courage was not forgiven, because it clearly indicated the cowardice and ordinariness of others."<ref name="chemistryandlife" />

While the initial Soviet investigation put almost all the blame on the operators, later findings by the [[International Atomic Energy Agency|IAEA]] found that the reactor design and how the operators were informed of safety information was more significant.<ref name="insag7p22to25">International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, [https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub913e_web.pdf INSAG-7 The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1], 1992, pages 22-25</ref> However, the operators were found to have deviated from operational procedures, changing test protocols on the fly, as well as having made "ill judged" actions, making human factors a major contributing factor.<ref name="insag7p22to25" />

On 20 September 1996, Russian president [[Boris Yeltsin]] posthumously conferred on Legasov the honorary title of [[Hero of the Russian Federation]], the country's highest honorary title, for the "courage and heroism" shown in his investigation of the disaster.<ref>{{cite book|author=de Miranda, Paulo Emilio V. | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=e5t5DwAAQBAJ&q=valery+legasov+hero+of+the+russian+federation&pg=PA352 |title= Science and Engineering of Hydrogen-Based Energy Technologies|isbn = 978-0-12-814252-3|date = 2018-11-12 | publisher=Academic Press }}</ref>