Papers by Mehmet M Erginel
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 56 (Summer 2019), 2019
In this paper I aim to show that the restoration model of pleasure as we find it in Plato’s Gorgi... more In this paper I aim to show that the restoration model of pleasure as we find it in Plato’s Gorgias, Republic, Timaeus, and Philebus contain a common psychological core, despite the substantial developments and greater sophistication in the later works. I argue that, contrary to the scholarly consensus, all four dialogues take the necessary condition for pain to be a state of imbalance or disharmony rather than a process of destruction or deterioration. Given that the necessary condition for pleasure is a process of restoration, it follows that the restoration model offers a strikingly asymmetrical account of pleasure and pain. This unorthodox interpretation of pain is not only favoured by the textual evidence but is also more charitable, as it attributes to Plato a more plausible view of impure pleasures, a more realistic account of desire, and a more compelling argument for the greater pleasantness of the philosophical life.
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British Journal for the History of Philosophy, May 26, 2016
In 'Nicomachean Ethics' VII Aristotle offers an account of akrasia that purports to salvage the k... more In 'Nicomachean Ethics' VII Aristotle offers an account of akrasia that purports to salvage the kernel of truth in the Socratic paradox that people act against what is best only through ignorance. Despite Aristotle’s apparent confidence in having identified the sense in which Socrates was right about akrasia, we are left puzzling over Aristotle’s own account, and the extent to which he agrees with Socrates. The most fundamental interpretive question concerns the sense in which Aristotle takes the akratic to be ignorant. The received view in the literature has been the intellectualist interpretation, which takes akratic agents to be so ignorant of the wrongness of what they do as to be unaware of it. In recent decades many scholars have identified serious problems in this interpretation and have moved towards the non-intellectualist reading, the strong version of which takes clearheaded akrasia to be possible. There is, however, a glaring shortage of discussion of the difficulties facing the strong non-intellectualist reading. In this paper I present what I take to be the most salient reasons for rejecting strong non-intellectualism, and argue that Aristotle’s text supports a moderate non-intellectualism, according to which clearheaded akrasia is impossible.
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Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 32/1, 2015
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Selected Papers from the Tenth Symposium Platonicum, Academia Verlag, 2016
At the heart of Plato’s theory of erōs is the ‘ascent’ of love for an individual body, through se... more At the heart of Plato’s theory of erōs is the ‘ascent’ of love for an individual body, through several stages, to love of Beauty itself (Symposium 210a-212b). I argue that our understanding of the psychology of this transformation would benefit especially from bringing in Plato’s views on pain from the Republic. For erōs is presented in the Symposium as including sexual desire (207b) as well as love of wisdom (210d), but the Republic takes the former to be a painful desire, whereas the latter is apparently treated as painless. The ‘ascent’ of love, then, seems to involve the transformation of a painful desire into a painless one. I conclude that this transformation is best understood as a rechanneling of desire within the tripartite soul.
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The Selected Papers of the Ninth Symposium Platonicum, Academia Verlag, 2013
In recent years there has been a surge of interest among Plato scholars in the tripartition of th... more In recent years there has been a surge of interest among Plato scholars in the tripartition of the soul in the Republic. Particular attention has been devoted to the nature of the soul-parts, and whether or not each part is agent-like. My concern in this paper is one crucial aspect of this issue: whether the non-rational parts of the soul are equipped with, or have access to, significant cognitive and conceptual capacities, which are normally associated with the rational (logistikon) part. That this is the case, and that the non-rational parts cannot be devoid of such capacities, is the widely accepted view, shared by Annas, Bobonich, Cooper, and Irwin among others. A number of scholars, however, have recently criticized this reading of Plato’s tripartition, and argued that the text does not in fact support the attribution of such capacities to the non-rational parts. I argue that the weight of evidence remains in favour of the mainstream view, despite the interesting objections raised by the critics.
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Phoenix, 2011
Plato’s account of pleasure in Republic IX, offered in the context of his third proof that the ju... more Plato’s account of pleasure in Republic IX, offered in the context of his third proof that the just man is happier than the unjust, has been treated as an ill-conceived and deeply flawed account that Plato thankfully retracted and replaced in the Philebus. I am convinced, however, that this received view of the Republic’s account is false. In this paper, I will not concern myself with whether, or in what way, Plato’s account of pleasure in the Republic falls short of what we find in the Philebus, but will rather focus on the merits of the former. My concern will be further narrowed down to the first half of the third proof: the proof involves two criteria for the evaluation of pleasures, the criteria of purity and of truth, both of which yield the result that the philosopher’s pleasures are the most pleasant (because it turns out that only those pleasures are pure and only they are true). I will be addressing the criterion of purity, which is based on a psychological/phenomenological account of pleasure and pain. This account has been harshly criticized as full of ambiguity and confusion. I believe, however, that these criticisms result from misunderstanding, and failing to appreciate the complexity of, Plato’s account. In this paper, I will offer an interpretation of Plato’s psychological account of pleasure and pain in Republic IX, showing that this account is, contrary to its detractors, both interesting and persuasive on many points.
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The Classical Quarterly, 2011
Plato’s view on pleasure in the Republic emerges in the course of developing the third proof of h... more Plato’s view on pleasure in the Republic emerges in the course of developing the third proof of his central thesis that the just man is happier than the unjust. Plato presents it as the “greatest and most decisive” proof of his central thesis, so one might expect to find an abundance of scholarly work on it. Paradoxically, however, this argument has received little attention from scholars, and what has been written on it has generally been harshly critical. I believe that this treatment of the argument has been unfair and that the relevant passages deserve a more careful and charitable interpretation. In this paper, I take up two serious charges that scholars have leveled against this proof, that it is inconsistent and that it involves a “fatal ambiguity”. I show that these charges result from misinterpreting Plato’s text, and I offer an alternative interpretation of the relevant passages. In doing so, I hope to shed some light on the complexities involved in Plato’s unappreciated third proof.
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Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XXXVII (Winter 2009)
Plato argues, at Theaetetus 170e-171c, that Protagoras’ relativism is self-refuting. This argume... more Plato argues, at Theaetetus 170e-171c, that Protagoras’ relativism is self-refuting. This argument, known as the ‘exquisite argument’, and its merits have been the subject of much controversy over the past few decades. Burnyeat (1976) has argued in defense of Plato’s argument, but his reconstruction of the argument has been criticized as question-begging. After offering an interpretation of Protagoras’ relativism, I argue that the exquisite argument is successful, for reasons that Burnyeat hints at but fails to develop sufficiently. I consider Protagorean relativism under both of the two possible readings with respect to its scope: global relativism, according to which all truths are only relatively true, and qualified relativism, according to which the relativistic thesis itself is excepted. Taking into consideration some contemporary work on relativism and self-refutation, I show that Plato’s argument succeeds on both of these readings. Given that Protagoras could avoid self-contradiction simply by denying that an enduring subject exists, I argue that the exquisite argument is best understood as confronting Protagoras with a dilemma between self-contradiction and self-defeat of various sorts, all of which lead to the same result, that Protagoras violates the requirements of rational discourse in such a way that he becomes an absurd figure who has nothing to say to us.
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Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2006
Plato argues in Republic IX that people are often mistaken about their own pleasures and pains. ... more Plato argues in Republic IX that people are often mistaken about their own pleasures and pains. One of the mistakes he focuses on is judging that an experience of ours is pleasant when, in fact, it is not. The view that such a mistake is possible is an unpopular one, and scholars have generally been dismissive of Plato’s position. Thus Urmson argues not only that this position is deeply flawed, but also that it results from a confusion on Plato’s part. In this paper, I show that Urmson’s criticism is misguided. I then defend Plato against the idea that it is impossible for someone to make the mistake in question. In doing so, I bring out details in Plato’s text and show that his account of the phenomenology involved in making this mistake is far more sophisticated than has so far been recognized.
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Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XXVI (Summer 2004)
The nature of non-substantial individuals in Aristotle's Categories has been a matter of intense ... more The nature of non-substantial individuals in Aristotle's Categories has been a matter of intense debate. According to the traditional view, a non-substantial individual is a property that cannot be shared by more than one individual substance, i.e., non-substantial individuals are non-recurrent. Owen has challenged this view, arguing that non-substantial individuals are, in fact, recurrent. In this paper, I defend Owen's view against the persistent traditional view. I show that the commonly held version of the traditional view is inconsistent with many passages in the Categories, and that there is no textual support at all for the traditional view.
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Papers by Mehmet M Erginel