[go: up one dir, main page]

Paper The following article is Open access

Syndication network associates with specialisation and performance of venture capital firms

, , , , and

Published 8 June 2023 © 2023 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
, , Focus on Fundamental Theory and Application of Complexity Economics Citation Qing Yao et al 2023 J. Phys. Complex. 4 025016 DOI 10.1088/2632-072X/acd6cc

2632-072X/4/2/025016

Abstract

The Chinese venture capital (VC) market is a young and rapidly expanding financial subsector. Gaining a deeper understanding of the investment behaviours of VC firms is crucial for the development of a more sustainable and healthier market and economy. Contrasting evidence supports that either specialisation or diversification helps to achieve a better investment performance. However, the impact of the syndication network is overlooked. Syndication network has a great influence on the propagation of information and trust. By exploiting an authoritative VC dataset of thirty-five-year investment information in China, we construct a joint-investment network of VC firms and analyse the impacts of syndication and diversification on specialisation and investment performance. There is a clear correlation between the syndication network degree and specialisation level of VC firms, which implies that the well-connected VC firms are diversified. More connections generally bring about more information or other resources, and VC firms are more likely to enter a new stage or industry with some new co-investing VC firms when compared to a randomised null model. Moreover, autocorrelation analysis of both specialisation and success rate on the syndication network indicates that feature clustering of similar VC firms is roughly limited to the secondary neighbourhood. When analysing local feature clustering patterns, we discover that, contrary to popular beliefs, there is no apparent successful club of investors. In contrast, investors with low success rates are more likely to cluster. Our discoveries enrich the understanding of VC investment behaviours and can assist policymakers in designing better strategies to promote the development of the VC industry.

Export citation and abstract BibTeX RIS

Original content from this work may be used under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license. Any further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the title of the work, journal citation and DOI.

1. Introduction

Venture capital (VC) has been an essential source of financing for start-up companies deemed to have a high growth potential with innovative technologies or business models [13]. In the past a few decades, we have witnessed an enormous increase in VC investment activities and start-ups supported by VC, including Tesla, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Alibaba, and Whole Foods, which have significantly impacted domestic and global economies. Gaining a deeper understanding of investment behaviours of VC firms are crucial for the more sustainable and healthier development of the industry and economy [4, 5].

On the one hand, given the ultimately limited knowledge of industries or investment stages and resources of individual entities, being specialised is a natural choice to obtain a good financial performance for VC firms [6]. Previous evidence indicates that specialised VC firms tend to outperform generalised ones on the quality of capital allocation across industries, as specialists may be more responsive to signals of specific industries [6]. Specialists can diversify their portfolios to become generalist. However, generalised VC firms may encounter difficulties in redeploying capital into industries with better opportunities [79].

On the other hand, previous literature also suggests that the role of networking (which can lead to diversification) is crucial for the investment activities and performance of VC firms. Gompers et al [10] surveyed hundreds of VC firms on 'How do venture capitalists make decisions?' and attributed the success more to the management team than to business-related characteristics (e.g. product or technology). However, similar case studies are limited to a local view focusing on individual VC firms. It does not have a global perspective that appreciates the importance of interactions between entities, e.g. either between individuals in management teams in different companies or collaborations between VC firms [1113]. Joint-investment relation between VC firms (i.e. investing in the same start-up company at the same time) form complex collective interaction patterns that influence the flow of information and trust [14, 15]. VC firms routinely refer deals and people to each other, pool capital together through their connections [16], Hochberg et al [11] examined U.S.-based VC funds and found that better-networked VC firms experience significantly better fund performance, as indicated by a higher fraction of investments that are successfully exited through an initial public offering (IPO) or mergers and acquisitions (M&A) [11], and concluded 'whom you know matters'. A better networking with other VC firms can generally bring insightful information [14], more contacts, more deal flows, and more resources [1719]. That means a better networked VC can benefit from mutual complementarity [20] and diversity [21, 22], which help the firm invest against uncertainties of market and policy, free ridings and opportunism behaviours [11, 2227]. Additionally, a better networking will build a VC firm reputations [16, 28, 29]. This suggests that networking positively affects the investment performance, as VC firms can benefit from mutual knowledge and skill complementing from collaborators [20] and diversity of investments [21, 22].

There seems to be a fundamental contradiction between specialisation and generalisation in previous literature, thus, a comprehensive understanding of the relation between network impact on specialisation/generalisation (diversification) and investment performance needs to be developed. In this work, we exploit an authoritative dataset that records over $160\,000$ detailed investment activities involving more than $31\,000$ VC firms and $50\,000$ start-up companies in the Chinese VC market since 1985. Syndication between VC firms is defined as making a joint investment by multiple investors in the same startup company at the same time. We first construct the syndication network of VC firms, where two VC firms are connected if they have made joint-investment in the same start-up company in one deal, i.e. at the same date. We reveal that better networked VC firms tend to have a more diversified spectrum of investments in terms of both investment stages and industries. In this project, we treat the co-investing VC firms as 'friends' of each other, because, they have common interests and are connected through the same start-up companies. In addition, when entering a new industry, VC firms are more likely to collaborate with new friends, which might indicate that new friends bring about new knowledge, information, or other resources. When we analyse the correlation patterns of VC firms in the syndication network, we find a strong feature clustering effect that VC firms with similar specialisation levels tend to neighbour each other. Such feature clustering pattern is generally limited to the second order of neighbourhood, which also echoes the idea of structural embeddedness that refers to having a connection with friends' friends (i.e. second order neighbours) [30, 31]. In addition, generalists are typically of a stronger local clustering, and the local clustering effect is weakening along with the increase of specialisation level. While for the investment performance, there is no obvious successful club where successful VC firms cluster together, but poor performance VC firms are surrounded by similar entities, that is, VC firms which perform poorly cluster together.

2. Methods

2.1. Herfindahl Index for evaluating the degree of specialisation

The Herfindahl Index, also known as Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), was first proposed to measure the competition between companies based on the market share of each firm [32]. With a similar formalisation, HHI later got adopted to evaluate the degree of specialisation of VC firms, which is the sum of the squares of the percentage of all previous investments of a VC firm in each industry [6] or in each investment stage. For example, if a VC firm i (VCi ) invests in α industry with a fraction $p^{\alpha}_i = n_i^{\alpha} / \sum_{\alpha = 1}^{m_i} n_i^{\alpha}, \alpha = 1, 2, \dots, m_i $, where $n_{i}^{\alpha}$ is the number of investments the VCi makes in α industry, mi is the total number of industries VCi entered (which can be different across VC firms), and $\sum_{\alpha} n_i^{\alpha}$, is the total number of investments the VCi has made. The counting of investment numbers is illustrated in figure 1(a). Then its HHI of industry, $\textrm{HHI}_i^\textrm{ind}$, is

Equation (1)

The most specialised VC firms ($m_{i} = 1$) have $\textrm{HHI}_i^\textrm{ind} = 1$, and the most diversified or generalised ones have $\textrm{HHI}_i^\textrm{ind} = 1/m_{i}$, which corresponds to the situation with equal number of investments $n^{\alpha}_{i}$ for each industry $\alpha = 1, 2, \dots, m_{i}$. The formalisation for the HHI of investment stage $\textrm{HHI}_i^\textrm{stage}$ is the same as equation (1) with $p^{\alpha}_{i}$ the fraction of investments in a certain stage α.

Figure 1.

Figure 1. (a) The illustration of investment relationships between VC firms and start-up companies. The purple circles represent VC firms while the green squares are the start-up companies. Every arrow associated with time represents one investment, it can happen in the same or different deals (times). The number of investment is the number of arrows. For example, $n_{i}^{\texttt{C}_{1}} = 1$ and $n_{k}^{\texttt{C}_{2}} = 2$. The quantity includes different industries or stages. (b) The number of VC firms (purple circles) and the number of start-up companies (green squares) during the period 1985–2020. A sharp increase happened around 2013–2014. (c) The distribution of the number of investments made by each VC firm, i.e. the number of outgoing arrow $n_{i} = \sum_{\alpha = 1}^{m_{i}}n_{i}^{\alpha}$ of each purple circle. (d) The distribution of the number of investments received by each start-up company, i.e. the number of incoming arrow on each green square. (e) The distribution of the number of IPOs of each VC firm. The three distributions are all approximated by a power-law like distribution, indicating the heterogeneous characteristics of both the investments and the performance of the VC firms.

Standard image High-resolution image

2.2. Assessing VC firm success rates

Evaluating and predicting financial investment performance lies at the heart of VC research [6, 11]. However, accurately assessing this performance remains a challenging task. The optimal method for evaluating a VC firm's financial performance involves using the return on investment of each deal or internal rate of return of each fund. Unfortunately, obtaining such data is often difficult due to proprietary business concerns.

VC firms typically generate significant profit or achieve higher valuations of invested start-ups when investments exit through IPOs, M&As, or by securing the next round of investment. Other exit types usually yield less favorable results [11]. Consequently, we define a VC firm's success rate as the proportion of investments resulting in IPOs, M&As, or the attainment of the next round of investment, relative to the firm's overall investment portfolio, following the approaches of [11, 13].

2.3. Moran's Index in networks

The Moran's Index (Moran's I) is widely used to measure the spatial autocorrelation of concerned variables [3335], and here we adapt it to measure autocorrelation between the variables of VC firms in the syndication network. The Moran's I for a variable with N observations xi is defined as:

Equation (2)

where N is the number of VC firms in the syndication network; xi is the variable of interest of node i (e.g. it can be HHI of stage $\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{stage}$ or HHI of industry $\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{ind}$, or success rate of a VC firm); $\bar {x} = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i = 1}^{N}x_{i}$ is the mean of x; $\sigma_{x}^{2} = \sum\nolimits_{i = 1}^{n}(x-x_{i})^2 / N $ is the variance of that variable. wij is the spatial weight between nodes i and j and $w_{ii} = 0$. The sum is $|{\mathbf{\textsf{W}}}| = \sum_{i = 1}^N\sum_{j = 1}^N w_{ij}$. We can define a spatial weight matrix ${\mathbf{\textsf{W}}}$ with entries wij . Literature, especially in geosciences, use this measurement to identify the geographic difference in or characterise the regional variations of the variables of interest. It is a measurement that combines both relational information (i.e. how close the two entities are) and non-relational information (i.e. feature of an entity). Moran's I ranges from −1 to 1, and a higher positive value of Moran's I indicates a more clustering scenario where entities with similar feature is closer to each other, and a smaller negative value of Moran's I indicates a more dispersed scenario where entities with contrasting feature are closer to each other, and a zero value corresponds to a random situation [3335]. This Moran's I is a global indicator for evaluating the average autocorrelation of the whole study area, in this work, we simply denote the global Moran's I as I.

When generalising the traditional Moran's I into the network setting, the main difference lies in measuring the distance between nodes wij , which defines the weight matrix $\mathrm{dist}$. In the geography setting, every entity is embedded into a Euclidean space, and their adjacency can be well described by a spatial lattice network, and their Euclidean distance is easy to calculate; while in the network setting, the adjacency between entities can be quite heterogeneous, and shortest path length between two nodes characterises how 'close' they are. To make further investigation on the impacts of topological distance on the autocorrelation of variables, we define four different weight matrices ${\mathbf{\textsf{W}}}$ based on different levels of neighbourhood: considering the nearest neighbours (i.e. first-order neighbourhood), further integrate the second-order, third-order, and all reachable neighbours, respectively. The detailed definitions are:

Equation (3a)

Equation (3b)

Equation (3c)

Equation (3d)

where L is the diameter of the network and

Equation (4)

represents the non-zero entry of nth order of adjacency, for example, ${\mathbf{\textsf{A}}}_{ij}^{(1)}$ is the ordinary adjacency matrix of the network, and ${\mathbf{\textsf{A}}}_{ij}^{(2)} = 1$ indicates there is at least one shortest path with a path length $l_{ij} = 2$ between node i and j.

Apart from the global Moran's I, we can scrutinize the feature clustering effect at a local level using the local Moran's I of a node i in networks $I_i^{\,\mathrm{local}}$, which is defined as:

Equation (5a)

Equation (5b)

3. Results

3.1. Fast growing Chinese VC market

The VC industry originated after World War II and matured in the late 1970s [11]. There have been several boom-and-bust cycles in the VC industry decades ago in the western world [36]. However, VC is still a relatively newly emerging industry in China, where government policies keep changing, the governance structure is immature, and information asymmetry always bothers investors [37, 38]. Nevertheless, the Chinese VC industry has undergone fast growth in the recent decades, especially after 2013 (see figure 1(b)). Although a drastic decrease in active VC firms happened after 2017, the number of start-up companies that receive VC investments remains high (see figure 1(b)).

We split our dataset into two parts: 1985–2013 and 2014–2020. We use investment data before 2014 to construct syndication network, and use exit events data from 2014 to 2020 to make better evaluations on the outcome of previous investments. The duration of the second part is seven years and is long enough to observe the results of investments made before 2014. As a start-up company needs time to grow or to mature, VC investments generally requires several years to exit [13].

The number of investments of individual VC firms, $\sum_{\alpha = 1}^{m_{i}}n_{i}^{\alpha}$ exhibits a power law (see figure 1(c)), which indicates that most VC firms only make a few investments, and only a notable small fraction of VC firms making many investments. However, since the slope −1.8 is larger than −2, the investments made by this small fraction of VC firms might take up the majority of VC investments in the whole market, because the average number of investments is determined by the tail of the distribution. The number of VC investments received by each start-up company also exhibits a power-law tail, implying some start-up companies receive a much larger number of investments from VC firms (see figure 1(d)). However, the distribution of investments made by VC firms are more heterogeneous as indicated by a flatter exponent compared with figure 1(d), reflecting that the probability of a VC firm has a large number of investment activities is higher than the probability of a start-up company receiving lots of investments. We find that the number of IPOs of VC firms exhibits a power law (see figure 1(e)). Similar behaviour is observed for the number of M&As, the number of investments that are not closed yet but receive a next round of investment, and unsuccessful exits (see appendix figures A1(a)–(c)). Again, these power-law like investment distributions indicate the heterogeneous nature of the VC market.

3.2. Being specialised and in the joint-investment network

Making investment decisions requires a versatile knowledge and resources depending on different industries and stages. Thus, being specialised is typically a sensible choice for VC firms to guarantee long-lasting and reproducible successful investments [6, 7].

According to the categories given by the Industrial Classification of National Economic Activities (ICNEA), there are seventeen industries in the first level classification, therefore, the range of the HHI of industry ($\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{ind}$) is within the interval $\left[1/17, 1 \right]$ (see the distributions of HHI of VC firms in figure A3 in appendix).

Except for the well-understood industry entry barriers [39], we would like to further explain the four different investment stages of VC investments. In each stage, apart from providing capital support, VC firms need to assist the start-up on various aspects with different focuses. During the seed stage, the VC investors focus on helping the start-up to prove the idea, polish its products, and build the team. In the initial stage, dissecting market opportunities and finding the target markets would generally be the focus, which is also referred to as product-market fit. In the expansion stage, VC firms needs to help scale the business or diversify and differentiate product lines. And at last, in the mature stage, VC firms prioritise how to go public. The four stages gives the range of HHI of stage ($\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{stage}$) $\left[1/4, 1 \right]$ (see the distributions of HHI of VC firms in figure A3 in appendix). The financing stage of each investment is documented in the database, which is classified as seed, initial (may also be named as early stage), expansion, and mature (may also be termed as mezzanine stage or bridge stage or pre-public stage), and we incorporate this classification in our analysis. In some criterion, there might be five stages with a pre-seed stage, and we just adopt the classification provided by the dataset.

Even though the Chinese VC market undergoes viral growth after 2013, the fraction of VC investments in 2020 in different investment stages (see figure 2(a)) and industries (see figure 2(b)) remains quite close to the 2013 snapshot. Most VC investments fall into the expansion stage and into 'manufacturing' (code C of ICNEA) and 'information transmission, software and information technology service' (code I of ICNEA), with a slight decrease in manufacturing and an increase in the information industry.

Figure 2.

Figure 2. The fraction of VC investments in each of the (a) 4 investment stages and each of the (b) 17 industries in 2013 (open) and 2020 (filled), where letters indicate the first level classification in the Industrial Classification of National Economic Activities (ICNEA). Even with the sharp increase in number of VC firms and start-up companies in 2013, the investment preferences remain very similarly: the investments in expansion stage is popular; two industries including 'manufacturing' (c) and 'information transmission, software and information technology service' (I) receive much more investments than any other industry.

Standard image High-resolution image

As mentioned in the section 1, evidence shows that both specialisation and generalisation can be beneficial to investment performance [6, 11, 22]. Why do we have this seemly contradictory phenomenon? We need new perspectives to comprehensively quantify the impacts of networking on specialisation and investment performance.

To study the network influences, we build the syndication network of VC firms based on their investment activities. In the syndication network, nodes are VC firms, and edges signify joint-investments in the same start-up company at the same time, see figures 1(a) and 3(a). To make a better illustration, we take the example in figure 1(a), as VC firm i and j invested in the same startup C1 at the same time t1, thus in the syndication network presented in figure 3(a), nodes i and j are connected. VC firms j, k, and l invested in the start-up company C2 at time t2 and thus these three nodes are linked in the syndication network (see figure 3(a)). In contrast, at a later time t3, nodes k and m jointly invested in start-up company C2, resulting in node m being connected only to node k and not to nodes j and l. We do not regard the investments at different stages as joint-investment since the investments between different rounds are not necessarily direct collaboration. For example, some VC institutions that make investments in earlier stages may exit in later rounds. The joint-investment network of VC firms in the Chinese market has grown quite dense with the emergence of many hub nodes that maybe of great importance (see figure 3(b)). There is not a strong correlation between the success rate and the number of investments. A similar pattern can be observed when considering the degree (refer to the figure A2) in appendix. Recent advance indicates that so called h-index can reveal the importance of a node in the network [41]. The node centrality h-index measure is defined to be the maximum value h such that there exists at least h (nearest) neighbours of degree larger than or equal to h. If a node has h-index 5, it has 5 neighbours with degree larger than or equal to 5 but does not have 6 neighbours with a degree larger than or equal to 6 [41]. We find that the distribution of the h-index also exhibits a power-law tail (see figure 3(d)). There is also a profound community structure in the Chinese VC market (see figure 3(e)), where VC firms within the same community would have denser connections with one another than with others outside that community [40, 42, 43].

Figure 3.

Figure 3. (a) The illustration for the joint-investment network constructed from the history of investments in figure 1(a). The purple circles represent VC firms and the VC firms are connected if they invest in the same start-up company at the same time. For example, node j, k and l are connected, because they all invest in start-up company C2 at t2; whereas m merely connects to k, as k and m co-invested in start-up company C2 at a later time t3. (b) The joint-investment network of VC firms in 2013. The size of nodes indicates the number of investments, and the colour indicates the success rate, which is between zero (red) and one (black). The large node with many degrees are not with high success rate while some clusters not at the core are with high success rates. The frequency distribution of (c) degree k, and (d) h-index of VC firms. These power-law like distributions of network measurements emerge from the interactions among VC firms, implying not a random but interdependent mechanism of the joint-investment. (e) The frequency distribution of community sizes in the log-log scale. The communities are detected by the Louvain method [40]. This plot indicates there exists a few large-sized and many small-sized communities.

Standard image High-resolution image

3.3. Impacts of networking on specialisation

As suggested by previous literature [11, 20, 22], for a VC firm, collaborating with others generally brings more information and knowledge, which is needed when entering an unfamiliar industry or stage. However, there is no quantitative analysis on the relation between networking (i.e. making joint-investments with others) and specialisation and, eventually, the performance of the VC firm. Here, we scrutinize the investment sequence of each VC firm to see if there is a higher probability for VC firms to enter a new stage or industry with others, especially with new friends who might have new knowledge, skills, or other resources.

In figure 4, we take an anonymous VC firm as an illustration. It enters three new stages (indicated by squares), one of which is joint-investment with others (indicated by filled symbols). We calculate the fraction of joint-investment out of all first-investment when entering a new industry for all VC firms, and find such a fraction is generally higher than 50% (see figure 4(b)). The same procedure is applied to analysis of investments when entering a new industry (see figure 4(d)), and very similar results are obtained (see figure 4(f)). This suggests that when a VC firm enters either a new stage or industry, it would have a high chance of making collaboration. This phenomenon most likely occurs because VC firms employ collaboration to complement knowledge and skills against uncertainty. However, given the frequency and the size of collaboration, the fraction of joint investment is lower than the randomised null model, where we randomly assign each of their joint-investment partners to an investment event (see table A1 in appendix for the randomisation process).

Figure 4.

Figure 4. The investment sequence illustration of an anonymous VC firm is categorised by (a) stage (red) and (d) industry (blue) of the start-up companies it invested in. That VC makes sixteen investments involving four investment stages (seed: S, initial: I, expansion: E, mature: (M) and seven industries and all its investments are ordered by time. The investments made alone or joint-investment with others are denoted by open symbols and filled symbols, respectively. Additionally, the first investment entering either a new stage (see (a)) or a new industry (see (d)) is denoted by squares, while non-fresh trials are denoted by circles (a VC usually makes its first investment in the stage and industry which it is most familiar with, therefore, we do not treat it as a new stage/industry). When a VC firm makes joint-investments with old friends and no new friends, the filled marker is denoted with a lighter colour, which only happens once in all of its sixteen investments in the example shown in (a) and (d). The fraction of joint investments when a VC firm enters (b) a new stage or (e) a new industry. The fraction of making joint investments with a new friend (i.e. VC firms with no previous collaborations) when a VC enters (c) a new stage or (f) a new industry. Null models in (b), (c) and (e), (f) are all generated two hundred times.

Standard image High-resolution image

Furthermore, for all joint-investments entering a new stage or industry, we analyse the fraction of joint-investments with new friends, i.e. the ones that have no collaboration before. The fractions are quite high, around 90% for both entering a new stage and industry (see figures 4(c) and (f)), and it is also much higher than the random configurations in the null model. This indicates that collaborations with new friends generally happen with a denser concentration and suggests that there are certain mechanics other than randomness driving joint-investments with new friends when entering unfamiliar situations. One of the possible reason is that new friends might be crucial for bringing in new information and resources, another explanation is that 'collaboration' with new friends is not intended, yet just a consequence of entering new stage or industry where the VC firm has few old friends.

By analysing the relationships between degree of the joint investment networks and the HHIs, we discover that when a VC firm has more friends (i.e. a larger degree in the syndication network), their level of specialisation on both investment stages (see figure 5(a)) and industries (see figure 5(b)) decrease (i.e. they are becoming more like a generalist), and the trends of deceasing become stronger when the degree is roughly beyond eight for both cases, which might be also fundamentally related to branching processes in networks [44].

Figure 5.

Figure 5. The relation between degree and specialisation on (a) investment stages and (b) industry. For (a) and (b), we analyse VC firms with no less than five investments to guarantee a better statistical analysis as it is more convincing to evaluate the HHI of four stages based on at least five times investment activities.

Standard image High-resolution image

3.4. Autocorrelation analysis on the joint-investment network

Given the heterogeneous nature the joint-investment syndication network, to further quantify the relation between networking and specialisation and investment performance, we adapt Moran's I in geoscience (see section 2) to study correlation between network measurements and the non-network properties of VC firms. In spatial analysis, the level of adjacency (i.e. the weight matrix ${\mathbf{\textsf{W}}}$ in equation (3)) between entities can be defined based on different Euclidean distance threshold [34] or other criteria [45]; on networks, we can specify the different level of adjacency and we define four types of weight matrices. The first one is the ordinary adjacency matrix (${\mathbf{\textsf{W}}}_{ij}^{(1)} = {\mathbf{\textsf{A}}}_{ij}$), i.e. if two VC firms have joint-investment, then $w_{ij} = 1$, otherwise, $w_{ij} = 0$ (see equation (3a )). As information and trust can spread on networks, we further integrate the second-order neighbours (${\mathbf{\textsf{W}}}_{ij}^{(2)}$), but with a smaller weight for them: $w_{ij} = 1/2$ if there exists a shortest path between i and j with $l_{ij} = 2$ (see equation (3b )). We further accumulates third-order neighbours (${\mathbf{\textsf{W}}}_{ij}^{(3)}$), and all reachable neighbours (${\mathbf{\textsf{W}}}_{ij}^{(L)}$, where L denotes the diameter of the network) in the same way, see equations (3c ) and (3d ), respectively.

The global Moran's I for different weight matrices ${\mathbf{\textsf{W}}}$ are summarised in table A2 in appendix. We find that for all measurements p-value $\lt0.001$, which demonstrate the significance of the local clustering of the concerned measurement (e.g. specialisation or performance). It is also worth noting that the global Moran's I for HHI of stage and industry are all high. Such clustering phenomenon suggests the trend that VC firms tend to make joint-investment with others alike. Moreover, there is a clear pattern of negative correlation between the global Moran's I and different level of adjacency (see figure 6). When considering the weighted adjacency with three-order neighbours, the global Moran's I becomes much smaller for all three measurements ($\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{ind}$, $\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{stage}$, and success rate), which suggest that at a larger range, the autocorrelation is much weaker, and the clustering effect is only obvious within second-order (e.g. for $\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{ind}$ and $\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{stage}$) or even just first-order (e.g. for success rate) neighbourhood (see figure 6). Such a discovery is also consistent with previous findings on VC firm syndication patterns that the syndication probability drops quite fast when the distance between two VC firms are larger than two [31].

Figure 6.

Figure 6. The relationship between the level of adjacency and the global Moran's I. For all three variables, the global Moran's I decreases with the level of adjacency. The Moran's I of success rate is always lower than both the stage and industry specialisation levels, which exhibit similar behaviours. L refers to the diameter of the network, which corresponds to all nodes reachable in the network.

Standard image High-resolution image

However, counter-intuitively, this global gathering pattern cannot represent the local similarity patterns, and the three variables ($\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{ind}$, $\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{stage}$, and success rate), distribute on the networks heterogeneously. The specialisation level ($\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{ind}$ or $\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{stage}$) or success rate of each node and their local Moran's I is shown in figure 7. Given the fact that there are many small VC firms with a high specialisation level due to a limited number of investment activities (see figure A3 in appendix), it is nontrivial to observe that specialists have small local Moran's I values, while generalists typically have larger local Moran's I values, which indicates a strong local clustering in their neighbourhoods. Additionally, we can find a clear decreasing trend of averaged local Moran's I along with the increase of HHI of both industry and stage. This indicates that when a VC firm becomes more specialised, their neighbours tend to be more random, i.e. with both similar and dissimilar neighbours around.

Figure 7.

Figure 7. The relation between specialisation level $\textrm{HHI}^{\textrm{stage}}$ (red solid circle) and $\textrm{HHI}^{\textrm{ind}}$ (blue solid circle) or success rate (orange solid circle) and the local Moran's I. The error bars are the standard errors of the binned values (mean values). The randomised results are shown by the open squares in the same colour scheme with the grey error bars. The weight matrix ${\mathbf{\textsf{W}}}_{ij}^{(1)} = {\mathbf{\textsf{A}}}_{ij}$, i.e, only considering first-order neighbours. The null model is implemented as follows: for each node, fix the concerned value of it and shuffle values of remaining nodes, then recalculate the local Moran's I of this node, and this process is repeated for 200 times to obtain an average. Note that the x label denotes concerned variables, here, $x \in \{\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{stage}, \textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{ind}, \mathrm{success\ rate\}}$.

Standard image High-resolution image

Compared to clustering of specialisation, the local Moran's I on success rate is not that high (see orange line in figure 7), indicating weak dependence of success level on local Moran's I. The local patterns of VC firms with higher success rate is within the error bar of the null model (except for the success rate 1). In other words, co-investing with successful investors will not guarantee a successful investment. However, the averaged local Moran's I is higher than the null model for most nodes with a low success rate (see the zoom-in figure in figure 7). This suggests that VC firms of poor performance may have a stronger clustering, while the performance of neighbours around relative successful VC firms are more random. Our results take new measurements of Moran's I, which is not considered by the previous study, such as [46]. Their conclusion that the better networked VC firms perform better is based on the regression of network measurements and the VC performance, which overlooked the local patterns.

4. Discussion

Network science has demonstrated its advantages in gaining a better understanding and insights of various physical and social systems, including investor types in shareholding networks [47], the life cycle of companies [48], the efficiency of transportation systems [49, 50], spatio-temporal interaction patterns between individuals [42], and attraction of cities on VC [4]. In this work, we leverage the advantages of the network modelling approach to investigate the impact of joint-investment relationships on the specialisation and performance of VC firms.

We first show that the number of investments made by VC firms, the number of investments received by start-up companies, and the number of IPOs all follow power-law like distributions. This fat-tail phenomenon is commonly identified in other types of real-world networks, implying collectively heterogeneous behaviours of a large number of VC firms. Then we construct a joint-investment syndication network, the nodes representing VC firms and the edges representing investments made by the connected nodes in the same start-up company at the same time. The characteristics of this network are demonstrated by the distributions of degree, h-index and community ranking.

Moreover, the statistics of the co-investors when entering a new stage or industry shows a tendency to co-invest with new friends. However, we cannot conclude whether there is a causal relationship between making new friends and entering a new stage or new industry. We also discover a negative correlation between the specialisation level on both investment stage and industry, which are measured by HHI, and the degree of the node in the syndication network. This informs us that a well-connected VC firm is likely to have diversified investment portfolios. Further analysis based on our adapted Moran's I on network demonstrates a decrease in the clustering phenomenon of VC firms with similar specialisation level and success rate with the topological distance. The clustering is generally restricted within one or two step of neighbours. Additionally, the local Moran's I analysis reveals an unequal distribution of the clustering. Instead of observing a successful club of VC firms connected by joint-investment relationships, we find it is likely that VC firms with low success rate cluster together.

In short, our work comprises the study of VC firms from a network perspective that appreciates the importance of interactions between entities. The analysing framework of this study can be applied to other similar scenarios to understand the network impacts on the node behaviours.

Future study can be expanded upon. In the recent decade, as the Chinese VC market becomes more mature, the managers (general partners) play a more important role in the investment. Thus, when team-level data is available, especially the social network between managers, instead of constructing the joint-investment network between VC firms, we can build the networks of managers and study the relationships between social networks and investment networks. Apart from syndicating with acquaintances, forming connections with some distant contacts can be achieved through various means, such as engaging with others in economic forums or indirectly associating with them due to the popularity of a startup in which they have invested [51], how such syndication relationship evolves and impacts the performance of VC firms is worth future investigation. When studying the performance of VC firms, we can further validate our argument by other types of financial performances, like the internal rate of return of the VC fund or the return of investment of each investment, when such data become available. Finally, regarding the causal inference between investment performance other behaviours, temporal analysis should be considered.

Acknowledgments

This work receives financial supports from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61903020), and Liyun Postdoctoral Program of Beijing Normal University.

Data availability statement

The data cannot be made publicly available upon publication because they contain commercially sensitive information. The data that support the findings of this study are available upon reasonable request from the authors.

Appendix:

Figure A1.

Figure A1. The distribution of (a) the number of M&A (Mergers & Acquisitions), (b) the number of start-up companies those got next round of investment, and (c) the number other types of unsuccessful exits of each VC firm. All distributions is well approximated by a power law.

Standard image High-resolution image
Figure A2.

Figure A2. Success rate of VC firms against (a) the number of investments made by the VC; (b) the degree of the VC in the syndication network. Each dot represents a VC firm. The colours indicate the density of the dots. The average success rates is 0.61.

Standard image High-resolution image
Figure A3.

Figure A3. The distribution of HHI of industry ($\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{ind}$), investment stage ($\textrm{HHI}^\mathrm{stage}$), and success rate of VC firms. Due to the fact that many VC firms only make few investments (e.g. one or two investments), they are of a higher probability of having an HHI as one or success rate as one or zero.

Standard image High-resolution image

Table A1. An example of the investment sequence of a VC firm. The investments are ordered by time. The stage corresponds to seed (S), initial (I), expansion (E), and mature (M), respectively. Letters in the Industry row corresponds to one of the 17 industry classifications by ICNEA.

Investments1st2nd3rd4th5th6th7th8th
StageEIESIMIM
IndustryAAICCBBT
Co-investor vc3 vc1,vc2 vc4,vc5,vc6  vc2,vc4 vc1,vc2,vc3 vc3,vc4
Null modelvc1 vc4,vc2 vc2,vc1 vc3 vc4,vc3 vc6,vc2 vc4 vc5,vc3

Table A2. The global Moran's I at different level of adjacency. The measurements include HHI of stage, HHI of industry and success rate. For instance, $I^\textrm{stage}$ is calculated by substituting $\textrm{HHI}^\textrm{stage}$ as x in equation (2). We permutate the values of the three measurements for 200 times and calculate the p-value of the observed Moran's I. The p-values of all the measurements are $\lt0.001$, indicating the significance of the autocorrelation of the measurements of nodes and their neighbours. The decreasing trend of Moran's I as a function of distance is visualised in figure 6.

  $I^\textrm{stage}$ $I^\textrm{ind}$ $I^\textrm{success}$
${\mathbf{\textsf{W}}}_{\boldsymbol{ij}}^{\boldsymbol{(1)}}$ 0.5580.5570.286
${\mathbf{\textsf{W}}}_{\boldsymbol{ij}}^{\boldsymbol{(2)}}$ 0.3540.3280.080
${\mathbf{\textsf{W}}}_{\boldsymbol{ij}}^{\boldsymbol{(3)}} $ 0.0770.0740.021
${\mathbf{\textsf{W}}}_{\boldsymbol{ij}}^{\boldsymbol{(L)}}$ 0.0110.0110.004
Please wait… references are loading.
10.1088/2632-072X/acd6cc