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Tristan Tomala
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2020 – today
- 2024
- [j28]Antoine Lagarde, Tristan Tomala:
Optimality and fairness of partisan gerrymandering. Math. Program. 203(1): 9-45 (2024) - [j27]Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala:
Splitting games over finite sets. Math. Program. 203(1): 477-498 (2024) - [c8]Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala:
A Converse Bound on the Mismatched Distortion-Rate Function. ISIT 2024: 867-872 - 2023
- [j26]Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala:
Corrigendum to "Social learning in nonatomic routing games" [Games Econ. Behav. 132 (2022) 221-233]. Games Econ. Behav. 138: 407-408 (2023) - 2022
- [j25]Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala:
Social learning in nonatomic routing games. Games Econ. Behav. 132: 221-233 (2022) - [j24]Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau, Tristan Tomala:
Interactive Information Design. Math. Oper. Res. 47(1): 153-175 (2022) - 2021
- [c7]Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala:
Strategic Communication with Decoder Side Information. ISIT 2021: 2696-2701 - [i8]Frédéric Koessler, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala:
Information Design in Large Games. CoRR abs/2107.06312 (2021) - 2020
- [c6]Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala:
Point-to-Point Strategic Communication. ITW 2020: 1-5 - [c5]Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala:
Bayesian Learning in Dynamic Nonatomic Routing Games. WINE 2020: 469 - [i7]Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala:
Bayesian Learning in Dynamic Non-atomic Routing Games. CoRR abs/2009.11580 (2020) - [i6]Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala:
Point-to-Point Strategic Communication. CoRR abs/2010.12480 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j23]Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala:
Persuasion with limited communication capacity. J. Econ. Theory 184 (2019) - [i5]Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala:
Strategic Communication with Side Information at the Decoder. CoRR abs/1911.04950 (2019) - 2018
- [j22]Fabien Gensbittel, Stefano Lovo, Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala:
Zero-sum revision games. Games Econ. Behav. 108: 504-522 (2018) - [j21]Marco Scarsini, Marc Schröder, Tristan Tomala:
Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows. Oper. Res. 66(2): 327-339 (2018) - [i4]Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala:
Information-Theoretic Limits of Strategic Communication. CoRR abs/1807.05147 (2018) - 2017
- [j20]Marie Laclau, Tristan Tomala:
Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring. J. Econ. Theory 169: 400-424 (2017) - [i3]Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala:
Persuasion with limited communication resources. CoRR abs/1711.04474 (2017) - [i2]Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala:
Information Design for Strategic Coordination of Autonomous Devices with Non-Aligned Utilities. CoRR abs/1711.04492 (2017) - 2016
- [c4]Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala:
Information design for strategic coordination of autonomous devices with non-aligned utilities. Allerton 2016: 233-242 - [i1]Marco Scarsini, Marc Schröder, Tristan Tomala:
Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows. CoRR abs/1606.05691 (2016) - 2015
- [j19]Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala:
Approximate implementation in Markovian environments. J. Econ. Theory 159: 401-442 (2015) - 2014
- [j18]Jérôme Renault, Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala:
Secure message transmission on directed networks. Games Econ. Behav. 85: 1-18 (2014) - 2013
- [j17]Tristan Tomala:
Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games. Math. Oper. Res. 38(4): 617-637 (2013) - 2012
- [j16]Yuval Heller, Eilon Solan, Tristan Tomala:
Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information. Games Econ. Behav. 74(1): 222-234 (2012) - [j15]Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala:
Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality. Int. J. Game Theory 41(3): 651-669 (2012) - 2011
- [j14]Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala:
General Properties of Long-Run Supergames. Dyn. Games Appl. 1(2): 319 (2011) - [j13]Tristan Tomala:
Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems. Oper. Res. 59(3): 754-763 (2011) - [j12]Johannes Hörner, Stefano Lovo, Tristan Tomala:
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence. J. Econ. Theory 146(5): 1770-1795 (2011) - 2010
- [c3]Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala:
Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality. BQGT 2010: 5:1 - [c2]Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala:
Mechanism design and communication networks. BQGT 2010: 94:1
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j11]Tristan Tomala:
Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Games Econ. Behav. 67(2): 682-694 (2009) - [j10]Olivier Gossner, Rida Laraki, Tristan Tomala:
Informationally optimal correlation. Math. Program. 116(1-2): 147-172 (2009) - [c1]Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala:
Secure communication: A mechanism design approach. GAMENETS 2009: 295-298 - [r1]Olivier Gossner, Tristan Tomala:
Repeated Games with Complete Information. Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science 2009: 7616-7630 - 2008
- [j9]Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala:
Probabilistic Reliability and Privacy of Communication Using Multicast in General Neighbor Networks. J. Cryptol. 21(2): 250-279 (2008) - [j8]Jérôme Renault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala:
Playing off-line games with bounded rationality. Math. Soc. Sci. 56(2): 207-223 (2008) - 2007
- [j7]Olivier Gossner, Tristan Tomala:
Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. Math. Oper. Res. 32(2): 413-424 (2007) - [j6]Jérôme Renault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala:
A Minority Game with Bounded Recall. Math. Oper. Res. 32(4): 873-889 (2007) - 2006
- [j5]Olivier Gossner, Tristan Tomala:
Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation. Math. Oper. Res. 31(1): 13-30 (2006) - 2004
- [j4]Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala:
Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals. Games Econ. Behav. 47(1): 124-156 (2004) - [j3]Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala:
Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Games Econ. Behav. 49(2): 313-344 (2004)
1990 – 1999
- 1998
- [j2]Tristan Tomala:
Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation. Int. J. Game Theory 27(1): 93-109 (1998) - [j1]Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala:
Repeated proximity games. Int. J. Game Theory 27(4): 539-559 (1998)
Coauthor Index
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last updated on 2024-10-13 17:58 CEST by the dblp team
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