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International Game Theory Review, Volume 21
Volume 21, Number 1, March 2019
- Vito Fragnelli, Stefano Moretti, Tamás Solymosi
:
Introduction. 1902001:1-1902001:3 - Giulia Bernardi
, Josep Freixas
:
An Axiomatization for Two Power Indices for (3, 2)-Simple Games. 1940001:1-1940001:24 - László Csató
:
Some Impossibilities of Ranking in Generalized Tournaments. 1940002:1-1940002:15 - Marco Dall'Aglio, Vito Fragnelli, Stefano Moretti:
Indices of Criticality in Simple Games. 1940003:1-1940003:21 - Leon A. Petrosyan:
Strong Strategic Support of Cooperation in Multistage Games. 1940004:1-1940004:12 - Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, Natividad Llorca:
A Solution Concept Related to "Bounded Rationality" for some Two-Echelon Models. 1940005:1-1940005:22 - Harborne W. Stuart Jr.:
Substitution, Complementarity, and Stability. 1940006:1-1940006:15
Volume 21, Number 2, June 2019
- Jane M. Binner
, Francesco Ciardiello, Leslie R. Fletcher, Vassili N. Kolokoltsov:
On Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in a Duopolistic Market Share Model. 1940007:1-1940007:20 - Yigal Gerchak, Eugene Khmelnitsky:
Partnership's Profit Sharing: Linear and Nonlinear Contracts. 1940008:1-1940008:18 - Gisèle Umbhauer:
Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria. 1940009:1-1940009:40 - Pierre von Mouche, Takashi Sato:
Cournot Equilibrium Uniqueness: At 0 Discontinuous Industry Revenue and Decreasing Price Flexibility. 1940010:1-1940010:19 - Thomas A. Weber
:
Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria. 1940011:1-1940011:19
Volume 21, Number 3, September 2019
- Darong Dai, Wenzheng Gao, Guoqiang Tian:
Two Differential Games Between Rent-Seeking Politicians and Capitalists: Implications for Economic Growth. 1850011:1-1850011:30 - Miguel Aramendía
, Quan Wen:
Defensive Plays in Repeated Games. 1850012:1-1850012:9 - Bernardo C. Lustosa, Alberto Luiz Albertin, Fernando Moreira:
Pricing in Information Orchestrators and Maximizing Stable Networks. 1850013:1-1850013:20 - Atsuhiro Satoh
, Yasuhito Tanaka:
Two Person Zero-Sum Game with Two Sets of Strategic Variables. 1850014:1-1850014:15 - Vladimir V. Mazalov
, Andrey Lukyanenko, Andrei V. Gurtov
:
Location-Price Competition in Mobile Operator Market. 1850015:1-1850015:15 - Thomas Vallée
, Gino Baudry
, Patrice Guillotreau:
To Discard or to Co-Produce by Recycling Waste: An Illustrative Analysis Involving Output Constraint. 1950001:1-1950001:21
- Vladimir Turetsky:
Dynamic Shapley Value and Dynamic Nash Bargaining. 1980001:1-1980001:3
Volume 21, Number 4, December 2019
- Mikhail I. Geraskin:
Equilibria in the Stackelberg Oligopoly Reflexive Games with Different Marginal Costs of Agents. 1950002:1-1950002:22 - Andrea di Liddo
:
Competition in the Presence of Counterfeiters: The Case of Fines Imposed on Counterfeiters and Pocketed by the Genuine Firm. 1950003:1-1950003:26 - Rabia Nessah, Tarik Tazdaït:
Quasi-Transfer Continuity and Nash Equilibrium. 1950004:1-1950004:8 - Elvio Accinelli
, Filipe Martins
, Jorge Oviedo
:
Evolutionary Game Theory: A Generalization of the ESS Definition. 1950005:1-1950005:19 - Simon Hoof:
Linear-State Differential Games in Partition Function Form. 1950006:1-1950006:13 - Brian R. Powers:
Dual-Issue Final-Offer Arbitration: Invariance of Pure Optimal Strategies Under Lp Metrics. 1950011:1-1950011:27
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