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International Game Theory Review, Volume 20
Volume 20, Number 1, March 2018
- Kjell Hausken:
Proactivity and Retroactivity of Firms and Information Sharing of Hackers. 1750027:1-1750027:30 - Takumi Kongo:
Effects of Players' Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values. 1750029:1-1750029:14 - Hiroaki Mukaidani
, Hua Xu
:
Differential Games for Weakly Coupled Large-Scale Linear Stochastic Systems with an H∞-Constraint. 1750025:1-1750025:24 - Vladislav Iosifovich Zhukovskiy, Tatiana Vladimirovna Makarkina, Maria Ivanovna Vysokos:
A New Approach to Noncooperative Games Under Uncertainty. 1750024:1-1750024:19 - Dömötör Pálvölgyi
:
All or Nothing Caching Games with Bounded Queries. 1750023:1-1750023:9 - Atsuhiro Satoh
, Yasuhito Tanaka:
Maximin and Minimax Strategies in Two-Players Game with Two Strategic Variables. 1750030:1-1750030:13
Volume 20, Number 2, June 2018
- Mostak Ahmed
, Hiroaki Mukaidani
, Tadashi Shima:
H∞ Constraint Pareto Optimal Strategy for Stochastic LPV Systems. 1750031:1-1750031:20 - Nicola Dimitri:
A Characterization of Verifiability and Observability in Contracts. 1750032:1-1750032:15 - Julio B. Clempner:
On Lyapunov Game Theory Equilibrium: Static and Dynamic Approaches. 1750033:1-1750033:14 - Misha Gavrilovich, Victoria L. Kreps:
Games with Symmetric Incomplete Information and Asymmetric Computational Resources. 1750034:1-1750034:16 - Evangelos Toumasatos, Stein Ivar Steinshamn:
Coalition Formation with Externalities: The Case of the Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Fishery in a Pre- and Post-Brexit Context. 1850001:1-1850001:48 - Pavlo Blavatskyy:
A Refinement of Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium. 1850004:1-1850004:14
Volume 20, Number 3, September 2018
- Mario A. García-Meza, Ekaterina V. Gromova
, José Daniel López-Barrientos
:
Stable Marketing Cooperation in a Differential Game for an Oligopoly. 1750028:1-1750028:18 - Koji Okuguchi, Takeshi Yamazaki:
Existence of Unique Equilibrium in Cournot Mixed Oligopoly. 1750035:1-1750035:13 - Trine Tornøe Platz, Peter Sudhölter
, José Manuel Zarzuelo, Lars Peter Østerdal
, Stefanos Leonardos, Costis Melolidakis:
Preface. 1802001:1-1802001:2 - Sébastien Rouillon
:
Noncooperative Dynamic Contribution to a Public Project. 1840002:1-1840002:24 - Judith Timmer, Werner R. W. Scheinhardt
:
Customer and Cost Sharing in a Jackson Network. 1850002:1-1850002:10 - Giorgio Gnecco
, Berna Tuncay, Fabio Pammolli
:
A Comparison of Game-Theoretic Models for Parallel Trade. 1850003:1-1850003:57
Volume 20, Number 4, December 2018
- Jinlu Li:
Split Equilibrium Problems for Related Games and Applications to Economic Theory. 1850005:1-1850005:20 - Andrey Parfenov:
Algorithm for Searching an Equilibrium in a Routing Game with Piecewise Constant Cost Functions. 1850006:1-1850006:13 - John Kleppe, Peter Borm
, Ruud Hendrickx
, Hans Reijnierse:
On Analyzing Cost Allocation Problems: Cooperation Building Structures and Order Problem Representations. 1850007:1-1850007:28 - Ryle S. Perera
:
An Evolutionary Game Theory Strategy for Carbon Emission Reduction in the Electricity Market. 1850008:1-1850008:20 - António Osório
:
Group Contest Success Function: The Heterogeneous Individuals Case. 1850009:1-1850009:8 - Ahmad Nahhas, Herbert W. Corley:
The Computational Complexity of Finding a Mixed Berge Equilibrium for a k-Person Noncooperative Game in Normal Form. 1850010:1-1850010:13
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