This article is the politics chapter of the China Forecast 2025 report published by MacroPolo in ... more This article is the politics chapter of the China Forecast 2025 report published by MacroPolo in October 2020.
Recent scholarship on career advancement in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shows that factiona... more Recent scholarship on career advancement in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shows that factional ties to the top leader, as measured by overlapping study and work experiences, strongly bolster chances of promotion to the Central Committee. Competence, if judged on economic growth and fiscal revenue, appears to matter more for the promotion of lower-level cadres. Such findings suggest that studies of Chinese elite politics must consider personal networks. A simple way to do so is to use The Committee, a product by MacroPolo that has recently been upgraded with a network feature that shows career and education overlaps for all 204 full members of the 19th CCP Central Committee, which holds office from 2017 to 2022.
Messaging trends in People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party's official mouthpiece, can reflec... more Messaging trends in People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party's official mouthpiece, can reflect changes in official views and policies. Data on three questions related to COVID-19 diplomacy sheds light on changing perspectives in Beijing: 1) Does China want to play a larger role in the world? 2) Does China want to inject its norms into global politics? 3) Did China’s assertive diplomacy begin with Xi Jinping?
This paper analyzes the markets, technology, and supply chains of 1) li-ion batteries, 2) OLED di... more This paper analyzes the markets, technology, and supply chains of 1) li-ion batteries, 2) OLED displays, and 3) AI chips, before offering key takeaways for policymakers to consider as part of any national strategy to ensure the United States remains competitive in the industries of tomorrow.
Under Xi Jinping the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department has formalized and signif... more Under Xi Jinping the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department has formalized and significantly intensified its efforts to proselytize Beijing’s policies to foreign political actors. Perhaps the most striking development is a “new normal” of sending high-level “briefing delegations” abroad, with such groups touring almost 80 countries after the 19th Party Congress. One reason for these trips is that the Party hopes “more people will study and learn from our experience of governance.”
Institutional reforms may not be as appealing as “liberalizing” economic reforms but, from Beijin... more Institutional reforms may not be as appealing as “liberalizing” economic reforms but, from Beijing’s perspective, they are the key to China’s future. While the Fourth Plenum’s Decision did not offer many concrete policies—not unusual for such high-level statements—it consolidated many developing strands of Chinese leader Xi Jinping ’s agenda into one authoritative document. In that vein, the Decision offers a revealing overview of the CCP’s overarching policy priority to improve the underlying structures of its rule to better govern an evermore complex China. The following analysis provides context for and analyzes major pillars of this governance reform program.
Debate over Washington’s decades-long policy of “engagement” with China has intensified in recent... more Debate over Washington’s decades-long policy of “engagement” with China has intensified in recent years. Within foreign policy circles, a growing and bipartisan chorus of voices is calling for the United States to abandon engagement because it failed to produce a liberal democracy in China that wholly accepted American global leadership. While these facts are incontrovertible, such a singular litmus test for whether engagement succeeded or failed is incomplete and misleading. It is premised on a selective historical record and risks oversimplifying what was a complex and multi-faceted approach to China across successive US administrations.
Economic engagement unquestionably gives Beijing greater weight in Canberra’s decision-making, bu... more Economic engagement unquestionably gives Beijing greater weight in Canberra’s decision-making, but China’s ability to convert trade into leverage is actually quite limited, and Chinese influence competes with countless other influences on national policy, including the U.S.
The Year of the Pig is supposed to be “a sensitive year for China,” according to The New York Tim... more The Year of the Pig is supposed to be “a sensitive year for China,” according to The New York Times. That’s because the Chinese Communist Party is “nervous” about the spate of anniversaries that loomed in 2019, declared The Economist. Indeed, this year sees the decennial anniversaries of several landmark events, including the 100th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen protests. But the rush of the day-to-day often crowds out more fundamental questions: Why are historical anniversaries important in Chinese politics? What makes one particular day, much the same as another, more subjectively significant?
Puzzled by “authoritarian resilience” in China after the “third wave” of democratization in the l... more Puzzled by “authoritarian resilience” in China after the “third wave” of democratization in the late 20th century, scholars began to delve deeper into how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) fortified its power by tolerating limited public participation in politics. In this vein, the CCP came to embrace the internet as a tool to both improve governance and enhance control, particularly through the collection and analysis of online public opinion. A fast-growing but under-studied case of this phenomenon is the Message Board for Local Leaders (MBLL, difang lingdao liuyanban). Run by People’s Daily Online and also accessible via a dedicated app and through WeChat, the MBLL lets netizens leave public messages for provincial, city, and county governments, which can either ignore the message or respond publicly.
Pundits are particularly fond of likening Xi Jinping to Chairman Mao. Xi’s accumulation of person... more Pundits are particularly fond of likening Xi Jinping to Chairman Mao. Xi’s accumulation of personal political power, purging of opponents, and removal of presidential term limits all lend credence to the comparison. Some of the latest evidence that “Xi is the new Mao” is his supposed “revival” of the Maoist concept of “self-reliance” (zili gengsheng). But talk of a rapid revival of Maoism under Xi is off the mark. Xi is hardly the first head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to be inspired by Mao Zedong Thought. In fact, self-reliance is a good case study of the abiding relevance of certain ideas in CCP thought. While self-reliance was championed by Mao, it is a concept that has been supported by all subsequent leaders, even if its application has evolved over time. That’s because self-reliance fundamentally means that the CCP will retain ultimate control over China’s economic development—an enduring consensus that has heavily influenced policy across generations of leaders. In many ways, Xi has built upon longstanding CCP principles that are larger than himself. Misinterpreting such concepts as merely “Xi issues” actually diminishes their importance as core “CCP issues” that would likely be pursued irrespective of who holds power in Zhongnanhai.
But who does the NPC actually represent? Who are the 2,975 NPC delegates who descended on Beijing... more But who does the NPC actually represent? Who are the 2,975 NPC delegates who descended on Beijing this March? The conclusion of this year’s Two Sessions is an opportune moment to compare several demographic characteristics of NPC “representatives,” as compiled by NPC Observer, with the 375 “policymakers” with full or alternate membership of the CCP Central Committee (CC). The Committee, MacroPolo’s relaunched digital interactive on Chinese elite politics, can now capture interesting but overlooked patterns and trends with the latest biographical data and enhanced search functions. Here, we look at several different types of representation: geographic, ethnic, gender, and generational. Co-authored with Damien Ma.
Perhaps no company exemplifies the complex and nuanced layers of the US-China relationship as muc... more Perhaps no company exemplifies the complex and nuanced layers of the US-China relationship as much as this American multinational, the world’s largest aerospace company. From hiring a Chinese student as its first engineer in 1916 and co-founding China’s first aircraft manufacturer in the 1930s, to the latest debates on trade and technology transfer, Boeing’s story is a unique window onto the forces—political and economic, domestic and international—that have both fortified the bilateral relationship and might now pull it apart.
While the Chinese economy was never as planned as that of the Soviet Union, “planning” has served... more While the Chinese economy was never as planned as that of the Soviet Union, “planning” has served a key role in the structure and operation of the country’s growth. From its origins as the State Planning Commission (SPC) in 1952 to its current incarnation as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) since 2003, the central planning agency has been adapted in response to China’s economic transformations. In the four decades since the sixth FYP in 1981, the NDRC’s focus has shifted markedly from microeconomic control to macroeconomic coordination, mainly manifest in the management of the FYP process that guides nationwide economic programs. The cyclicality of central planners' influence has in many ways reflected the gradual yet uneven retreat of the state and the rise of more market-oriented policies, and the NDRC still serves as a proxy for tensions between the state and market.
The winding path of the bicycle in China—from status symbol to mass transport to social rejection... more The winding path of the bicycle in China—from status symbol to mass transport to social rejection to lifestyle choice—reflects profound changes in the country's growth, cities, markets, trade, and manufacturing over 40 years of Reform and Opening.
Xi Jinping is wresting control of propaganda from State into Party hands, ramping up propaganda b... more Xi Jinping is wresting control of propaganda from State into Party hands, ramping up propaganda budgets, and making propaganda more watchable. Are his efforts winning over the public in China? Many Chinese elites are understandably unhappy, but some data suggest the general population has increasing trust in government. Co-authored with Damien Ma.
MacroPolo (Two Fen)
The “chairman of everything,” “China’s strongest leader since Mao,” and the ... more MacroPolo (Two Fen)
The “chairman of everything,” “China’s strongest leader since Mao,” and the “new Emperor” is spending a lot of time on, well, toilets. And China’s propaganda system, far from shying away from the image of a powerful leader focusing on the seemingly mundane, has worked overtime to promote this connection. Since President Xi Jinping proclaimed a “Toilet Revolution” (cesuo geming) in April 2015, China’s state news agency Xinhua boasted that the campaign has garnered extensive foreign coverage and approval, with 93% of a staggering 16,000 published articles deemed “positive.” Yet much of the commentary and media coverage have struck a bemused tone and offered little analysis. Actually, the Toilet Revolution should not be trivialized. It is a serious policy platform that enjoys strong backing from the central government. More than just a singular issue of improving public bathrooms, it is a prism through which to examine how the central government takes account of popular opinion, how bureaucratic interests are championed by China’s top leaders, and how agencies can effectively implement national policy campaigns. It’s also an interesting window on Xi’s leadership. His personal championing of the Toilet Revolution, which began as a campaign by the National Tourism Administration (NTA) but has since expanded its scope to become part of Xi’s broader rural development strategy, means that the initiative will likely continue to grow. The evolution of this policy also suggests that the government apparatus has not frozen entirely or ceased innovating under Xi, who has rewarded bottom-up initiative that aligns with his broader political goals.
While Xi has declared an interim victory over the COVID-19 pandemic, dealing with its economic an... more While Xi has declared an interim victory over the COVID-19 pandemic, dealing with its economic and social consequences will be the real test for China's political system.
This article is the politics chapter of the China Forecast 2025 report published by MacroPolo in ... more This article is the politics chapter of the China Forecast 2025 report published by MacroPolo in October 2020.
Recent scholarship on career advancement in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shows that factiona... more Recent scholarship on career advancement in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shows that factional ties to the top leader, as measured by overlapping study and work experiences, strongly bolster chances of promotion to the Central Committee. Competence, if judged on economic growth and fiscal revenue, appears to matter more for the promotion of lower-level cadres. Such findings suggest that studies of Chinese elite politics must consider personal networks. A simple way to do so is to use The Committee, a product by MacroPolo that has recently been upgraded with a network feature that shows career and education overlaps for all 204 full members of the 19th CCP Central Committee, which holds office from 2017 to 2022.
Messaging trends in People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party's official mouthpiece, can reflec... more Messaging trends in People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party's official mouthpiece, can reflect changes in official views and policies. Data on three questions related to COVID-19 diplomacy sheds light on changing perspectives in Beijing: 1) Does China want to play a larger role in the world? 2) Does China want to inject its norms into global politics? 3) Did China’s assertive diplomacy begin with Xi Jinping?
This paper analyzes the markets, technology, and supply chains of 1) li-ion batteries, 2) OLED di... more This paper analyzes the markets, technology, and supply chains of 1) li-ion batteries, 2) OLED displays, and 3) AI chips, before offering key takeaways for policymakers to consider as part of any national strategy to ensure the United States remains competitive in the industries of tomorrow.
Under Xi Jinping the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department has formalized and signif... more Under Xi Jinping the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department has formalized and significantly intensified its efforts to proselytize Beijing’s policies to foreign political actors. Perhaps the most striking development is a “new normal” of sending high-level “briefing delegations” abroad, with such groups touring almost 80 countries after the 19th Party Congress. One reason for these trips is that the Party hopes “more people will study and learn from our experience of governance.”
Institutional reforms may not be as appealing as “liberalizing” economic reforms but, from Beijin... more Institutional reforms may not be as appealing as “liberalizing” economic reforms but, from Beijing’s perspective, they are the key to China’s future. While the Fourth Plenum’s Decision did not offer many concrete policies—not unusual for such high-level statements—it consolidated many developing strands of Chinese leader Xi Jinping ’s agenda into one authoritative document. In that vein, the Decision offers a revealing overview of the CCP’s overarching policy priority to improve the underlying structures of its rule to better govern an evermore complex China. The following analysis provides context for and analyzes major pillars of this governance reform program.
Debate over Washington’s decades-long policy of “engagement” with China has intensified in recent... more Debate over Washington’s decades-long policy of “engagement” with China has intensified in recent years. Within foreign policy circles, a growing and bipartisan chorus of voices is calling for the United States to abandon engagement because it failed to produce a liberal democracy in China that wholly accepted American global leadership. While these facts are incontrovertible, such a singular litmus test for whether engagement succeeded or failed is incomplete and misleading. It is premised on a selective historical record and risks oversimplifying what was a complex and multi-faceted approach to China across successive US administrations.
Economic engagement unquestionably gives Beijing greater weight in Canberra’s decision-making, bu... more Economic engagement unquestionably gives Beijing greater weight in Canberra’s decision-making, but China’s ability to convert trade into leverage is actually quite limited, and Chinese influence competes with countless other influences on national policy, including the U.S.
The Year of the Pig is supposed to be “a sensitive year for China,” according to The New York Tim... more The Year of the Pig is supposed to be “a sensitive year for China,” according to The New York Times. That’s because the Chinese Communist Party is “nervous” about the spate of anniversaries that loomed in 2019, declared The Economist. Indeed, this year sees the decennial anniversaries of several landmark events, including the 100th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen protests. But the rush of the day-to-day often crowds out more fundamental questions: Why are historical anniversaries important in Chinese politics? What makes one particular day, much the same as another, more subjectively significant?
Puzzled by “authoritarian resilience” in China after the “third wave” of democratization in the l... more Puzzled by “authoritarian resilience” in China after the “third wave” of democratization in the late 20th century, scholars began to delve deeper into how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) fortified its power by tolerating limited public participation in politics. In this vein, the CCP came to embrace the internet as a tool to both improve governance and enhance control, particularly through the collection and analysis of online public opinion. A fast-growing but under-studied case of this phenomenon is the Message Board for Local Leaders (MBLL, difang lingdao liuyanban). Run by People’s Daily Online and also accessible via a dedicated app and through WeChat, the MBLL lets netizens leave public messages for provincial, city, and county governments, which can either ignore the message or respond publicly.
Pundits are particularly fond of likening Xi Jinping to Chairman Mao. Xi’s accumulation of person... more Pundits are particularly fond of likening Xi Jinping to Chairman Mao. Xi’s accumulation of personal political power, purging of opponents, and removal of presidential term limits all lend credence to the comparison. Some of the latest evidence that “Xi is the new Mao” is his supposed “revival” of the Maoist concept of “self-reliance” (zili gengsheng). But talk of a rapid revival of Maoism under Xi is off the mark. Xi is hardly the first head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to be inspired by Mao Zedong Thought. In fact, self-reliance is a good case study of the abiding relevance of certain ideas in CCP thought. While self-reliance was championed by Mao, it is a concept that has been supported by all subsequent leaders, even if its application has evolved over time. That’s because self-reliance fundamentally means that the CCP will retain ultimate control over China’s economic development—an enduring consensus that has heavily influenced policy across generations of leaders. In many ways, Xi has built upon longstanding CCP principles that are larger than himself. Misinterpreting such concepts as merely “Xi issues” actually diminishes their importance as core “CCP issues” that would likely be pursued irrespective of who holds power in Zhongnanhai.
But who does the NPC actually represent? Who are the 2,975 NPC delegates who descended on Beijing... more But who does the NPC actually represent? Who are the 2,975 NPC delegates who descended on Beijing this March? The conclusion of this year’s Two Sessions is an opportune moment to compare several demographic characteristics of NPC “representatives,” as compiled by NPC Observer, with the 375 “policymakers” with full or alternate membership of the CCP Central Committee (CC). The Committee, MacroPolo’s relaunched digital interactive on Chinese elite politics, can now capture interesting but overlooked patterns and trends with the latest biographical data and enhanced search functions. Here, we look at several different types of representation: geographic, ethnic, gender, and generational. Co-authored with Damien Ma.
Perhaps no company exemplifies the complex and nuanced layers of the US-China relationship as muc... more Perhaps no company exemplifies the complex and nuanced layers of the US-China relationship as much as this American multinational, the world’s largest aerospace company. From hiring a Chinese student as its first engineer in 1916 and co-founding China’s first aircraft manufacturer in the 1930s, to the latest debates on trade and technology transfer, Boeing’s story is a unique window onto the forces—political and economic, domestic and international—that have both fortified the bilateral relationship and might now pull it apart.
While the Chinese economy was never as planned as that of the Soviet Union, “planning” has served... more While the Chinese economy was never as planned as that of the Soviet Union, “planning” has served a key role in the structure and operation of the country’s growth. From its origins as the State Planning Commission (SPC) in 1952 to its current incarnation as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) since 2003, the central planning agency has been adapted in response to China’s economic transformations. In the four decades since the sixth FYP in 1981, the NDRC’s focus has shifted markedly from microeconomic control to macroeconomic coordination, mainly manifest in the management of the FYP process that guides nationwide economic programs. The cyclicality of central planners' influence has in many ways reflected the gradual yet uneven retreat of the state and the rise of more market-oriented policies, and the NDRC still serves as a proxy for tensions between the state and market.
The winding path of the bicycle in China—from status symbol to mass transport to social rejection... more The winding path of the bicycle in China—from status symbol to mass transport to social rejection to lifestyle choice—reflects profound changes in the country's growth, cities, markets, trade, and manufacturing over 40 years of Reform and Opening.
Xi Jinping is wresting control of propaganda from State into Party hands, ramping up propaganda b... more Xi Jinping is wresting control of propaganda from State into Party hands, ramping up propaganda budgets, and making propaganda more watchable. Are his efforts winning over the public in China? Many Chinese elites are understandably unhappy, but some data suggest the general population has increasing trust in government. Co-authored with Damien Ma.
MacroPolo (Two Fen)
The “chairman of everything,” “China’s strongest leader since Mao,” and the ... more MacroPolo (Two Fen)
The “chairman of everything,” “China’s strongest leader since Mao,” and the “new Emperor” is spending a lot of time on, well, toilets. And China’s propaganda system, far from shying away from the image of a powerful leader focusing on the seemingly mundane, has worked overtime to promote this connection. Since President Xi Jinping proclaimed a “Toilet Revolution” (cesuo geming) in April 2015, China’s state news agency Xinhua boasted that the campaign has garnered extensive foreign coverage and approval, with 93% of a staggering 16,000 published articles deemed “positive.” Yet much of the commentary and media coverage have struck a bemused tone and offered little analysis. Actually, the Toilet Revolution should not be trivialized. It is a serious policy platform that enjoys strong backing from the central government. More than just a singular issue of improving public bathrooms, it is a prism through which to examine how the central government takes account of popular opinion, how bureaucratic interests are championed by China’s top leaders, and how agencies can effectively implement national policy campaigns. It’s also an interesting window on Xi’s leadership. His personal championing of the Toilet Revolution, which began as a campaign by the National Tourism Administration (NTA) but has since expanded its scope to become part of Xi’s broader rural development strategy, means that the initiative will likely continue to grow. The evolution of this policy also suggests that the government apparatus has not frozen entirely or ceased innovating under Xi, who has rewarded bottom-up initiative that aligns with his broader political goals.
While Xi has declared an interim victory over the COVID-19 pandemic, dealing with its economic an... more While Xi has declared an interim victory over the COVID-19 pandemic, dealing with its economic and social consequences will be the real test for China's political system.
Tesla is a company that its critics love to hate. A swarm of short sellers have bet $10 billion t... more Tesla is a company that its critics love to hate. A swarm of short sellers have bet $10 billion that the electric carmaker will fail. They tweet incessantly about Tesla’s loss-making operations and even fly drones over its facilities to verify production figures. Elon Musk, Tesla’s erratic CEO, has berated these short-sellers as “haters.” Betting against Tesla’s prospects may profit short-sellers, but it could end up dashing America’s only hope to build supply chains for a technology that will reshape the future economy: the lithium-ion (li-ion) battery.
Over the past 40 years, Western observers often overlooked what Beijing was saying about its nati... more Over the past 40 years, Western observers often overlooked what Beijing was saying about its national ambitions. The policy of engagement that Washington has pursued with China may have been its best option, but if successive administrations had taken Beijing’s words more seriously, the United States might have been more proactive in safeguarding the international order from the political, economic and security challenges posed by an authoritarian superpower — challenges that have necessitated a new trade agreement today.
The translator John Minford personifies the quality by which he judges prose – its “generous spir... more The translator John Minford personifies the quality by which he judges prose – its “generous spirit.” For two marvelous hours on Thursday mornings in late 2015, Professor Minford taught a class on Chinese literature at The Australian National University in Canberra, where he introduced his students (myself among them) to the characters and the worlds of China’s cultural tradition. Hidden on an obscure university website, three of Minford’s six seminars survive. (A lecture series on similar themes that Minford gave at the Hang Seng Management College in Hong Kong is also available on YouTube.) Recorded at the Australian Center on China in the World, these sessions transport listeners from the present into a past that brims with vaster life, illuminating the tribulations and the revelations of ancient writers and their modern translators.
Los Angeles Review of Books (China Channel)
China boasts the world’s longest high-speed rail net... more Los Angeles Review of Books (China Channel)
China boasts the world’s longest high-speed rail network. Its train stations, in kind, house probably the world’s lengthiest security lines. These lines are not genteel queues. Hundreds of anxious travelers, corralled by metal barriers that wind into a joyless maze, jockey for position in a passing eternity of squeeze, stress, and quite some sweat. I often arrive hours before my train is due to leave; such is my fear of getting stuck in line. So I should have felt glad to save some time when, trudging through security at Beijing South Railway Station earlier this year, I encountered a sign I hadn’t seen before. In blocky white characters on blue chloroplast – a hallmark of official signage across the PRC – the sign was for a line that branched off near the luggage scanners, and announced “Gentlemen Only Line.”
Op-ed published in the Australian Financial Review, 13 March 2016. Co-authored with Professor Pet... more Op-ed published in the Australian Financial Review, 13 March 2016. Co-authored with Professor Peter Drysdale, ANU.
Published in East Asia Forum, 30 June 2015. Proposed a novel solution for how Western countries c... more Published in East Asia Forum, 30 June 2015. Proposed a novel solution for how Western countries can cooperate with Chinese anti-corruption campaigns while upholding rule-of-law in leading platform for Asia-Pacific analysis. Background information listed for an episode of Australia’s leading investigative journalism television show, Four Corners, titled ‘The Great Wall of Money’.
First English-language analysis of a major foreign policy editorial by Chinese IR scholar Yan Xue... more First English-language analysis of a major foreign policy editorial by Chinese IR scholar Yan Xuetong.
Published by The Australian, 30 August 2013. Arguing against winding back funding for Asia educat... more Published by The Australian, 30 August 2013. Arguing against winding back funding for Asia education and exchange initiatives.
Published by The Drum (Australian Broadcasting Corporation). Arguing for greater engagement with ... more Published by The Drum (Australian Broadcasting Corporation). Arguing for greater engagement with regional foreign policy in Australian election campaign.
Published by Danwei, 6 August 2013. Featured as an 'Essential' article in the Sinocism China News... more Published by Danwei, 6 August 2013. Featured as an 'Essential' article in the Sinocism China Newsletter.
The Australia-China Story Archive is a compendium of media reports, comments and analysis related... more The Australia-China Story Archive is a compendium of media reports, comments and analysis related to the Australia-China relationship that has been developed from 2009. The Archive is arranged by topic and theme. Each theme is prefaced by an introductory essay followed by links to media reports and articles arranged chronologically. This allows users to track not only the major debates on Australia-China relations over recent years, but also to identify who said what and when.
Worked on project led by Professor Geremie Barmé and supervised by Dr Ryan Manuel, ANU.
EABER Working Paper Series, No. 118. Forthcoming in the International Journal of Public Policy. C... more EABER Working Paper Series, No. 118. Forthcoming in the International Journal of Public Policy. Co-authored with Professor Peter Drysdale and Dr Shiro Armstrong, ANU.
Submission to Australian Senate Inquiry, March 2016. Co-authored with Professor Peter Drysdale an... more Submission to Australian Senate Inquiry, March 2016. Co-authored with Professor Peter Drysdale and Dr Shiro Armstrong, ANU.
Executive Editor. Peer-reviewed, bilingual journal co-published with the University of Sydney Chi... more Executive Editor. Peer-reviewed, bilingual journal co-published with the University of Sydney China Studies Centre.
Executive Editor. Peer-reviewed, bilingual journal co-published with the University of Sydney Chi... more Executive Editor. Peer-reviewed, bilingual journal co-published with the University of Sydney China Studies Centre.
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The “chairman of everything,” “China’s strongest leader since Mao,” and the “new Emperor” is spending a lot of time on, well, toilets. And China’s propaganda system, far from shying away from the image of a powerful leader focusing on the seemingly mundane, has worked overtime to promote this connection. Since President Xi Jinping proclaimed a “Toilet Revolution” (cesuo geming) in April 2015, China’s state news agency Xinhua boasted that the campaign has garnered extensive foreign coverage and approval, with 93% of a staggering 16,000 published articles deemed “positive.” Yet much of the commentary and media coverage have struck a bemused tone and offered little analysis. Actually, the Toilet Revolution should not be trivialized. It is a serious policy platform that enjoys strong backing from the central government. More than just a singular issue of improving public bathrooms, it is a prism through which to examine how the central government takes account of popular opinion, how bureaucratic interests are championed by China’s top leaders, and how agencies can effectively implement national policy campaigns. It’s also an interesting window on Xi’s leadership. His personal championing of the Toilet Revolution, which began as a campaign by the National Tourism Administration (NTA) but has since expanded its scope to become part of Xi’s broader rural development strategy, means that the initiative will likely continue to grow. The evolution of this policy also suggests that the government apparatus has not frozen entirely or ceased innovating under Xi, who has rewarded bottom-up initiative that aligns with his broader political goals.
Media
The “chairman of everything,” “China’s strongest leader since Mao,” and the “new Emperor” is spending a lot of time on, well, toilets. And China’s propaganda system, far from shying away from the image of a powerful leader focusing on the seemingly mundane, has worked overtime to promote this connection. Since President Xi Jinping proclaimed a “Toilet Revolution” (cesuo geming) in April 2015, China’s state news agency Xinhua boasted that the campaign has garnered extensive foreign coverage and approval, with 93% of a staggering 16,000 published articles deemed “positive.” Yet much of the commentary and media coverage have struck a bemused tone and offered little analysis. Actually, the Toilet Revolution should not be trivialized. It is a serious policy platform that enjoys strong backing from the central government. More than just a singular issue of improving public bathrooms, it is a prism through which to examine how the central government takes account of popular opinion, how bureaucratic interests are championed by China’s top leaders, and how agencies can effectively implement national policy campaigns. It’s also an interesting window on Xi’s leadership. His personal championing of the Toilet Revolution, which began as a campaign by the National Tourism Administration (NTA) but has since expanded its scope to become part of Xi’s broader rural development strategy, means that the initiative will likely continue to grow. The evolution of this policy also suggests that the government apparatus has not frozen entirely or ceased innovating under Xi, who has rewarded bottom-up initiative that aligns with his broader political goals.
China boasts the world’s longest high-speed rail network. Its train stations, in kind, house probably the world’s lengthiest security lines. These lines are not genteel queues. Hundreds of anxious travelers, corralled by metal barriers that wind into a joyless maze, jockey for position in a passing eternity of squeeze, stress, and quite some sweat. I often arrive hours before my train is due to leave; such is my fear of getting stuck in line. So I should have felt glad to save some time when, trudging through security at Beijing South Railway Station earlier this year, I encountered a sign I hadn’t seen before. In blocky white characters on blue chloroplast – a hallmark of official signage across the PRC – the sign was for a line that branched off near the luggage scanners, and announced “Gentlemen Only Line.”
Worked on project led by Professor Geremie Barmé and supervised by Dr Ryan Manuel, ANU.