In Devitt’s view linguistic intuitions are opinions about linguistic production or products, most... more In Devitt’s view linguistic intuitions are opinions about linguistic production or products, most often one’s own. They result from ordinary empirical investigation, so “they are immediate and fairly unreflective empirical central-processor responses to linguistic phenomena”, which reactions are, moreover, theory-laden, where the ‘theory’ encompasses all sorts of speaker’s beliefs. The paper reconstructs his arguments, places his view on a map of alternative approaches to intuitions and offers a defense of a minimalistic “voice-of -competence” view. First, intuitions are to be identified with the data, the minimal “products” of tentative linguistic production of naïve speaker-listeners and not with their opinions about the data. Second, the data involve no theory and very little proto-theory. Third, although there might be admixtures of guesswork in the conscious production of data, these are routinely weaned out by linguists. Finally, mere acceptance of the “voice of competence” does not land us in any objectionable Cartesianism: it is compatible with naturalism and with distrust of a priori philosophy.
Merely conceptual knowledge, not based on specific sensitivity to the referential domain, is not ... more Merely conceptual knowledge, not based on specific sensitivity to the referential domain, is not seriously a priori. It is argued here that it is either weakly and superficially a priori, or downright a posteriori. This is done starting from the fact that many of our definitions (or concepts) are recognizably empirically established, and pointing out that recognizably empirical grounding yields superficial a priority. Further, some (first-order) concept analyzing propositions are empirically false about their referents and thus empirically refutable. Therefore, our empirical definitions (or concepts) are fallible and empirically revisable: they can turn out to be incorrect about the intended satisfiers of the concept defined, and their concept analyzing propositions to be false. Now, empirical revisability is incompatible with strong apriority (and entails at best a weak a priority or a posteriority). The result is quite shocking: analyticity does not entail a priority.
The paper argues that the use of epistemic terms, prominently “…knows” and even “…knows a priori/... more The paper argues that the use of epistemic terms, prominently “…knows” and even “…knows a priori/a posteriori” is context-sensitive along several dimensions. Besides the best known dimension of quality of evidence (lower quality for less demanding context, and higher one for more demanding), there is a dimension of depth (shallow justification for superficial evaluation, and deeper justification for deeper probing evaluation contexts). This claim is illustrated by context-dependent ascription of apriority and aposteriority. The argument proposed here focuses upon the status of propositions that are analytic in empirical concepts (like “Whales are animals”). It is a commonplace in epistemology that any analytic proposition (including e-analytic ones) is a priori. The paper claims that propositions analyzing empirical concepts are an interesting counterexample. It develops the following argument: Many such propositions have empirical counterparts that are expressed by the same form-of-words. (E.g. the form of words „Whales are mammals“ can express both an e-analytic proposition and an empirical statement.) They normally derive from their empirical counterparts. Beliefs in such propositions, can be explicitly justified either a priori, by pointing out their conceptual, analytic status, or by reverting to their empirical counterparts. In contexts of very superficial evaluation, one may justify such an analytic belief in the first, conceptual way. In most contexts a belief in a proposition analyzing an empirical concept is being justified by appeal to its empirical counterparts. The empirical justification is normally taken as being ultimate. Empirical counterparts are derivationally deeper than the corresponding analytic propositions, and empirical justification is deeper than a priori one as well. Therefore, propositions analyzing empirical concepts are deeply a posteriori and superficially a priori.
Explaining intuitions in terms of “facts of our natural history” is compatible with rationally tr... more Explaining intuitions in terms of “facts of our natural history” is compatible with rationally trusting them. This compatibilist view is defended in the present paper, focusing upon nomic and essentialist modal intuitions. The opposite, incompatibilist view alleges the following. If basic modal intuitions are due to our cognitive makeup or “imaginative habits” then the epistemologists are left with mere non-rational feeling of compulsion on the side of the thinker. Intuitions then cannot inform us about modal reality. In contrast, the paper argues that there are several independent sources of justification which make the feeling of compulsion rational: the prima-facie and a priori ones come from obviousness and not being able to imagine things otherwise, others, a posteriori, from epistemic success of our basic modal intuitions. Further, the general scheme of evolutionary learning is reliable, reliability is preserved in the resulting individual’s cognitive makeup, and we can come to know this a posteriori. The a posteriori appeal to evolution thus plays a subsidiary role in justification, filling the remaining gap and removing the residual doubt. Explaining modal intuitions is compatible with moderate realism about modality itself.
In Horgan’s view it is the inference to the best explanation that is the only source of aposterio... more In Horgan’s view it is the inference to the best explanation that is the only source of aposteriority. This abductive view of aposteriority is original and challenging. Unfortunately, it appears to have some serious shortcomings. The phenomenology of philosophical thought experiments seems to speak against it.
Natural kind terms don't have descriptive meanings, Devitt claims. The paper argues that this cla... more Natural kind terms don't have descriptive meanings, Devitt claims. The paper argues that this claim is tantamount to denying the existence of natural kind concepts, in the usual sense of “concept”, since concepts are predicate meanings. The denial is counterintuitive, and has bad epistemological consequences, since natural kind concepts are among the building blocks of our understanding of the world. The paper ends with a positive proposal, featuring a bold claim: if the standard Kripke-Putnam line on semantics of natural kind terms is correct, and if there are natural kind concepts, then propositions analyzing these concepts are not a priori knowable. Analyticity does not entail apriority.
I have argued, all too briefly, that Allison’s epistemic two-aspect reading of Kant leaves opened... more I have argued, all too briefly, that Allison’s epistemic two-aspect reading of Kant leaves opened the problem of a priori knowledge, central for Kant’s enterprise. The question was: can the transcendental idealism with its Copernican turn explain synthetic a priori? Can it do it better than its causal-contingent rivals, in particular a pre-established harmony view according to which some causal process, for instance evolution, harmonizes the structure of mind with the structure of the world? If we assume, with Kant, that paradigmatic cases of such knowledge, arithmetic and geometry, concern the structure of space and of temporal succession, and if we accept, with Allison, that space and time are mere epistemic conditions tied to the structure of our mind, then the objects of paradigmatic a priori knowledge—arithmetical and geometrical—are mind-dependent, distinct from ostensible objects of the relevant discourse, and the pieces of such knowledge themselves can be understood only in a completely subjectivized manner.
The paper honors Dunja Jutronić’s work by discussing her view of linguistic intuitions and intuit... more The paper honors Dunja Jutronić’s work by discussing her view of linguistic intuitions and intuitions in general. The “ordinarist” views (D. Jutronić, M. Devitt, and T. Williamson) deny that intuitions are special in any regard, and insist on holistic justification for them, of a unitary, either a posteriori or neutral variety. The paper proposes the sketch of an alternative, a pluralistic intuitionism-competentialism, according to which intuition is special, since intuitions are deliverances of competence, linguistic, spatial-geometrical, metaphysical, moral, and so on, the stance dubbed here” the Moderate Voice-of-Competence view”. It agrees with the ordinarists that intuitions are extroverted, turned to their referential domain, in contrast to the views of conceptualists. It also agrees about explanationism, and about the importance of scenarios and simulation in generating intuitions in contrast to pure logical reasoning. It disagrees with them in defending a pluralistic aposteriorism: intuitions are justified a priori in a prima facie and sometimes superficial way at the level of immediate acceptance, but mainly a posteriori on the higher, reflective level, needed for full-scale knowledge. Finally, the metaphysical pluralism of the proposed view comes to fore in distinguishing intuition-kinds, like moral and linguistic one’s whose object is (taken here to be) response-dependent, from those whose object is completely mind-independent.
The real treat for philosophers is Chapter six:: “Language: inside or outside the mind?” Collins ... more The real treat for philosophers is Chapter six:: “Language: inside or outside the mind?” Collins goes way beyond merely introducing the reader to the issues; he offers a succinct defense of his own view, which he presents as a faithful philosophical interpretation of Chomsky. Here is the main idea. Let us agree that there are external items, strings of symbols and the like, that are usually associated with language, and let us, following Chomsky’s lead, call them and them only, taxonomized in any way you like, E-languages. Consider now the structure of the innermost psychological competence that ultimately explains our speaking, hearing and understanding utterances, not as abstract mathematical entity, but as a mental configuration. Call it I-language. Collins raises the right question: how and where is language to be located? His answer is that language is inside the mind, and he is clear about it from the beginning of the book to its end. In the review I offer a brief sketch of an alternative.my own preference is for a more catholic approach, which would make space for both, E- and I-languages. I agree very much with Collin’s stress on the I-language. But I would keep the word “language” closer to the folk usage, philosophical tradition and the usage of most linguists who write Chomsky-inspired grammars of English, Italian, French, even Croatian. Let me use as the signal for this general sense the form G-language. Using it in this sense, I would say that a given E-language is a G-language because the minds properly equipped recognize it as a G-language; it is this response of properly equipped minds that is constitutive of G-language.
There is nothing wrong in reflectively justifying our logical beliefs and habits by methods of w... more There is nothing wrong in reflectively justifying our logical beliefs and habits by methods of wide reflective equilibrium, taking into account both their stunning empirical success, and the available empirical explanation(s) of cognizers having them and of their reliability. The three conceptualist considerations should be supplemented (and, some might argue, even replaced) by wide reflective equilibrium at the reflective level: first, the meaning-constitutive account moves in a too small circle of a very narrow reflective equilibrium, so there is a need to expand the circle, which would make the equilibrium wide. Second, the logic-external consideration of obviousness-cum-compellingness cries for explanation. And finally, the logic-external consideration of indispensability leads directly to empirical considerations having to do with success, actual or potential, of the cognitive enterprise(s) for which logic is so badly needed. And success is an indicator of reliability. In short, staying within the narrow conceptualist circle amounts to placing of a “veil of conception” between us and the logic- in-the world, blocking the understanding of what makes logic objectively valid. Thus, the very dialectics of the conceptualist program points to a less apriorist view of logical knowledge.
Chalmers’s proposal is built around the idea that our concepts and their intensions dictate a pri... more Chalmers’s proposal is built around the idea that our concepts and their intensions dictate a priori our rational reactions to empirical discoveries. In contrast, I argue that the kinematics of conceptual change can be rational without being a priori dictated by concepts that figure within it. I will argue for the following picture. Very naïve concepts offer a poor guidance to empirical inquiry, which needs more refined and mature ones. Such concepts are themselves products of a lot of streamlining, that takes place under the impact of empirical discoveries and empirical theory building. Conceptual truths incorporated into such concepts are often themselves empirically founded. Therefore, knowledge of such truths is to a significant extent aposteriori knowledge.
this is a review of
Szabo Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (Eds.): Conceivability and Possibility, O... more this is a review of Szabo Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (Eds.): Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press, 2002
The review came out of a presentation at the
conference Plato on Goodness and Justice that took ... more The review came out of a presentation at the conference Plato on Goodness and Justice that took place in Zagreb, 3-7 March 2004.
This is a discussion of Boghossian, P. (2008), Content and Justification,
Oxford University Pres... more This is a discussion of Boghossian, P. (2008), Content and Justification, Oxford University Press. conclusion: "Here is my concluding worry: unavoidable and indispensable tools provide entitlement/justification for projects if projects are themselves meaningful. However, we are justified to think that our most general cognitive project is meaningful, and justified partly of the basis of its up to date success; and this basis is a posteriori. Therefore, the whole reflective justification from compellingness and unavoidability is a posteriori. This suggests that the justification of our intuitional armchair beliefs and practices in general is plural and structured, with a priori and a posteriori elements combined in a complex way. It seems thus that a priori/ a posteriori distinction is useful and to the point. What is needed is refinement and respect for structure, not rejection of the distinction."
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations feature three big thought-experiments, The Builders,... more Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations feature three big thought-experiments, The Builders, the Rule-following argument, and the Private language argument. The experiments in question are macro-TEs, rare in theoretical philosophy, that feature a number of steps or stages. The paper distinguishes eight such stages and characterizes them briefly, offering an explicit understanding of the stages, their mutual relations and commonalities with other thought-experiments in philosophy. This is proposed as a step towards systematically placing Wittgenstein’s work in the wider context of actual philosophical methodology and of present-day sharp debates about armchair thinking in the field. One immediate result of comparing Wittgenstein’s TEs with their counterparts in the analytic mainstream reveals an interesting trait: they are merely suggestive, in the sense that the theses they point to are rarely put forward explicitly, and even more rarely argued for in the manner that is nowadays fashionable in the mainstream. The paper briefly points to the difference by using the examples of Kripke’s presentation of Rule following and the unorthodox reading of the Builders by Charles Travis, to illustrate the potential of the merely suggestive material for re-interpretation by a creative thinker.
The paper joins Horwich’s criticism of stipulationist accounts of a priori knowledge, and raises ... more The paper joins Horwich’s criticism of stipulationist accounts of a priori knowledge, and raises some problems for his own account of the a priori. It first questions the assumed separability of scientific investigation and non-scientific assertoric practices in regard to norms of adequacy. It also questioned Horwich’s Restriction Assumption according to which only the former are answerable to the standards of empirical adequacy and overall simplicity(which threaten apriority in the case of science). Finally, itcriticises his argument that inability to think otherwise might guarantee apriority, pointing to science-driven reflective revisability of possibly innate beliefs.
The first, critical part of the paper summarizes J. R. Brown’s Platonic view on thought experime... more The first, critical part of the paper summarizes J. R. Brown’s Platonic view on thought experiments (TEs) and raises several questions. One of them concerns the initial, particular judgments in a TE. Since they seem to precede the general insight, Brown’s Platonic intuition, and not to derive from it the question arises as to the nature of the initial particular judgment. The other question concerns the explanatory status of Brown’s epistemic Platonism. The second, constructive descriptive-explanatory part argues for an alternative, i.e. the view of TE as reasoning in or with a help of mental models, which can accommodate all the relevant data within a non-aprioristic framework (or, at worst, within a minimally “aprioristic”, nativist one). The last part turns to issues of justification and argues that the mental model proposal can account for justification of intuitional judgments and can also support the view of properly functioning intuition as an epistemic virtue, all within a more naturalist framework than the one endorsed by Brown.
Building upon Crane’s intentionalism, the paper proposes a variant of response-dependentist view... more Building upon Crane’s intentionalism, the paper proposes a variant of response-dependentist view of colors. To be of a color C is to have a disposition to cause in normal observers a response, namely, intentional phenomenal C-experience. The view is dubbed “response-intentionalism.” It follows from the following considerations, with red of a tomato surface taken as example of color C. Full phenomenal red is being visaged (intentionally experienced) as being on the surface of the tomato. Science tells us that full phenomenal red is not on the surface of the tomato. Equally, full phenomenal red is not a property of subjective state but its intentional object. Response-intentionalism follows by considerations of charity, i.e. minimizing and rationalizing the error of the cognizer, and of inference to the best explanation: being red in scientific sense is being such as to cause the response (intentionally) visaging phenomenal red in normal observers under normal circumstances.
In Devitt’s view linguistic intuitions are opinions about linguistic production or products, most... more In Devitt’s view linguistic intuitions are opinions about linguistic production or products, most often one’s own. They result from ordinary empirical investigation, so “they are immediate and fairly unreflective empirical central-processor responses to linguistic phenomena”, which reactions are, moreover, theory-laden, where the ‘theory’ encompasses all sorts of speaker’s beliefs. The paper reconstructs his arguments, places his view on a map of alternative approaches to intuitions and offers a defense of a minimalistic “voice-of -competence” view. First, intuitions are to be identified with the data, the minimal “products” of tentative linguistic production of naïve speaker-listeners and not with their opinions about the data. Second, the data involve no theory and very little proto-theory. Third, although there might be admixtures of guesswork in the conscious production of data, these are routinely weaned out by linguists. Finally, mere acceptance of the “voice of competence” does not land us in any objectionable Cartesianism: it is compatible with naturalism and with distrust of a priori philosophy.
Merely conceptual knowledge, not based on specific sensitivity to the referential domain, is not ... more Merely conceptual knowledge, not based on specific sensitivity to the referential domain, is not seriously a priori. It is argued here that it is either weakly and superficially a priori, or downright a posteriori. This is done starting from the fact that many of our definitions (or concepts) are recognizably empirically established, and pointing out that recognizably empirical grounding yields superficial a priority. Further, some (first-order) concept analyzing propositions are empirically false about their referents and thus empirically refutable. Therefore, our empirical definitions (or concepts) are fallible and empirically revisable: they can turn out to be incorrect about the intended satisfiers of the concept defined, and their concept analyzing propositions to be false. Now, empirical revisability is incompatible with strong apriority (and entails at best a weak a priority or a posteriority). The result is quite shocking: analyticity does not entail a priority.
The paper argues that the use of epistemic terms, prominently “…knows” and even “…knows a priori/... more The paper argues that the use of epistemic terms, prominently “…knows” and even “…knows a priori/a posteriori” is context-sensitive along several dimensions. Besides the best known dimension of quality of evidence (lower quality for less demanding context, and higher one for more demanding), there is a dimension of depth (shallow justification for superficial evaluation, and deeper justification for deeper probing evaluation contexts). This claim is illustrated by context-dependent ascription of apriority and aposteriority. The argument proposed here focuses upon the status of propositions that are analytic in empirical concepts (like “Whales are animals”). It is a commonplace in epistemology that any analytic proposition (including e-analytic ones) is a priori. The paper claims that propositions analyzing empirical concepts are an interesting counterexample. It develops the following argument: Many such propositions have empirical counterparts that are expressed by the same form-of-words. (E.g. the form of words „Whales are mammals“ can express both an e-analytic proposition and an empirical statement.) They normally derive from their empirical counterparts. Beliefs in such propositions, can be explicitly justified either a priori, by pointing out their conceptual, analytic status, or by reverting to their empirical counterparts. In contexts of very superficial evaluation, one may justify such an analytic belief in the first, conceptual way. In most contexts a belief in a proposition analyzing an empirical concept is being justified by appeal to its empirical counterparts. The empirical justification is normally taken as being ultimate. Empirical counterparts are derivationally deeper than the corresponding analytic propositions, and empirical justification is deeper than a priori one as well. Therefore, propositions analyzing empirical concepts are deeply a posteriori and superficially a priori.
Explaining intuitions in terms of “facts of our natural history” is compatible with rationally tr... more Explaining intuitions in terms of “facts of our natural history” is compatible with rationally trusting them. This compatibilist view is defended in the present paper, focusing upon nomic and essentialist modal intuitions. The opposite, incompatibilist view alleges the following. If basic modal intuitions are due to our cognitive makeup or “imaginative habits” then the epistemologists are left with mere non-rational feeling of compulsion on the side of the thinker. Intuitions then cannot inform us about modal reality. In contrast, the paper argues that there are several independent sources of justification which make the feeling of compulsion rational: the prima-facie and a priori ones come from obviousness and not being able to imagine things otherwise, others, a posteriori, from epistemic success of our basic modal intuitions. Further, the general scheme of evolutionary learning is reliable, reliability is preserved in the resulting individual’s cognitive makeup, and we can come to know this a posteriori. The a posteriori appeal to evolution thus plays a subsidiary role in justification, filling the remaining gap and removing the residual doubt. Explaining modal intuitions is compatible with moderate realism about modality itself.
In Horgan’s view it is the inference to the best explanation that is the only source of aposterio... more In Horgan’s view it is the inference to the best explanation that is the only source of aposteriority. This abductive view of aposteriority is original and challenging. Unfortunately, it appears to have some serious shortcomings. The phenomenology of philosophical thought experiments seems to speak against it.
Natural kind terms don't have descriptive meanings, Devitt claims. The paper argues that this cla... more Natural kind terms don't have descriptive meanings, Devitt claims. The paper argues that this claim is tantamount to denying the existence of natural kind concepts, in the usual sense of “concept”, since concepts are predicate meanings. The denial is counterintuitive, and has bad epistemological consequences, since natural kind concepts are among the building blocks of our understanding of the world. The paper ends with a positive proposal, featuring a bold claim: if the standard Kripke-Putnam line on semantics of natural kind terms is correct, and if there are natural kind concepts, then propositions analyzing these concepts are not a priori knowable. Analyticity does not entail apriority.
I have argued, all too briefly, that Allison’s epistemic two-aspect reading of Kant leaves opened... more I have argued, all too briefly, that Allison’s epistemic two-aspect reading of Kant leaves opened the problem of a priori knowledge, central for Kant’s enterprise. The question was: can the transcendental idealism with its Copernican turn explain synthetic a priori? Can it do it better than its causal-contingent rivals, in particular a pre-established harmony view according to which some causal process, for instance evolution, harmonizes the structure of mind with the structure of the world? If we assume, with Kant, that paradigmatic cases of such knowledge, arithmetic and geometry, concern the structure of space and of temporal succession, and if we accept, with Allison, that space and time are mere epistemic conditions tied to the structure of our mind, then the objects of paradigmatic a priori knowledge—arithmetical and geometrical—are mind-dependent, distinct from ostensible objects of the relevant discourse, and the pieces of such knowledge themselves can be understood only in a completely subjectivized manner.
The paper honors Dunja Jutronić’s work by discussing her view of linguistic intuitions and intuit... more The paper honors Dunja Jutronić’s work by discussing her view of linguistic intuitions and intuitions in general. The “ordinarist” views (D. Jutronić, M. Devitt, and T. Williamson) deny that intuitions are special in any regard, and insist on holistic justification for them, of a unitary, either a posteriori or neutral variety. The paper proposes the sketch of an alternative, a pluralistic intuitionism-competentialism, according to which intuition is special, since intuitions are deliverances of competence, linguistic, spatial-geometrical, metaphysical, moral, and so on, the stance dubbed here” the Moderate Voice-of-Competence view”. It agrees with the ordinarists that intuitions are extroverted, turned to their referential domain, in contrast to the views of conceptualists. It also agrees about explanationism, and about the importance of scenarios and simulation in generating intuitions in contrast to pure logical reasoning. It disagrees with them in defending a pluralistic aposteriorism: intuitions are justified a priori in a prima facie and sometimes superficial way at the level of immediate acceptance, but mainly a posteriori on the higher, reflective level, needed for full-scale knowledge. Finally, the metaphysical pluralism of the proposed view comes to fore in distinguishing intuition-kinds, like moral and linguistic one’s whose object is (taken here to be) response-dependent, from those whose object is completely mind-independent.
The real treat for philosophers is Chapter six:: “Language: inside or outside the mind?” Collins ... more The real treat for philosophers is Chapter six:: “Language: inside or outside the mind?” Collins goes way beyond merely introducing the reader to the issues; he offers a succinct defense of his own view, which he presents as a faithful philosophical interpretation of Chomsky. Here is the main idea. Let us agree that there are external items, strings of symbols and the like, that are usually associated with language, and let us, following Chomsky’s lead, call them and them only, taxonomized in any way you like, E-languages. Consider now the structure of the innermost psychological competence that ultimately explains our speaking, hearing and understanding utterances, not as abstract mathematical entity, but as a mental configuration. Call it I-language. Collins raises the right question: how and where is language to be located? His answer is that language is inside the mind, and he is clear about it from the beginning of the book to its end. In the review I offer a brief sketch of an alternative.my own preference is for a more catholic approach, which would make space for both, E- and I-languages. I agree very much with Collin’s stress on the I-language. But I would keep the word “language” closer to the folk usage, philosophical tradition and the usage of most linguists who write Chomsky-inspired grammars of English, Italian, French, even Croatian. Let me use as the signal for this general sense the form G-language. Using it in this sense, I would say that a given E-language is a G-language because the minds properly equipped recognize it as a G-language; it is this response of properly equipped minds that is constitutive of G-language.
There is nothing wrong in reflectively justifying our logical beliefs and habits by methods of w... more There is nothing wrong in reflectively justifying our logical beliefs and habits by methods of wide reflective equilibrium, taking into account both their stunning empirical success, and the available empirical explanation(s) of cognizers having them and of their reliability. The three conceptualist considerations should be supplemented (and, some might argue, even replaced) by wide reflective equilibrium at the reflective level: first, the meaning-constitutive account moves in a too small circle of a very narrow reflective equilibrium, so there is a need to expand the circle, which would make the equilibrium wide. Second, the logic-external consideration of obviousness-cum-compellingness cries for explanation. And finally, the logic-external consideration of indispensability leads directly to empirical considerations having to do with success, actual or potential, of the cognitive enterprise(s) for which logic is so badly needed. And success is an indicator of reliability. In short, staying within the narrow conceptualist circle amounts to placing of a “veil of conception” between us and the logic- in-the world, blocking the understanding of what makes logic objectively valid. Thus, the very dialectics of the conceptualist program points to a less apriorist view of logical knowledge.
Chalmers’s proposal is built around the idea that our concepts and their intensions dictate a pri... more Chalmers’s proposal is built around the idea that our concepts and their intensions dictate a priori our rational reactions to empirical discoveries. In contrast, I argue that the kinematics of conceptual change can be rational without being a priori dictated by concepts that figure within it. I will argue for the following picture. Very naïve concepts offer a poor guidance to empirical inquiry, which needs more refined and mature ones. Such concepts are themselves products of a lot of streamlining, that takes place under the impact of empirical discoveries and empirical theory building. Conceptual truths incorporated into such concepts are often themselves empirically founded. Therefore, knowledge of such truths is to a significant extent aposteriori knowledge.
this is a review of
Szabo Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (Eds.): Conceivability and Possibility, O... more this is a review of Szabo Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (Eds.): Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press, 2002
The review came out of a presentation at the
conference Plato on Goodness and Justice that took ... more The review came out of a presentation at the conference Plato on Goodness and Justice that took place in Zagreb, 3-7 March 2004.
This is a discussion of Boghossian, P. (2008), Content and Justification,
Oxford University Pres... more This is a discussion of Boghossian, P. (2008), Content and Justification, Oxford University Press. conclusion: "Here is my concluding worry: unavoidable and indispensable tools provide entitlement/justification for projects if projects are themselves meaningful. However, we are justified to think that our most general cognitive project is meaningful, and justified partly of the basis of its up to date success; and this basis is a posteriori. Therefore, the whole reflective justification from compellingness and unavoidability is a posteriori. This suggests that the justification of our intuitional armchair beliefs and practices in general is plural and structured, with a priori and a posteriori elements combined in a complex way. It seems thus that a priori/ a posteriori distinction is useful and to the point. What is needed is refinement and respect for structure, not rejection of the distinction."
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations feature three big thought-experiments, The Builders,... more Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations feature three big thought-experiments, The Builders, the Rule-following argument, and the Private language argument. The experiments in question are macro-TEs, rare in theoretical philosophy, that feature a number of steps or stages. The paper distinguishes eight such stages and characterizes them briefly, offering an explicit understanding of the stages, their mutual relations and commonalities with other thought-experiments in philosophy. This is proposed as a step towards systematically placing Wittgenstein’s work in the wider context of actual philosophical methodology and of present-day sharp debates about armchair thinking in the field. One immediate result of comparing Wittgenstein’s TEs with their counterparts in the analytic mainstream reveals an interesting trait: they are merely suggestive, in the sense that the theses they point to are rarely put forward explicitly, and even more rarely argued for in the manner that is nowadays fashionable in the mainstream. The paper briefly points to the difference by using the examples of Kripke’s presentation of Rule following and the unorthodox reading of the Builders by Charles Travis, to illustrate the potential of the merely suggestive material for re-interpretation by a creative thinker.
The paper joins Horwich’s criticism of stipulationist accounts of a priori knowledge, and raises ... more The paper joins Horwich’s criticism of stipulationist accounts of a priori knowledge, and raises some problems for his own account of the a priori. It first questions the assumed separability of scientific investigation and non-scientific assertoric practices in regard to norms of adequacy. It also questioned Horwich’s Restriction Assumption according to which only the former are answerable to the standards of empirical adequacy and overall simplicity(which threaten apriority in the case of science). Finally, itcriticises his argument that inability to think otherwise might guarantee apriority, pointing to science-driven reflective revisability of possibly innate beliefs.
The first, critical part of the paper summarizes J. R. Brown’s Platonic view on thought experime... more The first, critical part of the paper summarizes J. R. Brown’s Platonic view on thought experiments (TEs) and raises several questions. One of them concerns the initial, particular judgments in a TE. Since they seem to precede the general insight, Brown’s Platonic intuition, and not to derive from it the question arises as to the nature of the initial particular judgment. The other question concerns the explanatory status of Brown’s epistemic Platonism. The second, constructive descriptive-explanatory part argues for an alternative, i.e. the view of TE as reasoning in or with a help of mental models, which can accommodate all the relevant data within a non-aprioristic framework (or, at worst, within a minimally “aprioristic”, nativist one). The last part turns to issues of justification and argues that the mental model proposal can account for justification of intuitional judgments and can also support the view of properly functioning intuition as an epistemic virtue, all within a more naturalist framework than the one endorsed by Brown.
Building upon Crane’s intentionalism, the paper proposes a variant of response-dependentist view... more Building upon Crane’s intentionalism, the paper proposes a variant of response-dependentist view of colors. To be of a color C is to have a disposition to cause in normal observers a response, namely, intentional phenomenal C-experience. The view is dubbed “response-intentionalism.” It follows from the following considerations, with red of a tomato surface taken as example of color C. Full phenomenal red is being visaged (intentionally experienced) as being on the surface of the tomato. Science tells us that full phenomenal red is not on the surface of the tomato. Equally, full phenomenal red is not a property of subjective state but its intentional object. Response-intentionalism follows by considerations of charity, i.e. minimizing and rationalizing the error of the cognizer, and of inference to the best explanation: being red in scientific sense is being such as to cause the response (intentionally) visaging phenomenal red in normal observers under normal circumstances.
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The paper claims that propositions analyzing empirical concepts are an interesting counterexample. It develops the following argument: Many such propositions have empirical counterparts that are expressed by the same form-of-words. (E.g. the form of words „Whales are mammals“ can express both an e-analytic proposition and an empirical statement.) They normally derive from their empirical counterparts.
Beliefs in such propositions, can be explicitly justified either a priori, by pointing out their conceptual, analytic status, or by reverting to their empirical counterparts. In contexts of very superficial evaluation, one may justify such an analytic belief in the first, conceptual way. In most contexts a belief in a proposition analyzing an empirical concept is being justified by appeal to its empirical counterparts. The empirical justification is normally taken as being ultimate. Empirical counterparts are derivationally deeper than the corresponding analytic propositions, and empirical justification is deeper than a priori one as well. Therefore, propositions analyzing empirical concepts are deeply a posteriori and superficially a priori.
This abductive view of aposteriority is original and challenging. Unfortunately, it appears to have some serious shortcomings. The phenomenology of philosophical thought experiments seems to speak against it.
In the review I offer a brief sketch of an alternative.my own preference is for a more catholic approach, which would make space for both, E- and I-languages. I agree very much with Collin’s stress on the I-language. But I would keep the word “language” closer to the folk usage, philosophical tradition and the usage of most linguists who write Chomsky-inspired grammars of English, Italian, French, even Croatian. Let me use as the signal for this general sense the form G-language. Using it in this sense, I would say that a given E-language is a G-language because the minds properly equipped recognize it as a G-language; it is this response of properly equipped minds that is constitutive of G-language.
of the cognitive enterprise(s) for which logic is so badly needed. And success is an indicator of reliability.
In short, staying within the narrow conceptualist
circle amounts to placing of a “veil of conception” between us and the logic-
in-the world, blocking the understanding of what makes logic objectively valid. Thus, the very dialectics of the conceptualist program points to a less apriorist view of logical knowledge.
Very naïve concepts offer a poor guidance to empirical inquiry, which needs more refined and mature ones. Such concepts are themselves products of a lot of streamlining, that takes place under the impact of empirical discoveries and empirical theory building. Conceptual truths incorporated into such concepts are often themselves empirically founded. Therefore, knowledge of such truths is to a significant extent aposteriori knowledge.
Szabo Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (Eds.): Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press, 2002
conference Plato on Goodness and Justice that took place in Zagreb, 3-7 March 2004.
Oxford University Press.
conclusion:
"Here is my concluding worry: unavoidable and indispensable tools provide entitlement/justification for projects if projects are themselves meaningful. However, we are justified to think that our most general cognitive project is meaningful, and justified partly of the basis of its up to date success; and this basis is a posteriori. Therefore, the whole reflective justification from compellingness and unavoidability is a posteriori. This suggests that the justification of our intuitional armchair beliefs and practices in general is plural and structured, with a priori and a posteriori elements combined in a complex way. It seems thus that a priori/ a posteriori distinction is useful and to the point. What is needed is refinement and respect for structure, not rejection of the distinction."
One immediate result of comparing Wittgenstein’s TEs with their counterparts in the analytic mainstream reveals an interesting trait: they are merely suggestive, in the sense that the theses they point to are rarely put forward explicitly, and even more rarely argued for in the manner that is nowadays fashionable in the mainstream. The paper briefly points to the difference by using the examples of Kripke’s presentation of Rule following and the unorthodox reading of the Builders by Charles Travis, to illustrate the potential of the merely suggestive material for re-interpretation by a creative thinker.
The paper claims that propositions analyzing empirical concepts are an interesting counterexample. It develops the following argument: Many such propositions have empirical counterparts that are expressed by the same form-of-words. (E.g. the form of words „Whales are mammals“ can express both an e-analytic proposition and an empirical statement.) They normally derive from their empirical counterparts.
Beliefs in such propositions, can be explicitly justified either a priori, by pointing out their conceptual, analytic status, or by reverting to their empirical counterparts. In contexts of very superficial evaluation, one may justify such an analytic belief in the first, conceptual way. In most contexts a belief in a proposition analyzing an empirical concept is being justified by appeal to its empirical counterparts. The empirical justification is normally taken as being ultimate. Empirical counterparts are derivationally deeper than the corresponding analytic propositions, and empirical justification is deeper than a priori one as well. Therefore, propositions analyzing empirical concepts are deeply a posteriori and superficially a priori.
This abductive view of aposteriority is original and challenging. Unfortunately, it appears to have some serious shortcomings. The phenomenology of philosophical thought experiments seems to speak against it.
In the review I offer a brief sketch of an alternative.my own preference is for a more catholic approach, which would make space for both, E- and I-languages. I agree very much with Collin’s stress on the I-language. But I would keep the word “language” closer to the folk usage, philosophical tradition and the usage of most linguists who write Chomsky-inspired grammars of English, Italian, French, even Croatian. Let me use as the signal for this general sense the form G-language. Using it in this sense, I would say that a given E-language is a G-language because the minds properly equipped recognize it as a G-language; it is this response of properly equipped minds that is constitutive of G-language.
of the cognitive enterprise(s) for which logic is so badly needed. And success is an indicator of reliability.
In short, staying within the narrow conceptualist
circle amounts to placing of a “veil of conception” between us and the logic-
in-the world, blocking the understanding of what makes logic objectively valid. Thus, the very dialectics of the conceptualist program points to a less apriorist view of logical knowledge.
Very naïve concepts offer a poor guidance to empirical inquiry, which needs more refined and mature ones. Such concepts are themselves products of a lot of streamlining, that takes place under the impact of empirical discoveries and empirical theory building. Conceptual truths incorporated into such concepts are often themselves empirically founded. Therefore, knowledge of such truths is to a significant extent aposteriori knowledge.
Szabo Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (Eds.): Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press, 2002
conference Plato on Goodness and Justice that took place in Zagreb, 3-7 March 2004.
Oxford University Press.
conclusion:
"Here is my concluding worry: unavoidable and indispensable tools provide entitlement/justification for projects if projects are themselves meaningful. However, we are justified to think that our most general cognitive project is meaningful, and justified partly of the basis of its up to date success; and this basis is a posteriori. Therefore, the whole reflective justification from compellingness and unavoidability is a posteriori. This suggests that the justification of our intuitional armchair beliefs and practices in general is plural and structured, with a priori and a posteriori elements combined in a complex way. It seems thus that a priori/ a posteriori distinction is useful and to the point. What is needed is refinement and respect for structure, not rejection of the distinction."
One immediate result of comparing Wittgenstein’s TEs with their counterparts in the analytic mainstream reveals an interesting trait: they are merely suggestive, in the sense that the theses they point to are rarely put forward explicitly, and even more rarely argued for in the manner that is nowadays fashionable in the mainstream. The paper briefly points to the difference by using the examples of Kripke’s presentation of Rule following and the unorthodox reading of the Builders by Charles Travis, to illustrate the potential of the merely suggestive material for re-interpretation by a creative thinker.