Journal of Experimental Psychology-learning Memory and Cognition, 2011
Verbal probability expressions are frequently used to communicate risk and uncertainty. The Inter... more Verbal probability expressions are frequently used to communicate risk and uncertainty. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for example, uses them to convey risks associated with climate change. Given the potential for human action to mitigate future environmental risks, it is important to understand how people respond to these expressions. In 3 studies employing a novel manipulation of event severity (so as to avoid any confound with event base rate), we demonstrated a systematic effect of event severity on the interpretation of verbal probability expressions. Challenging a previous finding in the literature, expressions referring to a severe event were interpreted as indicating a higher probability than those referring to a more neutral event. The finding was demonstrated in scenarios communicating risks relating to climate change (Studies 1 and 2) and replicated in scenarios involving nanotechnology and nuclear materials (Study 3). This is the first direct demonstration of an effect of outcome severity on the interpretation of verbal probability expressions, correcting a previous (potentially problematic) conclusion attributable to a flawed experimental design.
In a recent article in Argumentation, O’Keefe (Argumentation 21:151–163, 2007) observed that the ... more In a recent article in Argumentation, O’Keefe (Argumentation 21:151–163, 2007) observed that the well-known ‘framing effects’ in the social psychological literature on persuasion are akin to traditional fallacies of argumentation and reasoning and could be exploited for persuasive success in a way that conflicts with principles of responsible advocacy. Positively framed messages (“if you take aspirin, your heart will be more healthy”) differ in persuasive effect from negative frames (“if you do not take aspirin, your heart will be less healthy”), despite containing ‘equivalent’ content. This poses a potential problem, because people might be unduly (and unsuspectingly) influenced by mere presentational differences. By drawing on recent cognitive psychological work on framing effects in choice and decision making paradigms, however, we show that establishing whether two arguments are substantively equivalent—and hence, whether there is any normative requirement for them to be equally persuasive—is a difficult task. Even arguments that are logically equivalent may not be information equivalent. The normative implications of this for both speakers and listeners are discussed.
The slippery slope argument (SSA) is generally treated as a fallacy by both traditional and conte... more The slippery slope argument (SSA) is generally treated as a fallacy by both traditional and contemporary theories of argumentation, but is frequently used and widely accepted in applied reasoning domains. Experiment 1 tests the hypothesis that SSAs are not perceived as universally weak arguments. The results provide the first empirical demonstration that SSAs vary predictably in their subjective acceptability. Experiment
Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) have often been viewed as inherently weak arguments, to be classi... more Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) have often been viewed as inherently weak arguments, to be classified together with traditional fallacies of reasoning and argumentation such as circular arguments and arguments from ignorance. Over the last two decades several philosophers have taken a kinder view, often providing historical examples of the kind of gradual change on which slippery slope arguments rely. Against this background, Enoch (2001, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21(4), 629–647) presented a novel argument against SSA use that itself invokes a slippery slope. Specifically, he argued that the very reasons that can make SSAs strong arguments mean that we should be poor at abiding by the distinction between good and bad SSAs, making SSAs inherently undesirable. We argue that Enoch’s meta-level SSA fails on both conceptual and empirical grounds.
Journal of Experimental Psychology-learning Memory and Cognition, 2011
Verbal probability expressions are frequently used to communicate risk and uncertainty. The Inter... more Verbal probability expressions are frequently used to communicate risk and uncertainty. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for example, uses them to convey risks associated with climate change. Given the potential for human action to mitigate future environmental risks, it is important to understand how people respond to these expressions. In 3 studies employing a novel manipulation of event severity (so as to avoid any confound with event base rate), we demonstrated a systematic effect of event severity on the interpretation of verbal probability expressions. Challenging a previous finding in the literature, expressions referring to a severe event were interpreted as indicating a higher probability than those referring to a more neutral event. The finding was demonstrated in scenarios communicating risks relating to climate change (Studies 1 and 2) and replicated in scenarios involving nanotechnology and nuclear materials (Study 3). This is the first direct demonstration of an effect of outcome severity on the interpretation of verbal probability expressions, correcting a previous (potentially problematic) conclusion attributable to a flawed experimental design.
In a recent article in Argumentation, O’Keefe (Argumentation 21:151–163, 2007) observed that the ... more In a recent article in Argumentation, O’Keefe (Argumentation 21:151–163, 2007) observed that the well-known ‘framing effects’ in the social psychological literature on persuasion are akin to traditional fallacies of argumentation and reasoning and could be exploited for persuasive success in a way that conflicts with principles of responsible advocacy. Positively framed messages (“if you take aspirin, your heart will be more healthy”) differ in persuasive effect from negative frames (“if you do not take aspirin, your heart will be less healthy”), despite containing ‘equivalent’ content. This poses a potential problem, because people might be unduly (and unsuspectingly) influenced by mere presentational differences. By drawing on recent cognitive psychological work on framing effects in choice and decision making paradigms, however, we show that establishing whether two arguments are substantively equivalent—and hence, whether there is any normative requirement for them to be equally persuasive—is a difficult task. Even arguments that are logically equivalent may not be information equivalent. The normative implications of this for both speakers and listeners are discussed.
The slippery slope argument (SSA) is generally treated as a fallacy by both traditional and conte... more The slippery slope argument (SSA) is generally treated as a fallacy by both traditional and contemporary theories of argumentation, but is frequently used and widely accepted in applied reasoning domains. Experiment 1 tests the hypothesis that SSAs are not perceived as universally weak arguments. The results provide the first empirical demonstration that SSAs vary predictably in their subjective acceptability. Experiment
Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) have often been viewed as inherently weak arguments, to be classi... more Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) have often been viewed as inherently weak arguments, to be classified together with traditional fallacies of reasoning and argumentation such as circular arguments and arguments from ignorance. Over the last two decades several philosophers have taken a kinder view, often providing historical examples of the kind of gradual change on which slippery slope arguments rely. Against this background, Enoch (2001, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21(4), 629–647) presented a novel argument against SSA use that itself invokes a slippery slope. Specifically, he argued that the very reasons that can make SSAs strong arguments mean that we should be poor at abiding by the distinction between good and bad SSAs, making SSAs inherently undesirable. We argue that Enoch’s meta-level SSA fails on both conceptual and empirical grounds.
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